JOURNAL 



FEDERAL CONVENTION 



JAMES MADISON 



KEPRINTED FROM THE EDITION OF 184O, WHICH WAS PUBLISHED UNDER DIRECTION OF THE 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS. A COMPLETE 

INDEX SPECIALLY ADAPTED TO THIS EDITION IS ADDED 



EDITED BY 

E. H. SCOTT 



VOLUME I 



CHICAGO : 
SCOTT, FORESMAN AND CO. 

1398. 



&J 1 3 1 



Copyright, 189?, 
B< ALBERT, SCOTT & CO. 



TRESS OF 

THK HENRY O. SHETARD CO. 

CHICAGO, 



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>> 




PKEFACE. 



On the 15th November, 1836, Mrs. Madison addressed 
the following letter to the President of the United States: 
"Montpelier, November 15, 1836. 

"Sir: The will of my late husband, James Madison, 
contains the following provision: 

" ' Considering the peculiarity and magnitude of the 
occasion which produced the Convention at Philadelphia, 
in 1787, the characters who composed it, the Constitution 
which resulted from their deliberations, its effects during 
a trial of so many years on the prosperity of the people 
living under it, and the interest it has inspired among 
the friends of free government, it is not an unreasonable 
inference that a careful and extended report of the pro- 
ceedings and discussions of that body, which were with 
closed doors, by a member who was constant in his at- 
tendance, will be particularly gratifying to the people of 
the United States, and to all who take an interest in the 
progress of political science and the cause of true liberty. 

" This provision bears evidence of the value he set on 
his Report of the Debates in the Convention, and he 
has charged legacies on them alone to the amount of 
twelve hundred dollars for the benefit of literary institu- 
tions and for benevolent purposes, leaving the residuary 
net proceeds for the use of his widow." 

The President's message in relation to the purchase 
of the Madison Papers contains the following: "Con- 



4 PREFACE. 

gress has already, at considerable expense, published in 
a variety of forms, the naked journals of the Revolutionary 
Congress, and of the Convention that formed the Consti- 
tution of the United States. I am persuaded that the 
work of Mr. Madison, considering the author, the subject 
matter of it, and the circumstances under which it was 
prepared — long withheld from the public, as it has been, 
by those motives of personal kindness and delicacy that 
gave tone to his intercourse with his fellow -men, until he 
and all who had been participators with him in the scenes 
he describes have passed away — well deserves to become 
the property of the nation, and cannot fail, if published 
and disseminated at the public charge, to confer the most 
important of all benefits on the present and succeeding 
generations, accurate knowledge of the principles of their 
Government, and the circumstances under which they 
were recommended and embodied in the constitution, for 
adopti Andrew Jackson." 

The message of the President was referred to the 
Joint Library Committee, who, on the 24th January, 1837, 
reported a resolution authorizing that committee " to 
contract for and purchase, at the sum of thirty thousand 
dollars, the manuscripts of the late Mr. Madison, conced- 
ing to Mrs. Madison the right to use copies of the 
said manuscripts in foreign countries, as she might think 

On the 9th July the House of Representatives, 
after having had under consideration the resolution of 
the Senate, amended it by changing it into an act, in 
which form, it was passed, and being concurred in by the 
Senate and approved by the President on the same day, 
became a law in the following terms: 



PREFACE. 5 

" An act authorizing the printing of the Madison Papers. 

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 
tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
That the Joint Committee on the Library be authorized 
to cause the Madison Papers to be printed and published ; 
and that a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars be 
appropriated for that purpose out of any money in the 
Treasury not otherwise appropriated." 

On the 28th January, 1839, Mr. Wall of New Jersey, 
reported to the Senate, a contract made in pursuance of 
the act of Congress, by Messrs. Bobbins of Ehode Island, 
and Pope of Kentucky, the Chairmen of the Joint Library 
Committee for the publication of the work in its present 
form, to be executed under the superintendance of Mr. 
Gilpin, the Solicitor of the Treasury. For this purpose, 
one of the duplicate manuscript copies, deposited by Mrs. 
Madison, was withdrawn by the Library Committee from 
the Department of State, and delivered to the pursuers. 

In the publication thus directed it has been deemed 
to be a primary and indispensable duty to follow the 
manuscript with scrupulous care. It was not thought 
proper to admit any note or comment, even explanatory; 
and all those that are found, were in the manuscript de- 
posited in the Department of State. No alteration of 
any sort from the copy furnished and revised by Mrs. 
Madison, has been permitted, except the correction of a 
few slight and evident clerical errors, and the inser- 
tion of some dates and formal parts of official documents, 
for which blanks had been left. 



CONTENTS. 



DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL, CONVENTION, FROM 
MONDAY, MAY 14th, 1787, TO MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 

17th, 1787. 

Introduction, 29 

Confederacies — Meeting of Colonial Deputies at Albany, in 1754 — 
Congress of 1774 — Declaration of Independence — Articles of Con- 
federation — Difficulties arising from the public lands, and duties 
on foreign commerce — Want of a permanent revenue — Resolution 
of Virginia for a Convention — Meeting of the Convention at An- 
napolis, in 1786 — Recommends Federal Convention — Proceedings 
of Virginia and other States — Previous suggestions for a Conven- 
tion by Pelatiah Webster, General Schuyler, Alexander Hamilton, 
Richard H. Lee, and Noah Webster — Defects to be provided for 
by a Constitution — Mr. Madison's sketch — Meeting of Federal 
Convention in 1787 — Manner in which the Reports of the Debates 
were taken. 

Friday, May 25th, 53 

Organization of Convention — General Washington chosen Presi- 
dent, and Major Jackson Secretary — Delaware credentials — Com- 
mittee on Rules. 

Monday, May 28th, 55 

Rules reported — No yeas and nays required — Vote by States— Let- 
ter from Rhode Island. 

Tuesday, May 29th, 58 

Additional rules — Keeping of minutes — Convention goes into Com- 
mittee of the Whole— Mr. Randolph submits fifteen propositions — 
His remarks— Propositions stated— Mr. Charles Pinckney submits 
a plan of a Constitution — Plan stated. 

Wednesday, May 30th, 72 

Mr. Randolph's first proposition withdrawn, and a substitute offer- 
ed — The proposed government to be National, and to consist of a 
Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. 

Mr. Randolph's second proposition — The right of suffrage in the 
National Legislature, to be proportioned to the quotas of contribu- 
tion, or the number of free inhabitants as is best in different cases 
— Postponed. 



b CONTENTS. 

Thursday, May 31st, • 78 

Mr. Randolph's third proposition— The National Legislature to 
have two branches — Agreed to. 

Mr. Randolph's fourth proposition — First branch of the National 
Legislature to be elected by the people — Agreed to — Qualifications 
&c. of members of first branch — Postponed. 

Mr. Randolph's fifth proposition — Second branch of the National 
Legislature to be chosen by the first branch, from nominations by 
State Legislatures — Disagreed to — Qualifications of members of 
second branch — Not considered. 

Mr. Randolph's sixth Proposition — Powers of the National Leg- 
islature — Each branch to originate laws — Agreed to — National 
Legislature to possess all the legislative powers of the Congress 
of the Confederation, to pass laws where State Legislatures are 
incompetent; or where necessary to preserve harmony among the 
States, and to negative State laws contravening the articles of 
union or foreign treaties — Agreed to — The National Legislature 
authorized to exert the force of the whole against a delinquent 
State — Postponed 

Friday, June 1st, . . . . . ... 84- 

Mr. Randolph's seventh proposition — The National Executive to 
possess the Executive powers of the Congress of the Confedera- 
tion — Amended, to possess power to execute the National laws, 
and appoint to offices not otherwise provided for — Amendment 

agreed to — To be chosen for a term of years — Amended, for 

seven years — Amendment agreed to — To be chosen by the National 
Legislature — Postponed 

Saturday, June 2d, 89 

Mr. Randolph's sevent h proposition — The National Executive to 
be chosen by the National Legislature, resumed — Agreed to — To 
receive fixed compensation — Amended, to receive no salary, but ex 
penses to be defrayed — Amendment postponed — To be ineligible a 
second time — Amended, to be removable on impeachment — Clause 
and amendment agreed to — To consist of persons — Postponed. 

Monday, .Tine 4th, 99 

Mr. Randolph's seventh proposition — The National Executive to 

consist of persons, resumed — Amended, a single person — 

Agreed to. 

Mr. Randolph's eighth proposition — A Council of Revision, to 
consist of the National Executive, and a convenient number of the 
National Judiciary, to have a negative on acts of National Legisla- 
ture unless again passed by — Members of each branch — Amended, 
to give the National Executive alone that power, unless overruled 
by two-thirds of each branch of the National Legislature — Amend- 
ment agreed to. 

Mr. Randolph's ninth proposition — The National Judiciary to be 



CONTENTS. 9* 

established — Agreed to — To consist of one or more supreme tri- 
bunals and of inferior tribunals — Amended to consist of one supreme 
tribunal and of inferior tribunals — Amendment agreed to. 

Tuesday, June 5th, . .... 108 

Mr. Randolph's ninth proposition — The National Judiciary to be 
chosen by the National Legislature — Disagreed to — To hold office 
during good behaviour and to receive fixed compensation — Agreed 
to — To have jurisdiction over offences at sea, captures, cases of 
foreigners and citizens of different States, of National revenue, im- 
peachments of National officers, and questions of National peace 
and harmony — Postponed. 

Mr. Randolph's tenth proposition — New States to be admitted — 
Agreed to. 

Mr. Randolph's eleventh proposition — Republican government 
and its territory, except in case of voluntary junction, to be guar- 
anteed to each State — Postponed. 

Mr. Randolph's twelfth proposition — The Congress of the Con- 
federation to continue till a given day, and its engagements to be 
fulfilled — Agreed to. 

Mr. Randolph's thirteenth proposition — Provision to be made for 
amendments of the Constitution, without the assent of the Na- 
tional Legislature — Postponed. 

Mr. Randolph's fourteenth proposition — National and State offi- 
cers to take an oath to support the National Government — Post- 
poned. 

Mr. Randolph's fifteenth proposition — The Constitution to be 
ratified by Conventions of the people of the States recommended 
by the State Legislatures — Postponed. 

Motion to strike out "inferior tribunals" in the ninth proposi- 
tion — Agreed to. 

Motion to amend the ninth proposition, so as to empower the 
National Legislature to institute inferior tribunals — Agreed to. 

Wednesday, June 6th, . . . . . .115 

Motion to amend fourth proposition so as to provide that the first 
branch of the National Legislature be elected by the State Legis- 
latures — Disagreed to. 

Motion to reconsider the vote on the eighth proposition, so as to 
unite a convenient number of the National Judiciary with the Na- 
tional Executive in the revision of the acts of the National Legis- 
lature — Disagreed to. 

Thursday, June 7th, 124 

Motions to supply the blank occasioned by the disagreement to 
Mr. Randolph's fifth proposition relative to the mode of choosing 
the second branch of the National Legislature — To be elected by 
the people divided into large districts — Disagreed to — To be ap- 
pointed by the National Executive out of nominations by the State 



10 CONTENTS. 

Legislatures— Disagreed to — To be chosen by the State Legisla- 
tures—Agreed to. 

Friday, June 8th, .131 

Motion, on a reconsideration of that part of the sixth proposition 
which gives the National Legislature power to negative State laws 
contravening the articles of union, or foreign treaties, to extend the 
power so as to authorize the National Legislature to negative all 
laws which they should judge to be improper— Disagreed to. 

Saturday, June 9th, 136 

Motion, on a reconsideration of that part of the seventh proposition 
which declares that the National Executive shall be chosen by the 
National Legislature, to substitute therefor that the National Exec- 
utive be elected by the Executives of the States, their proportion 
of votes to be the same as in electing the second branch of the 
National Legislature — Disagreed to. 

Monday, June 11th, 142 

Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's second proposition, as to the 
right of suffrage in the National Legislature, which had been post- 
poned — Agreed to — Motion to substitute therefor that the right of 
suffrage in the National Legislature ought not to be according to 
the rule in the Articles of Confederation, (an equality, each State 
having one vote therein,) but according to some equitable ratio of 
representation — Agreed to — Motion that this equitable ratio of rep- 
resentation should be according to the quotas of contribution — 
Postponed — Motion that this equitable ratio of representation 
should be in proportion to the number of free citizens and inhabit- 
ants, and three-fifths of other persons in each State — Agreed to — 
Motion that there should be an equality of suffrage in the second 
branch of the National Legislature, each State to have one vote 
therein — Disagreed to — Motion that the right of suffrage should 
be the same in each branch — Agreed to. 

Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's eleventh proposition, guaran- 
teeing republican government and its territory to each State, which 
had been postponed — Agreed to — Motion to amend it, so as to 
guarantee to each State a republican Constitution, and its existing 
laws — Agreed to. 

Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's thirteenth proposition, provid- 
ing for amendments to the Constitution, which had been post- 
poned, agreed to — Motion that provision for amendments ought to 
be made — Agreed to — That the assent of the National Legislature 
ought not to be required — Postponed. 

Motion to consider Mr. Randolph's fourteenth proposition, requir- 
ing oaths of National and State officers to observe the National 
Constitution, which had been postponed — Agreed to — Motion to 
strike out the part requiring oaths of State officers — Disagreed 
to — Proposition agreed to. 



CONTENTS. 11 

Tuesday, June 12th, 150 

Mr. Randolph's fifteenth proposition relative to ratification of the 
Constitution by State Conventions considered and agreed to. 

Motion to consider that part of Mr. Randolph's fourth proposi- 
tion relative to the qualifications of the members of the first branch, 
which had been postponed — Agreed to — Motion that the members 
of the first branch shall be elected every three years — Agreed to — 

Shall be of years of age— Disagreed to— Shall be allowed a 

fixed compensation, to be paid out of the National Treasury — 
Agreed to — Shall be ineligible to State or National offices during 
their term of service, or for one year after — Agreed to — Shall be 

incapable of re-election for years after, and subject to recall — 

Disagreed to. 

The part of Mr. Randolph's fifth proposition relative to qualifi- 
cations of the members of the second branch, considered — Motion 
that the members of the second branch shall be of the age of 
thirty years — Agreed to — Shall hold their offices for the term of 
seven years — Agreed to — Shall be entitled to no compensation — 
Disagreed to — Shall be subject to the same qualifications as to 
compensation and ineligibility as the members of the first branch — 
Agreed to. 

Wednesday, June 13th, 157 

The part of Mr. Randolph's ninth proposition relative to the juris- 
diction of the National Judiciary was struck out —Motion that 
National Judiciary shall have jurisdiction in cases of national rev- 
enue, impeachments of national officers and questions of national 
peace and harmony — Agreed to — Motion that the judges of the 
supreme tribunal be appointed by the second branch (Senate) of 
National Legislature — Agreed to. 

Motion to amend that part of the sixth proposition which em- 
powers each branch to originate acts by restraining the second 
(senatorial) branch from originating money bills — Disagreed to. 

State of the resolutions (nineteen in number) as adopted by the 
Committee of the Whole; and founded on Mr. Randolph's fifteen 
propositions. 

Friday, June 15th, 163 

Mr. Patterson submits nine propositions to be substituted for those 
of Mr. Randolph — Propositions stated. 

Saturday, June 16th, . . . . . .167 

Mr. Patterson's first proposition — The Articles of Confederation 
to be revised and enlarged — Adjourned. 

Monday, June 18th, 175 

Mr. Patterson's first proposition — The Articles of Confederation 
to be revised and enlarged, resumed — Motion to amend so as to 



V 



12 CONTENTS. 

provide for an adequate government of the United States — Post- 
poned. 

Mr. Hamilton submits eleven propositions as amendments which 
he should probably offer to those of Mr. Randolph — Read but not 
moved. 

Tuesday, June 19th, 187 

Motion to amend Mr. Patterson's first proposition 60 as to provide 
for an adequate government of the United States, resumed — Dis- 
agreed to — Motion to postpone Mr. Patterson's first proposition — 
Agreed to. 

Motion for the Committee of the Whole to rise and report the 
nineteen resolutions founded on Mr. Randolph's propositions as 
amended and adopted in committee — Agreed to. 

First resolution establishing a National Government to consist 
of a Legislative, Executive and Judiciary, considered by the Con- 
vention. 

Wednesday, June 20th, 199 

First resolution, establishing a National Government, resumed — 
Motion to amend so as to establish a government of the United 
States — Agreed to. 

Second resolution that the National Legislature consist of two 
branches — Motion to amend by striking out National — Agreed to — 
Motion to amend by declaring that legislation be vested in the 
United States in Congress — Disagreed to. 

Thursday, June 21st, 209 

Second resolution, that the Legislature consist of two branches? 
resumed — Agreed to. 

Third resolution, fixing election, term, qualifications. <fcc. of the 
first branch of the Legislature — Motion to amend so as to provide 
that the election of the first branch be, as the State Legislatures, 
direct — Disagreed to — Motion to amend so as to provide that the 
term of the first branch be for two years — Agreed to. 

Friday, June 22d, 217 

Third resolution fixing election, term, qualifications, &c. of the 
iirst branch, resumed — Motion to amend so as to provide that the 
compensation of members of the first branch shall be fixed by the 
National Legislature — Disagreed to — Motion to amend, by striking 
.out its payment from the National Treasury — Disagreed to — 
Motion to amend so as to provide that the compensation shall be 
fixed— Agreed to — Motion to amend so as to provide that the 
members of the first branch shall be twenty-five years of age- 
Agreed to — Motion to amend by striking out the ineligibility of 
members of the first branch Disagreed to. 



CONTENTS. 13 

Saturday, June 23d, 223 

Third resolution for fixing the qualifications, &c. of the first branch, 
resumed — Motion to amend by striking out the ineligibility of the 
members to State offices — Agreed to — Motion to amend by confin- 
ing their ineligibility to such National offices as had been estab- 
lished, or their emoluments increased while they were members — 
Disagreed to — Motion to confine their ineligibility to National 
offices, during one year after their term of service is expired— 
Agreed to. 

Monday, June 25th, ....... 228 

Fourth resolution, fixing election, term, qualifications, &c. of the 
second branch of the Legislature — Motions to amend the clause 
relating to their term of office by making it six or five years — Dis- 
agreed to. 

Tuesday, June 26th, . . . . . . 241 

Fourth resolution relative to the term of the second branch of the 
Legislature, resumed — Motion to amend so as to make their term 
nine years, one third to go out every third year — Disagreed to — To 
make their term six years, one third to go out every second year — 
Agreed to — Motion to amend by striking out their compensation — 
Disagreed to — Motion to amend so as to provide that their com- 
pensation be paid by the States — Disagreed to — Motion to provide 
that their compensation be paid out of the National Treasury — 
Disagreed to— Motion to amend by striking out the ineligibility of 
the members to State offices — Agreed to — Motion to confine their 
ineligibility to National offices during one year after their term of 
service is expired. 

Wednesday, June 27th, . . . . . . 250 

Fifth resolution authorizing each branch to originate acts — 
Agreed to. 

Sixth resolution defining the powers of the Legislature — Post- 
poned. 

Seventh resolution fixing the right of suffrage in the first branch 
of the Legislature, considered. 

Thursday, June 28th, . . . . . . 252 

Seventh resolution, fixing the right of suffrage in the first branch, 
resumed — Motion to amend so as to provide that the right of suf- 
frage in the first branch should be the same as in the Articles of 
the Confederation, (an equality, each State having one vote there- 
in) — Postponed. 

Friday, June 29th, . 261 

Amendment proposed to the seventh resolution, so as to give each 
State an equal suffrage in the first branch, resumed — Disagreed to 
— Remaining clauses of seventh resolution postponed. 



14 CONTENTS. 

Eighth resolution, fixing the same right of suffrage in the second 
branch of the Legislature as in the first — Motion to amend so as 
to provide that each State should have an equal suffrage in the 
second branch — Adjourned. 

Saturday, June 30th, 270 

Amendment proposed to the eighth resolution, so as to give each 
State an equal suffrage in the second branch, resumed — Proposi- 
tion to amend so as to provide that each State should send an 
equal number of members to the second branch; that in all ques- 
tions of State sovereignty and of appointments to office, each State 
shall have an equal suffrage, and that in fixing salaries and appro- 
priations, each State shall vote in proportion to its contributions to 
the Treasury — Not moved. 

Monday, July 2d, 284 

Amendment proposed to the eighth resolution, so as to give each 
State an equal suffrage in the second branch, resumed — Disa- 
greed to. 

Motion to refer the clauses of the seventh and eighth resolutions, 
relating to the suffrages of both branches of the Legislature, to a 
Committee — Agreed to. 

Thursday, July 5th, 290 

Report of Committee to amend the seventh resolution so as to pro- 
vide that the proportion of suffrage of each State in the first 
branch, shall be one member for every forty thousand inhabitants 
of the description mentioned in that resolution, that each State 
shall have one member in the first branch; that all bills for raising 
or appropriating money shall originate in the first branch, and 
not be altered in the second; and that no payments shall be made 
from the treasury except on appropriations by law. 

Report to amend the eighth resolution so as to provide that each 
State shall have an equal suffrage in the second branch. 

Friday, July 6th, 299 

Clause of the report on the seventh resolution, providing that the 
proportion of suffrage of each State in the first branch, should be 
one member for every forty thousand inhabitants, resumed — Re- 
ferred to a Committee — Clause of the report on the seventh reso- 
lution providing that all money bills shall originate in the first 
branch, resumed — Agreed to. 

Saturday, July 7th,. . . ... 307 

Report on the eighth resolution, providing that each State shall 
have an equal suffrage in the second branch, resumed — Agreed to. 

Monday, July 9th, 311 

Report of the Committee, to amend the clause of the seventh res- 
olution, relative to the proportion of suffrage in the first branch, by 



CONTENTS. 15 

fixing at present the whole number therein at forty-six, and appor- 
tioning them in a certain ratio among the States, considered — Re- 
ferred to another Committee. 

Report of the Committee, providing that the future number of 
members of the first branch may be altered from time to time and 
fixed by the Legislature, on the principles of the wealth and num- 
bers of inhabitants of each State — Agreed to. 

Tuesday, July 10th, 315 

Report of the Committee on the seventh resolution, providing that 
at present the whole number of members in the first branch shall 
be sixty-five and apportioning them in a certain ratio among the 

States — Agreed to — Motion that a census be taken every 

years, and the representation in the first branch be arranged by the 
Legislature accordingly — Adjourned. 

Wednesday, July 11th, ...... 321 

Amendment to the seventh resolution, requiring the future repre- 
sentation to be arranged by the Legislature according to a periodi- 
cal census, resumed— Motion to amend it by requiring the Legis- 
lature to arrange the representation according to a census of the 
. free inhabitants, taken at least every fifteen years — Agreed to — 
Motion farther to amend by requiring the census to include three 
fifths of the negroes — Disagreed to. 

Thursday, July 12th, . . . . . . 333 

Seventh resolution, relative to the proportion of suffrage in the first 
branch, resumed — Motion to provide that representation and di- 
rect taxation shall be in the same proportion — Agreed to — Motion 
to provide that for the future arrangement of representation, a 
census shall be taken within six years, and within every ten years 
afterwards, and that it shall be made according to the whole num- 
ber of inhabitants, rating the blacks at three fifths of their 
number — Agreed to. 

Friday, July 13th, ....... 339 

Seventh resolution, relative to the proportion of suffrage in the first 
branch, resumed — Motion to provide that until the first census be 
taken, the proportion of the representatives from the States in the 
first branch, and the moneys raised from them by direct taxation 
shall be the same — Agreed to — Motion to strike out the amend- 
ment heretofore made for regulating future representation on the 
principle of wealth — Agreed to. 

Saturday, July 14th, 345 

Seventh resolution, relative to the proportion of suffrage in the first 
branch, resumed — Motion that the number of representatives in 
the first branch from new States, shall never exceed those of the 
present States — Disagreed to. 
Eighth resolution, relative to the proportion of suffrage in the 



16 CONTENTS. 

second branch, resumed — -Motion to provide that the second branch 
shall consist of thirty-six members, distributed among the States 
in certain proportions — - Disagreed to. 

Monday, July 16th, ....... 355 

Seventh and eighth resolutions as amended, and fixing the suffrage 
in both branches, resumed — Agreed to. 
Sixth resolution, defining the powers of the Legislature, resumed 

— Motion to amend by giving a specification of the powers not 
comprised in general terms — Disagreed to. 

Tuesday, July 17th, 360 

Sixth resolution, defining the powers of the Legislature, resumed — 
Motion to amend, so as to provide that the National Legislature 
should not interfere with the governments of the States in matters 
of internal police, in which the general welfare of the United 
States is not concerned — Disagreed to — Motion to amend so as to 
extend the power of the Legislature to cases affecting the general 
interests of the Union — Ag/eed to — Motion to agree to the power 
of negativing State laws — Disagreed to — Motion to provide that 
the acts of the Legislature, and treaties made in pursuance of the 
Constitution, shall bind the several States — Agreed to. 

Ninth resolution, relative to National Executive — Motion to 
amend so as to provide that the Executive be chosen by the people 

— Disagreed to — That he be chosen by Electors appointed by the 
State Legislatures — Disagreed to — Motion to amend by striking 
out the provision that the Executive is to be ineligible a second 
time — Agreed to — Motion to amend so as to provide that the 
term of the Executive should be during good behaviour — Disa- 
greed to — Motion to amend by striking out seven years as the Ex- 
ecutive term — Disagreed to. 

Wednesday, July 18th, ...... 373 

Tenth resolution, giving the Executive a negative on acts of the 
Legislature not afterwards passed by two -thirds — -Agreed to. 

Eleventh resolution, relative to the Judiciary — Motion to amend 

so as to provide that the supreme judges be appointed by the Ex- 

- ecutive — Disagreed to — That they be nominated and appointed by 

the Executive, with the consent of two-thirds of the second branch 

— Disagreed to — Motion to amend so as to provide that their com- 
pensation shall not be diminished while in office — Agreed to. 

Twelfth resolution, relative to the establishment of inferior Na- 
tional tribunals, by the Legislature — Agreed to. 

Thirteenth resolution, relative to the powers of the National Ju- 
diciary — Motion to amend by striking out their power in regard to 
impeachment of National officers — Agreed to — Motion to amend 
so as to provide that their power shall extend to all cases arising 
under the National laws, or involving the National peace and har- 
mony — Agreed 



CONTENTS. 1? 

Fourteenth resolution, providing for the admission of new States 
— Agreed to. 

Fifteenth resolution, providing for the continuance of the Con- 
gress of the Confederation and the completion of its engagements 

— Disagreed to. 

Sixteenth resolution, guaranteeing a republican government and 
their existing laws to the States — Motion to amend so as to pro- 
vide that a republican form of government, and protection against 
foreign and domestic violence, be guaranteed to each State — 
Agreed to. 

Thursday, July 19th, 382 

Ninth resolution, relative to the National Executive, resumed — ■ 
Motion to amend so as to provide that the Executive be chosen by- 
Electors chosen by the State Legislatures — Agreed to — Motion to 
amend so as to provide that the Executive shall be ineligible a 
second time — Disagreed to — Motion to amend by making the Ex- 
ecutive term six years — Agreed to. 

Friday, July 20th, . . . . . . . 391 

Ninth resolution, relative to the National Executive, resumed — Mo- 
tion to provide that the number of Electors of the Executive to be 
chosen by the State Legislatures shall be regulated by their re- 
spective numbers of representatives in the first branch, and that 
at present it shall be in a prescribed ratio — Agreed to — Motion to 
amend by striking out the provision for impeaching the Executive 

— Disagreed to — Motion to provide that the Electors of the Execu- 
tive shall not be members of the National Legislature, nor National 
officers, nor eligible to the supreme magistracy — Agreed to. 

Saturday, July 21st, . . . » . . . 398 
Ninth resolution, relative to National Executive, resumed — Motion 
to provide for the payment of the Electors of the Executive out of 
the National Treasury — Agreed to. 

Tenth resolution, relative to the negative of the Executive on the 
Legislature, resumed — Motion to amend by providing that the 
Supreme Judiciary be associated in this power — Disagreed to. 

Eleventh resolution, relative to Judiciary, resumed — Motion to 
provide that the Judges be nominated by the Executive, and ap- 
pointed, unless two-thirds of the second branch disagree thereto — 
Disagreed to. 

Monday, July 23d, . . . . . * .409 
Seventeenth resolution, providing for future amendments — Agreed 
to. 

Eighteenth resolution, requiring the oath of State officers to sup- 
port the Constitution — Agreed to. 

Nineteenth resolution, requiring the ratification of the Constitu- 
tion by State Conventions — Motion to amend by providing for its 
2 






18 CONTENTS. 

reference to the State Legislatures — Disagreed to — Motion to a 
second Federal Convention — Not seconded. 

The eighth resolution, relative to the suffrage in the second 
branch, resumed — Motion to amend so as to provide that the rep- 
resentation consist of two members from each State, who shall 
vote per capita — Agreed to. 

Tuesday, July 24th, 419 

Ninth resolution, relative to the National Executive, resumed — Mo- 
tion to amend so as to provide that he be appointed by the National 
Legislature, and not by Electors chosen by the State Legislatures — 
Agreed to — Motion to amend so as to provide that the Executive 
be chosen by Electors taken by lot from the National Legislature 

— Postponed. 

The resolutions as amended and adopted, together with the 
propositions submitted by Mr. Patterson, and the plan proposed by 
Mr. C. Pinckney, referred to a Committee of Detail, to report a 
Constitution conformable to the resolutions. 

Wednesday, July 25th, ...... 427 

Ninth resolution, relative to the National Executive, resumed — 
Motion to appoint the Executive by Electors appointed by State 
Legislatures, where the actual Executive is re-eligible — Disagreed 
to — Motion to appoint the Executive by the Governors of States 
and their Councils — Not passed — Motion that no person be eligible 
to the Executive for more than six years in twelve — Disagreed to 

— Motion to authorize copies to be taken of the resolutions as 
adopted — Disagreed to. 

Thursday, July 26th, 434 

The ninth resolution, relative to the National Executive, resumed 

— Motion that the Executive be for seven years, and not re-eligible 

— Agreed to. 

The third and fourth resolutions, relative to the qualifications 
of the members of the Legislature, resumed — Motion to require 
property and citizenship — Agreed to — Motion to exclude persons 
indebted to the United States — Disagreed to. 

Statement of the resolutions as amended agreed to, and referred 
to the Committee of Detail. 

Plan of a Federal Constitution, offered by Mr. Charles Pinckney 
on the 29th May, referred to the Committee of Detail. 

Propositions offered by Mr. Patterson on the 15th June, referred 
to the Committee of Detail. 

Monday, August 6th, ...... 449 

Report of Committee of Detail. 

Draught of a Constitution, as reported by the Committee. 



CONTENTS. 19 

Tuesday, August 7th, ...... 462 

The Constitution as reported by the Committee of Detail, con- 
sidered. 

The preamble, article first, designating the style of the govern- 
ment ; and article second, dividing into a Supreme Legislative, Ex- 
ecutive, and Judiciary, agreed to. 

Article third, dividing the Legislature into two distinct bodies, 
a House of Representatives, and Senate, with a mutual negative in 
all cases, and to meet on a fixed day — Motion to confine the nega- 
tive to Legislative acts — Disagreed to — Motion to strike out the 
clauses giving a mutual negative — Agreed to — Motion to add that 
a different day of meeting may be appointed by law — Agreed to — 
Motion to give the Executive an absolute negative on the Legisla- 
ture — Disagreed to. 

Article fourth, relative to the House of Representatives — Motion 
to confine the rights of Electors to freeholders — Disagreed to. 

Wednesday, August 8th, ...... 472 

Article fourth, relative to the House of Representatives, resumed 
— Motion to require seven years citizenship in members — Agreed 
to — Motion to require the members to be inhabitants of the States 
they represent — Agreed to — Motion to require the inhabitancy for 
a specified period — Disagreed to — Motion to require that after a 
census the number of members shall be proportioned to direct tax- 
ation — Agreed to — Motion to fix the ratio of representation by the 
number of free inhabitants — Disagreed to — Motion to give every 
State one representative at least — Agreed to — Motion to strike out 
the exclusive power over money bills — Agreed to. 

Thursday, August 9th, ...... 482 

Article fourth, relative to the House of Representatives, resumed — 
Agreed to as amended. 

Article fifth, relative to the Senate — Motion to strike out the 
right of State Executives to supply vacancies — Disagreed to — Mo- 
tion to supply vacancies by the State Legislatures, or by the Ex- 
ecutive till its next meeting — Agreed to — Motion to postpone the 
clauses giving each member one vote — Disagreed to — Motion to 
require fourteen years citizenship in Senators — Disagreed to — 
Motion to require nine years citizenship in Senators — Agreed to — 
Motion to require Senators to be inhabitants of the States they rep- 
resent — Agreed to. 

Article sixth, relative to the elections, qualifications, and pro- 
ceedings of the Legislature — Motion to strike out the right of the 
Legislature to alter the provisions concerning the election of its 
members — Disagreed to. 

Friday, August 10th, . ..... 493 

Article sixth, relative to the elections, qualifications, and proceed- 
ings of the Legislature, resumed — Motion to require the Executive, 



20 CONTENTS. 

Judiciary and Legislature, to possess a certain amount of property 

— Disagreed to — Motion to strike out the right of the Legislature 
>- to establish a qualification of its members — Agreed to — Motion to 

reduce a quorum of each House below a majority — Disagreed to — 
Motion to authorize the compulsory attendance of members — 
Agreed to — Motion to require a vote of two-thirds to expel a mem- 
ber — Agreed to — Motion to allow a single member to call the yeas 
and nays — Disagreed to — Motion to allow Senators to enter their 
dissent on the journals — Disagreed to — Motion to strike out the 
clause which confines the keeping and publication of the journal 
of the Senate to its Legislative business — Agreed to. 

Saturday, August 11th, ...... 502 

Article sixth, relative to the elections, qualifications, and proceed- 
ings of the Legislature, resumed — Motion to except from publica- 
tion of such parts of the Senate journal, not Legislative, as it may 
judge to require secrecy — Disagreed to — Motion to except from 
publication such parts of the Senate journal as relate to treaties 
and military operations — Disagreed to — Motion to omit the publi- 
cation of such parts of the journals as either House may judge to 
require secrecy — Agreed to. 

Monday, August 13th, ...... 506 

Article fourth, relative to the House of Representatives, resumed 

— Motion to require only citizenship and inhabitancy in members 

— Disagreed to — Motion to require nine years' citizenship — Disa- 
greed to — Motion to require four and five years' citizenship instead 
of seven — Disagreed to — Motion to provide that the seven years' 
citizenship should not affect the rights of persons now citizens — 
Disagreed to. 

Article fifth, relative to the Senate, resumed — Motion to require 

seven years' citizenship in Senators instead of nine — Disagreed to. 

Article fourth, relative to the House of Representatives, resumed 

— Motion to restore the clause relative to money bills — Disa- 
greed to. 

Tuesday, August 14th, 520 

Article sixth, relative to the elections, qualifications, and proceed- 
ings of the Legislature, resumed — Motion to permit members to be 
appointed to office during their term, but to vacate their seats — 
Disagreed to — Motion to permit members to be appointed during 
their term to offices in the Army or Navy, but to vacate their 
seats — Postponed — Motion to pay the members out of the National 
Treasury, a sum to be fixed by law — Agreed to. 

Wednesday, August 15th, ...... 531 

Article sixth, relative to the* elections, qualifications, and proceed- 
ings of the Legislature, resumed — Motion to unite the judges of the 
supreme court with the President, in his revisory power over acts 






CONTENTS. 21 

of the Legislature — Disagreed to — Motion to require three -fourths 
instead of two-thirds to pass bills negatived by the Executive — 
Agreed to — Motion to extend the negative of the Executive to re- 
solves as well as bills — Disagreed to — Motion to allow the Execu- 
tive ten days to revise bills — Agreed to — Article sixth, as amended, 
agreed to. 

Thursday, August 16th, 537 

Article sixth, relative to the elections, qualifications, and proceed- 
ings of the Legislature, resumed — Motion to subject joint resolu- 
tions, (except on adjournment,) to the negative of the Executive — 
Agreed to. 

Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature — Mo- 
tion to exclude exports from duty — Postponed — Motion to author- 
ize the establishment of post roads — Agreed to — Motion to forbid 
the emission of bills of credit — Agreed to. 

Friday, August 17th, ...... 544 

Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, resumed 
— Motion that it may appoint a Treasurer by joint ballot — Agreed 
to — Subdue rebellion in a State without the application of its 
Legislature when it cannot meet — Disagreed to — Declare war — 
Agreed to. 

Saturday, August 18th, 549 

Motion to add various powers to the Legislature — Referred to the 
Committee of Detail. 

Motion relative to an assumption of the State debts — Referred 
to a Grand Committee. 

Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, re- 
sumed — Motion that it may make rules for the Army and Navy — 
Agreed to — Motion that the army shall be limited in time of peace 
to a fixed number — Disagreed to — Motion that the subject of regu- 
lating the militia be referred to the Grand Committee — Agreed to. 

Monday, August 20th, ...... 558 

Motion to add various powers to the Legislature — Referred to the 
Committee of Detail. 

Article seventh, relative to the powers of Congress, resumed — 
Motion that it may pass sumptuary laws — Disagreed to — Motions 
to amend the language defining and providing for the punishment 
of treason — Agreed to — Motion to require the first census in three 
years — Agreed to. 

Tuesday, August 21st, . . . . . . 568 

Report of Grand Committee on assuming State debts, and regu- 
lating the militia. 

Article seventh, relative to the powers of Congress, resumed — 
Motion that State quotas for the expenses of the war be adjusted 
by the same rate as representation and direct taxation — Postponed 



22 CONTENTS. 

— Motion that until a census, direct taxation should be in propor- 
tion to representation — Disagreed to — Motion to raise direct taxes 
by requisitions on the States — Disagreed to — Motion to permit 
taxes on exports by a vote of two-thirds — Disagreed to. 

Wednesday, August 22d, 578 

Report of Committee of Detail on various proposed additional pow- 
ers of the Legislature. 

Article seventh, relative to the powers of Congress, resumed — 
Motion to refer the clauses relative to the importation and migra- 
tion of slaves, and to a capitation tax, and navigation act. to a 
Grand Committee — Agreed to — Motion to prohibit attainders or 
ex post facto laws — Agreed to — Motion to require the Legislature 
to discharge the debts, and fulfil the engagements of the United 
States — Agreed to. 

Thursday, August 23d, 588 

Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, resumed 

— Motion requiring them to organize the militia, when in the 
service of the United States, reserving the training and appoint- 
ment of officers to the States — Agreed to — Motion to prohibit for- 
eign presents, offices, or titles, to any officer without consent of the 
Legislature — Agreed to. 

Article eighth, relative to the supreme authority of acts of the 
Legislature and treaties — Agreed to. 

Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, resumed 

— Motion to refer to a Committee, to consider the propriety of a 
power to them to negative State laws — Disagreed to. 

Article ninth, relative to the powers of the Senate — Motion to 
require treaties to be ratified by law — Disagreed to. 



Friday, August 24th, ...... 598 

Report of the Grand Committee on the importation and migration 
of slaves, and a capitation tax, and navigation act. 

Article ninth, relative to the powers of the Senate, resumed — 
Motion to strike out the power to decide controversies between the 
States — Agreed to. 

Article tenth, relative to the Executive — Motion that the Ex- 
ecutive be elected by the people — Disagreed to — By Electors chosen 
by the people of the States — Disagreed to — By joint ballot of the 
Legislature, and a majority of the members present — Agreed to — 
Motion that each State have one vote in electing the Executive — 
Disagreed to — Motion to require the President to give information 
to the Legislature — Agreed to — Motion to restrain appointing 
power by law — Disagreed to — Motion to except from the appoint- 
ing power, officers otherwise provided for by the Constitution — 
Agreed to — Motion to authorize by law, appointments by State 
Legislatures ami Executives Disagreed to. 



CONTENTS. 23 

Saturday, August 25th, 605 

Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, resumed 
— Motion that in discharging the debts of the United States, they 
shall be considered as valid under the Constitution, as they were 
under the Confederation — Agreed to — Motion to postpone the 
prohibition for importing slaves to 1808 — Agreed to — Motion to 
confine the clause to such States as permit the importation of slaves 
— Disagreed to — Motion that the tax on such importation shall not 
exceed ten dollars for each person — Agreed to — Motion that a cap- 
itation tax shall be in proportion to the census — Agreed to. 

Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion to 
limit reprieves to the meeting of the Senate, and requiring their 
consent to pardons — Disagreed to — Motion to except cases of im- 
peachment from the pardoning power — Agreed to — Motion that 
his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar — Disagreed to. 

Monday, August 27th, . . . . . 613 

Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion to limit 
his command of the militia to their being in the service of the 
United States — Agreed to — Motion to require an oath from the 
Executive — Agreed to. 

Article eleventh, relative to the Judiciary — Motion to confer 
equity powers on the courts — Agreed to — Motion that the judges 
may be removed by the Executive, on application of the Legisla- 
ture — Disagreed to — Motion that the salaries of judges should not 
be increased while they are in office — Disagreed to — Motion to ex- 
tend jurisdiction to cases in which the United States are a party, 
or arising under the Constitution, or treaties, or relating to lands 
granted by different States — Agreed to — Motion to extend the ap- 
pellate jurisdiction to law and fact — Agreed to. 

Tuesday, August 28th, ...... 618 

Article eleventh, relative to the Judiciary — Motion to confine the 
appellate jurisdiction in certain cases to the Supreme Court — 
Agreed to — Motion that crimes not committed within any State be 
tried where the Legislature directs — Agreed to — Motion that the 
writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless required by 
invasion or rebellion — Agreed to. 

Article twelfth, relative to the prohibitions on the power of the 
States— Motions to prohibit them absolutely from emitting billsof 
credit, legalizing any tender except gold or silver, or passing attain- 
ders or retrospective laws, or laying duties on imports— Agreed to 
— Motion to forbid them to lay embargoes — Disagreed to. 

Article thirteenth, relative to the prohibitions on slaves, unless 
authorized by the National Legislature — Motion to include in 
these duties on exports, and, if permitted, to be for the use of the 
use of the United States — Agreed to. 



24 CONTENTS. 

Article fourteenth, relative to the rights of citizens of one State 
in another — Agreed to. 

Article fifteenth, relative to the delivery of persons fleeing to 
other States — Motion to extend it to all cases of crime — Agreed 
to — Motion to extend it to fugitive slaves — Withdrawn. 

Wednesday, August 29th, t 624 

Article sixteenth, relative to the effect of public records and docu- 
ments of one State in another — Motion to refer it to a Committee 
to add a provision relative to bankruptcies and foreign judgments 

— Agreed to. 

Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, 
resumed — Motion to require two-thirds of each House on acts 
regulating foreign commerce — Disagreed to — Motion to strike out 
the provision requiring two-thirds of each House on navigation 
acts — Agreed to. 

Article fifteenth, relative to the delivery of persons fleeing to 
other States, resumed — Motion to extend it to slaves — Agreed to. 
Article seventeenth, relative to the admission of new States — 
Motion to strike out the clause requiring their admission on the 
same terms with the original States — Agreed to. 

Thursday, August 30th, ..... 634 

Article seventeenth, relative to the admission of new States, 
resumed — Motion not to require any other assent than that of 
Congress to admit other States now existing — Disagreed to — 
Motion not to require any other assent than that of Congress, to 
admit States over which those now existing exercise no jurisdiction 

— Agreed to — Motion to allow the Legislature to form new States 
within the territory claimed by the existing States — Disagreed to 

— Motion to require assent of the State Legislatures to a junction of 
States — Agreed to — Motion to authorize the Legislature to make 
regulations regarding the territories, but not to affect the claims 
either of the United States, or the States — Agreed to — Motion to 
refer such claims to the Supreme Court — Disagreed to. 

Article eighteenth, guaranteeing to the States a republican gov- 
ernment, and protection against foreign invasion, and, on the appli- 
cation of the State Legislature, against domestic violence — Motion 
to strike out the clause requiring the application of the State Leg- 
islature — Disagreed to — Motion to authorize it on the application 
of the State Executive — Agreed to — Motion to limit the Execu- 
tive application to a recess of the Legislature — Disagreed to. 

Article nineteenth, relative to amendments of the Constitution — 
Agreed to. 

Article twentieth, relative to the oath to support the Constitu- 
tion — Motion to forbid any religious test — Agreed to. 

Article twenty -first, relative to the ratification of the Constitu- 
tion — Motion to require it to be by all the States. 



CONTENTS. 25 

Friday, August 31st, . . .... 642 

Article twenty -first, relative to the number of States necessary 
for a ratification of the Constitution, resumed — Motion that the 
Constitution be confined to the States ratifying it — Agreed to — 
Motion not to require the ratification to be made by conventions — 
Disagreed to — Motion to require unanimous ratification of the 
States — Disagreed to — That of nine States — Agreed to. 

Article twenty -second, relative to the mode of ratification — Mo- 
tion not to require the approbation of the present Congress — 
.Agreed to — Motion that the State Legislatures ought to call Con- 
ventions speedily — Disagreed to. 

Article twenty -third, relative to the measures to be taken for 
carrying the Constitution into effect when ratified — Motion to 
strike out the clause requiring the Legislature to choose the Exe- 
cutive — Agreed to. 

Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, resumed 

— Motion that no different duties or regulations, giving preference 
to the ports of any particular State, or requiring clearances, &c, 
between them, shall be made — Agreed to. 

Saturday, September 1st, . . . . . 649 

Report of Committee on Article six, section nine — Report of 
Committee on Article sixteen. • 

Monday, September 3d . . . . . . 649 

Article sixteenth, relative to the effect of public records and 
documents of one State in another, resumed — Motion to require 
the Legislature to provide the manner of authenticating them — 
Agreed to. 

Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, resumed 

— Motion that they may establish a bankrupt law — Disagreed to. 
Article sixth, relative to the elections, qualifications, and pro- 
ceedings of the Legislature, resumed — Motion to amend the rule 
as to incapacity, by prescribing only that members shall not hold 
an office of emolument, and shall vacate their seats on appointment 

— Disagreed to — Motion to limit such incapacity to offices created, 
or whose emoluments were increased during their term — Agreed 
to — Motion to render office and membership incompatible — 
Agreed to. 

Tuesday, September 4th ...... 654 

Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature resumed 

— Motion that they shall lay and collect taxes to pay debts and 
provide for the common defence and welfare — Agreed to — Regu- 
late trade with the Indians — Agreed to. 

Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion to ap- 
point a Vice President, and he and the President to be chosen by 



26 CONTENTS. 

Electors appointed in such manner as the State Legislatures may 
direct; if not chosen by a majority of the Electors to be balloted 
for by the Senate from the five highest — Postponed. 

Wednesday, September 5th ..... 660 

Article seventh, relative to the powers of the Legislature, resumed 

— Motion that they may grant letters of marque — Agreed to — Not 
make army appropriations for more than two years — Agreed to — 
Have exclusive jurisdiction in the district ceded for the seat of gov- 
ernment, and for other purposes with the consent of the State Leg- 
islatures — Agreed to — Grant patents and copyrights — Agreed to. 

Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion that 
in case of failure of the Electors to elect, the choice shall be by the 
Legislature — Disagreed to — Motion not to require a majority of 
the Electors but one third to choose a President — Disagreed to — 
Motion that a choice of the Senate be limited to the three highest 

— Disagreed to — To the thirteen highest — Disagreed to. 

Thursday, September 6th ...... 668 

Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion to ex- 
clude members of the Legislature, and public officers from being 
Electors — Agreed to — Motion to extend the Executive term to 
seven and six years — Disagreed to — Motion to elect the Executive 
by Electors — Agreed to — Motion that the election be at the seat 
of Government — Disagreed to — On the same day throughout the 
Union — Agreed to — Motion to refer it to the Senate, two thirds 
being present, if not made by the Electors — Agreed to — Motion to 
refer it to the House of Representatives, two thirds of the States 
being present, and each State to have one vote — Agreed to. 

Friday, September 7th 676 

Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion to leave 
to the Legislature to declare the Executive officer in case of death, 
&c, of President and Vice President, until a new election — Agreed 
to — Motion that the President be a natural born citizen, and thirty 
five years of age — Agreed to — Motion that the Vice President be 
President of the Senate — Agreed to — Motion to unite House of 
■sA Representatives in the treaty power — Disagreed to — Motion to 
give the Executive and Senate the appointing power — Agreed to 

— Motion to allow treaties of peace to be made by the Executive 
and a majority of the Senate — Agreed to — Motion to allow two 
thirds of the Senate to make treaties of peace without the Execu- 
tive— Disagreed to— Motion to appoint an Executive Council — 
Disagreed to. 

Saturday, September 8th ...... 685 

Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion to re- 
quire treaties of peace to be consented to by two thirds of the Sen- 



CONTENTS. 27 

ate — Agreed to — Motion to require that in such cases two thirds 
of all the members be required — Disagreed to — Motion to extend 
impeachment to high crimes and misdemeanors — Agreed to — Mo- 
tion to withdraw trial of impeachment from the Senate — Disa- 
greed to. 

Article fourth, relative to the House of Representatives, resumed 

— Motion that it must originate, but Senate may amend, money 
bills — Agreed to. 

Article tenth, relative to the Executive, resumed — Motion that 
he may convene both or either House — Agreed to. 

All the Articles as amended and agreed to, referred to a Com- 
mittee of Revision. 

Monday, September 10th . . . . . 692 

Article nineteenth, relative to amendments of the Constitution, 
resumed — Motion that Legislature may propose amendments, to be 
binding when assented to by three-fourths of the States — Agreed to. 

Article twenty-first, relative to the number of States necessary 
for a ratification of the Constitution — Motion to require the assent 
of the present Congress, before submitting it to the States for rati- 
fication — Disagreed to. 

Article twenty -second, relative to the mode of ratifying the Con- 
stitution — Motion to require the assent of the present Congress 

— Disagreed to — Motion to submit the Constitution after it is acted 
on by the State Conventions, to a second Federal Convention — 
Postponed — Motion that an address to the States accompany the 
Constitution, when transmitted for ratification — Agreed to. 

Wednesday, September 12th 699 

The Constitution as reported by the Committee of Revision, con- 
sidered. 

Article first, relative to the Legislative power — Motion to require 
two thirds instead of three fourths to overrule the negative of the 
President — Agreed to. 

Motion to add a bill of rights — Disagreed to. 

Thursday, September 13th . . . . . 719 

Motion for a Committee to report articles of association for en- 
couraging, by the influence of the Convention, economy, frugality, 
and A merican manufactures — Agreed to. 

Article first, relative to the Legislative power, resumed — Motion 
to permit the States to impose such duties on exports as are neces- 
sary to execute their inspection laws — Agreed to. 

Resolutions directing the mode of proceeding in the present Con- 
gress to submit the Constitution to the States. 

Friday, September 14th ..... 722 

Article first, relative to the Legislative powers, resumed — Motion 
to change the present proportion of members in the House of Rep- 



28 CONTENTS. 

resentatives — Disagreed to — Motion that officers impeached be 
suspended till trial — Disagreed to — Motion to require the House 
of Representatives to publish all its proceedings — Disagreed to — 
Motion that Treasurer be appointed as other officers — Agreed to 

— Motion to provide for cutting canals and granting charters of 
incorporation, where the States may be incompetent — Disagreed 
to — To establish a university — Disagreed to — To provide for the 
preservation of the liberty of the press — Disagreed to — To pub- 
lish the expenditures — Agreed to. * 

Saturday, September 15th ..... 730 

Article first, relative to the Legislative powers, resumed — Mo- 
tion to change the present proportion of members in the House of 
Representatives — Disagreed to — Motion that the inspection laws 
of the State may be revised by Congress — Agreed to — Motion that 
no State shall lay a duty on tonnage, without assent of Congress — 
Agreed to. 

Article second, relative to the Executive — Motion that Presi- 
dent shall receive no emolument from the States during his term 

— Agreed to — Motion to deprive the President of the power to 
pardon treason — Disagreed to — Motion that appointments to 
inferior offices may be vested by law — Agreed to. 

Article third, relative to the Judiciary — Motion to provide for 
trial by jury in civil cases — Disagreed to. 

Article fifth, relative to amendments to the Constitution — Mo- 
tion to require Congress to call a Convention on an application of 
two thirds of the States — Agreed to. 

Article first, relative to the Legislative power, resumed — Motion 
to guarantee to the States an equal representation in the Senate 

— Agreed to — Motion to forbid the passage of a navigation act 
before 1808, without two thirds of each House — Disagreed to. 

Motion that the amendments of the States be submitted to a new 
Federal Convention — Disagreed to. 
The Constitution, as amended — Agreed to. 

Monday, September 17th ..... 741 

Article first, relative to the Legislative power, resumed — Motion 
to provide that thirty thousand instead of forty thousand, be the 
lowest ratio of representation — Agreed to. 

Motion that the Constitution be signed as agreed to by all the 
States — Agreed to. 

Motion that the Journals and papers be deposited with the Pres- 
ident — Agreed to. 

The Constitution signed as finally amended, and the Convention 
adjourned. 



INTRODUCTION. 



Note.— The following paper is copied from a rough draught in the handwriting 
of Mr. Madison. The particular place it was intended to occupy in his works is not 
designated ; but as it traces the causes and steps which led to the meeting of the 
Convention of 1787, it seems properly to preface the acts of that body. The paper 
bears evidence, in the paragraph preceding its conclusion, that it was written at a 
late period of the life of its author, when the pressure of ill health, combined with 
his great age, in preventing a final revision of it. 



As the weakness and wants of man naturally lead to an 
association of individuals under a common authority, 
whereby each may have the protection of the whole against 
danger from without, and enjoy in safety within the 
advantages of social intercourse, and an exchange of the 
necessaries and comforts of life; in like manner feeble 
communities, independent of each other, have resorted to a 
union, less intimate, but with common councils, for the 
common safety against powerful neighbours, and for the 
preservation of justice and peace among themselves. 
Ancient history furnishes examples of these confederate 
associations, though with a very imperfect account of their 
structure, and of the attributes and functions of the presid- 
ing authority. There are examples of modern date also, 
some of them still existing, the modifications and transac- 
tions of which are sufficiently known. 

It remained for the British Colonies, now United States 
of North America, to add to those examples, one of a more 
interesting character than any of them; which led to a 
system without an example ancient or modern. A system 
founded on popular rights, and so combining a federal form 
with the forms of individual republics, as may enable each 

29 



30 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

to supply the defects of the other and obtain that advantage 
of both. 

Whilst the Colonies eujoyed the protection of the parent 
country, as it was called, against foreign danger, and were 
secured by its superintending control against conflicts 
among themselves, they continued independent of each 
other, under a common, though limited, dependence on the 
parental authority. When, however, the growth of the 
offspring in strength and in wealth awakened the jealousy, 
and tempted the avidity of the parent, into schemes of 
usurpation and exaction, the obligation was felt by the 
former of uniting their counsels and efforts, to avert the 
impending calamity. 

As early as the year 1754, indications having been 
given of a design in the British government to levy con- 
tributions on the Colonies without their consent, a meeting 
of Colonial deputies took place at Albany, which attempted 
to introduce a compromising substitute, that might at once 
satisfy the British requisitions, and save their own rights 
from violation. The attempt had no other effect, than, by 
bringing these rights into a more conspicuous view, to 
invigorate the attachment to them, on the one side; and to 
nourish the haughty and encroaching spirit on the other. 

In 1774, the progress made by Great Britain in the 
open assertion of her pretensions, and the apprehended 
purpose of otherwise maintaining them by legislative en- 
actments and declarations, had been such that the Colonies 
did not hesitate to assemble, by their deputies, in a formal 
Congress, authorized to oppose to the British innovations 
whatever measures might be found best adapted to the 
occasion; without, however, losing sight of an eventual 
reconciliation. 

The dissuasive measures of that Congress being with- 
out effect another Congress was held in 1775, whose pacific 
efforts to bring about a change in the views of the other 
party being equally unavailing, and the commencement of 
actual hostilities having at length put an end to all hope of 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 31 

reconciliation, the Congress finding, moreover, that the pop- 
ular voice began to call for an entire and perpetual dissolu- 
tion of the political ties which had connected them with 
Great Britain, proceeded on the memorable Fourth of July, 
1776, to declare the thirteen Colonies Independent States. 

During the discussions of this solemn act, a Committee, 
consisting of a member from each Colony, had been 
appointed, to prepare and digest a form of Confederation 
for the future management of the common interests, which 
had hitherto been left to the discretion of Congress, guided 
by the exigencies of the contest, and by the known inten- 
tions or occasional instructions of the Colonial Legislatures. 

It appears that as early as the twenty-first of July, 
1775, a plan, entitled " Articles of Confederation and per- 
petual union of the Colonies," had been sketched by Doc- 
tor Franklin, the plan being on that day submitted by him 
to Congress; and though not copied into their Journals, 
remaining on their files in his handwriting. But notwith- 
standing the term ''perpetual" observed in the title, the 
Articles provided expressly for the event of a return of the 
Colonies to a connection with Great Britain. 

This sketch became a basis for the plan reported by the 
Committee on the twelfth of July, now also remaining on 
the files of Congress in the hand-writing of Mr. Dickinson. 
The plan, though dated after the Declaration of Indepen- 
dence, was probably drawn up before that event; since the 
name of Colonies, not States, is used throughout the 
draught. The plan reported was debated and amended 
from time to time, till the seventeenth of November, 1777, 
when it was agreed to by Congress, and proposed to the 
Legislatures of the States, with an explanatory and recom- 
mendatory letter. The ratifications of these, by their dele- 
gates in Congress, duly authorized, took place at successive 
dates; but were not completed till the first of March, 1781, 
when Maryland, who had made a prerequisite that the 
vacant lands acquired from the British Crown should be a 
common fund, yielded to the persuasion that a final and- 



32 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

formal establishment of the Federal Union and Government 
would make a favorable impression, not only on other 
foreign nations, but on Great Britain herself. 

The great difficulty experienced in so framing the Fed- 
eral system, as to obtain the unanimity required for its due 
sanction, may be inferred from the long interval, and recur- 
ring discussions, between the commencement and completion 
of the work; from the changes made during its progress; 
from the language of Congress when proposing it to the 
States, which dwelt on the impracticability of devising a 
system acceptable to all of them; from the reluctant assent 
given by some; and the various alterations proposed by 
others; and by a tardiness in others again, which produced 
a special address to them from Congress, enforcing the duty 
of sacrificing local considerations and favorite opinions to 
the public safety, and the necessary harmony; nor was the 
assent of some of the States finally yielded without strong 
protests against particular Articles, and a reliance on future 
amendments removing their objections. It is to be recol- 
lected, no doubt, that these delays might be occasioned in 
some degree by an occupation of the public councils, both 
general and local, with the deliberations and measures 
essential to a voluntary struggle ; but there must have been 
a balance for these causes in the obvious motives to hasten 
the establishment of a regular and efficient government; 
and in the tendency of the crisis to repress opinions and 
pretensions which might be inflexible in another state of 
things. 

The principal difficulties which embarrassed the prog- 
ress, and retarded the completion, of the plan of Confed- 
eration, may be traced to — first, the natural repugnance of 
the parties to a relinquishment of power; secondly, a natural 
jealousy of its abuse in other hands than their own; thirdly, 
the rule of suffrage among parties whose inequality in size 
did not correspond with that of their wealth, or of their 
military or free population; fourthly, the selection and 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 33 

definition of the powers, at once necessary to the federal 
head, and safe to the several members. 

To these sources of difficulty, incident to the formation 
of all such confederacies, were added two others, one of a 
temporary, the other of a permanent nature. The first was 
the case of the Crown lands, so called because they had 
been held by the British Crown, and being ungranted to 
individuals when its authority ceased, were considered by 
the States within whose charters or asserted limits they lay, 
as devolving on them ; whilst it was contended by the others, 
that being wrested from the dethroned authority by the 
equal exertions of all, they resulted of right and in 
equity to the benefit of all. The lands being of vast extent, 
and of growing value, were the occasion of much discussion 
and heart-burning; and proved the most obstinate of the 
impediments to an earlier consummation of the plan of fed- 
eral government. The State of Maryland, the last that 
acceded to it, held out as already noticed, till the first of 
March, 1781 ; and then yielded only to the hope that, by 
giving a stable and authoritative character to the Confedera- 
tion, a successful termination of the contest might be accel- 
erated. The dispute was happily compromised by succes- 
sive surrenders of portions of the territory by the States 
having exclusive claims to it, and acceptances of them by 
Congress. 

The other source of dissatisfaction was the peculiar sit- 
uation of some of the States, which, having no convenient 
ports for foreign commerce, were subject to be taxed by 
their neighbours, through whose ports their commerce was 
carried on. New Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and 
New York, was likened to a cask tapped at both ends; and 
North Carolina, between Virginia and South Carolina, to a 
patient bleeding at both arms. The Articles of Confeder- 
ation provided no remedy for the complaint; which pro- 
duced a strong protest on the part of New Jersey, and 
never ceased to be a source of dissatisfaction and discord, 
until the new Constitution superseded the old. 
3 



34 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

But the radical infirmity of the "Articles of Confedera- 
tion" was the dependence of Congress on the voluntary 
and simultaneous compliance with its requisitions by so 
many independent communities, each consulting more or 
less its particular interests and convenience, and distrusting 
the compliance of the others. Whilst the paper emissions 
of Congress continued to circu]ate, they were employed as 
a sinew of war, like gold and silver. When that ceased to 
be the case, and the fatal defect of the political system was 
felt in its alarming force, the war was merely kept alive, 
and brought to a successful conclusion, by such foreign 
aids and temporary expedients as could be applied; a hope 
prevailing with many, and a wish with all, that a state of 
peace, and the sources of prosperity opened by it, would 
give to the Confederacy, in practice, the efficiency which 
had been inferred from its theory. 

The close of the war, however, brought no cure for the 
public embarrassments. The States, relieved from the 
pressure of foreign danger, and flushed with the enjoyment 
of independent and sovereign power, instead of a dimin- 
ished disposition to part with it, persevered in omissions 
and in measures incompatible with their relations to the 
Federal Government, and with those among themselves. 

Having served as a member of Congress through the 
period between March, 1780, and the arrival of peace, in 
1783, I had become intimately acquainted with the public 
distresses and the causes of them. I had observed the 
successful opposition to every attempt to procure a remedy 
by new grants of power to Congress. I had found, more- 
over, that despair of success hung over the compromising 
principle of April, 1783, for the public necessities, which 
had been so elaborately planned and so impressively recom- 
mended to the States. Sympathizing, under this aspect of 
affairs, in the alarm of the friends of free government at 
the threatened danger of an abortive result to the great, 
and perhaps last, experiment in its favor, I could not be in- 
sensible to the obligation to aid as far as I could in averting 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 35 

the calamity. With this view I acceded to the desire of 
my fellow citizens of the County, that I should be one of 
its representatives in the Legislature, hoping that I might 
there best contribute to inculcate the critical posture to 
which the Revolutionary cause was reduced, and the merit 
of a leading agency of the State in bringing about a rescue 
of the Union, and the blessings of liberty staked on it, 
from an impending catastrophe. 

It required but little time after taking my seat in the 
House of Delegates in May, 1784, to discover, that, how- 
ever favorable the general disposition of the State might 
be towards the Confederacy, the Legislature retained the 
aversion of its predecessors to transfers of power from the 
State to the Government of the Union ; notwithstanding the 
urgent demands of the Federal Treasury, the glaring inad- 
equacy of the authorized mode of supplying it, the rapid 
growth of anarchy in the Federal system, and the animosity 
kindled among the States by their conflicting regulations. 

The temper of the Legislature, and the wayward course 
of its proceedings, may be gathered from the Journals of 
its sessions in the years 1784 and 1785. 

The failure, however, of the varied propositions in the 
Legislature, for enlarging the powers of Congress ; the con- 
tinued failure of the efforts of Congress to obtain from 
them the means of providing for the debts of the Revolu- 
tion, and of countervailing the commercial laws of Great 
Britain, a source of much irritation, and against which the 
separate efforts of the States were found worse than abor- 
tive; these considerations, with the lights thrown on the 
whole subject by the free and full discussion it had under- 
gone, led to a general acquiescence in the Resolution 
passed on the twenty -first of January, 1786, which proposed 
and invited a meeting of Deputies from all the States, as 
follows: 

" Resolved, that Edmund Randolph, James Madison, 
Jr., Walter Jones, St. George Tucker, and Meriwether 
Smith, Esquires, be appointed Commissioners, who, or any 



36 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

three of whom, shall meet such Commissioners as may be 
appointed in the other States of the Union, at a time and 
place to be agreed on, to take into consideration the trade of 
the United States ; to examine the relative situations and trade 
of said States ; to consider how far a uniform system in their 
commercial regulations may be necessary to their common 
interest and their permanent harmony ; and to report to the 
several States such an act, relative to this great object, as, 
when unanimously ratified by them, will enable the United 
States in Congress, effectually to provide for the same." 

The Eesolution had been brought forward some weeks 
before, on a failure of a proposed grant of power to Con- 
gress to collect a revenue from commerce, which had been 
abandoned by its friends in consequence of material alter- 
ations made in the grant by a Committee of the Whole. 
The Eesolution, though introduced by Mr. Tyler, an influ- 
ential member, — who, having never served in Congress, 
had more the ear of the House than those whose services 
there exposed them to an imputable bias, — was so little 
acceptable, that it was not then persisted in. Being now 
revived by him, on the last day of the session, and being 
the alternative of adjourning without any effort for the 
crisis in the affairs of the Union, it obtained a general 
vote; less, however, with some of its friends, from a con- 
fidence in the success of the experiment, than from a hope 
that it might prove a step to a more comprehensive and 
adequate provision for the wants of the Confederacy. 

It happened also, that Commissioners, appointed by 
Virginia and Maryland to settle the jurisdiction on waters 
dividing the two States, had, apart from their official 
reports, recommended a uniformity in the regulations of 
the two States on several subjects, and particularly on those 
having relation to foreign trade. It appeared at the same 
time, that Maryland had deemed a concurrence of her 
neighbours, Delaware and Pennsylvania, indispensable in 
such a case; who, for like reasons, would require that of 
their neighbours. So apt and forcible an illustration of the 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 37 

necessity of an uniformity throughout all the States could 
not but favor the passage of a resolution which proposed a 
Convention having that for its object. 

The Commissioners appointed by the Legislature, and 
who attended the Convention, were Edmund Randolph, the 
Attorney of the State, St. George Tucker and James Madi- 
son. The designation of the time and place to be pro- 
posed for its meeting, and communicated to the States, 
having been left to the Commissioners, they named, for the 
time the first Monday in September, and for the place the 
city of Annapolis, avoiding the residence of Congress, and 
large commercial cities, as liable to suspicions of an extra- 
neous influence. 

Although the invited meeting appeared to be generally 
favored, five States only assembled; some failing to make 
appointments, and some of the individuals appointed not 
hastening their attendance; the result in both cases being 
ascribed mainly to a belief that the time had not arrived for 
such a political reform as might be expected from a further 
experience of its necessity. 

But in the interval between the proposal of the Con- 
vention and the time of its meeting, such had been the 
advance of public opinion in the desired direction, stimulated 
as it had been by the effect of the contemplated object of 
the meeting, in turning the general attention to the critical 
state of things, and in calling forth the sentiments and 
exertions of the most enlightened and influential patriots, 
that the Convention, thin as it was, did not scruple to 
decline the limited task assigned to it, and to recommend 
to the States a Convention with powers adequate to the 
occasion. Nor had it been unnoticed that the commission 
of the New Jersey deputation had extended its object to a 
general provision for the exigencies of the Union. A 
recommendation for this enlarged purpose was accordingly 
reported by a committee to whom the subject had been 
referred. It was drafted by Col. Hamilton, and finally 
agreed to in the following form: 



38 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

" To the Honorable, the Legislatures of Virginia, Dela- 
ware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York, the Com- 
missioners from the said States, respectively, assembled at 
Annapolis, humbly beg leave to report: 

" That, pursuant to their several appointments, they met 
at Annapolis, in the State of Maryland, on the eleventh day 
of September instant ; and having proceeded to a communi- 
cation of their powers, they found that the States of New 
York, Pennsylvania and Virginia, had, in substance, and 
nearly in the same terms, authorized their respective Com- 
missioners ' to meet such commissioners as were, or might 
be, appointed by the other States of the Union, at such time 
and place as should be agreed upon by the said Commis- 
sioners, to take into consideration the trade and commerce 
of the United States ; to consider how far an uniform system 
in their commercial intercourse and regulations might be 
necessary to their common interest and permanent harmony ; 
and to report to the several States such an act, relative 
to this great object, as, when unanimously ratified by them, 
would enable the United States in Congress assembled 
effectually to provide for the same.' 

"That the State of Delaware had given similar powers 
to their Commissioners, with this difference only, that the 
act to be framed in virtue of these powers is required to be 
reported ' to the United States in Congress assembled, to be 
agreed to by them, and confirmed by the Legislature of 
every State.' 

" That the State of New Jersey had enlarged the object 
of their appointment, empowering their commissioners, ' to 
consider how far an uniform system in their commercial 
regulations, and other important matters, might be necessary 
to the common interest and permanent harmony of the sev- 
eral States ; ' and to report such an act on the subject, as, 
when ratified by them, * would enable the United States in 
Congress assembled effectually to provide for the exigencies 
of the Union.' 

" That appointments of Commissioners have also been 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 39 

made by the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, and North Carolina, none of whom, however, 
have attended; but that no information has been received 
by your Commissioners of any appointment having been 
made by the States of Maryland, Connecticut, South Caro- 
lina or Georgia. 

" That the express terms of the powers to your Com- 
missioners supposing a deputation from all the States, and 
having for object the trade and commerce of the United 
States, your Commissioners did not conceive it advisable to 
proceed on the business of their mission under the circum- 
stances of so partial and defective a representation. 

"Deeply impressed, however, with the magnitude and 
importance of the object confided to them on this occasion, 
your Commissioners cannot forbear to indulge an expression 
of their earnest and unanimous wish, that speedy measures 
may be taken to effect a general meeting of the States in a 
future Convention, for the same and such other purposes, 
as the situation of public affairs may be found to require. 

" If, in expressing this wish, or in intimating any other 
sentiment, your Commissioners should seem to exceed the 
strict bounds of their appointment, they entertain a full 
confidence, that a conduct dictated by an anxiety for the 
welfare of the United States will not fail to receive an indul- 
gent construction. 

"In this persuasion, your Commissioners submit an 
opinion, that the idea of extending the powers of their 
Deputies to other objects than those of commerce, which 
has been adopted by the State of New Jersey, was an 
improvement on the original plan, and will deserve to be 
incorporated into that of a future Convention. They are 
the more naturally led to this conclusion, as, in the course 
of their reflections on the subject, they have been induced 
to think that the power of regulating trade is of such com- 
prehensive extent, and will enter so far into the general 
system of the Federal Government, that to give it efficacy, 
and to obviate Questions and doubts concerning its precise 



40 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

nature and limits, may require a correspondent adjustment 
of other parts of the Federal system. 

"That there are important defects in the system of 
the Federal Government, is acknowledged by the acts of all 
those States which have concurred in the present meeting. 
That the defects, upon a closer examination, may be found 
greater and more numerous than even these acts imply, is 
at least so far probable, from the embarrassments which 
characterize the present state of our national affairs, foreign 
and domestic, as may reasonably be supposed to merit a 
deliberate and candid discussion, in some mode which will 
unite the sentiments and councils of all the States. In the 
choice of the mode, your Commissioners are of opinion, that 
a Convention of deputies from the different States, for the 
special and sole purpose of entering into this investigation, 
and digesting a plan for supplying such defects as may be 
discovered to exist, will be entitled to a preference, from 
considerations which will occur without being particularized. 

"Tour Commissioners decline an enumeration of those 
national circumstances on which their opinion, respecting 
the propriety of a future Convention with more enlarged 
powers, is founded ; as it would be an useless intrusion of 
facts and observations, most of which have been frequently 
the subject of public discussion, and none of which can have 
escaped the penetration of those to whom they would in this 
instance be addressed. They are, however, of a nature so 
serious, as, in the view of your Commissioners, to render 
the situation of the United States delicate and critical, 
calling for an exertion of the united virtue and wisdom of 
all the members of the Confederacy. 

" Under this impression, your Commissioners, with the 
most respectful deference, beg leave to suggest their unan- 
imous conviction, that it may essentially tend to advance 
the interests of the Union, if the States by whom they have 
been respectively delegated would themselves concur, and 
use their endeavours to procure the concurrence of the other 
States, in the appointment of Commissioners, to meet at 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 41 

Philadelphia on the second Monday in May next, to take 
into consideration the situation of the United States ; to 
devise such further provisions as shall appear to them 
necessary to render the constitution of the Federal Govern- 
ment adequate to the exigencies of the Union ; and to 
report such an act for that purpose, to the United States in 
Congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them, and after- 
wards confirmed by the Legislatures of every State, will 
effectually provide for the same. 

" Though your Commissioners could not with propriety 
address these observations and sentiments to any but the 
States they have the honor to represent, they have never- 
theless concluded, from motives of respect, to transmit 
copies of this Eeport to the United States in Congress 
assembled, and to the Executives of the other States." 

The recommendation was well received by the Legisla- 
ture of Virginia, which happened to be the first that acted 
on it; and the example of her compliance was made as con- 
ciliatory and impressive as possible. The Legislature were 
unanimous, or very nearly so, on the occasion. As a proof 
of the magnitude and solemnity attached to it, they placed 
General Washington at the head of the deputation from the 
State; and as a proof of the deep interest he felt in the 
case, he overstepped the obstacles to his acceptance of the 
appointment. 

The law complying with the recommendation from 
Annapolis was in the terms following : 

4 'Whereas, the Commissioners who assembled at 
Annapolis, on the fourteenth day of September last, for the 
purpose of devising and reporting the means of enabling 
Congress to provide effectually for the commercial interests 
of the United States, have represented the necessity of 
extending the revision of the Federal system to all its 
defects; and have recommended that deputies for that pur- 
pose be appointed by the several Legislatures, to meet in 
Convention in the City of Philadelphia, on the second Mon- 
day of May next, — a provision which seems preferable to a 



42 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

discussion of the subject in Congress, where it might be too 
much interrupted by the ordinary business before them, 
and where it would, besides, be deprived of the valuable 
counsels of sundry individuals who are disqualified by the 
constitution or laws of particular States, or restrained by 
peculiar circumstances, from a seat in that Assembly: 

" And whereas, the General Assembly of this Common- 
wealth, taking into view the actual situation of the Con- 
federacy, as well as reflecting on the alarming representa- 
tions made from time to time, by the United States in 
Congress, particularly in their act of the fifteenth day of 
February last, can no longer doubt that the crisis is arrived 
at which the good people of America are to decide the 
solemn question, whether they will, by wise and magnan- 
imous efforts, reap the just fruits of that independence 
which they have so gloriously acquired, and of that union 
which they have cemented wiih so much of their common 
blood; or whether, by giving way to unmanly jealousies 
and prejudices, or to partial and transitory interests, they 
will renounce the auspicious blessings prepared for them 
by the Kevolution, and furnish to its enemies an eventual 
triumph over those, by whose virtue and valour, it has been 
accomplished: 

"And whereas, the same noble and extended policy, 
and the same fraternal and affectionate sentiments, which 
originally determined the citizens of this Commonwealth 
to unite with their brethren of the other States, in estab- 
lishing a federal government, cannot but be felt with equal 
force now, as motives to lay aside every inferior considera- 
tion, and to concur in such farther concessions and provis- 
ions, as may be necessary to secure the great objects for 
which that government was instituted, and to render the 
United States as happy in peace, as they have been glorious 
in war. 

" Be it, therefore, enacted, by the General Assembly of 
the Commonwealth of Virginia, That seven Commissioners 
be appointed by joint ballot of both Houses of Assembly, 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. ±3 

who, or any three of them, are hereby authorized as Depu- 
ties from this Commonwealth, to meet such Deputies as 
may be appointed and authorized by other States, to assem- 
ble in Convention at Philadelphia, as above recommended, 
and to join with them in devising and discussing all such 
alterations and farther provisions, as may be necessary to 
render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies 
of the Union; and in reporting such an act for that pur- 
pose, to the United States in Congress, as when agreed to 
by them, and duly confirmed by the several States, will 
effectually provide for the same. 

" And be it further enacted, That in case of the death 
of any of the said deputies, or of their declining their ap- 
pointments, the Executive are hereby authorized to supply 
such vacancies; and the Governor is requested to transmit 
forthwith a copy of this act to the United States in Con- 
gress, and to the Executives of each of the States in the 
Union." * 

A resort to a General Convention, to re-model the Con- 
federacy, was not a new idea. It had entered at an early 
date into the conversations and speculations of the most 
reflecting and foreseeing observers of the inadequacy of the 
powers allowed to Congress. In a pamphlet published in 
May, 1781, at the seat of Congress, Pelatiah Webster, an 
able though not conspicuous citizen, after discussing the 
fiscal system of the United States, and suggesting, among 
other remedial provisions, one including a national bank, 
remarks, that "the authority of Congress at present is 
very inadequate to the performance of their duties; and 
this indicates the necessity of their calling a Continental 
Convention for the express purpose of ascertaining, defin- 
ing, enlarging and limiting, the duties and powers of their 
Constitution." 

On the first day of April, 1783, Colonel Hamilton, in a 
debate in Congress, observed, " that he wished, instead of 

* Drawn by J. Madison, passed the House of Delegates November 9th, the Senate 
November 23d — and Deputies appointed December 4th, 1786. 



44 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

them (partial Conventions), to see a general Convention 
take place ; and that he should soon, in pursuance of 
instructions from his constituents, propose to Congress a 
plan for that purpose, the object of which would be to 
strengthen the Federal Constitution." He alluded prob- 
ably, to the resolutions introduced by General Schuyler in 
the Senate, and passed unanimously by the Legislature of 
New York in the summer of 1782, declaring, that the Con- 
federation was defective, in not giving Congress power to 
provide a revenue for itself, or in not investing them with 
funds from established and productive sources ; and that it 
would be advisable for Congress to recommend to the 
States to call a general Convention to revise and amend the 
Confederation." It does not appear, however, that his 
expectation had been fulfilled. 

In a letter to James Madison from E. H. Lee, then 
President of Congress, dated the twenty-sixth of November, 
1784, he says : "It is by many here suggested as a very 
necessary step for Congress to take, the calling on the 
States to form a Convention for the sole purpose of revising 
the Confederation, so far as to enable Congress to execute 
with more energy, effect and vigor the powers assigned to 
it, than it appears by experience that they can do under the 
present state of things." The answer of Mr. Madison 
remarks : "I hold it for a maxim, that the union of the 
States is essential to their safety against foreign danger 
and internal contention ; and that the perpetuity and effi- 
cacy of the present system cannot be confided in. The 
question, therefore, is, in what mode, and at what moment, 
the experiment for supplying the defects ought to be 
made." 

In the winter of 1784-5, Noah Webster, whose political 
and other valuable writings had made him known to the 
public, proposed, in one of his publications, " a new system 
of government which should act, not on the States, but 
directly on individuals, and vest in Congress full power to 
carry its laws into effect." 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 45 

The proposed and expected Convention at Annapolis, 
the first of a general character that appears to have been 
realized, and the state of the public mind awakened by it, 
had attracted the particular attention of Congress, and 
favored the idea there of a Convention with fuller power for 
amending the Confederacy.* 

It does not appear that in any of these cases the 
reformed system was to be otherwise sanctioned than by the 
Legislative authority of the States; nor whether, nor how 
far, a change was to be made in the structure of the deposi- 
tory of Federal powers. 

The act of Virginia providing for the Convention at 
Philadelphia was succeeded by appointments from the 
other States as their Legislatures were assembled, the 
appointments being selections from the most experienced 
and highest standing citizens. Rhode Island was the only 
exception to a compliance with the recommendation from 
Annapolis, well known to have been swayed by an obdurate 
adherence to an advantage which her position gave her, of 
taxing her neighbours through their consumption of 
imported supplies, an advantage which it was foreseen 
would be taken from her by a revisal of the Articles of 
Confederation. 

As the public mind had been ripened for a salutary 
reform of the political system, in the interval between the 
proposal and the meeting of the Commissioners at Annapolis, 
the interval between the last event and the meeting of 
deputies at Philadelphia had continued to develope more 
and more the necessity and the extent of a systematic pro- 
vision for the preservation and government of the Union. 
Among the ripening incidents was the insurrection of 
Shays, in Massachusetts, against her government; which 
was with difficulty suppressed, notwithstanding the influ- 
ence on the insurgents of an apprehended interposition 
of the Federal troops. 

* The letters of Wm. Grayson, March 22, 1786, and of James Monroe, of April 28th, 
1786, both then members, to Mr. Madison, state that a proposition for such a Con- 
vention had been made. 



46 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

At the date of the Convention, the aspect and retrospect 
of the political condition of the United States could not but 
fill the public mind with a gloom which was relieved only 
by a hope that so select a body would devise an adequate 
remedy for the existing and orospective evils so impres- 
sively demanding it. 

It was seen that the public debt, rendered so sacred by 
the cause in which it had been incurred, remained without 
any provision for its payment. The reiterated and elabo- 
rate efforts of Congress to procure from the States a more 
adequate power to raise the means of payment, had failed. 
The effect of the ordinary requisitions of Congress had only 
displayed the inefficiency of the authority making them, 
none of the States having duly complied with them, some 
having failed altogether, or nearly so; while in one in- 
stance, that of New Jersey,* a compliance was expressly 
refused; nor was more yielded to the expostulations of 
members of Congress depused to her Legislature, than a 
mere repeal of the law, without a compliance. The want of 
authority in Congress to regulate commerce had produced 
in foreign nations, particularly Great Britain, a monopoliz- 
ing policy, injurious to the trade of the United States, and 
destructive to their navigation; the imbecility, and antici- 
pated dissolution, of the Confederacy extinguishing all 
apprehensions of a countervailing policy on the part of the 
United States. The same want of a general power over 
commerce led to an exercise of the power, separately, by the 
States, which not only proved abortive, but engendered 
rival, conflicting and angry regulations. Besides the vain 
attempts to supply their respective treasuries by imposts, 
which turned their commerce into the neighbouring ports, 
and to coerce a relaxation of the British monopoly of the 
West India navigation, which was attempted by Virginia, f 
the States having ports for foreign commerce, taxed and 

* A letter of Mr. Grayson to Mr. Madison of March 22, 1786, relating the conduct of 
New Jersey, states this fact. 

t See the Journal of her Legislature. 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 47' 

irritated the adjoining States, trading through them, as 
New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina. 
Some of the States, as Connecticut, taxed imports from 
others, as from Massachusetts, which complained in a letter 
to the Executive of Virginia, and doubtless to those of 
other States. In sundry instances, as of New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania and Maryland, the navigation laws 
treated the citizens of other States as aliens. In certain 
cases the authority of the Confederacy was disregarded, as 
in violation, not only of the Treaty of Peace, but of treaties 
with France and Holland; which were complained of to 
Congress. In other cases the Federal authority was vio- 
lated by treaties and war with Indians, as by Georgia ; by 
troops raised and kept up without the consent of Congress, 
as by Massachusetts; by compacts without the consent of 
Congress, as between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and 
between Virginia and Maryland. From the Legislative 
Journals of Virginia it appears, that a vote refusing to 
apply for a sanction of Congress was followed by a vote 
against the communication of the compact to Congress. In. 
the internal administration of the States, a violation of con- 
tracts had become familiar, in the form of depreciated paper 
made a legal tender, of property substituted for money, of 
instalment laws, and of the occlusions of the courts of jus- 
tice, although evident that all such interferences affected the 
rights of other States, relatively creditors, as well as citi- 
zens creditors within the State. Among the defects which 
had been severely felt was want of an uniformity in cases 
requiring it, as laws of naturalization and bankruptcy, a 
coercive authority operating on individuals, and a guarantee 
of the internal tranquillity of the States. 

As a natural consequence of this distracted and dis- 
heartening condition of the Union, the Federal authority 
had ceased to be respected abroad, and dispositions were* 
shown there, particularly in Great Britain, to take advan- 
tage of its imbecility, and to speculate on its approaching 
downfall. At home it had lost all confidence and credit ; 



48 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

the unstable and unjust career of the States had also for- 
feited the respect and confidence essential to order and 
good government, involving a general decay of confidence 
and credit between man and man. It was found, moreover, 
that those least partial to popular government, or most dis- 
trustful of its efficacy, were yielding to anticipations, that 
from an increase of the confusion a government might re- 
sult more congenial with their taste or their opinions ; whilst 
those most devoted to the principles and forms of Republics 
were alarmed for the cause of liberty itself, at stake in the 
American experiment, and anxious for a system that would 
avoid the ineflicacy of a mere confederacy, without passing 
into the opposite extreme of a consolidated government. 
It was known that there were individuals who had betrayed 
a bias towards monarchy, and there had always been some 
not unfavorable to a partition of the Union into several 
confederacies; either from a better chance of figuring on a 
sectional theatre, or that the sections would require stronger 
governments, or by their hostile conflicts lead to a mon- 
archical consolidation. The idea of dismemberment had 
recently made its appearance in the newspapers. 

Such were the defects, the deformities, the diseases and 
the ominous prospects, for which the Convention were to 
provide a remedy, and which ought never to be overlooked 
in expounding and appreciating the constitutional charter, 
the remedy that was provided. 

As a sketch on paper, the earliest, perhaps, of a Consti- 
tutional Government for the Union (organized into the reg- 
ular departments, with physical means operating on indi- 
viduals) to be sanctioned by the people of the States, acting 
in their original and sovereign character, was contained in 
the letters of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson of the 
nineteenth of March; to Governor Randolph of the eighth 
of April; and to General Washington of the sixteenth of 
April, 1787, for which see their respective dates. 

The feature, in these letters which vested in the general 
authority a negative on the laws of the States, was Bug- 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 49 

gested by the negative in the head of the British Empire, 
which prevented collisions between the parts and the whole, 
and between the parts themselves. It was supposed that 
the substitution of an elective and responsible authority, 
for an hereditary and irresponsible one, would avoid the 
appearance even of a departure from Republicanism. But 
although the subject was so viewed in the Convention, and 
the votes on it were more than once equally divided, it was 
finally and justly abandoned, as, apart from other objec- 
tions, it was not practicable among so many States, increas- 
ing in number, and enacting, each of them, so many laws. 
Instead of the proposed negative, the objects of it were left 
as finally provided for in the Constitution. 

On the arrival of the Virginia Deputies at Philadelphia, 
it occurred to them, that, from the early and prominent part 
taken by that State in bringing about the Convention, some 
initiative step might be expected from them. The Resolu- 
tions introduced by Governer Randolph were the result of 
consultation on the subject, with an understanding that they 
left all the Deputies entirely open to the lights of discus- 
sion, and free to concur in any alterations or modifications 
which their reflections and judgments might approve. The 
Resolutions, as the Journals show, became the basis on 
which the proceedings of the Convention commenced, and 
to the developements, variations and modifications of which 
the plan of government proposed by the Convention may be 
traced. 

The curiosity I had felt during my researches into the 
history of the most distinguished confederacies, particularly 
those of antiquity, and the deficiency I found in the means 
of satisfying it, more especially in what related to the pro- 
cess, the principles, the reasons, and the anticipations, 
which prevailed in the formation of them, determined me to 
preserve, as far I could, an exact account of what might 
pass in the Convention while executing its trust; with the 
magnitude of which I was duly impressed, as I was by the 
gratification promised to future curiosity by an authentic 
4 



50 INTRODUCTION TO THE 

exhibition of the objects, the opinions, and the reasonings, 
from which the system of government was to receive its 
peculiar structure and organization. Nor was I unaware of 
the value of such a contribution to the fund of materials 
for the history of a Constitution on which would be staked 
the happiness of a people great even in its infancy, and 
possibly the cause of liberty throughout the world. 

In pursuance of the task I had assumed, I chose a seat 
in front of the presiding member, with the other members 
on my right and left hands. In this favorable position for 
hearing all that passed, I noted, in terms legible and in 
abbreviations and marks intelligible to myself, what was 
read from the Chair or spoken by the members; and losing 
not a moment unnecessarily between the adjournment and 
reassembling of the Convention, I was enabled to write out 
my daily notes during the session, or within a few finishing 
days after its close, in the extent and form preserved in 
my own hand on my files. 

In the labor and correctness of this I was not a little 
aided by practice, and by a familiarity with the style and 
the train of observation and reasoning which characterized 
the principal speakers. It happened, also, that I was not 
absent a single day, nor more than a casual fraction of an 
hour in any day, so that I could not have lost a single 
speech, unless a very short one. 

It may be proper to remark, that, with a very few 
exceptions, the speeches were neither furnished, nor revised, 
nor sanctioned, by the speakers, but written out from my 
notes, aided by the freshness of my recollections. A further 
remark maybe proper, that views of the subject might occa- 
sionally be presented, in the speeches and proceedings, with 
a latent reference to a compromise on some middle ground, 
by mutual concessions. The exceptions alluded to were, — 
first, the sketch furnished by Mr. Eandolph of his speech 
on the introduction of his propositions on the 29th day of 
May ; secondly, the speech of Mr. Hamilton, who happened 
to call on me when putting the last hand to it, and who 



DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION. 51 

acknowledged its fidelity, without suggesting more than 
a very few verbal alterations which were made ; thirdly, 
the speech of Gouverneur Morris on the second day of 
May,* which was communicated to him on a like occasion, 
and who acquiesced in it without even a verbal change. 
The correctness of his language and the distinctness of his 
enunciation were particularly favorable to a reporter. The 
speeches of Doctor Franklin, excepting a few brief ones, 
were copied from the written ones read to the Convention 
by his colleague, Mr. Wilson, it being inconvenient to the 
Doctor to remain long on his feet. 

Of the ability and intelligence of those who composed 
the Convention the debates and proceedings may be a test ; 
as the character of the work which was the offspring of 
their deliberations must be tested by the experience of the 
future, added to that of nearly half a century which has 



But whatever may be the judgment pronounced on the 
competency of the architects of the Constitution, or what- 
ever may be the destiny of the edifice prepared by them, 
I feel it a duty to express my profound and solemn con- 
viction, derived from my intimate opportunity of observing 
and appreciating the views of the Convention, collectively 
and individually, that there never was an assembly of men, 
charged with a great and arduous trust, who were more 
pure in their motives, or more exclusively or anxiously 
devoted to the object committed to them, than were the 
members of the Federal Convention of 1787, to the object 
of devising and proposing a constitutional system which 
should best supply the defects of that which it was to 
replace, and best secure the permanent liberty and happi- 
ness of their country. 

* It reads thus in original copy, but probably refers to July 2nd. (Pub. Note.) 



DEBATES 

IN THE 

FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787. 



Monday, May 14th, 1787, 

Was the day fixed for the meeting of the Deputies in 
Convention, for revising the federal system of government. 
On that day a small number only had assembled. Seven 
States were not convened till, 

Friday, May 25th. 



When the following members appeared: 

From 

Massachusetts, 

New York, 



Rufus King. 

Robert Yates, and 

Alexander Hamilton. 
New Jersey, David Brearly, 

William Churchill Houston, and 

William Patterson. 
Pennsylvania, Robert Morris, 

Thomas Fitzsimons, 

James Wilson, and 

Gouverneur Morris. 
Delaware, George Read, 

Richard Basset, and 

Jacob Broom. 
Virginia, George Washington, 

Edmund Randolph, 

John Blair, 

James Madison, 
53 



54 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

George Mason, 
George Wythe, and 
James McClurg. 

North Carolina, Alexander Martin, 

William Kichardson Davie, 
Eichard Dobbs Spaight, and 
Hugh Williamson. 

South Carolina, John Eutledge, 

Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, 
Charles Pinckney, and 
Pierce Butler. 

Georgia, William Few. 

Mr. Eobert Morris informed the members assembled, 
that, by the instruction and in behalf of the deputation of 
Pennsylvania, he proposed George Washington, Esquire, 
late Commander-in-Chief, for President of the Convention.* 
Mr. John Eutledge seconded the motion, expressing his 
confidence that the choice would be unanimous; and ob- 
serving, that the presence of General Washington forbade 
any observations on the occasion which might otherwise be 
proper. 

General Washington was accordingly unanimously 
elected by ballot, and conducted to the Chair by Mr. E. 
Morris and Mr. Eutledge ; from which, in a very emphatic 
manner, he thanked the Convention for the honor they had 
conferred on him; reminded them of the novelty of the 
scene of business in which he was to act, lamented his 
want of better qualifications, and claimed the indulgence of 
the House towards the involuntary errors which his inex- 
perience might occasion. 

Mr. Wilson moved that a Secretary be appointed, and 
nominated Mr. Temple Franklin. 

Colonel Hamilton nominated Major Jackson. On the 

*The nomination came with particular grace from Pennsylvania, as Doctor 
Franklin alone could have been thought of as a competitor. The Doctor was him- 
self to have made the nomination of General Washington, but the state of the 
weathor and of his health confined him to his house. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 55 

ballot Major Jackson had five votes, and Mr. Franklin two 
votes. 

On reading the credentials of the Deputies, it was 
noticed that those from Delaware were prohibited from 
changing the Article in the Confederation establishing an 
equality of votes among the States. 

The appointment of a Committee, on the motion of Mr. 
C. Pinckney, consisting of Messrs. Wythe, Hamilton, and 
0. Pinckney, to prepare standing rules and orders, was the 
only remaining step taken on this day. 



Monday, May 28th. 

In Convention, — From Massachusetts, Nathaniel Gor- 
ham and Caleb Strong ; from Connecticut, Oliver Ells- 
worth ; from Delaware, Gunning Bedford ; from Mary- 
land, James McHenry ; from Pennsylvania, Benjamin 
Franklin, George Clymer, Thomas Mifflin, and Jared 
Ingersoll, — took their seats. 

Mr. Wythe, from the Committee for preparing rules, 
made a report, which employed the deliberations of this day. 

Mr. King objected to one of the rules in the report 
authorizing any member to call for the Yeas and Nays and 
have them entered on the minutes. He urged, that as the 
acts of the Convention were not to bind the constituents, it 
was unnecessary to exhibit this evidence of the votes ; and 
improper, as changes of opinion would be frequent in the 
course of the business, and would fill the minutes with con- 
tradictions. 

Colonel Mason seconded the objection, adding, that 
such a record of the opinions of members would be an 
obstacle to a change of them on conviction ; and in case of 
its being hereafter promulged, must furnish handles to 
the adversaries of the result of the meeting. 

The proposed rule was rejected, nem. con. The standing 
rules agreed to were as follows : 



56 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

RULES. 

" A House to do business shall consist of the Deputies 
of not less than seven States ; and all questions shall be 
decided by the greater number of these which shall be fully 
represented. But a less number than seven may adjourn 
from day to day. 

" Immediately after the President shall have taken the 
Chair, and the members their seats, the minutes of the pre- 
ceding day shall be read by the Secretary. 

"Every member, rising to speak, shall address the 
President ; and, whilst he shall be speaking, none shall 
pass between them, or hold discourse with another, or read a 
book, pamphlet, or paper, printed or manuscript. And of 
two members rising to speak at the same time, the Presi- 
dent shall name him who shall be first heard. 

" A member shall not speak oftener than twice, without 
special leave, upon the same question; and not the 
second time, before every other who had been silent shall 
have been heard, if he choose to speak upon the subject. 

" A motion, made and seconded, shall be repeated, and, 
if written, as it shall be when any member shall so require, 
read aloud, by the Secretary, before it shall be debated; 
and may be withdrawn at any time before the vote upon it 
shall have been declared. 

" Orders of the day shall be read next after tne minutes; 
and either discussed or postponed, before any other busi- 
ness shall be introduced. 

" When a debate shall arise upon a question, no motion, 
other than to amend the question, to commit it, or to post- 
pone the debate, shall be received. 

" A question which is complicated shall, at the request 
of any member, be divided, and put separately upon the 
propositions of which it is compounded. 

" The determination of a question, although fully de- 
bated, shall be postponed, if the Deputies of any State 
desire it, until the next day. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 57 

u A writing which contains any matter brought on to be 
considered shall be read once throughout, for information ; 
then by paragraphs, to be debated; and again, with the 
amendments, if any, made on the second reading; and 
afterwards the question shall be put upon the whole, 
amended, or approved in its original form, as the case shall 
be. 

"Committees shall be appointed by ballot; and the 
members who have the greatest number of ballots, although 
not a majority of the votes present, shall be the Committee. 
When two or more members have an equal number of votes, 
the member standing first on the list, in the order of taking 
down the ballots, shall be preferred. 

" A member may be called to order by any other mem- 
ber, as well as by the President; and may be allowed to 
explain his conduct, or expressions supposed to be repre- 
hensible. And all questions of order shall be decided by 
the President, without appeal or debate. 

" Upon a question to adjourn, for the day, which may 
be made at any time, if it be seconded, the question shall be 
put without a debate. 

" When the House shall adjourn, every member shall 
stand in his place until the President pass him."* 

A letter from sundry persons of the State of Khode 
Island, addressed to the Chairman of the General Conven- 
tion, was presented to the Chair by Mr Gouverneur Mor- 
ris; and, being read, was ordered to lie on the table for 
further consideration. 

* Previous to the arrival of a majority of the States, the rule by which they ought 
to vote in the Convention had been made a subject of conversation among the mem 
bers present. It was pressed by Gouverneur Morris, and favored by Robert Morris 
and others from Pennsylvania, that the large States should unite in firmly refusing 
to the small States an equal vote, as unreasonable, and as enabling the small States 
to negative every good system of government, which must, in the nature of things, be 
founded on a violation of that equality. The members from Virginia, conceiving 
that such an attempt might beget fatal altercations between the large and small 
States ; and that it would be easier to prevail on the latter, in the course of the 
deliberations, to give up their equality for the sake of an effective government, than 
on taking the field of discussion, to disarm themselves of the right, and thereby throw 
themselves on the mercy of the larger States, discountenanced and stifled the 
project. 



58 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Butler moved that the House provide against 
interruption of business by absence of members, and against 
licentious publications of their proceedings. To which was 
added, by Mr. Spaight, a motion to provide, that, on the 
one hand, the House might not be precluded by a vote 
upon any question from revising the subject matter of it, 
when they see cause, nor, on the other hand, be led too 
hastily to rescind a decision which was the result of mature 
discussion. Whereupon it was ordered, that these motions 
be referred for the consideration of the Committee appoint- 
ed to draw up the standing rules, and that the Committee 
make report thereon. 

Adjourned till to-morrow, at ten o'clock. 



Tuesday, May 29th. 

In Convention, — John Dickinson, and Elbridge Gerry, 
the former from Delaware, the latter from Massachusetts, 
took their seats. The following rules were added, on the 
Eeport of Mr. Wythe, from the Committee — 

" That no member be absent from the House, so as to 
interrupt the representation of the State, without leave. 

" That Committees do not sit whilst the House shall 
be, or ought to be, sitting. 

" That no copy be taken of any entry on the Journal 
during the sitting of the House, without leave of the House. 

"That members only be permitted to inspect the 
Journal. 

"That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or 
otherwise published, or communicated without leave. 

" That a motion to reconsider a matter which has been 
determined by a majority, may be made, with leave, unani- 
mously given, on the same day on which the vote passed ; but 
otherwise, not without one day's previous notice; in which 
last case, if the House agree to the reconsideration, some 
future day shall be assigned for that purpose." 



1787 ] FEDERAL CONVENTION 59 

Mr. C. Pinckney moved, that a Committee be appointed 
to superintend the minutes. 

Mr. G. Morris objected to it. The entry of the pro- 
ceedings of the Convention belonged to the Secretary as 
their impartial officer. A Committee might have an interest 
and bias in moulding the entry, according to their opinions 
and wishes. 

The motion was negatived, five Noes, four Ayes. 

Mr. Eandolph then opened the main business: — 

He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him, 
rather than those who were of longer standing in life and 
political experience, to open the great subject of their mis- 
sion. But as the Convention had originated from Virginia, 
and his colleagues supposed that some proposition was ex- 
pected from them, they had imposed the task on him. 

He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis, and 
the necessity of preventing the fulfilment of the prophecies 
of the American downfall. 

He observed, that, in revising the Federal system we 
ought to inquire, first, into the properties which such a 
government ought to possess; secondly, the defects of the 
Confederation; thirdly the danger of our situation; and 
fourthly, the remedy. 

1. The character of such a government ought to secure, 
first, against foreign invasion ; secondly, against dissensions 
between members of the Union, or seditions in particular 
States; thirdly, to procure to the several States various 
blessings of which an isolated situation was incapable; 
fourthly, it should be able to defend itself against encroach- 
ment; and fifthly, to be paramount to the State Constitu- 
tions. 

2. In speaking of the defects of the Confederation, he 
professed a high respect for its authors, and considered 
them as having done all that patriots could do, in the 
then infancy of the science of constitutions, and of confed- 
eracies ; when the inefficiency of requisitions was unknown — 
no commercial discord had arisen among any States — no 



60 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

rebellion had appeared, as in Massachusetts — foreign debts 
had not become urgent — the havoc of paper-money had not 
been foreseen — treaties had not been violated — 'and perhaps 
nothing better could be obtained, from the jealousy of the 
States with regard to their sovereignty. 

He then proceeded to enumerate the defects: — First, 
tnat the Confederation produced no security against foreign 
invasion; Congress not being permitted to prevent a war, 
nor to support it by their own authority. Of this he cited 
many examples; most of which tended to shew, that they 
could not cause infractions of treaties, or of the law of 
nations to be punished; that particular States might by 
their conduct provoke war without control ; and that, neither 
militia nor drafts being fit for defence on such occasions, 
enlistments only could be successful, and these could not 
be executed without money. 

Secondly, that the Federal Government could not check 
the quarrel between the States, nor a rebellion in any, not 
having constitutional power nor means to impose according 
to the exigency. 

Thirdly, that there were many advantages which the 
United States might acquire, which were not attainable 
under the Confederation — such as a productive impost — 
counteraction of the commercial regulations of other 
nations — pushing of commerce ad libitum, &c, &c. 

Fourthly, that the Federal Government could not defend 
itself against encroachments from the States. 

Fifthly, that it was not even paramount to the State 
Constitutions, ratified as it was in many of the States. 

3. He next reviewed the danger of our situation and 
appealed to the sense of the best friends of the United 
States — to the prospect of anarchy from the laxity of gov- 
ernment every where — and to other considerations. 

4. He then proceeded to the remedy ; the basis of 
which he said must be the republican principle. 

He proposed, as conformable to his ideas, the following 
resolutions, which he explained one by one. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 61 

1. " Kesolved, that the Articles of Confederation ought 
to be so corrected and enlarged as to accomplish the objects 
proposed by their institution ; namely, " common defence, 
security of liberty, and general warfare." 

2. " Eesolved, therefore, that the rights of suffrage in 
the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the 
quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, 
as the one or the other rule may seem best in different 
cases. 

3. "Kesolved, that the National Legislature ought to 
consist of two branches. 

4. " Eesolved, that the members of the first branch of 
the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people 

of the several States every for the term of ; 

to be of the age of years at least ; to receive liberal 

stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion 
of their time to the public service ; to be ineligible to any 
office established by a particular State, or under the 
authority of the United States, except those peculiarly 
belong to the functions of the first branch, during the term 

of service, and for the space of after its expiration ; 

to be incapable of re-election for the space of after 

the expiration of their term of service, and to be subject to 
recall. 

5. " Eesolved, that the members of the second branch 
of the National Legislature ought to be elected by those of 
the first, out of a proper number of persons nominated by 

the individual Legislatures, to be of the age of years 

at least ; to hold their offices for a term sufficient to 
ensure their independency ; to receive liberal stipends, 
by which they may be compensated for the devotion of 
their time to the public service ; and to be ineligible to 
any office established by a particular State, or under the 
authority of the United States, except those peculiarly 
belonging to the functions of the second branch, during 

the term of service ; and for the space of after the 

expiration thereof. 



62 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

6. "Resolved, that each branch ought to possess the 
right of originating acts ; that the National Legislature 
ought to be empowered to enjoy the legislative rights vested 
in Congress by the Confederation, and moreover to legislate 
in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, 
or in which the harmony of the United States may be inter- 
rupted by the exercise of individual legislation ; to negative 
all laws passed by the several States contravening, in the 
opinion of the National Legislature, the Articles of Union, 
or any treaty subsisting under the authority of the Union ; 
and to call forth the force of the Union against any member 
of the Union failing to fulfil its duty under the Articles 
thereof. 

7. " Resolved, that a National Executive be instituted ; 
to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of 
; to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed com- 
pensation for the services rendered, in which no increase 
nor diminution shall be made, so as to affect the magistracy 
existing at the time of increase or diminution ; and to be 
ineligible a second time ; and that, besides a general 
authority to execute the national laws, it ought to enjoy the 
executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation. 

8. " Resolved, that the Executive, and a convenient 
number of the national Judiciary, ought to compose a 
Council of Revision, with authority to examine every act 
of the National Legislature, before it shall operate, and 
every act of a particular Legislature before a negative 
thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said 
Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the act of the 
National Legislature be again passed, or that of a particular 

Legislature be again negatived by of the members 

of each branch. 

9. "Resolved, that a National Judiciary be established; 
to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior 
tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature ; to hold 
their offices during good behaviour, and to receive punctu- 
ally, at stated times, fixed compensation for their services. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 63 

in which no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to 
affect the persons actually in office at the same time of such 
increase or diminution. That the jurisdiction of the infe- 
rior tribunals shall be to hear and determine, in the first 
instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and deter- 
mine, in the dernier resort, all piracies and felonies on the 
high seas ; captures from an enemy ; cases in which foreign- 
ers, or citizens of other States, applying to such jurisdic- 
tions, may be interested; or which respect the collection of 
the national revenue ; impeachments of any national officers, 
and questions which may involve the national peace and 
harmony. 

10. "Resolved, that provision ought to be made for the 
admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of 
the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of 
government and territory, or otherwise, with the consent of 
a number of voices in the National Legislature less than 
the whole. 

11. " Resolved, that a republican government, and the 
territory of each State, except in the instance of a volun- 
tary junction of government and territory, ought to be 
guaranteed by the United States to each State. 

12. "Resolved, that provision ought to be made for the 
continuance of Congress and their authorities and privi- 
leges, until a given day after the reform of the Articles of 
Union shall be adopted, and for the completion of all their 
engagements. 

13. " Resolved, that provision ought to be made for the 
amendment of the Articles of Union, whensoever it shall 
seem necessary; and that the assent of the National Legis- 
lature ought not to be required thereto. 

14. "Resolved, that the legislative, executive, and ju- 
diciary powers, within the several States ought to be bound 
by oath to support the Articles of Union. 

15. " Resolved, that the amendments which shall be of- 
fered to the Confederation, by the Convention, ought, at a 
proper time or times, after the approbation of Congress, to 



64 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

be submitted to an assembly or assemblies of representa- 
tives, recommended by the several Legislatures, to be 
expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide 
thereon." 

He concluded with an exhortation, not to suffer the 
present opportunity of establishing general peace, harmony, 
happiness and liberty in the United States to pass away un- 
improved.* 

It was then resolved, that the House will to-morrow 
resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole House, to con- 
sider of the state of the American Union; and that the. pro- 
positions moved by Mr. Bandolph be referred to the said 
Committee. 

Mr. Charles Pinckney laid before the House the draft 
of a federal government which he had prepared, to be 
agreed upon between the free and independent States of 
America: 

PLAN OF A FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 

We, the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massa- 
chusetts, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Con- 
necticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Georgia, do ordain, declare, and establish the following 
Constitution, for the government of ourselves and posterity. 

Article I. 
" The style of this government shall be, The United States 
of America, and the government shall consist of supreme 
legislative, executive and judicial powers. 

Article II. 
" The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress, to 
consist of two separate Houses ; one to be called the House 
of Delegates ; and the other the Senate, who shall meet on 
the day of in every year. 

* This abstract of the speech was furnished to James Madison by Mr. Randolph, 
and is in his hand-writing. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. $$ 

Article III. 

" The members of the House of Delegates shall be chosen 

every year by the people of the several States ; and 

the qualification of the electors shall be the same as those 
of the electors in the several States for their Legislatures. 
Each member shall have been a citizen of the United States 

for years ; and shall be of years of age, and a 

resident in the State he is chosen for. Until a census of 
the people shall be taken in the manner hereinafter men- 
tioned, the House of Delegates shall consist of 

-, to be chosen from the different States in the follow- 



ing proportions: for New Hampshire, ; for Massa- 
chusetts, ; for Rhode Island, ; for Connecticut,— 

— ; for New York, — ; for New Jersey, ; for 

Pennsylvania, ; for Delaware, ; for Maryland, 

; for Virginia, ; for North Carolina, ; 

for South Carolina ; for Georgia, ; and the 

Legislature shall hereinafter regulate the number of Dele- 
gates by the number of inhabitants, according to the pro- 
visions hereinafter made, at the rate of one for every 

thousand. All money bills of every kind shall originate in 
the House of Delegates, and shall not be altered by the 
Senate. The House of Delegates shall exclusively possess 
the power of impeachment, and shall choose its own officers ; 
and vacancies therein shall be supplied by the executive 
authority of the State in the representation from which they 
shall happen. 

Article IV. 

" The Senate shall be elected and chosen by the House 
of Delegates; which House, immediately after their meet- 
ing, shall choose by ballot Senators from among the 

citizens and residents of New Hampshire; from 

among those of Massachusetts ; from among those 

of Rhode Island ; from among those of Connecti- 
cut ; from among those of New York ; 

from among those of New Jersey; from among 

5 



66 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

those of Pennsylvania ; from among those of Dela- 
ware; from among those of Maryland; 

from among those of Virginia ; from among those 

of North Carolina; from among those of South 

Carolina; and — from among those of Georgia. 

The senators chosen from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, and Connecticut, shall form one class; those 
from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, 
one class; and those from Maryland, Virginia, North Caro- 
lina, South Carolina, and Georgia, one class. The House 
of Delegates shall number these classes one, two, and three ; 
and fix the times of their service by lot. The first class 

shall serve for years ; the second for years ; 

and the third for years. As their times of service 

expire, the House of Delegates shall fill them up by 

elections for years; and they shall fill all vacancies 

that arise from death or resignation, for the time of service 
remaining of the members so dying or resigning. Each 

Senator shall be years of age at least; and shall 

have been a citizen of the United States for four years 
before his election; and shall be a resident of the State he 
is chosen from. The Senate shall choose its own officers. 

Article V. 

"Each State shall prescribe the time and manner of 
holding elections by the people for the House of Delegates ; 
and the House of Delegates shall be the judges of the 
elections, returns, and qualifications of their members. 

" In each House a majority shall constitute a quorum 
to do business. Freedom of speech and debate in the 
Legislature shall not be impeached, or questioned, in any 
place out of it; and the members of both Houses shall in 
all cases, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace, 
be free from arrest during their attendance on Congress, 
and in going to and returning from it. Both Houses shall 
keep Journals of their proceedings, and publish them, ex- 
cept on secret occasions; and the Yeas and Nays may be 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 67 

entered thereon at the desire of one of the members 

present. Neither House, without the consent of the other, 

shall adjourn for more than days, nor to any place 

but where they are sitting. 

" The members of each House shall not be eligible to, 
or capable of holding, any office under the Union, during 
the time for which they have been respectively elected ; nor 
the members of the Senate for one year after. The mem- 
bers of each House shall be paid for their services by the 
States which they represent. Every bill which shall have 
passed the Legislature shall be presented to the President 
of the United States for his revision; if he approves it, he 
shall sign it ; but if he does not approve it, he shall return 
it, with his objections, to the House it originated in; which 
House, if two-thirds of the members present, notwithstand- 
ing the President's objections, agree to pass it, shall send it 
to the other House, with the President's objections; where 
if two-thirds of the members present also agree to pass it, 
the same shall become a law; and all bills sent to the Pres- 
ident, and not returned by him within days, shall be 

laws, unless the Legislature, by their adjournment, prevent 
their return ; in which case they shall not be laws. • 

Aeticle VI. 

" The Legislature of the United States shall have the 
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; 

To regulate commerce with all nations, and among the 
several States; 

To borrow money and emit bills of credit; 

To establish post-offices; 

To raise armies; 

To build and equip fleets; 

To pass laws for arming, organizing, and disciplining 
the militia of the United States ; 

To subdue a rebellion in any State, on application of its 
Legislature ; 



68 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

To coin money, and regulate the value of all coins, and 
fix the standard of weights and measures ; 

To provide such dockyards and arsenals, and erect such 
fortifications as may be necessary for the United States, 
and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction therein; 

To appoint a Treasurer, by ballot; 

To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court ; 

To establish post and military roads; 

To establish and provide for a national university at the 
seat of government of the United States; 

To establish uniform rules of naturalization; 

To provide for the establishment of a seat of govern- 
ment for the United States, not exceeding miles 

square, in which they shall have exclusive jurisdiction ; 

To make rules concerning captures from an enemy; 

To declare the law and punishment of piracies and 
felonies at sea, and of counterfeiting coin, and of all of- 
fences against the laws of nations; 

To call forth the aid of the militia to execute the laws 
of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and 
repel invasions ; 

And to make all laws for carrying the foregoing powers 
into execution. 

" The Legislature of the United States shall have the 
power to declare the punishment of treason, which shall con- 
sist only in levying ^ar against the United States, or any of 
them, or in adhering to their enemies. No person shall be 
convicted of treason but by the testimony of two witnesses. 

" The proportion of direct taxation shall be regulated 
by the whole number of inhabitants of every description ; 

which number shall, within years after the first 

meeting of the Legislature, and within the term of every 

year after, be taken in the manner to be prescribed 

by the Legislature. 

"No tax shall be laid on articles exported from the 
States ; nor capitation tax, but in proportion to the census 
before directed. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 69 

" All laws regulating commerce shall require the assent 
of two-thirds of the members present in each House. The 
United States shall not grant any title of nobility. The 
Legislature of the United States shall pass no law on the 
subject of religion ; nor touching or abridging the liberty 
of the press ; nor shall the privilege of the writ of Habeus 
Corpus ever be suspended, except in case of rebellion or 
invasion. 

" All acts made by the Legislature of the United States, 
pursuant to this Constitution, and all treaties made under 
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law 
of the land ; and all judges shall be bound to consider them 
as such in their decisions. 

Aeticle VII. 

" The Senate shall have the sole and exclusive power to 
declare war ; and to make treaties ; and to appoint ambas- 
sadors and other ministers to foreign nations, and judges of 
the Supreme Court. 

" They shall have the exclusive power to regulate the 
manner of deciding all disputes and controversies now ex- 
isting, or which may arise, between the States, respecting 
jurisdiction or territory. 

Article VIII. 

"The executive power of the United States shall be 
vested in a President of the United States of America, 
which shall be his style ; and his title shall be His Excel- 
lency. He shall be elected fors — years ; and shall be 

re-eligible. 

" He shall from time to time give information to the 
Legislature, of the State of the Union, and recommend to 
their consideration the measures he may think necessary. 
He shall take care that the laws of the United States be 
duly executed. He shall commission all the officers of the 
United States ; and, except as to ambassadors, other minis- 
ters, and judges of the Supreme Court, he shall nominate. 



70 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

and, with the consent of the Senate, appoint, all other officers 
of the United States. He shall receive public ministers from 
foreign nations ; and may correspond with the Executives 
of the different States. He shall have power to grant par- 
dons and reprieves, except in impeachments. He shall be 
Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United 
States, and of the militia of the several States ; and shall 
receive a compensation which shall not be increased or 
diminished during his continuance in office. At entering 
on the duties of his office, he shall take an oath faithfully 
to execute the duties of a President of the United States. 
He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the 
House of Delegates, and conviction in the Supreme Court, 
of treason, bribery, or corruption. In case of his removal, 
death, resignation, or disability, the President of the Senate 
shall exercise the duties of his office until another President 
be chosen. And in case of the death of the President of the 
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Delegates shall do so. 

Article IX. 

1 The Legislature of the United States shall have the 
power, and it shall be their duty, to establish such courts 
of law, equity, and admiralty, as shall be necessary. 

" The judges of the courts shall hold their offices during 
good behaviour; and receive a compensation, which shall 
not be increased or diminished during their continuance in 
office. One of these courts shall be termed the Supreme 
Court; whose jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising 
under the laws of the United States, or affecting embassa- 
dors, other public ministers and consuls; to the trial of 
impeachment of officers of the United States; to all cases 
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In cases of im- 
peachment affecting ambassadors, and other public minis- 
ters, this jurisdiction shall be original; and in all other 
cases appellate. 

" All criminal offences, except in cases of impeachment 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 71 

shall be tried in the State where they shall be committed. 
The trials shall be open and public, and shall be by jury. 

Article X. 

" Immediately after the first census of the people of the 
United States, the House of Delegates shall apportion the 
Senate by electing for each State, out of the citizens resi- 
dent therein, one Senator for every members each 

State shall have in the House of Delegates. Each State 
shall be entitled to have at least one member in the Senate. 

Article XL 

" No State shall grant letters of marque and reprisal, or 
enter into treaty, or alliance, or confederation; nor grant 
any title of nobility ; nor, without the consent of the Legis- 
lature of the United States, lay any impost on imports ; nor 
keep troops or ships of war in time of peace; nor enter 
into compacts with other States or foreign powers ; nor emit 
bills of credit; nor make any thing but gold, silver, or cop- 
per, a tender in payment of debts; nor engage in war, 
except for self-defense when actually invaded, or the danger 
of invasion be so great as not to admit of a delay until the 
Government of the United States can be informed thereof. 
And to render these prohibitions effectual, the Legislature 
of the United States shall have the power to revise the laws 
of the several States that may be supposed to infringe the 
powers exclusively delegated by this Constitution to Con- 
gress, and to negative and annul such as do. 

Article XII. 

" The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all priv- 
ileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. Any 
person, charged with crimes in any State, fleeing from jus- 
tice to another, shall, on demand of the Executive of the 
State from which he fled, be delivered up, and removed to 
the State having jurisdiction of the offence. 



72 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Article XIII. 

"Full faith shall be given, in each State, to the acts of 
the Legislature, and to the records and judicial proceedings 
of the courts and magistrates, of every State. 

Article XIV. 

" The Legislature shall have power to admit new States 
into the Union, on the same terms with the original States ; 
provided two-thirds of the members present in both Houses 
agree. 

Article XV. 

" On the application of the Legislature of a State, the 
United States shall protect it against domestic insurrection. 

Article XVI. 

" If two-thirds of the Legislatures of the States apply 
for the same, the Legislature of the United States shall 
call a convention for the purpose of amending the Constitu- 
tion; or, should Congress, with the consent of two-thirds 
of each House, propose to the States amendments to the 
same, the agreement of two-thirds of the Legislatures of 
the States shall be sufficient to make the said amendments 
parts of the Constitution. 

" The ratification of the conventions of 

States shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution." 

Ordered, that the said draft be referred to the Com- 
mittee of the Whole appointed to consider the state of the 
American Union. 

Adjourned. 

Wednesday, May 30th. 

Roger Sherman, from Connecticut, took his seat. 

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the 
state of the Union. Mr. Gorham was elected to the Chair 
by ballot. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 73 

The propositions of Mr. Eandolph which had been re- 
ferred to the Committee being taken up, he moved, on the 
suggestion of Mr. G. Morris, that the first of his proposi- 
tions, — to-wit: "Resolved, that the Articles of Confedera- 
tion ought to be so collected and enlarged, as to accomplish 
the objects proposed by their institution; namely, common 
defence, security of liberty, and general welfare, — should 
mutually be postponed, in order to consider the three fol- 
lowing: 

" 1. That a union of the States merely federal will not 
accomplish the objects proposed by the Articles of Confed- 
eration, namely, common defence, security of liberty, and 
general welfare. 

" 2. That no treaty or treaties among the whole or part 
of the States, as individual sovereignties, would be suffi- 
cient. 

" 3. That a national government ought to be established, 
consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive and Judi- 
ciary " 

The motion for postponing was seconded by Mr. G. 
Morris, and unanimously agreed to. 

Some verbal criticisms were raised against the first prop- 
osition, and it was agreed, on motion of Mr. Butler, sec- 
onded by Mr. Randolph, to pass on to the third, which un- 
derwent a discussion, less, however, on its general merits 
than on the force and extent of the particular terms national 
and supreme. 

Mr. Charles Pinckney wished to know of Mr. Ran- 
dolph, whether he meant to abolish the State governments 
altogether. Mr. Randolph replied, that he meant by these 
general propositions merely to introduce the particular ones 
which explained the outlines of the system he had in view. 
Mr. Butler said, he had not made up his mind on the 
subject, and was open to the light which discussion might 
throw on it. After some general observations, he concluded 
with saying, that he had opposed the grant of powers to 
Congress heretofore, because the whole power was vested in 



74 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

one body. The proposed distribution of the powers with 
different bodies changed the case, and would induce him to 
go great lengths. 

General Pinckney expressed a doubt whether the act of 
Congress recommending the Convention, or the commissions 
of the Deputies to it, would authorize a discussion of a 
system founded on different principles from the Federal 
Constitution. 

Mr. Gerry seemed to entertain the same doubt. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris explained the distinction be- 
tween a federal and a national, supreme government; the 
former being a mere compact resting on the good faith of 
the parties; the latter having a complete and compulsive 
operation. He contended, that in all communities there 
must be one supreme power, and one only. 

Mr. Mason observed, not only that the present Confed- 
eration was deficient in not providing for coercion and pun- 
ishment against delinquent States ; but argued very cogently, 
that punishment could not in the nature of things be exe- 
cuted on the States collectively, and therefore that such a 
government was necessary as could directly operate on 
individuals, and would punish those only whose guilt 
required it. 

Mr. Sherman admitted that the Confederation had not 
given sufficient power to Congress, and that additional pow- 
ers were necessary; particularly that of raising money, 
which he said would involve many other powers. He ad- 
mitted also, that the general and particular jurisdictions 
ought in no case to be concurrent. He seemed, however, 
not to be disposed to make too great inroads on the exist- 
ing system; intimating, as one reason, that it would be 
wrong to lose every amendment by inserting such as would 
not be agreed to by the States. 

It was moved by Mr. Head, and seconded by Mr. 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, to postpone the third 
proposition last offered by Mr. Kandolph, viz. " that a 
national government ought to be established, consisting of 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 75 

a supreme Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary," in order 
to take up the following, viz. " Kesolved, that, in order to 
carry into execution the design of the States in forming 
this Convention, and to accomplish the objects proposed by 
the Confederation, a more effective Government, consisting 
of a Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary, ought to be 
established." The motion to postpone for this purpose was 
lost: 

Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, South Carolina, 
aye — 4 ; New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Caro- 
lina, no — 4. 

On the question, as moved by Mr. Butler, on the third 
proposition, it was resolved, in Committee of Whole, "that 
a national government ought to be established, consisting 
of a supreme Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary," — 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 6 ; Connecticut, no — 1 ; 
New York divided (Colonel Hamilton, aye, Mr. Yates, 
no). 

The following Resolution, being the second of those 
proposed by Mr. Randolph, was taken up, viz. " that the 
rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be 
proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number 
of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem 
best in different cases." 

Mr. Madison, observing that the words, " or to the num- 
ber of free inhabitants" might occasion debates which 
would divert the Committee from the general question 
whether the principle of representation should be changed 
moved that they might be struck out. 

Mr. King observed, that the quotas of contribution, which 
would alone remain as the measure of representation, would 
not answer; because, waiving every other view of the mat- 
ter, the revenue might hereafter be so collected by the 
General Government that the sums respectively drawn from 
the States would not appear, and would besides be continu- 
ally varying. 



76 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Madison admitted the propriety of the observation, 
and that some better rule ought to be found. 

Colonel Hamilton moved to alter the resolution so as to 
read, " that the rights of suffrage in the National Legisla- 
ture ought to be proportioned to the number of free inhabi- 
tants." Mr. Spaight seconded the motion. 

It was then moved that the resolution be postponed; 
which was agreed to. 

Mr. Eandolph and Mr. Madison then moved the fol- 
lowing resolution: "that the rights of suffrage in the 
National Legislature ought to be proportioned." 

It was moved and seconded to amend it by adding, ' ' and 
not according to the present system," which was agreed to. 

It was then moved and seconded to alter the resolution so 
as to read, "that the rights of suffrage in the National 
Legislature ought not to be according to the present 
system." 

It was then moved and seconded to postpone the resolu- 
tion moved by Mr. Eandolph and Mr. Madison; which 
being agreed to, — 

Mr. Madison moved, in order to get over the difficulties, 
the following resolution: "that the equality of suffrage 
established by the Articles of Confederation ought not to 
prevail in the National Legislature; and that an equitable 
ratio of representation ought to be substituted." This was 
seconded by Mr. Gouverneur Morris, and, being generally 
relished, would have been agreed to ; when — 

Mr. Read moved, that the whole clause relating to the 
point of representation be postponed ; reminding the Com- 
mittee that the Deputies from Delaware were restrained by 
their commission from assenting to any change of the rule 
of suffrage, and in case such a change should be fixed on, it 
might become their duty to retire from the Convention. 
Mr. Gouverneur Morris observed, that the valuable 
assistance of those members could not be lost without real 
concern; and that so early a proof of discord in the Con- 
vention, as the secession of a State, would add much to the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 77 

regret; that the change proposed was, however, so funda- 
mental an article in a national government, that it could 
not be dispensed with. 

Mr. Madison observed, that, whatever reason might have 
existed for the equality of suffrage when the Union was a 
federal one among sovereign States, it must cease when a 
national government should be put into the place. In the 
former case, the acts of Congress depended so much for 
their efficacy on the co-operation of the States, that these 
had a weight, both within and without Congress, nearly in 
proportion to their extent and importance. In the latter 
case, as the acts of the General Government would take 
effect without the intervention of the State Legislatures, a 
vote from a small State would have the same efficacy and 
importance as a vote from a large one, and there was the 
same reason for different numbers of representatives from 
different States, as from counties of different extents within 
particular States. He suggested as an expedient for at 
once taking the sense of the members on this point, and 
saving the Delaware Deputies from embarrassment, that the 
question should be taken in Committee, and the clause, on 
report to the House, be postponed without a question there. 
This, however, did not appear to satisfy Mr. Read. 

By several it was observed, that no just construction of 
the act of Delaware could require or justify a secession of 
her Deputies, even if the resolution were to be carried 
through the House as well as the Committee. It was finally 
agreed, however, that the clause should be postponed; it 
being understood that, in the event, the proposed change of 
representation would certainly be agreed to, no objection 
or difficulty being started from any other quarter than from 
Delaware. 

The motion of Mr. Read to postpone being agreed to, — 
The Committee then rose ; the Chairman reported 
progress ; and the House, having resolved to resume the 
subject in Committee to-morrow, — 
Adjourned to ten o'clock. 



78 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Thursday, May 31st. 

William Pierce, from Georgia, took his seat. 

In the Committee of the Whole on Mr. Randolph's 
Resolutions, — The third Resolution, "that the National 
Legislature ought to consist of two branches" was agreed to 
without debate, or dissent, except that of Pennsylvania, — 
given probably from complaisance to Doctor Franklin, who 
was understood to be partial to a single house of legislation. 

The fourth Resolution, first clause, " that the members 
of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be 
elected by the people of the several States" being taken up : 

Mr. Sherman opposed the election by the people, 
insisting that it ought to be by the State Legislatures. 
The people, he said, immediately, should have as little to do 
as may be about the government. They want information, 
and are constantly liable to be misled. 

Mr. Gerry. The evils we experience flow from the 
excess of democracy. The people do not want virtue, but 
are the dupes of pretended patriots. In Massachusetts it 
had been fully confirmed by experience, that they are daily 
misled into the most baneful measures and opinions, by the 
false reports circulated by designing men, and which no 
one on the spot can refute. One principal evil arises from 
the want of due provision for those employed in the admin- 
istration of government. It would seem to' be a maxim of 
democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned 
the popular clamor in Massachusetts for the reduction of 
salaries, and the attack made on that of the Governor, 
though secured by the spirit of the Constitution itself. He 
had, he said, been too republican heretofore : he was still, 
however, republican ; but had been taught by experience 
the danger of the leveling spirit, j 

Mr. Mason argued strongly for an election of the larger 
branch by the people. It was to be the grand depository 
of the democratic principle of the government. It was, so 
to speak, to be our House of Commons. It ought to know 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 79 

and sympathize with every part of the community ; and 
ought therefore to be taken, not only from different parts 
of the whole republic, but also from different districts of 
the larger members of it ; which had in several instances, 
particularly in Virginia, different interests and views arising 
from difference of produce, of habits, &c. &c. He admitted 
that we had been too democratic, but was afraid we should 
incautiously run into the opposite extreme. We ought to 
attend to the rights of every class of the people. He had 
often wondered at the indifference of the superior classes of 
society to this dictate of humanity and policy ; considering, 
that, however affluent their circumstances, or elevated their 
situations, might be, the course of a few years not only 
might, but certainly would, distribute their posterity 
throughout the lowest classes of society. Every selfish 
motive, therefore, every family attachment, ought to recom- 
mend such a system of policy as would provide no Jess care- 
fully for the rights and happiness of the lowest, than of the 
highest, order of citizens. 

Mr. Wilson contended strenuously for drawing the 
most numerous branch of the Legislature immediately from 
the people. He was for raising the federal pyramid to a 
considerable altitude, and for that reason wished to give it 
as broad a basis as possible. No government could long 
subsist without the confidence of the people. In a repub- 
lican government, this confidence was peculiarly essential. 
He also thought it wrong to increase the weight of the 
State Legislatures by making them the electors of the 
National Legislature. All interference between the general 
and local governments should be obviated as much as possi- 
ble. On examination it would be found that the opposition 
of States to Federal measures had proceeded much more 
from the officers of the States than from the people at large. 

Mr. Madison considered the popular election of one 
branch of the National Legislature as essential to every 
plan of free government. He observed, that in some of the 
States one branch of the Legislature was composed of men 



80 DEBATES IN THE [1T8T. 

already removed from the people by an intervening body of 
electors. That if the first branch of the General Legisla- 
ture should be elected by the State Legislatures, the second 
branch elected by the first, the Executive by the second 
together with the first, and other appointments again made 
for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the people would 
be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy 
between them and their rulers and officers too little felt. 
He was an advocate for the policy of refining the popular 
appointments by successive nitrations, but thought it might 
be pushed too far. He wished the expedient to be resorted 
to only in the appointment of the second branch of the 
Legislature, and in the Executive and Judiciary branches of 
the government. He thought, too, that the great fabric to 
be raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest 
on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it 
should stand merely on the pillars of the Legislatures. 

Mr. Gerry did not like the election by the people. The 
maxims taken from the British constitution were often fal- 
lacious when applied to our situation, which was extremely 
different. Experience, he said, had shown that the State 
Legislatures, drawn immediately from the people, did not 
always possess their confidence. He had no objection, 
however, to an election by the people, if it were so qualified 
that men of honor and character might not be unwilling to 
be joined in the appointments. He seemed to think the 
people might nominate a certain number, out of which the 
State Legislatures should be bound to choose. 

Mr. Butler thought an election by the people an 
impracticable mode. 

On the question for an election of the first branch of the 
National Legislature, by the people, Massachusetts, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, 
aye — 5 ; New Jersey, South Carolina, no — 2 ; Connecticut, 
Delaware, divided. 

The remaining clauses of the fourth Kesolution, relating 
t<> the qualifications of members of the National Legislature, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 81 

being postponed, nem. con,, as entering too much into detail 
for general propositions, — 

The Committee proceeded to the fifth Resolution, thai 
the second [or senatorial] branch of the National Legislatui'e 
ought to be chosen by the first branch, out of persons nomi- 
nated by the State Legislatures. 

Mr. Spaight contended, that the second branch ought to 
be chosen by the State Legislatures, and moved an amend- 
ment to that effect. 

Mr. Butler apprehended that the taking so many pow- 
ers out of the hands of the States as was proposed, tended 
to destroy all that balance and security of interests among 
the States which it was necessary to preserve; and called 
on Mr. Randolph, the mover of the propositions, to explain 
the extent of his ideas, and particularly the number of 
members he meant to assign to this second branch. 

Mr. Randolph observed, that he had, at the time of 
offering his propositions, stated his ideas as far as the 
nature of general propositions required; that details made 
no part of the plan, and could not perhaps with propriety 
have been introduced. If he was to give an opinion as to 
the number of the second branch, he should say that it 
ought to be much smaller than that of the first; so small 
as to be exempt from the passionate proceedings to which 
numerous assemblies are liable. He observed, that the 
general object was to provide a cure for the evils under 
which the United States labored; that in tracing these evils 
to their origin, every man had found it in the turbulence 
and follies of democracy; that some check therefore was to 
be sought for, against this tendency of our governments; 
and that a good Senate seemed most likely to answer the 
purpose. 

Mr. King reminded the Committee that the choice of 
the second branch as proposed, (by Mr. Spaight) viz., by 
the State Legislatures, would be impracticable, unless it was 
to be very numerous, or the idea of proportion among the 
States was to be disregarded. According to this idea, there 
6 



82 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

must be eighty or a hundred members to entitle Delaware 
to the choice of one of them. 

Mr. Spaight withdrew his motion. 

Mr. Wilson opposed both a nomination by the State 
Legislatures, and an election by the first branch of the 
National Legislature, because the second branch of the latter 
ought to be independent of both. He thought both branches 
of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the people, 
but was not prepared with a specific proposition. He 
suggested the mode of choosing the Senate of New York, 
to wit, of uniting several election districts for one branch, 
in choosing members for the other branch, as a good model. 

Mr. Madison observed, that such a mode would destroy 
the influence of the smaller States associated with larger 
ones in the same district; as the latter would choose from 
within themselves, although better men might be found in 
the former. The election of Senators in Virginia, where 
large and small counties were often formed into one district 
for the purpose, had illustrated this consequence. Local 
partiality would often prefer a resident within the county 
or State, to a candidate of superior merit residing out of it. 
Less merit also in a resident would be more known through- 
out his own State. 

Mr. Sherman favored an election of one member by 
each of the State Legislatures. 

Mr. Pinckney moved to strike out the " nomination by 
the State Legislatures ; " on this question — 

* Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no — 9 ; Delaware, divided. 

On the whole question for electing by the first branch 
out of nominations by the State Legislatures — Massa- 
chusetts, Virginia, South Carolina, aye — 3 ; Connecticut, 
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North 
Carolina, Georgia, no — 7. 

♦This question is omitted in the printed Journal, and the Totee applied to the succeeding 
one, instead of the votes as here stated. 



1^87.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 83 

So the clause was disagreed to, and a chasm left in this 
part of the plan. 

The sixth Resolution, stating the cases in which the 
National Legislature ought to legislate, was next taken into 
discussion. On the question whether each branch should 
originate laws, there was an unanimous affirmative, without 
debate. On the question for transferring all the legislative 
powers of the existing Congress to this assembly, there was 
also an unanimous affirmative, without debate. 

On the proposition for giving legislative power in all 
cases to which the State Legislatures were individually 
incompetent, — Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Rutledge objected 
to the vagueness of the term " incompetent,'''' and said they 
could not well decide how to vote until they should see an 
exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by this 
definition. 

Mr. Butler repeated his fears that we were running 
into an extreme, in taking away the powers of the States ; 
and called on Mr. Randolph for the extent of his meaning. 

Mr. Randolph disclaimed any intention to give indefi- 
nite powers to the National Legislature, declaring that he 
was entirely opposed to such an inroad on the State juris- 
dictions ; and that he did not think any considerations 
whatever could ever change his determination. His opinion 
was fixed on this point. 

Mr. Madison said, that he had brought with him into 
the Convention a strong bias in favor of an enumeration 
and definition of the powers necessary to be exercised by 
the National Legislature ; but had also brought doubts con- 
cerning its practicability. His wishes remained unaltered ; 
but his doubts had become stronger. What his opinion 
might ultimately be, he could not yet tell. But he should 
shrink from nothing which should be found essential to 
such a form of government as would provide for the safety, 
liberty and happiness of the community. This being the 
end of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for 
attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted to. 



84 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

On the question for giving powers, in cases to which 
the States are not competent — Massachusetts, New York, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Caro- 
lina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; Connecticut divided, 
(Sheeman, no, Ellsworth, aye.) 

The other clauses, giving powers necessary to preserve 
harmony among the States, to negative all State laws con- 
travelling, in the opinion of the National Legislature, the 
Articles of Union, down to the last clause, (the words, "or 
any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union," 
being added after the words " contravening, &c. the articles 
of the Union," on motion of Doctor Franklin) were agreed 
to without debate or dissent. 

The last clause of the sixth Resolution, authorizing an 
exertion of the force of the whole against a delinquent State, 
came next into consideration. 

Mr. Madison observed, that the more he reflected on the 
use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the jus- 
tice and the efficacy of it, when applied to people collectively, 
and not individually. An union of the States containing 
such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruc- 
tion. The use of force against a State would look more like 
a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment ; and 
would probably be considered by the party attacked as a 
dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be 
bound. He hoped that such a system w r ould be framed as 
might render this resource unnecessary, and moved that the 
clause be postponed. This motion was agreed to, nem. con. 

The Committee then rose, and the House adjourned. 



Friday, June 1st. 

William Houstoun, from Georgia, took his seat. 

The Committee of the Whole proceeded to the seven tli 
Resolution, that a National Executive be instituted, to be 
chosen by the National Legislature for the term of 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 85 

years, &c, to be ineligible thereafter, to possess the Execu- 
tive powers of Congress, &c. 

Mr. Pinckney was for a vigorous Executive, but was 
afraid the executive powers of the existing Congress might 
extend to peace and war, &c. ; which would render the 
Executive a monarchy of the worst kind, to wit, an elective 
one. 

Mr. Wilson moved that the Executive consist of a single 
person. Mr. C. Pinckney seconded the motion so as to 
read "that a National Executive, to consist of a single per- 
son, he instituted." 

A considerable pause ensuing, and the Chairman asking 
if he should put the question, Doctor Franklin observed 
that it was a point of great importance, and wished that the 
gentlemen would deliver their sentiments on it before the 
question was put. 

Mr. Rutledge animadverted on the shyness of gentle- 
men on this and other subjects. He said it looked as if 
they supposed themselves precluded, by having frankly dis- 
closed their opinions, from afterwards changing them, 
which he did not take to be at all the case. He said he was 
for vesting the executive power in a single person, though 
he was not for giving him the power of war and peace. A 
single man would feel the greatest responsibility, and 
administer the public affairs best. 

Mr. Sherman said, he considered the executive magis- 
tracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the 
will of the legislature into effect ; that the person or persons 
ought to be appointed by and accountable to the legislature 
only, which was the depository of the supreme will of the 
society. As they were the best judges of the business 
which ought to be done by the executive department, and 
consequently of the number necessary from time to time for 
doing it, he wished the number might not be fixed, but that 
the legislature should be at liberty to appoint one or more 
as experience might dictate. 

Mr. Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving 



86 . DEBATES IN THE [1T8T. 

most energy, dispatch and responsibility to the office. He 
did not consider the prerogatives of the British monarch as 
a proper guide in defining the executive powers. Some of 
these prerogatives were of a legislative nature; among 
others, that of war and peace, &c. The only powers he 
considered strictly executive were those of executing the 
laws, and appointing officers, not appertaining to, and ap- 
pointed by, the legislature. 

Mr. Gerry favored the policy of annexing a council 
to the Executive, in order to give weight and inspire con- 
fidence. 

Mr. Eandolph strenuously opposed an unity in the ex- 
ecutive magistracy. He regarded it as the foetus of mon- 
archy. We had, he said, no motive to be governed by the 
British government as our prototype. He did not mean, 
however, to throw censure on that excellent fabric. If we 
were in a situation to copy it, he did not know that he 
should be opposed to it ; but the fixed genius of the people 
of America required a different form of government. He 
could not see why the great requisites for the executive de- 
partment, vigor, dispatch, and responsibility, could not be 
found in three men as well as in one man. The Executive 
ought to be independent. It ought, therefore, in order to 
support its independence, to consist of more than one. 

Mr. Wilson said, that unity in the Executive, instead 
of being the fcetus of monarchy, would be the best safe- 
guard against tyranny. He repeated, that he was not gov- 
erned by the British model, which was inapplicable to the 
situation of this country ; the extent of which was so great, 
and the manners so republican, that nothing but a great 
confederated republic would do for it. 

Mr. Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was post- 
poned by common consent, the Committee seeming unpre- 
pared for any decision on it ; and the first part of the clause 
agreed to, viz. "that a national Executive be instituted." 

Mr. Madison thought it would be proper, before a choice 
should be made between a unity and a plurality in the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 87 

Executive, to fix the extent of the executive authority; that 
as certain powers were in their nature executive, and must 
be given to that department, whether administered by one 
or more persons, a definition of their extent would assist 
the judgment in determining how far they might be safely 
entrusted to a single officer. He accordingly moved that 
so much of the clause before the Committee as related to 
the powers of the Executive should be struck out, and that 
•after the words "that a national Executive ought to be 
instituted," there be inserted the words following, viz. " with 
power to carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to 
offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute 
such other powers, ' not legislative nor judiciary in their 
nature,' as may from time to time be delegated by the na- 
tional Legislature." The words "not legislative nor judi- 
ciary in their nature," were added to the proposed amend- 
ment, in consequence of a suggestion, by General Pinckney, 
that improper powers might otherwise be delegated. 

Mr. Wilson seconded this motion. 

Mr. Pinckney moved to amend the amendment by striking 
out the last member of it, viz. "and to execute such other 
powers, not legislative or judiciary in their nature, as may 
from time to time be delegated." He said they were un- 
necessary, the object of them being included in the " power 
to carry into effect the national laws." 

Mr. Bandolph seconded the motion. 

Mr. Madison did not know that the words were absolutely 
necessary, or even the preceding words, "to appoint to 
offices, &c, " the whole being, perhaps, included in the first 
member of the proposition. He did not, however, see any 
inconvenience in retaining them ; and cases might happen 
in which they might serve to prevent doubts and miscon- 
structions. 

In consequence of the motion of Mr. Pinckney, the ques- 
tion on Mr. Madison's motion was divided; and the words 
objected to by Mr. Pinckney struck out, by the votes of Con- 
necticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 



88 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

North Carolina and Georgia — 7, against Massachusetts, 
Virginia and South Carolina — 3 ; the preceding part of the 
motion being first agreed to, — Connecticut, divided ; all 
the other States in the affirmative. 

The next clause in the seventh Resolution, relating to the 
mode of appointing, and the duration of, the Executive, 
being under consideration, — 

Mr. Wilson said, he was almost unwilling to declare the 
mode which he wished to take place, being apprehensive 
that it might appear chimerical. He would say, however, 
at least, that in theory he was for an election by the peo- 
ple. Experience, particularly in New York and Massa- 
chusetts, showed that an election of the first magistrate by 
the people at large was both a convenient and successful 
mode. The objects of choice in such cases must be oersons 
whose merits have general notoriety. 

Mr. Sheeman was for the appointment by the Legislature, 
and for making him absolutely dependent on that body, as 
it was the will of that which was to be executed. An inde- 
pendence of the Executive on the supreme Legislature, was, 
in his opinion, the very essence of tyranny, if there was any 
such thing. 

Mr. Wilson moved, that the blank for the term of dura- 
tion should be filled with three years, observing, at the 
same time, that he preferred this short period on the sup- 
position that a re- eligibility would be provided for. 

Mr. Pinckney moved, for seven years. 

Mr. Sherman was for three years, and against the doc- 
trine of rotation, as throwing out of office the men best 
qualified to execute its duties. 

Mr Mason was for seven years at least, and for 
prohibiting a re-eligibility, as the best expedient, both for 
preventing the effect of a false complaisance on the side of 
the Legislature towards unfit characters; and a temptation 
on the side of the Executive to intrigue with the Legislature 
for a re-appointment. 

Mr. Bedford was strongly opposed to so long a term as 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 89 

seven years. He begged the Committee to consider what 
the situation of the country would be, in case the first 
magistrate should be saddled on it for such a period, and it 
should be found on trial that he did not possess the qualifi- 
cations ascribed to him, or should lose them after his 
appointment. An impeachment, he said, would be no cure 
for this evil, as an impeachment would reach misfeasance 
only, not incapacity. He was for a triennial election, and 
for an ineligibility after a period of nine years. 

On the question, for seven years, — New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virgina, aye — 5; Con- 
necticut, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no 4; 
Massachusetts divided. There being five yeas, four noes, 
and one divided, a question was asked, whether a majority 
had voted in the affirmative. The President decided that it 
was an affirmative vote. 

The mode of appointing the Executive was the next 
question. 

Mr. Wilson renewed his declarations in favor of an 
appointment by the people. He wished to derive not only 
both branches of the Legislature from the people without 
the intervention of the State Legislatures, but the Execu- 
tive also, in order to make them as independent as possible 
of each other, as well as of the States. 

Colonel Mason favors the idea, but thinks it impracti- 
cable. He wishes, however, that Mr. Wilson might have 
time to digest it into his own form. The clause " to be chosen 
by the National Legislature," was accordingly postponed. 

Mr. Rutledge suggests an election of the Executive by 
the second branch only of the National Legislature. 

The Committee then rose, and the House adjourned. 



Saturday, June 2nd. 

William Samuel Johnson, from Connecticut, Daniel 
of St. Thomas Jenifer, from Maryland, and John Lansing, 
Jun., from New York, took their seats. 



90 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

In Committee of the Whole, — It was moved and seconded 
to postpone the Resolutions of Mr. Randolph respecting 
the Executive, in order to take up the second branch of the 
Legislature; which being negatived, — by Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia — 7; against New York, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland — 3; the mode of appointing the Executive was 
resumed. 

Mr. Wilson made the following motion, to be substituted 
for the mode proposed by Mr. Randolph's Resolution, 
"that the executive magistracy shall be elected in the 

following manner : That the States be divided into 

districts and that the persons qualified to vote in each 
district for members of the first branch of the National 
Legislature elect members for their respective dis- 
tricts to be electors of the executive magistracy; that the 

said electors of the executive magistracy meet at , 

and they, or any of them, so met, shall proceed to 

elect by ballot, but not out of their own body, 

person- in whom the executive authority of the National 
Government shall be vested." 

Mr. Wilson repeated his arguments in favor of an 
election without the intervention of the States. He sup- 
posed, too, that this mode would produce more confidence 
among the people in the first magistrate, than an election 
by the National Legislature. 

Mr. Gerry opposed the election by the National Legis- 
lature. There would be a constant intrigue kept up for 
the appointment. The Legislature and the candidates 
would bargain arid play into one another's hands. Votes 
would be given by the former under promises or expecta- 
tions from the latter, of recompensing them by services to 
members of the Legislature or their friends. He liked the 
principle of Mr. Wilson's motion, but fears it would alarm 
and give a handle to the State partizans, as tending to 
supersede altogether the State authorities. He thought the 
community not yet ripe for stripping the States of their 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 91 

powers, even such as might not be requisite for local pur- 
poses. He was for waiting till the people should feel more 
the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking the 
suffrages of the States, instead of electors ; or letting the 
Legislatures nominate, and the electors appoint. He was 
not clear that the people ought to act directly even in the 
choice of electors, being too little informed of personal char- 
acters in large districts, and liable to deceptions. 

Mr. Williamson could see no advantage in the intro- 
duction of electors chosen by the people, who would stand 
in the same relation to them as the State Legislatures; 
whilst the expedient would be attended to with great trouble 
and expense. 

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Wilson's substitute, 
it was negatived, — Pennsylvania, Maryland, aye — 2 ; 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,* Delaware, Vir- 
ginia North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 8. 

On the question, for electing the Executive by the 
National Legislature, for the term of seven years, it was 
agreed to, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Dela- 
ware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
aye — 8 ; Pennsylvania, Maryland, no — 2. 

Doctor Franklin moved, that what related to the com- 
pensation for the services of the Executive be postponed, in 
order to substitute, " whose necessary expenses shall be de- 
frayed, but who shall receive no salary, stipend, fee or 
reward whatsoever for their services." He said, that, 
being very sensible of the effect of age on his memory, 
he had been unwilling to trust to that for the observations 
which seemed to support his motion, and had reduced 
them to writing, that he might, with the permission of the 
Committee, read, instead of speaking, them. Mr. Wilson 
made an offer to read the paper, which was accepted. The 
following is a literal copy of the paper : 

" Sir, it is with reluctance that I rise to express a dis- 
approbation of any one article of the plan for which we are 
so much obliged to the honorable gentleman who laid it 

* New York , in the printed Journals, divided. 



92 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

before us. From its first reading I have borne a good will 
to it, and in general wished it success. In this particular 
of salaries to the Executive branch, I happen to differ : and 
as my opinion may appear new and chimerical, it is only 
from a persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty, 
that I hazard it. The Committee will judge of my reasons 
when they have heard them, and their judgment may pos- 
sibly change mine. I think I see inconveniences in the 
appointment of salaries ; I see none in refusing them, but, 
on the contrary, great advantages. 

"Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful 
influence on the affairs of men. These are ambition and 
avarice • the love of power, and the love of money. Sepa- 
rately, each of these has great force in prompting men to 
action ; but when united in view of the same object, they 
have in many minds the most violent effects. Place before 
the eyes of such men a post of honor, that shall be at the 
same time a place of profit, and they will move heaven and 
earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places it is 
that renders the British government so tempestuous. The 
struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions, 
which are perpetually dividing the nation, distracting its 
councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless and mischievous 
wars, and often compelling a submission to dishonorable 
terms of peace. 

"And of what kind are the men that will strive for this 
profitable pre-eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the 
heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties, 
tearing to pieces the best of characters ? It will not be 
the wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, 
the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and 
the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable 
activity in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust them- 
selves into your government, and be your rulers. And 
these, too, will be mistaken in the expected happiness of 
their situation : for their vanquished competitors, of the 
same spirit, and from the same motives, will perpetually be 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 93 

endeavouring to distress their administration, thwart their 
measures, and render them odious to the people. 

" Besides these evils, Sir, though we may set out in the 
beginning with moderate salaries, we shall find that such 
will not be of long continuance. Reasons will never be 
wanting for proposed augmentations. And there will 
always be a party for giving more to the rulers, that the 
rulers may be able in return to give more to them. Hence, 
as all history informs us, there has been in every state and 
kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the governing 
and governed, the one striving to obtain more for its sup- 
port, and the other to pay less. And this has alone occa- 
sioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either 
in dethroning of the princes, or enslaving of the people. 
Generally, indeed, the ruling power carries its point, the 
revenues of princes constantly increasing ; and we see that 
they are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The 
more the people are discontented with the oppression of 
taxes, the greater need the prince has of money to distribute 
among his partizans, and pay the troops that are to sup- 
press all resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. 
There is scarce a king in an hundred, who would not, if he 
could, follow the example of Pharaoh, get first all the 
people's money, then all their lands, and then make them 
and their children servants for ever. I It will be said, that 
we don't propose to establish kings. I know it ; but there 
is a natural inclination in mankind to kingly government. 
It sometimes relieves them from aristocratic domination. 
They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It 
gives more of the appearance of equality among citizens, 
and that they like. I am apprehensive, therefore, perhaps 
too apprehensive, that the government of these States may 
in future times end in a monarchy. But this catastrophe I 
think may be delayed, if in our proposed system we do not 
sow the seeds of contention, faction, and tumult, by making 
our posts of honor, places of profi A If we do, I fear that, 
though we do employ at first a number, and not a single 



94 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

person, the number will in time be set aside ; it will only 
nourish the foetus of a king, as the honorable gentleman 
from Virginia very aptly expressed it, and a king will the 
sooner be set over us. 

" It may be imagined by some that this is a Utopian 
idea, and that we can never find men to serve us in the 
Executive department without paying them well for their 
services. I conceive this to be a mistake. Some existing 
facts present themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary 
opinion. The high-sheriff of a county in England is an 
honorable office, but it is not a profitable one. It is rather 
expensive and therefore not sought for. But yet, it is 
executed and well executed, and usually by some of the 
principal gentlemen of the county. In France, the office 
of Counsellor, or member of their judiciary parliament, is 
more honorable. It is therefore purchased at a high price : 
there are indeed fees on the law proceedings, which are 
divided among them, but these fees do not amount to more 
than three per cent on the sum paid for the place. There- 
fore, as legal interest is there at five per cent, they in fact 
pay two per cent for being allowed to do the judiciary busi- 
ness of the nation, which is at the same time entirely 
exempt from the burden of paying them any salaries for 
their services. I do not, however, mean to recommend this 
as an eligible mode for our Judiciary department. I only 
bring the instance to show, that the pleasure of doing good 
and serving their country, and the respect such conduct 
entitles them to, are sufficient motives with some minds to 
give up a great portion of their time to the public, without 
the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction. 

"Another instance is that of a respectable society who 
have made the experiment, and practised it with success 
more than one hundred years. I mean the Quakers. It is 
an established rule with them, that they are not to go to 
law; but in their controversies they must apply to their 
monthly, quarterly, and yearly meetings. Committees of 
these sit with patience to hear the parties, and spend much 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 95 

time in composing their differences. In doing this, they 
are supported by a sense of duty, and the respect paid to 
usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed, but it is 
never made profitable by salaries, fees or perquisites. And, 
indeed, in all cases of public service, the less the profit the 
greater the honor. 

" To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen the 
great and most important of our offices, that of General of 
our armies, executed for eight years together without the 
smallest salary, by a patriot whom I will not now offend by 
any other praise ; and this, through fatigues and distresses, 
in common with the other brave men, his military friends 
and companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to his 
station ? And shall we doubt finding three or four men in 
all the United States, with public spirit enough to bear 
sittirfg in peaceful council for perhaps an equal term, merely 
to preside over our civil concerns, and see that our laws are 
duly executed ? Sir, I have a better opinion of our country. 
I think we shall never be without a sufficient number of 
wise and good men to undertake and execute well and 
faithfully the office in question. 

" Sir, the saving of the salaries that may at first be pro- 
posed is not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs 
of proposing them are what I apprehend. And therefore 
it is, that I move the amendment. If it is not seconded or 
accepted, I must be contented with the satisfaction of hav- 
ing delivered my opinion frankly and done my duty. " 

The motion was seconded by Col. Hamilton, with the 
view, he said, merely of bringing so respectable a proposi- 
tion before the Committee, and which was besides enforced 
by arguments that had a certain degree of weight. No de- 
bate ensued, and the proposition was postponed for the con- 
sideration of the members. It was treated with great re- 
spect, but rather for the author of it, than from any appa- 
rent conviction of its expediency or practicability. 

Mr. Dickinson moved, " that the Executive be made re- 
movable by National Legislature, on the request of a ma- 



96 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

jority of the Legislatures of individual States. " It was 
necessary, lie said, to place the power of removing some- 
where. He did not like the plan of impeaching the great 
officers of state. He did not know how provision could be 
made for removal of them in a better mode than that which 
he had proposed. (He had no idea of abolishing the State 
governments, as some gentlemen seemed inclined to do. 
The happiness of this country, in his opinion, required con- 
siderable powers to be left in the hands of the States, f 

Mr. Bedford seconded the motion. 

Mr. Sherman contended, that the National Legislature 
should have power to remove -the Executive at pleasure. 

Mr. Mason. Some mode of displacing an unfit magis- 
trate is rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those 
who choose, as well as by the corruptibility of the man 
chosen. He opposed decidedly the making the Executive 
the mere creature of the Legislature, as a violation of the 
fundamental principle of good government. 

Mr. Madison and Mr. Wilson observed, that it would 
leave an equality of agency in the small with the great 
States; that it would enable a minority of the people to 
prevent the removal of an officer who had rendered himself 
justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it would open 
a door for intrigues against him in States where his 
administration, though just, might be unpopular; and might 
tempt him to pay court to particular States whose leading 
partizans he might fear, or wish to engage as his partizans. 
They both thought it bad policy to introduce such a mixture 
of the State authorities, where their agency could be other- 
wise supplied. 

Mr. Dickinson considered the business as so important 
that no man ought to be silent or reserved. YHe went into 
a discourse of some length, the sum of which was, that the 
Legislative, Executive and Judiciary departments ought to 
be made as independent as possible; but that such an 
Executive as some seemed to have in contemplation was not 
consistent with a republic; that a firm Executive could only 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 97 

exist in a limited monarchy. In the British government 
itself the weight of the Executive arises from the attach- 
ments which the Crown draws to itself, and not merely from 
the force of its prerogatives. In place of these attachments 
we must look out for something else. One source of sta- 
bility is the double branch of the Legislature. The divis- 
ion of the country into distinct States formed the other 
principal source of stability. This division ought therefore 
to be maintained, and considerable powers to be left with 
the States. This was the ground of his consolation for the 
future fate of his country. Without this, and in case of 
a consolidation of the States into one great republic, we 
might read its fate in the history of smaller ones. A 
limited monarchy he considered as one of the best govern- 
ments in the world. It was not certain that the same 
blessings were derivable from any other form. It was 
certain that equal blessings had never yet been derived 
from any of the republican forms. A limited monarchy, 
however, was out of the question. The spirit of the times, 
the state of affairs forbade the experiment, if it were 
desirable. Was it possible, moreover, in the nature of 
things, to introduce it even if these obstacles were less 
insuperable ? A house of nobles was essential to such a 
government, — could these be created by a breach, or by a 
stroke of the pen? No. They were the growth of ages, 
and could only arise under a complication of circumstances 
none of which existed in this country. But though a form 
the most perfect, perhaps, in itself, be unattainable, we 
must not despair. If ancient republics have been found to 
flourish for a moment only, and then vanish forever, it 
only proves that they were badly constituted; and that we 
ought to seek for every remedy for their diseases. One of 
these remedies he conceived to be the accidental lucky 
division of this country into distinct States; a division 
which some seemed desirous to abolish altogetherj 

As to the point of representation in the National Legis- 
lature, as it might affect States of different sizes, he said it 
7 



98 * DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

must probably end in mutual concession. He hoped that 
each State would retain an equal voice at least in one 
branch of the National Legislature, and supposed the sums 
paid within each State would form a better ratio for the 
other branch than either the number of inhabitants or the 
quantum of property. 

A motion being made to strike out, " on request by a 
majority of the Legislatures of the individual States," and 
rejected — (Connecticut, South Carolina and Georgia, being 
aye; the rest, no,) the question was taken on Mr. Dickin- 
son's motion, " for making the Executive removable by the 
National Legislature at the request of a majority of State 
Legislatures," which was also rejected, — all the States 
being in the negative, except Delaware, which gave an 
affirmative vote. 

The question for making the Executive ineligible after 
seven years, was next taken and agreed to, — Massachusetts, 
New York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, aye — 7; Connecticut, Georgia,* no — 2;. 
Pennsylvania, divided. 

Mr. Williamson, seconded by Mr. Davie, moved to add 
to the last clause the words, " and to be removable on im- 
peachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of 
duty;" which was agreed to. 

Mr. Kutledge and Mr. C. Pinckney moved, that the 
blank for the number of persons in the Executive be filled 
with the words, "one person." He supposed the reasons 
to be so obvious and conclusive in favor of one, that no 
member would oppose the motion. 

Mr. Randolph opposed it with great earnestness, declar- 
ing that he should not do justice to the country which sent 
him, if he were silently to suffer the establishment of a 
unity in the Executive department. He felt an opposition 
to it which he believed he should continue to feel as long 
as he lived. He urged — first, that the permanent temper 
of the people was adverse to the very semblance of mon- 

*In the printed Journal, Georgia, aye. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 99 

archy; secondly, that a unity was unnecessary, a plurality 
being equally competent to all the objects of the depart- 
ment; thirdly, that the necessary confidence would never 
be reposed in a single magistrate /fourthly, that the appoint- 
ments would generally be in favor of some inhabitant near 
the centre of the community, and consequently the remote 
parts would not be on an equal footing. He was in favor 
of three members of the Executive, to be drawn from dif- 
ferent portions of the country. 

Mr. Butler contended strongly for a single magistrate, 
as most likely to answer the purpose of the remote parts. 
If one man should be appointed, he would be responsible 
to the whole, and he would be impartial to its interests. If 
three or more should be taken from as many districts, there 
would be a constant struggle for local advantages. In mil- 
itary matters this would be particularly mischievous. He 
said, his opinion on this point had been formed under the 
opportunity he had had of seeing the manner in which a 
plurality of military heads distracted Holland, when threat- 
ened with invasion by the imperial troops. One man was for 
directing the force to the defence of this part, another to that 
part of the country, just as he happened to be swayed by 
prejudice or interest. 

The motion was then postponed; the Committee rose; 
and the House adjourned. 



Monday, June 4th. 

In Committee of the Whole. — The question was resumed 
on motion of Mr. Pinckney, seconded by Mr. Wilson, 
' shall the blank for the number of the Executive be filled 
with a single person ? ' 

Mr. Wilson was in favor of the motion. It had been 
opposed by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) ; 
but the arguments used had not convinced him. He 
observed that the objections of Mr. Randolph were level- 
led not so much against the measure itself, as against its 

LofC. 



100 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

unpopularity. If he could suppose that it would occasion a 
rejection of the plan of which it should form a part, though 
the part were an important one, yet he would give it up 
rather than lose the whole. On examination, he could see 
no evidence of the alleged antipathy of the people. On the 
contrary, he was persuaded that it does not exist. All 
know that a single magistrate is not a king. One fact has 
great weight with him. All the thirteen States, though 
agreeing in scarce any other instance, agree in placing a 
single magistrate at the head of the government. The idea 
of three heads had taken place in none. The degree of 
power is, indeed, different; but there are no co-ordinate 
heads. In addition to his former reasons for preferring a 
unity, he would mention another. The tranquillity, not less 
than the vigor, of the government, he thought, would be 
favored by it. Among three equal members, he foresaw 
nothing but uncontrolled, continued and violent animosities ; 
which would not only interrupt the public administration, 
but diffuse their poison through the other branches of gov- 
ernment, through the states, and at length through the 
people at large. If the members were to be unequal in 
power, the principal of opposition to the unity was given 
up. If equal, the making them an odd number would not 
be a remedy. In courts of justice there are two sides only 
to a question. In the legislative and executive departments 
questions have commonly many sides. Each member, 
therefore, might espouse a separate one, and no two 
agree. 

Mr. Sherman. This matter is of great importance, and 
ought to be well considered before it is determined. Mr. 
Wilson, he said, had observed that in each State a single 
magistrate was placed at the head of the government. It 
was so, he admitted, and properly so; and he wished the 
same policy to prevail in the Federal Government. But 
then it should be also remarked, that in all the States there 
was a council of advice, without which the first magistrate 
<3ould not act. A council he thought necessary to make the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 101 

establishment acceptable to the people. Even in Great 
Britain, the King has a council ; and thongh he appoints it 
himself, its advice has its weight with him, and attracts the 
confidence of the people. 

Mr. Williamson asks Mr. Wilson, whether he means to 
annex a Council. 

Mr. Wilson means to have no Council, which oftener 
serves to cover, than prevent malpractices. 

Mr. Gerry was at a loss to discover the policy of: three 
members for the Executive. It would be extremely incon- 
venient in many instances, particularly in military matters, 
whether relating to the militia, an army, or a navy. It 
would be a general with three heads. 

On the question for a single Executive, it was agreed to, 
— Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, (Mr. 
Randolph and Mr. Blair, no ; Doctor McClurg, Mr. Madi- 
son and General Washington, aye ; Colonel Mason being 
no, but not in the House, Mr. Wythe, aye, but gone home), 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye, — 7 ; New 
York, Delaware, Maryland, no — 3. 

The first clause of the eighth Resolution, relating to a 
council of revision, was next taken into consideration. 

Mr. Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a 
part of it, as they will have a sufficient check against en- 
croachments of their own department by their exposition of 
the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their con- 
stitutionality. In some States the judges had actually set 
aside laws, as being against the Constitution. This was 
done, too, with general approbation. It was quite foreign 
from the nature of their office to make them judges of the 
policy of public measures. He moves to postpone the 
clause, in order to propose, "that the National Executive 
shall have a right to negative any legislative act, which 

shall not be afterwards passed by parts of each branch 

of the National Legislature." 

Mr. King seconded the motion, observing that the 
judges ought to be able to expound the law, as it should 



102 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

come before them, free from the bias of having participated 
in its formation. 

Mr. Wilson thinks neither the original proposition nor 
the amendment goes far enough. If the Legislative, Ex- 
ecutive, and Judiciary ought to be distinct and indepen- 
dent, the Executive ought to have an absolute negative. 
Without such a self-defence, the Legislature can at any 
moment sink it into non-existence. He was for varying 
the proposition, in such a manner as to give the Executive 
and Judiciary jointly an absolute negative. 

On the question to postpone, in order to take Mr. 
Gerry's proposition into consideration, it was agreed to, — 
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, aye, — 6 ; Connecticut, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, no — 4. 

Mr. Gerry's proposition being now before the Committee, 
Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hamilton moved, that the last part of 

it (viz. ''which shall not be afterwards passed by 

parts of each branch of the National Legislature"), be 
struck out, so as to give the Executive an absolute negative 
on the laws. There was no danger, they thought, of such a 
power being too much exercised. It was mentioned by 
Colonel Hamilton that the King of Great Britain had not 
exerted his negative since the Revolution. 

Mr. Gerry sees no necessity for so great a control over 
the Legislature, as the best men in the community would 
be comprised in the two branches of it. 

Doctor Franklin said he was sorry to differ from his col- 
league, for whom he had a very great respect, on any occasion, 
but he could not help it on this. He had had some experience 
of this check in the Executive on the Legislature, under the 
proprietary government of Pennsylvania. The negative of the 
Governor was constantly made use of to extort money. No 
good law whatever could be passed without a private bar- 
gain with him. An increase of his salary, or some donation, 
was always made a condition ; till at last it became the 
regular practice, to have orders in his favor on the Treasury, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 103 

presented along with the bills to be signed, so that he 
might actually receive the former before he should sign the 
latter. When the Indians were scalping the western peo- 
ple, and notice of it arrived, the concurrence of the Gov- 
ernor in the means of self-defence could not be got, till it 
was agreed that his estate should be exempted from tax- 
ation : so that the people were to fight for the security of 
his property, whilst he was to bear no share of the burden. 
This was a mischievous sort of check. If the Executive 
was to have a Council, such a power would be less objec- 
tionable. It was true, the King of Great Britain had not, 
a,s was said, exerted his negative since the Revolution ; but 
that matter was easily explained. The bribes and emolu- 
ments now given to the members of parliament rendered it 
unnecessary, every thing being done according to the will 
of the ministers. He was afraid, if a negative should be 
given as proposed, that more power and money would be 
demanded, till at last enough would be got to influence and 
bribe the Legislature into a complete subjection to the will 
of the Executive. 

Mr. Sheeman was against enabling any one man to stop 
the will of the whole. No one man could be found so far 
above all the rest in wisdom. He thought we ought to avail 
ourselves of his wisdom in revising the laws, but not permit 
him to overrule the decided and cool opinions of the Legis- 
lature. 

Mr. Madison supposed, that, if a proper proportion of 
each branch should be required to overrule the objections 
of the Executive, it would answer the same purpose as an 
absolute negative. It would rarely, if ever, happen that 
the Executive, constituted as ours is proposed to be, would 
have firmness enough to resist the Legislature, unless 
backed by a certain part of the body itself. The King of 
Great Britain, with all his splendid attributes, would not be 
able to withstand the unanimous and eager wishes of both 
Houses of Parliament. To give such a prerogative would 



104 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

certainly be obnoxious to the temper of this country, — its 
present temper at least. 

Mr. Wilson believed, as others did, that this power 
would seldom be used. The Legislature would know that 
such a power existed, and would refrain from such laws as 
it would be sure to defeat. Its silent operation would 
therefore preserve harmony and prevent mischief. The 
case of Pennsylvania formerly was very different from its 
present case. The Executive was not then, as now to be, 
appointed by the people. It will not in this case, as in the 
one cited, be supported by the head of a great empire, 
actuated by a different and sometimes opposite interest. 
The salary, too, is now proposed to be fixed by the Consti- 
tution, or, if Doctor Franklin's idea should be adopted, all 
salary whatever interdicted. The requiring a large pro- 
portion of each House to overrule the Executive check, 
might do in peaceable times ; but there might be tempestu- 
ous moments in which animosities may run high between 
the Executive and Legislative branches, and in which the 
former ought to be able to defend itself. 

Mr. Butler had been in favor of a single executive 
magistrate; but could he have entertained an idea that a 
complete negative on the laws was to be given him, he cer- 
tainly should have acted very differently. It had been 
observed, that in all countries the executive power is in 
a constant course of increase. This was certainly the case 
in Great Britain. Gentlemen seemed to think that we had 
nothing to apprehend from an abuse of the executive power. 
But why might not a Cataline or a Cromwell arise in this 
country as well as in others? 

Mr. Bedford was opposed to every check on the Legis- 
lature, even the council of revision first proposed. He 
thought it would be sufficient to mark out in the constitu- 
tion the boundaries to the legislative authority, which 
would give all the requisite security to the rights of the 
other departments. The representatives of the people were 
the best judges of what was for their interest, and ought 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 105 

to be under no external control whatever. The two branches 
would produce a sufficient control within the Legislature 
itself. 

Col. Mason observed that a vote had already passed, he 
found — he was out at the time — for vesting the executive 
powers in a single person. Among these powers was that 
of appointing to offices in certain cases. The probable 
abuses of a negative had been well explained by Doctor 
Franklin, as proved by experience, the best of all tests. 
Will not the same door be opened here? The Executive 
may refuse its assent to necessary measures, till new ap- 
pointments shall be referred to him ; and, having by degrees 
engrossed all these into his own hands, the American Exec- 
utive, like the British, will, by bribery and influence, save 
himself the trouble and odium of exerting his negative 
afterwards. We are, Mr. Chairman, going very far in this 
business. We are not indeed constituting a British gov- 
ernment, but a more dangerous monarchy, an elective one. 
We are introducing a new principle into our system, and 
not necessary, as in the British government, where the 
Executive has greater rights to defend. Do gentlemen 
mean to pave the way to hereditary monarchy? Do they 
flatter themselves that the people will ever consent to such 
an innovation? If they do, I venture to tell them, they 
are mistaken. The people never will consent. And do 
gentlemen consider the danger of delay, and the still greater 
danger of a rejection, not for a moment, but forever, of the 
plan which shall be proposed to them ? Notwithstanding 
the oppression and injustice experienced among us from 
democracy, the genius of the people is in favor of it; 
and the genius of the people must be consulted. He 
could not but consider the Federal system as in effect 
dissolved by the appointment of this Convention to devise 
a better one. And do gentlemen look forward to the dan- 
gerous interval between extinction of an old, and the 
establishment of a new, government; and to the scenes of 
confusion which may ensue? He hoped that nothing like 



106 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

a monarchy would ever be attempted in this country. A 
hatred to its oppressions had carried the people through the 
late Revolution. Will it not be enough to enable the Ex- 
ecutive to suspend offensive laws, till they shall be coolly 
revised, and the objections to them overruled by a greater 
majority than was required in the first instance ? He never 
could agree to give up all the rights of the people to a sin- 
gle magistrate. If more than one had been fixed on, 
greater powers might have been entrusted to the Executive. 
He hoped this attempt to give such powers would have its 
weight hereafter, as an argument for increasing the number 
of the Executive. 

Doctor Franklin. A gentleman from South Carolina, 
(Mr. Butler) a day or two ago called our attention to the 
case of the United Netherlands. He wished the gentleman 
had been a little fuller, and had gone back to the original 
of that government. The people being under great obli- 
gations to the Prince of Orange, whose wisdom and bravery 
had saved them, chose him for the Stadtholder. He did 
very well. Inconveniences, however, were felt from his 
powers; which growing more and more oppressive, they 
were at length set aside. Still, however, there was a party 
for the Prince of Orange, which descended to his son ; who 
excited insurrections, spilled a great deal of blood, murdered 
the De Witts, and got the powers re-vested in the Stadt- 
holder. Afterwards another prince had power to excite 
insurrections, and make the Stadtholdership hereditary. 
And the present 'Stadtholder is ready to wade through a 
bloody civil war to the establishment of a monarchy. Col. 
Mason had mentioned the circumstance of appointing 
officers. He knew how that point would be managed. No 
new appointment would be suffered, as heretofore in Penn- 
sylvania, unless it be referred to the Executive ; so that all 
profitable offices will be at his disposal. The first man put 
at the helm will be a good one. Nobody knows what sort 
may come afterwards. The Executive will be always 
increasing here, as elsewhere, till it ends in a monarchy. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 107 

On the question for striking out, so as to give the 
Executive an absolute negative, — Massachusetts, Con- ~ 
necticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 
10. 

Mr. Butler moved that the Resolution be altered so as 
to read, " Resolved, that the national Executive have a power 
to suspend any legislative act for the term of ." 

Doctor Franklin seconded the motion. 

Mr. Gerry observed, that the power of suspending 
might do all the mischief dreaded from the negative of 
useful laws, without answering the salutary purpose of 
checking unjust or unwise ones. 

On the question for giving this suspending power, all the 
States, to wit, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, were, no. 

On a question for enabling two-thirds of each branch of 
the Legislature to overrule the provisionary check, it passed 
in the affirmative, sub silentio; and was inserted in the 
blank of Mr. Gerry's motion. 

On the question of Mr. Gerry's motion, which gave 
the Executive alone, without the Judiciary, the revision - 
ary control on the laws, unless overruled by two-thirds of 
each branch, — Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, aye — 8 ; Connecticut, Maryland, no — 2. 

It was moved by Mr. Wilson, seconded by Mr. Madison, 
that the following amendment be made to the last Resolution : 
after the words " national Executive," to add " and a conve- 
nient number of the national Judiciary." 

An objection of order being taken by Mr. Hamilton to 
the introduction of the last amendment at this time, notice 
was given by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Madison, that the same 
would be moved to-morrow ; whereupon Wednesday was 
assigned to reconsider the amendment of Mr. Gerry. 

It was then moved and seconded to proceed to the con- 



108 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

sideration of the ninth Eesolution submitted by Mr. Ean- 
dolph; when, on motion to agree to the first clause, namely, 
"Resolved, that a national Judiciary be established" it 
passed in the affirmative, nem. con. 

It was then moved and seconded, to add these words to 
the first clause of the ninth Resolution, namely, " to con- 
sist of one supreme tribunal, and of one or more inferior 
tribunals;" which passed in the affirmative. 

The Committee then rose, and the House adjourned. 



Tuesday, June 5th. 

Governor Livingston, of New Jersey, took his seat. 

In Committee of the Whole. — The words " 
were struck out before "inferior tribunals," as an amend- 
ment to the last clause of the ninth Eesolution. The clause, 
" that the national Judiciary be chosen by the .National 
Legislature," being under consideration. 

Mr. Wilson opposed the appointment of Judges by the 
National Legislature. Experience showed the impropriety 
of such appointments by numerous bodies. Intrigue, par- 
tiality, and concealment were the necessary consequences. 
A principal reason for unity in the Executive was, that 
officers might be appointed by a single, responsible person. 

Mr. Eutledge was by no means disposed to grant so 
great a power to any single person. The people will think 
we are leaning too much towards monarchy. He was 
against establishing any national tribunal, except a single 
supreme one. The State tribunals are most proper to de- 
cide in all cases in the first instance. 

Doctor Franklin observed, that the two modes of 
choosing the Judges had been mentioned, to wit, by 
the Legislature, and by the Executive. He wished 
such other modes to be suggested as might occur to 
other gentlemen; it being a point of great moment. 
He would mention one which he had understood was 
practised in Scotland. He then, in a brief and en- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 109 

tertaining manner, related a Scotch mode, in which 
the nomination proceeded from the lawyers, who 
always selected the ablest of the profession, in order to get 
rid of him, and share his practice among themselves. It 
was here, he said, the interest of the electors to make the 
best choice, which should always be made the case if 
possible. 

Mr. Madison disliked the election of the Judges by the 
Legislature, or any numerous body. Besides the danger 
of intrigue and partiality, many of the members were not 
judges of the requisite qualifications. The legislative 
talents, which were very different from those of a Judge, 
commonly recommended men to the favor of legislative 
assemblies. It was known, too, that the accidental circum- 
stances of presence and absence, of being a member or not 
a member, had a very undue influence on the appointment. 
On the other hand, he was not satisfied with referring the 
appointment to the Executive. He rather inclined to give 
it to the Senatorial branch, as numerous enough to be 
confided in; as not so numerous as to be governed by the 
motives of the other branch ; and as being sufficiently stable 
and independent to follow their deliberate judgments. He 
hinted this only, and moved that the appointment by the 
Legislature might be struck out, and a blank left, to be 
hereafter filled on maturer reflection. Mr. Wilson seconds 
it. On the question for striking out, — Massachusetts, 
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, 
Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9; Connecticut, 
South Carolina, no — 2. 

Mr. Wilson gave notice that he should at a future day 
move for a reconsideration of that clause which respects 
"inferior tribunals." 

Mr. Pinckney gave notice, that when the clause respect- 
ing the appointment of the Judiciary should again come 
before the Committee, he should move to restore the 
" appointment by the National Legislature." 

The following clauses of the ninth Kesolution were 



110 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

agreed to, viz., "to hold their offices during good behaviour, 
and to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensa- 
tion for their services, in which no increase nor diminution 
shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at 
the time of such increase or diminution." 

The remaining clause of the ninth Resolution was 
postponed. 

The tenth Resolution was agreed to, viz.. " that provision 
ought to be made for the admission of States, lawfully 
arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a 
voluntary junction of government and territory, or otherwise, 
with the consent of a number of voices in the national legis- 
lature less than the whole" 

The eleventh Resolution for guaranteeing to States 
republican government and territory, &c, being read, — 

Mr. Patterson wished the point of representation could 
be decided before this clause should be considered, and 
moved to postpone it; which was not opposed, and agreed 
to, — Connecticut and South Carolina only voting against it. 

The twelfth Resolution, for continuing Congress till a 
given day, and for fulfilling their engagements, produced 
no debate. 

On the question, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey,* 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; Connecticut, Delaware, no — 2. 

The thirteenth Resolution, to the effect that provision 
ought to be made for hereafter amending the system now to 
be established, without requiring the assent of the National 
Legislature, being taken up, — 

Mr. Pinckney doubted the propriety or necessity of it. 

Mr. Gerry favored it. The novelty and difficulty of 
the experiment requires periodical revision. The prospect 
of such a revision would also give intermediate stability to 
the government. Nothing had yet happened in the States 
where this provision existed to prove its impropriety. — The 
proposition was postponed for further consideration ; 

*New Jersey omitted in the printed Journal. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. Ill 

the votes being, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, aye — 
7 ; Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 3. 

The fourteenth Resolution, requiring oath from the 
State officers to support the National Government, — was 
postponed, after a short, uninteresting conversation ; the 
votes, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, 
South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6 ; New York, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, North Carolina, no — 4 ; Massachusetts, divided. 

The fifteenth Resolution, for recommending conventions 
under appointment of the people to ratify the new Consti- 
tution, &c, being taken up, — 

Mr. Sheeman thought such a popular ratification un- 
necessary ; the Articles of Confederation providing for 
changes and alterations, with the assent of Congress, and 
ratification of State Legislatures. 

Mr. Madison thought this provision essential. The 
Articles of Confederation themselves were defective in this 
respect, resting, in many of the States, on the legislative 
sanction only. Hence, in conflicts between acts of the 
States and of Congress, especially where the former are 
of posterior date, and the decision is to be made by State 
tribunals, an uncertainty must necessarily prevail ; or 
rather perhaps a certain decision in favor of the State 
authority. He suggested also, that, as far as the Articles 
of Union were to be considered as a treaty only, of a par- 
ticular sort, among the governments of independent states, 
the doctrine might be set up that a breach of any one 
Article, by any of the parties, absolved the other parties 
from the whole obligation. For these reasons, as well as 
others, he thought it indispensable that the new Consti- 
tution should be ratified in the most unexceptionable form, 
and by the supreme authority of the people themselves. 
/" Mr. Gebky observed, that in the Eastern States the 
I Confederation had been sanctioned by the people them- 
selves. He seemed afraid of referring the new system to 
\ them. The people in that quarter have at this time the 



112 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

wildest ideas of government in the world. They were for 
abolishing the Senate in Massachusetts, and giving all the 
other powers of government to the other branch of the 
Legislature. 

Mr. King supposed, that the last Article of the Con- 
federation rendered the Legislature competent to the rati- 
fication. The people of the Southern States, where the 
Federal Articles had been ratified by the Legislatures only, 
had since, impliedly, given their sanction to it. He thought, 
notwithstanding, that there might be policy in varying the 
mode. A convention being a single house, the adoption 
may more easily be carried through it, than through the 
Legislatures, where there are several branches. The Legis- 
latures also, being to lose power, will be most likely to raise 
objections. The people having already parted with the 
necessary powers, it is immaterial to them, by which govern- 
ment they are possessed, provided they be well employed. 

Mr. Wilson took this occasion to lead the Committee, 
by a train of observations, to the idea of not suffering a 
disposition in the plurality of States, to confederate anew 
on better principles, to be defeated by the inconsiderate or 
selfish opposition of a few States. He hoped the provision 
for ratifying would be put on such a footing as to admit of 
such a partial union, with a door open for the accession of 
the rest.* 

Mr. Pinckney hoped, that, in case the experiment should 
not unanimously take place, nine States might be author- 
ized to unite under the same government. 

The fifteenth Eesolution was postponed, nem. con. 

Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Eutledge moved, that to-mor- 
row be assigned to reconsider that clause of the fourth 
Eesolution which respects the election of the first branch of 
the National Legislature; which passed in the affirmative, — 
Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, 

•This hint was probably meant in terrorem to the smaller States of New Jersey 
and Delaware. Nothing was said in reply to it. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 113 

Virginia, aye — 6 ; Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Caro- 
lina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 5. 

Mr. Rutledge having obtained a rule for reconsidera- 
tion of the clause for establishing inferior tribunals under 
the national authority, now moved that that part of the 
clause in the ninth Resolution should be expunged; argu- 
ing, that the State tribunals might and ought to be left in 
all cases to decide in the first instance, the right of appeal 
to the supreme, national tribunal being sufficient to secure 
the national rights and uniformity of judgments; that it 
was making an unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdic- 
tion of the States, and creating unnecessary obstacles to 
their adoption of the new system. 

Mr. Sherman seconded the motion. 

Mr. Madison observed, that unless inferior tribunals 
were dispersed throughout the Republic with final jurisdic- 
tion in many cases, appeals would be multiplied to a most 
oppressive degree ; that, besides, an appeal would not in 
many cases be a remedy. What was to be done after im- 
proper verdicts, in State tribunals, obtained under the 
biassed directions of a dependent judge, or the local preju- 
dices of an undirected jury ? To remand the cause for a 
new trial would answer no purpose. To order a new trial 
at the supreme bar, would oblige the parties to bring up 
their witnesses, though ever so distant from the seat of 
the court. An effective Judiciary establishment commen- 
surate to the Legislative authority, was essential. A gov- 
ernment, without a proper Executive and Judiciary, would 
be the mere trunk of a body, without arms or legs to act 
or move. 

Mr. Wilson opposed the motion on like grounds. He 
said the admiralty jurisdiction ought to be given wholly to 
the National Government, as it related to cases not within 
the jurisdiction of particular States, and to a scene in which 
controversies with foreigners would be most likely to hap- 
pen. 

Mr. Sherman was in favor of the motion. He dwelt 

8 



114 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

chiefly on the supposed expensiveness of having a new set 
of courts, when the existing State courts would answer the 
same purpose. 

Mr. Dickinson contended strongly, that if there was to 
be a National Legislature, there ought to be a National 
Judiciary, and that the former ought to have authority to 
institute the latter. 

On the question for Mr. Butledge's motion to strike 
out "inferior tribunal," it passed in the affirmative, — Con- 
necticut, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6 ; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary- 
land, Virginia, no — 4 ; Massachusetts, divided. 

Mr. Wilson and Mr. Madison then moved, in pursu- 
ance of the idea expressed above by Mr. Dickinson, to add 
to the ninth Kesolution the words following: "that the 
National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior 
tribunals." They observed, that there was a distinction 
between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving 
a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not to estab- 
lish them. They repeated the necessity of some such pro- 
vision. 

Mr. Butler. The people will not bear such innovations. 
The States will revolt at such encroachments. Supposing 
such an establishment to be useful, we must not venture on 
it. We must follow the example of Solon, who gave the 
Athenians not the best government he could devise, but the 
best they would receive. 

Mr. King remarked, as to the comparative expense, that 
the establishment of inferior tribunals would cost infinitely 
less than the appeals that would be prevented by them. 

On this question, as moved by Mr. Wilson and Mr. 
Madison, — Massachusetts, New Jersey,* Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, 
aye — 8; Connecticut, South Carolina, no — 2; New York, 
divided. 

The Committee then rose, and the House adjourned. 

* In the printed Journal. New Jersey, no. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 115 

Wednesday, June 6th. 

In Committee of the Whole. — Mr. Pinckney, according 
to previous notice, and rule obtained, moved, " that the first 
branch of the National Legislature be elected by the State 
Legislatures, and not by the people;" contending that the 
people were less fit judges in such a case, and that the Leg- 
islatures would be less likely to promote the adoption of the 
new government if they were to be excluded from all share 
in it. 

Mr. Eutledge seconded the motion. 

Mr. Gerry. Much depends on the mode of election. 
In England the people will probably lose their liberty from 
the smallness of the proportion having a right of suffrage. 
Our danger arises from the opposite extreme. Hence in 
; Massachusetts the worst men get into the Legislature. 
Several members of that body had lately been convicted of 
infamous crimes. Men of indigence, ignorance, and base- 
ness, spare no pains, however dirty, to carry their point 
against men who are superior to the artifices practised. 
He was not disposed to run into extremes. He was as much 
principled as ever against aristocracy and monarchy. It 
was necessary, on the one hand, that the people should 
appoint one branch of the government, in order to inspire 
them with the necessary confidence; but he wished the 
election, on the other, to be so modified as to secure more 
effectually a just preference of merit. His idea was, that 
the people should nominate certain persons, in certain dis- 
tricts, out of whom the State Legislatures should make the 
appointment./ 

Mr. Wilson. He wished for vigor in the government, 
but he wished that vigorous authority to flow immediately 
from the legitimate source of all authority. The govern- 
ment ought to possess, not only, first, the force, but second, 
the mind or sense, of the people at large. The Legislature 
ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole society. 
Representation is made necessary only because it is impos- 



116 DEBATES IN THE . [1787. 

sible for the people to act collectively. The opposition was 
to be expected, he said, from the governments, not from the 
citizens of the States. The latter had parted, as was ob- 
served by Mr. King, with all the necessary powers; and it 
was immaterial to them by whom they were exercised, if well 
exercised. The State officers were to be the losers of power. 
The people, he supposed, would be rather more attached to 
the National Government than to the State Governments, 
as being more important in itself, and more flattering to 
their pride. There is no danger of improper elections, if 
made by large districts. Bad elections proceed from the 
smallness of the districts, which give an opportunity to bad 
men to intrigue themselves into office. 

Mr. Sherman. If it were in view to abolish the State 
Governments, the elections ought to be by the people. If 
the State Governments are to be continued, it is necessary, 
in order to preserve harmony between the National and 
State Governments, that the elections to the former should 
be made by the latter. The right of participating in the 
National Government would be sufficiently secured to the 
people by their election of the State Legislatures. The 
objects of the Union, he thought were few, — first, defence 
against foreign danger; secondly, against internal disputes, 
and a resort to force ; thirdly, treaties with foreign nations ; 
fourthly, regulating foreign commerce, and drawing revenue 
from it. These, and perhaps a few lesser objects, alone 
rendered a confederation of the States necessary. All 
other matters, civil and criminal, would be much better in 
the hands of the States. The people are more happy in 
small than in large States. States, may, indeed, be too 
small, as Ehode Island, and thereby be too subject to fac- 
tion.' Some others were, perhaps, too large, the powers of 
government not being able to pervade them. He was for 
giving the General Government power to legislate and 
execute within a defined province. 

Col. Mason. Under the existing Confederacy, Congress 
represent the States, and not the people of the States; 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 117 

their acts operate on the States, not on the individuals. 
The case will be changed in the new plan of government. 
The people will be represented; they ought therefore to 
choose the Representatives. rcThe requisites in actual rep- 
resentation are, that the representatives should sympathize 
with their constituents ; should think as they think, and feel 
as they feel; and that for these purposes they should be 
residents among them. Much, he said, had been alleged 
against democratic elections. He admitted that much 
might be said; but it was to be considered that no govern- 
ment was free from imperfections and evils ; and that improper 
elections in many instances were inseparable from republi- 
can governments. But compare these with the advantage 
of this form, in favor of the rights of the people, in favor of 
human nature! He was persuaded there was a better 
chance for proper elections by the people, if divided into 
large districts, than by the State Legislatures. Paper- 
money had been issued by the latter, when the former were 
against it. Was it to be supposed that the State Legisla- 
tures, then, would not send to the National Legislature., 
patrons of such projects, if the choice depended on them?/ 

Mr. Madison considered an election of one branch, at 
least, of the Legislature by the people immediately, as a 
clear principle of free government; and that this mode, 
under proper regulations, had the additional advantage of 
securing better representatives, as well as of avoiding too 
great an agency of the State Governments in the general 
one. He differed from the member from Connecticut, (Mr. 
Sherman,) in thinking the objects mentioned to be all the 
principal ones that required a national government. Those 
were certainly important and necessary objects ; but he com- 
bined with them the necessity of providing more effectually 
for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensa- 
tion of justice. Interferences with these were evils which 
had, more perhaps than anything else, produced this Con- 
vention. Was it to be supposed, that republican liberty 
could long exist under the abuses of it practised in some of 



118 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the States? The gentleman (Mr. Sherman) had admitted, 
that in a very small State faction and oppression would 
prevail. It was to be inferred, then, that wherever these 
prevailed the State was too small. Had they not prevailed 
in the largest as well as the smallest, though less than in 
the smallest ? And were we not thence admonished to 
enlarge the sphere as far as the nature of the government 
would admit ? This was the only defence against the 
inconveniences of democracy, consistent with the demo- 
cratic form of government. /All civilized societies would be 
divided into different sects, factions, and interests, as they 
happened to consist of rich and poor, debtors and creditors, 
the landed, the manufacturing, the commercial interests, 
the inhabitants of this district or that district, the followers 
of this political leader or that political leader, the disciples 
of this religious sect or that religious sect. In all cases 
where a majority are united by a common interest or 
passion, the rights of the minority are injianger. What 
motives are to restrain them ? A prudent regard to the 
maxim, that honesty is the best policy, is found by expe- 
rience to be as little regarded by bodies of men as by 
individuals. Kespect for character is always diminished in 
proportion to the number among whom the blame or praise 
is to be divided. Conscience, the only remaining tie, is 
known to be inadequate in individuals ; in large numbers, 
little is to be expected from it. Besides, religion itself, 
may become a motive to persecution and oppression. 
These observations are verified by the histories of every 
country, ancient and modern. In Greece and Borne the 
rich and poor, the creditors and debtors, as well as the 
patricians and plebeians, alternately oppressed each other 
with equal unmercifulness. What a source of oppression 
was the relation between the parent cities of Home, Athens, 
and Carthage, and their respective provinces ; the former 
possessing the power, and the latter being sufficiently dis- 
tinguished to be separate objects of it ? Why was America 
so justly apprehensive of parliamentary injustice ? Be- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. H9 

cause Great Britain had a separate interest, real or sup- 
posed, and, if her authority had been admitted, could have 
pursued that interest at our expense. We have seen the 
mere distinction of color made, in the most enlightened 
period of time, a ground of the most oppressive dominion 
ever exercised by man over man. What has been the 
source of those unjust laws complained of among ourselves ? 
Has it not been the real or supposed interest of the major 
number ? Debtors have defrauded their creditors. The 
landed interest has borne hard on the mercantile interest. 
The holders of one species of property have thrown a dis- 
proportion of taxes on the holders of another species. The 
lesson we are to draw from the whole is, that where a 
majority are united by a common sentiment, and have an 
opportunity, the rights of the minor party become inse- 
cure. In a republican government, the majority, if united, 
have always an opportunity. The only remedy is, to 
enlarge the sphere, and thereby divide the community into 
so great a number of interests and parties, that, in the first 
place, a majority will not be likely, at the same moment, 
to have a common interest separate from that of the whole, 
•or of the minority ; and in the second place, that in case 
they should have such an interest, they may not be so apt 
to unite in the pursuit of it. It was incumbent on us, then, 
to try this remedy, and, with that view, to frame a repub- 
lican system on such a scale, and in such a form, as will 
control all the evils which have been experienced. J 

Mr. Dickinson considered it essential, that one branch 
of the Legislature should be drawn immediately from the 
people; and expedient, that the other should be chosen by 
the Legislatures of the States. This combination of the 
State Governments with the National Government was as^i 
politic as it was unavoidable. In the formation of the ' 
Senate, we ought to carry it through such a refining pro- 
cess as will assimilate it, as nearly as may be, to the House 
of Lords in England. He repeated his warm eulogiums on 
the British Constitution. He was for a strong National 



120 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Government; but for leaving the States a considerable 
agency in the system. The objection against making the 
former dependent on the latter might be obviated by giving 
to the Senate an authority permanent, and irrevocable for 
three, five or seven years. Being thus independent, they 
will check and decide with uncommon freedom. 

Mr. Read. Too much attachment is betrayed to the 
State Governments. We must look beyond their continu- 
ance. A National Government must soon of necessity 
swallow them all up. They will soon be reduced to the 
mere office of electing the National Senate. He was against 
patching up the old Federal system: he hoped the idea 
would be dismissed. It would be like putting new cloth on 
an old garment. The confederation was founded on tem- 
porary principles. It cannot last: it cannot be amended. 
If we do not establish a good government on new princi- 
ples, we must either go to ruin, or have the work to do over 
again. The people at large are wrongly suspected of be- 
ing averse to a General Government. The aversion lies 
among interested men who possess their confidence. 

Mr. Pierce was for an election by the people as to the 
first branch ; and by the States as to the second branch ; by 
which means the citizens of the States would be repre- 
sented both individually and collectively. 

General Pinckney wished to have a good National Gov- 
ernment, and at the same time to leave a considerable share 
Of power in the States. An election of either branch by the 
people, scattered as they are in many States, particularly in 
South Carolina, was totally impracticable. He differed 
from gentlemen who thought that a choice by the people 
would be a better guard against bad measures, than by the 
Legislatures. (A majority of the people in South Carolina 
were notoriously for paper-money, as a legal tender; the 
Legislature had refused to make it a legal tender. The 
reason was, that the latter had some sense of character, and 
were restrained by that consideration.' The State Legisla- 
tures, also, he said, would be more jealous, and more ready 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 121 

to thwart the National Government, if excluded from a par- 
ticipation in it. The idea of abolishing these Legislatures 
would never go down. 

Mr. Wilson would not have spoken again, but for what 
had fallen from Mr. Bead ; namely that the idea of preser- 
ving the State Governments ought to be abandoned. He 
saw no incompatibility between the National and State Gov- 
ernments, provided the latter was restrained to certain local 
purposes; nor any probability of their being devoured by 
the former. In all confederated systems, ancient and mod- 
ern, the reverse had happened; the generality being de- 
stroyed gradually by the usurpations of the parts composing 
it. 

On the question for electing the first branch by the 
State Legislatures as moved by Mr. Pinckney, it was nega- 
tived, — Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina, aye — 3; 
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary- 
land, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 8. 

Mr. Wilson moved to reconsider the vote excluding the 
Judiciary from a share in the revision of the laws, and to 
add, after " national Executive," the words, " with a conven- 
ient number of the national Judiciary ; " remarking the ex- 
pediency of reinforcing the Executive with the influence of 
that department. 

Mr. Madison seconded the motion. He observed, that 
the great difficulty in rendering the Executive competent to 
its own defence arose from the nature of republican govern- 
ment, which could not give to an individual citizen that 
settled pre-eminence in the eyes of the rest, that weight of 
property, that personal interest against betraying the 
national interest, which appertain to an hereditary magis- 
trate. In a republic personal merit alone could be the 
ground of political exaltation; but it would rarely happen 
that this merit would be so pre-eminent as to produce uni- 
versal acquiescence. The executive magistrate would be 
envied and assailed by disappointed competitors: his firm- 
ness therefore would need support. He would not possess 



122 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

those great emoluments from his station, nor that perma- 
nent stake in the public interest, which would place him out 
/of the reach of foreign corruption. He would stand in need 
therefore of being controlled as well as supported. An as- 
sociation of the judges in his revisionary function would 
both double the advantage, and diminish the danger. It 
would also enable the Judiciary department the better to 
defend itself against legislative encroachments. Two ob- 
jections had been made, — first, that the judges ought not to 
be subject to the bias which a participation in the making 
of laws might give in the exposition of them ; secondly that 
the Judiciary department ought to be separate and dis- 
tinct from the other great departments. The first objection 
had some weight ; but it was much diminished by reflecting, 
that a small proportion of the laws coming in question 
before a judge would be such wherein he had been con- 
sulted; that a small part of this proportion would be so 
ambiguous as to leave room for his prepossessions ; and that 
but a few cases would probably arise in the life of a judge, 
under such ambiguous passages. How much good, on the 
other hand, would proceed from the perspicuity, the con- 
ciseness, and the systematic character which the code of 
laws would receive from the Judiciary talents. As to the 
second objection, it either had no weight, or it applied with 
equal weight to the Executive, and to the Judiciary re- 
vision of the laws. The maxim on which the objection was 
founded, required a separation of the Executive, as well as 
the Judiciary, from the Legislature and from each other. 
There would, in truth, however, be no improper mixture of 
these distinct powers in the present case. In England, 
whence the maxim itself had been drawn, the Executive had 
an absolute negative on the laws; and the supreme tribunal 
of justice (the House of Lords), formed one of the other 
branches of the Legislature. In short, whether the object 
of the revisionary power was to restrain the Legislature 
from encroaching on the other co-ordinate departments, or 
on the rights of the people at large; or from passing laws 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 123 

unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their form; the 
utility of annexing the wisdom and weight of the Judiciary 
to the Executive seemed incontestable. 

Mr. Gerry thought the Executive whilst standing alone 
would be more impartial than when he could be covered by 
the sanction and seduced by the sophistry of the Judges. 

Mr. King. If the unity of the Executive was preferred 
for the sake of responsibility, the policy of it is as applica- 
ble to the revisionary, as to the executive, power. 

Mr. Pinckney had been at first in favor of joining the 
heads of the principal departments, the Secretary at War, 
of Foreign Affairs, &c, in the Council of Revision. He had, 
however, relinquished the idea, from a consideration that 
these could be called on by the executive magistrate, when- 
ever he pleased to consult them. He was opposed to the 
introduction of the judges into the business. 

Colonel Mason was for giving all possible weight to the 
revisionary institution. The executive power ought to be 
well secured against legislative usurpations on it. The 
purse and the sword ought never to get into the same hands 
whether legislative or executive. 

Mr. Dickinson. Secrecy, vigor, and despatch are not 
the principal properties required in the Executive. Import- 
ant as these are, that of responsibility is more so, which 
can only be preserved by leaving it singly to discharge its 
functions. He thought, too, a junction of the Judiciary to it 
involved an improper mixture of powers. 

Mr. Wilson remarked, that the responsibility required 
belonged to his executive duties. The revisionary duty 
was an extraneous one, calculated for collateral purposes. 

Mr. Williamson was for substituting a clause requiring 
two-thirds for every effective act of the legislature, in place 
of the revisionary provision. 

On the question for joining the judges to the Executive 
in the revisionary business, — Connecticut, New York, Vir- 
ginia, aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylva- 



124 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

nia, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina. 
Georgia, no — 8. 

Mr. Pinckney gave notice, that to-morrow he should 
move for the re-consideration of that clause in the sixth 
Kesolution adopted by the Committee, which vests a nega- 
tive in the National Legislature on the laws of the several 
States. 

The Committee rose, and the House adjourned. 



Thuesday, June 7th. 

In Committee of the Whole — Mr. Pinckney, accord- 
ing to notice, moved to reconsider the clause respecting the 
negative on State laws, which was agreed to, and to-mor- 
row fixed for the purpose. 

The clause providing for the appointment of the second 
branch of the National Legislature, having lain blank since 
the last vote on the mode of electing it, to wit, by the first 
branch, Mr. Dickinson now moved, "that the members of 
the second branch ought to be chosen by the individual 
Legislatures." 

Mr. Sheeman seconded the motion ; observing, that the 
particular States would thus become interested in support- 
ing the National Government, and that a due harmony 
between the two governments would be maintained. He 
admitted that the two ought to have separate and distinct 
jurisdictions, but that they ought to have a mutual interest 
in supporting each other. 

Mr. Pinckney. If the small States should be allowed 
one Senator only, the number will be too great; there will 
be eighty at least. 

Mr. Dickinson had two reasons for his motion — first, 
because the sense of the States would be better collected 
through their Governments, than immediately from the 
people at large; secondly, because he wished the Senate to 
consist of the most distinguished characters, distinguished 
for their rank in life and their weight of property, and 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 125 

bearing as strong a likeness to the British House of Lords 
as possible; and he thought such characters more likely to 
be selected by the State Legislatures, than in any other 
mode. The greatness of the number was no objection with 
him. He hoped there would be eighty, and twice eighty of 
them. If their number should be small, the popular branch 
could not be balanced by them. The Legislature of a 
numerous people ought to be a numerous body. 

Mr. Williamson preferred a small number of Senators, 
but wished that each State should have at least one. He 
suggested twenty -five as a convenient number. The differ- 
ent modes of representation in the different branches will 
serve as a mutual check. 

Mr. Butler was anxious to know the ratio of represen- 
tation before he gave any opinion. 

Mr. Wilson. If we are to establish a National Govern- 
ment, that government ought to flow from the people at 
large. If one branch of it should be chosen by the Legis- 
latures, and the other by the people, the two branches will 
rest on different foundations, and dissensions will naturally 
arise between them. He wished the Senate to be elected 
by the people, as well as the other branch ; the people might 
be divided into proper districts for the purpose; and he 
moved to postpone the motion of Mr. Dickinson, in order 
to take up one of that import. 

Mr. Morris seconded him. 

Mr. Read proposed " that the Senate should be appointed 
by the Executive magistrate, out of a proper number of 
persons to be nominated by the individual Legislatures." 
He said, he thought it his duty to speak his mind frankly. 
Gentlemen he hoped would not be alarmed at the idea. 
Nothing short of this approach towards a proper model of 
government would answer the purpose, and he thought it 
best to come directly to the point at once. His proposition 
was not seconded nor supported. 

Mr. Madison. If the motion (of Mr. Dickinson) should 
be agreed to, we must either depart from the doctrine of 



126 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

proportional representation, or admit into the Senate a very- 
large number of members. The first is inadmissible, being 
evidently unjust. The second is inexpedient. The use 
of the Senate is to consist in its proceeding with more 
coolness, with more system, and with more wisdom, than 
the popular branch. Enlarge their number, and you 
communicate to them the vices which they are meant to cor- 
rect. He differed from Mr. Dickinson, who thought that 
the additional number would give additional weight to the 
body. On the contrary, it appeared to him that their 
weight would be in an inverse ratio to their numbers. The 
example of the Roman tribunes was applicable. They lost 
their influence and power, in proportion as their number 
was augmented. The reason seemed to be obvious: they 
were appointed to take care of the popular interests and 
pretensions at Rome; because the people by reason of their 
numbers could not act in concert, and were liable to fall 
into factions among themselves, and to become a prey to 
their aristocratic adversaries. The more the representa- 
tives of the people, therefore, were multiplied, the more 
they partook of the infirmities of their constituents, the 
more liable they became to be divided among themselves, 
either from their own indiscretions or the artifices of the 
opposite faction, and of course the less capable of fulfilling 
their trust. When the weight of a set of men depends 
merely on their personal characters, the greater the num- 
ber, the greater the weight. When it depends on the de- 
gree of political authority lodged in them, the smaller the 
number, the greater the weight. These considerations 
might perhaps be combined in the intended Senate; but the 
latter was the material one. 

Mr. Gerry. Four modes of appointing the Senate have 
been mentioned. First, by the first branch of the National 
Legislature, — this would create a dependence contrary to 
the end proposed. Secondly, by the National Executive, — 
this is a stride towards monarchy that few will think of. 
Thirdly, by the people ; the people have two great interests, 



1787.J FEDERAL CONVENTION. 127 

the landed interest, and the commercial, including the 
stockholders. To draw both branches from the people will 
leave no security to the latter interest; the people being 
chiefly composed of the landed interest, and erroneously 
supposing that the other interests are adverse to it. 
Fourthly, by the individual Legislatures, — the elections 
being carried through this refinement, will be most like to 
provide some check in favor of the commercial interest 
against the landed; without which, oppression will take 
place ; and no free government can last long where that is 
the case. He was therefore in favor of this last. 

(Mr. Dickinson.* The preservation of the States in a 
certain degree of agency is indispensable. It will produce 
that collision between the different authorities which should 
be wished for in order to check each other. To attempt to 
abolish the States altogether, would degrade the councils of 
our country, would be impracticable, would be ruinous. He 
compared the proposed national system to the solar system, 
in which the States were the planets, and ought to be left 
to move freely in their proper orbits. The gentleman from 
Pennsylvania (Mr. Wilson) wished, he said, to extinguish 
these planets. If the State Governments were excluded 
from all agency in the national one, and all power drawn 
from the people at large, the consequence would be that the 
National Government would move in the same direction as 
the State Governments now do, and would run into all the 
same mischiefs. The reform would only unite the thirteen 
small streams into one great current, ^pursuing the same 
course without any opposition whatever^ He adhered to 
the opinion that the Senate ought to be composed of a large 
number; and that their influence, from family weight and 
other causes, would be increased thereby. He did not 
admit that the Tribunes lost their weight in proportion as 

* It will throw light on this discussion to remark that an election by the State 
Legislatures involved a surrender of the principle insisted on by the large States, and 
dreaded by the small ones, namely, that of a proportional representation in the 
Senate. Such a rule would make the body too numerous, as the smallest State must 
elect one member at least. 



128 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

their number was augmented, and gave a historical sketch 
of this institution. If the reasoning (of Mr. Madison) was 
good, it would prove that the number of the Senate ought 
to be reduced below ten, the highest number of the Tribu- 
nitial corps. 

Mr. Wilson. The subject, it must be owned, is sur- 
rounded with doubts and difficulties. But we must sur- 
mount them. The British Government cannot be our model. 
We have no materials for a similar one. Our manners, our 
laws, the abolition of entails and of primogeniture, the 
whole genius of the people, are opposed to it. He did not 
see the danger of the States being devoured by the National 
Government. On the contrary, he wished to keep them 
from devouring the National Government. He was not, 
however, for extinguishing these planets, as was supposed 
by Mr. Dickinson; neither did he, on the other hand, be- 
lieve that they would warm or enlighten the sun. Within 
their proper orbits they must still be suffered to act for sub- 
ordinate purposes, for which their existence is made essen- 
tial by the great extent of our country. He could not com- 
prehend in what manner the landed interest would be ren- 
dered less predominant in the Senate by an election through 
the medium of the Legislatures, than by the people them- 
selves. If the Legislatures, as was now complained, sacri- 
ficed the commercial to the landed interest, what reason was 
there to expect such a choice from them as would defeat 
their own views? He was for an election by the people, in 
large districts, which would be most likely to obtain men of 
intelligence and uprightness ; subdividing the districts only 
for the accommodation of voters. 

Mr. Madison could as little comprehend in what manner 
family weight, as desired by Mr. Dickinson, would be more 
certainly conveyed into the Senate through elections by the 
State Legislatures, than in some other modes. The true 
question was, in what mode the best choice would be made ? 
If an election by the people, or through any other channel 
than the State Legislatures, promised as uncorrupt and 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 129 

impartial a preference of merit, there could surely be no 
necessity for an appointment by those Legislatures. Nor 
was it apparent that a more useful check would be derived 
through that channel, than from the people through some 
other. /The great evils complained of were, that the 
State Legislatures run into schemes of paper-money, <fcc, 
whenever solicited by the people, and sometimes without 
even the sanction of the people. Their influence, then, 
instead of checking a like propensity in the National Legis- 
lature, may be expected to promote it. Nothing can be 
more contradictory than to say that the National Legisla- 
ture, without a proper check, will follow the example of the 
State Legislatures ; and, in the same breath, that the State 
Legislatures are the only proper check. ) 

Mr. Sherman opposed elections by the people in dis- 
tricts, as not likely to produce such fit men as elections by 
the State Legislatures. 

Mr. Gerry insisted, that the commercial and monied 
interest would be more secure in the hands of the State 
Legislatures, than of the people at large. The former have 
more sense of character, and will be restrained by that from 
injustice. The people are for paper-money, when the Leg- 
islatures are against it. In Massachusetts the county con- 
ventions had declared a wish for a depreciating paper that 
would sink itself. Besides, in some States there are two 
branches in the Legislature, one of which is somewhat 
aristocratic. There would therefore be so far a better 
chance of refinement in the choice. There seemed, he 
thought, to be three powerful objections against elections 
by districts. First, it is impracticable ; the people cannot 
be brought to one place for the purpose ; and, whether 
brought to the same place or not, numberless frauds would 
be unavoidable. Secondly, small States, forming part of 
the same district with a large one, or a large part of a large 
one, would have no chance of gaining an appointment for 
its citizens of merit. Thirdly, a new source of discord 

would be opened between different parts of the same district. 
9 



130 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Pinckney thought the second branch ought to be 
permanent and independent ; and that the members of it 
would be rendered more so by receiving their appointments 
from the State Legislatures. This mode would avoid the 
rivalships and discontents incident to the election by dis- 
tricts. He was for dividing the States in three classes, 
according to their respective sizes, and for allowing to the 
first class three members ; to the second, two ; and to the 
third, one. 

On the question for postponing Mr. Dickinson's motion, 
referring the appointment of the Senate to the State Legis- 
latures, in order to consider Mr. Wilson's for referring it 
to the people, Pennsylvania, aye — 1 ; Massachusetts, Con- 
necticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Vir- 
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 10. 

f Col. Mason. Whatever power may be necessary for the 
National Government, a certain portion must necessarily be 
left with the States. It is impossible for one power to per- 
vade the extreme parts of the United States, so as to carry 
equal justice to them. The State Legislatures also ought 
to have some means of defending themselves against 
encroachments of the National Government. In every 
other department we have studiously endeavoured to pro- 
vide for its self-defence. Shall we leave the States alone 
unprovided with the means for this purpose ? And what 
better means can we provide, than the giving them some 
share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of, the 
national establishment ? There is danger on both sides, 
no doubt ; but we have only seen the evils arising on the 
side of the State Governments. Those on the other side 
remain to be displayed. The example of Congress does 
not apply. Congress had no power to carry their acts into 
execution, as the National Government will have. 

On Mr. Dickinson's motion for an appointment of the 
Senate by the State Legislatures, — Massachusetts, Connecti- 
cut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Vir- 
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 10. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 131 

Mr. Gerky gave notice, that he would to-morrow move 
for a reconsideration of the mode of appointing the National 
Executive, in order to substitute an appointment by the 
State Executives. 

The Committee rose, and the House adjourned. 

Friday, June 8 th. 

In Committee of the Whole. — On a reconsideration of the 
clause giving the National Legislature a negative on such 
laws of the States as might be contrary to the Articles of 
Union, or treaties with foreign nations; 

Mr. Pinckney moved, "that the National Legislature 
should have authority to negative all laws which they should 
judge to be improper." He urged that such a universality 
of the power was indispensably necessary to render it 
effectual ; that the States must be kept in due subordination 
to the nation ; that if the States were left to act of them- 
selves in any case, it would be impossible to defend the 
national prerogatives, however extensive they might be, on 
paper ; that the acts of Congress had been defeated by this 
means ; nor had foreign treaties escaped repeated viola- 
tions : that this universal negative was in fact the corner- 
stone of an efficient national Government ; that under the 
British Government the negative of the Crown had been 
found beneficial, and the States are more one nation now, 
than the colonies were then. 

Mr. Madison seconded the motion. He could not but 
regard an indefinite power to negative legislative acts of the 
States as absolutely necessary to a perfect system. Experi- 
ence had evinced a constant tendency in the States to encroach 
on the Federal authority ; to violate national treaties ; to 
infringe the rights and interests of each other ; to oppress 
the weaker party within their respective jurisdictions. A 
negative was the mildest expedient that could be devised for 
preventing these mischiefs. The existence of such a check 
would prevent attempts to commit them. Should no such 



132 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

precaution be engrafted, the only remedy would be in an 
appeal to coercion. Was such a remedy eligible? Was it 
practicable? Could the national resources, if exerted to 
the utmost, enforce a national decree against Massachusetts, 
abetted, perhaps, by several of her neighbours? It would 
not be possible. A small proportion of the community, in a 
compact situation, acting on the defensive, and at one of its 
extremities, might at any time bid defiance to the national 
authority. Any government for the United States, formed 
on the supposed practicability of using force against the 
unconstitutional proceedings of the States, would prove as 
visionary and fallacious as the government of Congress. 
The negative would render the use of force unnecessary. 
The States could of themselves pass no operative act, any 
more than one branch of a legislature, where there are two 
branches, can proceed without the other. But in order to 
give the negative this efficacy, it must extend to all cases. 
A discrimination would only be a fresh source of conten- 
tion between the two authorities. In a word, to recur to 
the illustrations borrowed from the planetary system, this 
prerogative of the General Government is the great pervad- 
ing principle that must control the centrifugal tendency of 
the States ; which, without it, will continually fly out of 
their proper orbits, and destroy the order and harmony of 
the political system. 

Mr. Williamson was against giving a power that might 
restrain the States from regulating their internal police. 

Mr. Gerry could not see the extent of such a power, 
and was against every power that was not necessary. He 
thought a remonstrance against unreasonable acts of the 
States would restrain them. If it should not, force might 
be resorted to. He had no objection to authorize a nega- 
tive to paper-money and similar measures. When the con- 
federation was depending before ' Congress, Massachusetts 
was then for inserting the power of emitting paper-money 
among the exclusive powers of Congress. He observed, 
that the proposed negative would extend to the regulations 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 133 

of the militia, a matter on which the existence of the State 
might depend. The National Legislature, with such a 
power, may enslave the States. Such an idea as this will 
never be acceded to. It has never been suggested or con- 
ceived among the people. No speculative projector — and 
there are enough of that character among us, in politics as 
well as in other things — has, in any pamphlet or news- 
paper, thrown out the idea. The States, too, have different 
interests, and are ignorant of each other's interests. The 
negative, therefore, will be abused. New States, too, hav- 
ing separate views from the old States, will never come 
into the Union. They may even be under some foreign 
influence; are they in such case to participate in the nega- 
tive on the will of the other States ? 

Mr. Sherman thought the cases in which the negative 
ought to be exercised might be defined. He wished the 
point might not be decided till a trial at least should be 
made for that purpose. 

Mr. Wilson would not say what modifications of the 
proposed power might be practicable or expedient. But 
however novel it might appear, the principle of it, when 
viewed with a close and steady eye, is right. There is no 
instance in which the laws say that the individual should 
be bound in one case, and at liberty to judge whether he 
will obey or disobey in another. The cases are parallel. 
Abuses of the power over the individual persons may hap- 
pen, as well as over the individual States. Federal liberty 
is to the States what civil liberty is to private individuals; 
and States are not more unwilling to purchase it, by the 
necessary concession of their political sovereignty, than the 
savage is to purchase civil liberty by the surrender of the 
personal sovereignty, which he enjoys in a state of nature. 
A definition of the cases in which the negative should be 
exercised is impracticable. A discretion must be left on 
one side or the other, — will it not be most safely lodged on 
the side of the National Government? Among the first 
sentiments expressed in the first Congress, one was, that 



134 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Virginia is no more, that Massachusetts is no more, that 
Pennsylvania is no more, <fcc. — we are now one nation 
of brethren ; — we must bury all local interests and distinc- 
tions. This language continued for some time. The tables 
at length began to turn. No sooner were the State Govern- 
ments formed than their jealousy and ambition began to 
display themselves; each endeavoured to cut a slice from 
the common loaf, to add to its own morsel, till at length the 
Confederation became frittered down to the impotent con- 
dition in which it now stands. Review the progress of the 
Articles of Confederation through Congress, and compare 
the first and last draught of it. To correct its vices is the 
business of this convention. One of its vices is the want 
of an effectual control in the whole over its parts. What 
danger is there that the whole will unnecessarily sacrifice a 
part? But reverse the case, and leave the whole at the 
mercy of each part, and will not the general interest be 
continually sacrificed to local interests? 

Mr. Dickinson deemed it impossible to draw a line be- 
tween the cases proper, and improper, for the exercise of 
the negative. We must take our choice of two things. We 
must either subject the States to the danger of being in- 
jured by the power of the National Government, or the 
latter to the danger of being injured by that of the States. 
He thought the danger greater from the States. To leave 
the power doubtful, would be opening another spring of 
discord, and he was for shutting as many of them as 
possible. 

Mr. Bedford, in answer to his colleague's question, 
where would be the danger to the States from this power, 
would refer him to the smallness of his own State, which 
may be injured at pleasure without redress. It was meant, 
he found, to strip the small States of their equal right of 
suffrage. In this case Delaware would have about one- 
ninetieth for its share in the general councils; whilst Penn- 
sylvania and Virginia would possess one-third of the whole. 
Is there no difference of interests, no rival ship of com- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 135 

merce, of manufactures? Will not these large States crush 
the small ones, whenever they stand in the way of their 
ambitious or interested views? This shows the impossi- 
bility of adopting such a system as that on the table, or 
any other founded on a change in the principle of repre- 
sentation. And after all, if a State does not obey the law 
of the new system, must not force be resorted to, as the only 
ultimate remedy in this as in any other system ? It seems 
as if Pennsylvania and Virginia, by the conduct of their 
deputies, wished to provide a system in which they would 
have an enormous and monstrous influence. Besides, how 
can it be thought that the proposed negative can be exer- 
cised? Are the laws of the States to be suspended in the 
most urgent cases, until they can be sent seven or eight 
hundred miles, and undergo the deliberation of a body who 
may be incapable of judging of them? Is the National 
Legislature, too, to sit continually in order to revise the 
laws of the States ? 

Mr. Madison observed, that the difficulties which had 
been started were worthy of attention, and ought to be 
answered before the question was put. The case of laws 
of urgent necessity must be provided for by some emana- 
tion of the power from the National Government into each 
State, so far as to give a temporary assent at least. This 
was the practice in the Eoyal Colonies before the Revolu- 
tion, and would not have been inconvenient if the supreme 
power of negativing had been faithful to the American in- 
terest, and had possessed the necessary information. He 
supposed that the negative might be very properly lodged in 
the Senate alone, and that the more numerous and expensive 
branch therefore might not be obliged to sit constantly. 
He asked Mr. Bedford, what would be the consequence to 
the small States of a ddissolution of the Union, which seemed 
likely to happen if no effectual substitute was made for the 
defective system existing ? — and he did not conceive any 
effectual system could be substituted on any other basis 
than that of a proportional suffrage. If the large States 



136 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

possessed the avarice and ambition with which they were 
charged, would the small ones in their neighbourhood be 
more secure when all control of a General Government was 
withdrawn ? 

Mr. Butler was vehement against the negative in the 
proposed extent, as cutting off all hope of equal justice to 
the distant States. The people there would not, he was 
sure give it a hearing. 

On the question for extending the negative power to all 
cases, as proposed by Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Madison, — 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, (Mr. Bandolph and 
Mr. Mason, no ; Mr. Blair, Doctor McClurg and Mr. Madi- 
son, aye ; General Washington not consulted, ) aye — 3 ; 
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, North Caro- 
lina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 7; Delaware, divided, 
(Mr. Head and Mr. Dickinson, aye; Mr. Bedford and Mr. 
Basset, no). 

On motion of Mr. Gerry and Mr. King, to-morrow was 
assigned for reconsidering the mode of appointing the 
national Executive; the reconsideration being voted for by 
all the States except Connecticut and North Carolina. 

Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Butledge moved to add to the 
fourth Besolution, agreed to by the Committee, the follow- 
ing, viz.: " that the States be divided into three classes, the 
first class to have three members, the second two, and the third 
one member, each; that an estimate be taken of the com- 
parative importance of each State at fixed periods, so as to 
ascertain the number of members they may from time to 
time be entitled to." The Committee then rose, and the 
House adjourned. 



Saturday, June 9th. 

Mr. Luther Martin, from Maryland, took his seat. 

In Committee of ihe Whole, — Mr. Gerry, according to 
previous notice given by him, moved " that the national 
Executive should be elected by the Executives of the States, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 137 

whose proportion of votes should be the same with that 
allowed to the States, in the election of the Senate." If 
the appointment should be made by the National Legisla- 
ture, it would lessen that independence of the Executive, 
which ought to prevail ; would give birth to intrigue and 
corruption between the Executive and Legislature previous 
to the election, and to partiality in the Executive afterwards 
to the friends who promoted him. Some other mode, there- 
fore, appeared to him necessary. He proposed that of 
appointing by the State Executives, as most analagous to 
the principle observed in electing the other branches of the 
National Government; the first branch being chosen by the 
people of the States and the second by the Legislatures of 
the States, he did not see any objection against letting the 
Executive be appointed by the Executives of the States. 
He supposed the Executives would be most likely to select 
the fittest men, and that it would be their interest to sup- 
port the man of their own choice. 

Mr. Randolph urged strongly the inexpediency of Mr. 
Gerry's mode of appointing the National Executive. The 
confidence of the people would not be secured by it to the 
National magistrate. The small States would lose all chance 
of an appointment from within themselves. Bad appoint- 
ments would be made, the Executives of the States being 
little conversant with characters not within their own small 
spheres. The State Executives, too, notwithstanding their 
constitutional independence, being in fact dependent on the 
State Legislatures, will generally be guided by the views of 
the latter, and prefer either favorites within the States, or 
such as it may be expected will be most partial to the inter- 
ests of the State. A national Executive thus chosen will 
not be likely to defend with becoming vigilance and firm- 
ness the national rights against State encroachments. 
Vacancies also must happen. How can these be filled? He 
could not suppose, either, that the Executives would feel the 
interest in supporting the national Executive which 



138 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

had been imagined. They will not cherish the great oak 
which is to reduce them to paltry shrubs. 

On the question for referring the appointment of the 
national Executive to the State Executives, as proposed by 
Mr. Geery, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no; Delaware, divided. 

Mr. Patterson moved, that the Committee resume the 
clause relating to the rule of suffrage in the National Leg- 
islature. 

Mr. Brearly seconds him. He was sorry, he said, that 
any question on this point was brought into view. It had 
been much agitated in Congress at the time of forming the 
Confederation, and was then rightly settled by allowing to 
each sovereign State an equal vote. Otherwise, the smaller 
States must have been destroyed instead of being saved. 
The substitution of a ratio, he admitted, carried fairness on 
the face of it ; but on a deeper examination was unfair and 
unjust. Judging of the disparity of the States by the quota 
of Congress, Virginia would have "sixteen votes, and Georgia 
but one. A like proportion to the others will make the 
whole number ninety. There will be three large States, 
and ten small ones. The large States, by which he meant 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Virginia, will carry every 
thing before them. It had been admitted, and was known 
to him from facts within New Jersey that where large and 
small counties were united into a district for electing rep- 
resentatives for the district, the large counties always car- 
ried their point, and consequently the States would do so. 
Virginia with her sixteen votes will be a solid column 
indeed, a formidable phalanx. While Georgia with her 
solitary vote, and the other little States, will be obliged to 
throw themselves constantly into the scale of some large 
one, in order to have any weight at all. He had come to 
the Convention with a view of being as useful as he could, 
in giving energy and stability to the Federal Government. 
When the proposition for destroying the equality of votes 



1787. J FEDERAL CONVENTION. 139 

came forward, he was astonished, he was alarmed. Is it 
fair, then, it will be asked, that Georgia should have an 
equal vote with Virginia ? He would not say it was. What 
remedy, then? One only, that a map of the United States 
be spread out, that all the existing boundaries be erased, 
and that a new partition of the whole be made into thirteen 
equal parts. 

Mr. Patterson considered the proposition for a pro- 
portional representation as striking at the existence of the 
lesser States. He would premise, however, to an investiga- 
tion of this question, some remarks on the nature, structure, 
and powers of the Convention. The Convention, he said, 
was formed in pursuance of an act of Congress; that this 
act was recited in several of the commissions, particularly 
that of Massachusetts, which he required to be read; that 
the amendment of the Confederacy was the object of all 
the laws and commissions on the subject; that the Articles 
of the Confederation were therefore the proper basis of all 
the proceedings of the Convention ; that we ought to keep 
within its limits, or we should be charged by our constitu- 
ents with usurpation; that the people of America were 
sharp-sighted, and not to be deceived. But the commis- 
sions under which we acted were not only the measure of 
our power, they denoted also the sentiments of the States 
on the subject of our deliberation. (The idea of a National 
Government, as contradistinguished from a federal one, 
never entered into the mind of any of them; and to the 
public mind we must accommodate ourselves. We have no 
power to go beyond the Federal scheme ; and if we had, the 
people are not ripe for any other. We must follow the 
people; the people will not follow us. The proposition 
could not be maintained, whether considered in reference 
to us as a nation, or as a confederacy. A confederacy 
supposes sovereignty in the members composing it, and 
sovereignty supposes equality. If we are to be considered 
as a nation, all State distinctions must be abolished, the 
whole must be thrown into hotchpot, and when an equal 



140 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

division is made, then there may be fairly an equality of 
representation. He held up Virginia, Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania, as the three large States, and the other ten 
as small ones; repeating the calculations of Mr. Brearly, 
as to the disparity of votes which would take place, and 
affirming that the small States would never agree to it. He 
said there was no more reason that a great individual State, 
contributing much, should have more votes than a small 
one, contributing little, than that a rich individual citizen 
should have more votes than an indigent one\ If the rate- 
able property of A was to that of B as forty to one, ought 
A for that reason to have forty times as many votes as B? 
Such a principle would never be admitted; and if it were 
admitted would put B entirely at the mercy of A. As A 
has more to be protected than B, so he ought to contribute 
more for the common protection. The same may be said 
of a large State, which has more to be protected than a 
small one. Give the large States an influence in proportion 
to their magnitude, and what will be the consequence? 
Their ambition will be proportionally increased, and the 
small States will have every thing to fear. It was once 
proposed by Galloway, and some others, that America should 
be represented in the British Parliament, and then be bound 
by its laws. America could not have been entitled to more 
than one-third of the representatives which would fall to 
the share of Great Britain, — would American rights and 
interests have been safe under an authority thus constituted? 
It has been said that if a national Government is to be 
formed, so as to operate on the people and not on the States, 
the Representatives ought to be drawn from the people. But 
why so? May not a Legislature, filled by the State Legis- 
latures, operate on the people who choose the State Legisla- 
tures? Or may not a practicable coercion be found? He 
admitted that there were none such in the existing system. 
He was attached strongly to the plan of the existing Con- 
federacy, in which the people choose their legislative repre- 
sentatives; and the Legislatures their federal representa 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 141 

tives. No other amendments were wanting than to mark 
the orbits of the States with due precision, and provide for 
the use of coercion, which was the great point. He alluded 
to the hint thrown out by Mr. Wilson, of the necessity to 
which the large States might be reduced, of confederating 
among themselves, by a refusal of the others to concur. 
Let them unite if they please, but let them remember that 
they have no authority to compel the others to unite. New 
Jersey will never confederate on the plan before the Com- 
mittee. She would be swallowed up. He had rather submit 
to a monarch, to a despot, than to such a fate. He would 
not only oppose the plan here, but on his return home do 
every thing in his power to defeat it there. 

Mr. Wilson hoped, if the Confederacy should be dis- 
solved, that a majority, — nay, a minority of the States 
would unite for their safety. He entered elaborately into 
the defence of a proportional representation, stating for his 
first position, that, as all authority was derived from the 
people, equal numbers of people ought to have an equal 
number of representatives, and different numbers of people, 
different numbers of representatives. This principle had 
been improperly violated in the Confederation, owing to the 
urgent circumstances of the time. As to the case of A and 
B stated by Mr. Patterson, he observed, that, in districts 
as large as the States, the number of people was the best 
measure of their comparative wealth. Whether, therefore, 
wealth or numbers was to form the ratio it would be the 
same. Mr. Patterson admitted persons, not property, 
to be the measure of suffrage. Are not the citizens of 
Pennsylvania equal to those of New Jersey ? Does it 
require one hundred and fifty of the former to balance 
fifty of the latter ? Kepresentatives of different districts 
ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as 
their respective constituents hold to each other. If the 
small States will not confederate on this plan, Pennsylvania, 
and he presumed some other States, would not confederate 
on any other. We have been told that each State being 



142 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

sovereign, all are equal. So each man is naturally a sov- 
ereign over himself, and all men are therefore naturally 
equal. Can he retain this equality when he becomes a 
member of civil government ? He cannot. As little can a 
sovereign State, when it becomes a member of a federal 
government. If New Jersey will not part with her sover- 
eignty, it is vain to talk of government. A new partition 
of the States is desirable, but evidently and totally imprac- 
ticable. 

Mr. Williamson illustrated the cases by a comparison 
of the different States to counties of different sizes within 
the same State ; observing that proportional representation 
was admitted to be just in the latter case, and could not, 
therefore, be fairly contested in the former. 

The question being about to be put, Mr. Patterson 
hoped that as so much depended on it, it might be thought 
best to postpone the decision till to-morrow ; which was 
done, nem. con. 

The Committee rose, and the House adjourned. 



Monday, June 11th. 

Mr. Abraham Baldwin, from Georgia, took his seat. 

In Committee of the Whole, — The clause concerning the 
rule of suffrage in the National Legislature, postponed on 
Saturday, was resumed. 

Mr. Sherman proposed, that the proportion of suffrage 
in the first branch should be according to the respective 
numbers of free inhabitants ; and that in the second branch, 
or Senate, each State should have one vote and no more. 
He said, as the States would remain possessed of certain 
individual rights, each State ought to be able to protect 
itself ; otherwise, a few large States will rule the rest. 
The House of Lords in England, he observed, had certain 
particular rights under the Constitution, and hence they 
have an equal vote with the House of Commons, that they 
may be able to defend their rights. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 143 

Mr. Rutledge proposed, that the proportion of suffrage 
in the first branch should be according to the quotas of 
contribution. The justice of this rule, he said, could not 
be contested. Mr. Butlek urged the same idea ; adding 
that money was power ; and that the States ought to have 
weight in the government in proportion to their wealth. 

Mr. King and Mr. Wilson,* in order to bring the 
question to a point, moved, " that the right of suffrage in 
the first branch of the National Legislature ought not to 
be according to the rule established in the Articles of Con- 
federation, but according to some equitable ratio of repre- 
sentation." The clause, so far as it related to suffrage in 
the first branch, was postponed, in order to consider this 
motion. 

Mr. Dickinson contended for the actual contributions of 
the States, as the rule of their representation and suffrage 
in the first branch. By thus connecting the interests of 
the States with their duty, the latter would be sure to be 
performed. 

Mr. King remarked, that it was uncertain what mode 
might be used in levying a national revenue; but that it 
was probable, imposts would be one source of it. If the 
actual contributions were to be the rule, the non-importing" 
States, as Connecticut and New Jersey, would be in a bad 
situation, indeed. It might so happen that they would have 
no representation. This situation of particular States had 
been always one powerful argument in favor of the five per 
cent, impost. 

The question being about to be put, Doctor Franklin 
said, he had thrown his ideas of the matter on a paper, which 
Mr. Wilson read to the Committee, in the words following: 

Mr. Chairman, — It has given me great pleasure to 
observe, that, till this point, the proportion of representa- 
tion, came before us, our debates were carried on with great 
coolness and temper. If any thing of a contrary kind has on 

* In the printed Journal Mr. Rutledge is named as the seconder of the motion. 



14:4 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

this occasion appeared, I hope it will not be repeated; for/ 
we are sent here to consult, not to contend, with each other; ) 
and declarations of a fixed opinion, and of determined reso- 
lution never to change it, neither enlighten nor convince 
us. Positiveness and warmth on one side naturally beget 
their like on the other, and tend to create and augment dis- 
cord and division, in a great concern wherein harmony and 
union are extremely necessary to give weight to our coun- 
cils, and render them effectual in promoting and securing 
the common good. 

"I must own, that I was originally of opinion it would 
be better if every member of Congress, or our national 
Council, were to consider himself rather as a representative 
of the whole, than as an agent for the interests of a particu- 
lar State ; in which case the proportion of members for each 
State would be of less consequence, and it would not be very 
material whether they voted by States or individually. But 
as I find this is not to be expected, I now think the number 
of representatives should bear some proportion to the num- 
ber of the represented ; and that the decisions should be by 
the majority of members, not by the majority of the States. 
This is objected to from an apprehension that the greater 
States would then swallow up the smaller. I do not at 
present clearly see what advantage the greater States could 
propose to themselves by swallowing up the smaller, and 
therefore do not apprehend they would attempt it. I recol- 
lect that, in the beginning of this century, when the union 
was proposed of the two kingdoms, England and Scotland, 
the Scotch patriots were full of fears, that unless they had 
an equal number of representatives in Parliament, they 
should be ruined by the superiority of the English. They 
finally agreed, however, that the different proportions of 
importance in the union of the two nations should be 
attended to, whereby they were to have only forty members 
in the House of Commons, and only sixteen in the House 
of Lords. A very great inferiority of members! And yet 
to this day I do not recollect that anything has been done 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 145 

in the Parliament of Great Britain to the prejudice of Scot- 
land; and whoever looks over the lists of public officers, 
civil and military, of that nation, will find, I believe, that 
the North Britons enjoy at least their full proportion of 
emolument. 

"But, sir, in the present mode of voting by States, it is 
equally in the power of the lesser States to swallow up the 
greater; and this is mathematically demonstrable. Sup- 
pose, for example, that seven smaller States had each three 
members in the House, and the six larger to have, one with 
another six members, and that, upon a question, two mem- 
bers of each smaller State should be in the affirmative, and 
one in the negative, they would make: — affirmatives, 14; 
negatives, 7 ; and that all the larger States should be unani- 
mously in the negative, they would make, negatives, 36 ; in 
all, affirmatives, 14, negatives, 43. 

" It is, then, apparent, that the fourteen carry the ques- 
tion against the forty-three, and the minority overpowers 
the majority, contrary to the common practice of assemblies 
in all countries and ages. 

" The greater States, sir, are naturally as unwilling to 
have their property left in the disposition of the smaller, as 
the smaller are to have theirs in the disposition of the 
greater. An honorable gentleman has, to avoid this diffi- 
culty, hinted a proposition of equalizing the States. It 
appears to me an equitable one, and I should, for my own 
part, not be against such a measure, if it might be found 
practicable. Formerly, indeed, when almost every province 
had a different constitution, some with greater, others with 
fewer, privileges, it was of importance to the borderers, 
when their boundaries were contested, whether, by running 
the division lines, they were placed on one side or the 
other. At present, when such differences are done away, it 
is less material. The interest of a State is made up of the 
interests of its individual members. If they are not injured, 
the State is not injured. Small States are, more easily well 

and happily governed than large ones. If, therefore, in 
10 



146 DEBATES IN THE L 17 ^. 

such an equal division, it should be found necessary to 
diminish Pennsylvania, I should not be averse to the giving 
a part of it to New Jersey, and another to Delaware. But 
as there would probably be considerable difficulties in 
adjusting such a division; and, however equally made at 
first, it would be continually varying by the augmentation 
of inhabitants in some States, and their fixed proportion 
in others, and thence frequently occasion new divisions I 
beg leave to propose, for the consideration of the Committee, 
another mode, which appears to me to be as equitable, 
more easily carried into practice, and more permanent in its 
nature. 

" Let the weakest State say what proportion of money or 
force it is able and willing to furnish for the general pur- 
poses of the Union: 

" Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish each an 
equal proportion: 

" The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely in 
the disposition of Congress: 

" The Congress in this case to be composed of an equal 
number of delegates from each State: 

" And their decisions to be by the majority of individual 
members voting. 

" If these joint and equal supplies should, on particular 
occasions, not be sufficient, let Congress make requisitions 
on the richer and more powerful States for further aids, to 
be voluntarily afforded, leaving to each State the right of 
considering the necessity and utility of the aid desired, and 
of giving more or less as it should be found proper. 

" This mode is not new. It was formerly practiced 
with success by the British government with respect to 
Ireland and the Colonies. We sometimes gave even more 
than they expected, or thought just to accept; and in the 
last war, carried on while we were united, they gave us 
back in five years a million sterling. We should probably 
have continued such voluntary contributions, whenever the 
occasions appeared to require them for the common good of 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 147 

the Empire. It was not till they chose to force us, and to 
deprive us of the merit and pleasure of voluntary contribu- 
tions, that we refused and resisted. These contributions, 
however, were to be disposed of at the pleasure of a govern- 
ment in which we had no representative. I am, therefore, 
persuaded, that they will not be refused to one in which 
the representation shall be equal. 

"My learned colleague (Mr. Wilson) has already men- 
tioned, that the present method of voting by States was 
submitted to originally by Congress under a conviction of 
its impropriety, inequality, and injustice. This appears in 
the words of their resolution. It is of the sixth of Septem- 
ber, 1774 The words are: 

" Eesolved, that in determining questions in this Con- 
gress each Colony or Province shall have one vote; the 
Congress not being possessed of, or at present able to 
procure, materials for ascertaining the importance of each 
Colony." 

On the question for agreeing to Mr. King's and Mr. 
Wilson's motion, it passed in the affirmative, — Massachu- 
setts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7 ; New York, New Jersey, 
Delaware, no — 3 ; Maryland, divided. 

It was then moved by Mr. Rutledge, seconded by Mr. 
Butlek, to add to the words, " equitable ratio of represen- 
tation, 1 ' at the end of the motion just agreed to, the words 
"according to the quotas of contribution." On motion of 
Mr. Wilson, seconded by Mr. Pinckney, this was post- 
poned; in order to add, after the words, "equitable ratio of 
representation," the words following: "in proportion to the 
whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabit- 
ants of every age, sex and condition, including those 
bound to servitude for a term of years, and three-fifths of 
all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing de- 
scription, except Indians not paying taxes, in each State " 
— this being the rule in the act of Congress, agreed to by 
eleven States, for apportioning quotas of revenue on the 



148 DEBATES IN THE [178?. 

States, and requiring a census only every five, seven, or 
ten years. 

Mr. Gerry thought property not the rule of represen- 
tation. Why, then, should the blacks, who were property 
in the South, be in the rule of representation more than 
the cattle and horses of the North? 

On the question, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia ; aye — 9 ; New Jersey, Delaware, 
no — 2. 

Mr. Sherman moved, that a question be taken, whether 
each State shall have one vote in the second branch. Every 
thing, he said, depended on this. The smaller States would 
never agree to the plan on any other principle than an 
equality of suffrage in this branch. Mr. Ellsworth sec- 
onded the motion. On the question for allowing each 
State one vote in the second branch, — Connecticut, New 
York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, aye — 5; Massa- 
chusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, no — 6. 

Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hamilton moved, that the right 
of suffrage in the second branch ought to be according to 
the same rule as in the first branch. 

On this question for making the ratio of representation, 
the same in the second as in the first branch, it passed in 
the affirmative, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6 ; Connec- 
ticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no — 5. 

The eleventh Resolution, for guaranteeing republican 
government and territory to each State, being considered, 
the words " or partition," were, on motion of Mr. Madison, 
added after the words "voluntary junction," — Massachu- 
setts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7 ; Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Delaware, Maryland, no — 4. 

Mr. Read disliked the idea of guaranteeing territory. 
It abetted the idea of distinct States, which would be a 



178.7.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 149 

perpetual source of discord. There can be no cure for this 
evil but in doing away States altogether, and uniting them 
all into one great society. 

Alterations having been made in the Resolution, mak- 
ing it read, "that a Republican constitution, and its exist- 
ing laws, ought to be guaranteed to each State by the 
United States," the whole was agreed to, nem. com. 

The thirteenth Resolution, for amending the national 
Constitution, hereafter, without consent of the national 
Legislature, being considered, several members did not see 
the necessity of the Resolution at all, nor the propriety of 
making the consent of the National Legislature unneces- 
sary. 

Col. Mason urged the necessity of such a provision. 
The plan now to be formed will certainly be defective, as 
the Confederation has been found on trial to be. Amend- 
ments, therefore, will be necessary ; and it will be better to 
provide for them in an easy, regular and constitutional 
way, than to trust to chance and violence. It would be 
improper to require the consent of the National Legislat- 
ure, because they may abuse their power, and refuse their 
assent on that very account. The opportunity for such an^ 
abuse may be the fault of the Constitution calling foi 
amendment. 

Mr. Randolph enforced these arguments. 

The words, " without requiring the consent of the Na- 
tional Legislature," were postponed. The other provision 
in the clause passed, nem. con. 

The fourteenth resolution, requiring oaths from the 
members of the State Governments to observe the national 
Constitution and laws, being considered, — 

Mr. Sherman opposed it, as unnecessarily intruding into 
the State jurisdictions. 

Mr. Randolph considered it necessary to prevent that 
competition between the national Constitution and laws, and 
those of the particular States, which had already been felt. 
The officers of the States are already under oath to the 



150 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

States. To preserve a due impartiality they ought to be 
equally bound to the National Government. The national 
authority needs every support we can give it. The Exec- 
utive and Judiciary of the States, notwithstanding their 
nominal independence on the State Legislatures, are in fact 
so dependent on them, that unless they be brought under 
some tie to the National System, they will always lean too 
much to the State systems, whenever a contest arises 
between the two. 

Mr. Gerry did not like the clause. He thought there 
was as much reason for requiring an oath of fidelity to the 
States from national officers, as vice versa. 

Mr. Luther Martin moved to strike out the words 
requiring such an oath from the State officers, viz.: 
" within the several States, " observing, that if the new 
oath should be contrary to that already taken by them, it 
would be improper ; if coincident, the oaths already taken 
will be sufficient. 

On the question for striking out as proposed by Mr. L. 
Martin, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, 
aye — 4 ; Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 7. 

Question on the whole Eesolution as proposed by Mr, 
Randolph, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6 ; Connecticut, 
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no — 5. 

The Committee rose, and the House adjourned. 



Tuesday, June 12th, 

In Committee of the Whole, — The question was taken 
on the fifteenth Resolution, to wit, referring the new sys- 
tem to the people of the United States for ratification. It 
passed in the affirmative, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,* 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 

* Pennsylvania omitted in the printed Journal. The vote is there entered as of 
June 11th. 

i 



\ 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 151 

6; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, no — 3; Delaware, 
Maryland, divided. 

Mr. Sherman and Mr. Ellsworth moved to fill the blank 
left in the fourth Resolution, for the periods of electing the 
members of the first branch, with the words, " every year;" 
Mr. Sherman observing that he did it in order to bring on 
some question. 

Mr. Eutledge proposed " every two years." 

Mr. Jenifer proposed, "every three years;" observing 
that the too great frequency of elections rendered the peo- 
ple indifferent to them, and made the best men unwilling to 
engage in so precarious a service. 

Mr. Madison seconded the motion for three years. 
Instability is one of the great vices of our republics to be 
remedied. Three years will be necessary, in a government 
so extensive, for members to form any knowledge of the 
various interests of the States to which they do not belong, 
and of which they can know but little from the situation 
and affairs of their own. One year will be almost con- 
sumed in preparing for, and traveling to and from the seat 
of national business. 

Mr. Gerry. The people of New England will never 
give up the point of annual elections. They know of the 
transition made in England from triennial to septennial 
elections, and will consider such an innovation here as the 
prelude to a like usurpation. He considered annual elections 
as the only defence of the people against tyranny. He was 
as much against a triennial House, as against a hereditary 
Executive. 

Mr. Madison observed, that if the opinions of the people 
were to be our guide, it would be difficult to say what 
course we ought to take. No member of the Convention 
could say what the opinions of his constituents were at this 
time; much less could he say what they would think, if 
possessed of the information and lights possessed by the 
members here; and still less, what would be their way of 
thinking six or twelve months hence. We ought to con- 



i 

/ 



152 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

sider what was right and necessary in itself for the attain- 
ment of a proper government. A plan adjusted to this 
idea will recommend itself. The respectability of this Con- 
vention will give weight to their recommendation of it. 
Experience will be constantly urging the adoption of it; 
and all the most enlightened and respectable citizens will 
be its advocates. Should we fall short of the necessary 
and proper point, this influential class of citizens will be 
turned against the plan, and little support in opposition to 
them can be gained to it from the unreflecting multitude. 

Mr. Gerry repeated his opinion, that it was necessary 
to consider what the people would approve. This had been 
the policy of all legislators. If the reasoning (of Mr. 
Madison) were just, and we supposed a limited monarchy 
the best form in itself, we ought to recommend it, though 
the genius of the people w r as decidedly adverse to it, and, 
having no hereditary distinctions among us, we were 'desti- 
tute of the essential materials for such an innovation. 

On the question for the triennial election of the first 
branch, — New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye — 7; Massachusetts, (Mr. 
King, aye, Mr. Gorman, wavering) Connecticut, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, no — 4. 

The words requiring members of the first branch to be 

of the age of years were struck out, — Maryland 

alone, no. 

The words " liberal compensation for members" being 
considered, Mr. Madison moved to insert the words, " and 
fixed." He observed that it would be improper to leave the 
members of the National Legislature to be provided for by 
the State Legislatures, because it would create an improper 
dependence; and to leave them to regulate their own wages 
was an indecent thing, and might in time prove a danger- 
ous one. He thought wheat, or some other article of which 
the average price, throughout a reasonable period preced- 
ing, might be settled in some convenient mode, would form 
a proper standard. 



1787. j FEDERAL CONVENTION. 153 

Colonel Mason seconded the motion; adding, that it 
would be improper, for other reasons, to leave the wages to 
be regulated by the States, — first, the different States 
would make different provision for their representatives, 
and an inequality would be felt among them, whereas he 
thought they ought to be in all respects equal; secondly,, 
the parsimony of the States might reduce the provision so 
low, that, as had already happened in choosing delegates to 
Congress, the question would be, not who were most fit to 
be chosen, but who were most willing to serve. 

On the question for inserting the words, " and fixed," — 
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, 
Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8 ; Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, South Carolina, no — 3. 

Doctor Fkanklin said, he approved of the amendment 
just made for rendering the salaries as fixed as possible; 
but disliked the word " liberal." He would prefer the 
word " moderate," if it was necessary to substitute any 
other. He remarked the tendency of abuses, in every case, 
to grow of themselves when once begun; and related very 
pleasantly the progression in ecclesiastical benefices, from 
the first departure from the gratuitous provision for the 
apostles, to the establishment of the papal system. The 
word "liberal" was struck out, nem. con. 

On the motion of Mr. Pieece, that the wages should be 
paid out of the National Treasury, Massachusetts, New Jer- 
sey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8 ; Connecticut, New York, South 
Carolina, no — 3. 

Question on the clause relating to term of service and 
compensation of the first branch, — Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8 ; Connecticut, New York, South 
Carolina, no — 3. 

On a question for striking out the " ineligibility of mem- 
bers of the National Legislature to State offices" — Con- 
necticut, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 



154: DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

4; New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, Georgia, 
no — 5 ; Massachusetts, Maryland, divided. 

On the question for agreeing to the clause as amended, 
— Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- 
lina, Georgia, aye — 10 ; Connecticut, no — 1. 

On a question for making members of the National 
Legislature ineligible to any office under the National 
Government for the term of three years after ceasing to be 
members, — Maryland, aye — 1 ; Massachusetts, Connecti- 
cut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Vir- 
ginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 10. 

On the question for such ineligibility for one year, — 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 
8 ; New York, Georgia, no — 2 ; Maryland, divided. 

On the question moved by Mr. Pinckney for striking 
out " incapable of re-election into the first branch of the 

National Legislature for years, and subject to 

recall," agreed to, nem. con. 

On the question for striking out from the fifth Resolu- 
tion the words requiring members of the Senatorial branch 

to be of the age of years at least, — Connecticut, 

New Jersey, Pennsylvania, aye — 3; Massachusetts, New 
York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no — 
6 ; North Carolina, Georgia, divided. 

On the question for filling the blank with " thirty 
years," as the qualification, it was agreed to, — Massachu- 
setts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 7 ; Connecticut, New Jer- 
sey, Delaware, Georgia, no — 4. 

Mr. Spaight moved to fill the blank for the duration of 
the appointments to the second branch of the National 
Legislature, with the words, " seven years." 

Mr. Sherman thought seven years too long. He 
grounded his opposition, he said, on the principle, that if 
they did their duty well, they would be re-elected; and if 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 155 

they acted amiss, an earlier opportunity should be allowed 
for getting rid of them. He preferred five years, which 
would be between the terms of the first branch and of the 
Executive. 

Mr. Pierce proposed three years. Seven years would 
raise an alarm. Great mischiefs have arisen in England 
from their Septennial Act, which was reprobated by most of 
their patriotic statesmen. 

/Mr. Eandolph was for the term of seven years. The 
democratic licentiousness of the State Legislatures proved 
the necessity of a firm Senate. The object of this second 
branch is, to control the democratic branch of the National 
Legislature. If it be not a firm body, the other branch, 
being more numerous, and coming immediately from the 
people, will overwhelm it. The senate of Maryland, consti- 
tuted on like principles, had been scarcely able to stem the 
popular torrent. No mischief can be apprehended, as the 
concurrence of the other branch, and in some measure of 
the Executive, will in all cases be necessary. A firmness and 
independence may be the more necessary, also, in this 
branch, as it ought to guard the Constitution against 
encroachments of the Executive, who will be apt to form 
combinations with the demagogues of the popular branch, j 

Mr. Madison considered seven years as a term by no 
means too long. What we wished was, to give to the govern- 
ment that stability which was every where called for, and 
which the enemies of the republican form alleged to be 
inconsistent with its nature. He was not afraid of giving 
too much stability, by the term of seven years. His fear 
was, that the popular branch would still be too great an 
overmatch for it. It was to be much lamented that we had 
so little direct experience to guide us. The Constitution of 
Maryland was the only one that bore any analogy to this 
part of the plan. In no instance had the Senate of Mary- 
land created just suspicions of danger from it. In some 
instances, perhaps, it may have erred by yielding to the House 
of Delegates. In every instance of their opposition to the 



156 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

measures of the House of Delegates, they had had with 
them the suffrages of the most enlightened and impartial 
people of the other States, as well as of their own. (In the 
States, where the Senates were chosen in the same manner 
as the other branches of the Legislature, and held their 
seats for four years, the institution was found to be no 
check whatever against the instabilities of the other 
branches. J He conceived it to be of great importance that a 
stable and firm government, organized in the republican 
form, should be held out to the people. If this be not done, 
and the people be left to judge of this species of govern- 
ment by the operations of the defective systems under which 
they now live, it is much to be feared, the time is not dis- 
tant, when, in universal disgust, they will renounce the 
blessing which they have purchased at so dear a rate, and 
be ready for any change that may be proposed to them. 

On the question for " seven years," as the term for the 
second branch, — New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, aye — 8; Connecticut, no — 1; Massachusetts, (Mr. 
Gorham and Mr. King, aye; Mr. Gerry and Mr. Strong, no) 
New York, divided. 

Mr. Butler and Mr. Kutledge proposed that the mem- 
bers of the second branch should be entitled to no salary or 
compensation for their services. On the question,* — Con- 
necticut Delaware, South Carolina, aye — 3 ; New York, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Car- 
olina, Georgia, no — 7; Massachusetts, divided. 

It was then moved, and agreed, that the clauses respect- 
ing the stipends and ineligibility of the second branch be 
the same as of the first branch, — Connecticut disagreeing to 
the ineligibility. It was moved and seconded, to alter the 
ninth Resolution, so as to read, " that the jurisdiction of the 
supreme tribunal shall be, to hear and determine, in the 
dernier resort, all piracies, felonies, <fcc." 

*It. is probable the votes lion* turned chiefly on the idea that if the salaries were 
not here provided for, the membi ra would be paid by their respective States. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 157 

It was moved and seconded, to strike out, " all piracies 
and felonies on the high seas," which was agreed to. 

It was moved, and agreed, to strike out, " all captures 
from an enemy." 

It was moved, and agreed, to strike out, "other States," 
and insert, " two distinct States of the Union." 

It was moved, and agreed, to postpone the consideration 
of the ninth Resolution, relating to the Judiciary. 

The Committee then rose, and the House adjourned. 



Wednesday, June 13th. 

In Committee of the Whole, — The ninth Eesolution 
being resumed, — 

The latter part of the clause relating to the jurisdiction 
of the national tribunals, was struck out, nem. con. ; in order 
to leave full room for their organization. 

Mr. Randolph and Mr. Madison then moved the fol- 
lowing resolution respecting a national Judiciary, viz.: 
"that the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary shall 
extend to cases which respect the collection of the national 
revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and ques- 
tions which involve the national peace and harmony." 
Agreed to. 

Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Sherman moved to insert after 
the words, "one supreme tribunal," the words, "the judges 
of which to be appointed by the National Legislature." 

Mr. Madison objected to an appointment by the whole 
Legislature. Many of them are incompetent judges of the 
requisite qualifications. They were too much influenced 
by their partialities. The candidate who was present, who 
had displayed a talent for business in the legislative field, 
who had, perhaps, assisted ignorant members in business 
of their own, or of their constituents, or used other winning 
means, would, without any of the essential qualifications 
for an expositor of the laws, prevail over a competitor not 
having these recommendations, but possessed of every 



158 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

necessary accomplishment. He proposed that the appoint- 
ment should be made by the Senate , which, as a less 
numerous and more select body, would be more competent 
judges, and which was sufficiently numerous to justify such 
a confidence in them. 

Mr. Sherman and Mr. Pinckney withdrew their motion, 
and the appointment by the Senate was agreed to nem. con. 

Mr. Gerry moved to restrain the Senatorial branch 
from originating money bills. The other branch was more 
immediately the representatives of the people, and it was a 
maxim, that the people ought to hold the purse-strings. 
If the Senate should be allowed to originate such bills, 
they would repeat the experiment, till chance should furnish 
a set of Representatives in the other branch who will fall 
into their snares. 

Mr. Butler saw no reason for such a discrimination. 
We were always following the British Constitution, when 
the reason of it did not apply. There was no analogy 
between the House of Lords and the body proposed to be 
established. If the Senate should be degraded by any 
such discriminations, the best men would be apt to decline 
serving in it, in favor of the other branch. And it will 
lead the latter into the practice of tacking other clauses to 
money bills. 

Mr. Madison observed, that the commentators on the 
British Constitution had not yet agreed on the reason of 
the restriction on the House of Lords, in money bills. 
Certain it was, there could be no similar reason in the case 
before us. The Senate would be the representatives of the 
people, as well as the first branch. If they should have 
any dangerous influence over it, they would easily prevail 
on some member of the latter to originate the bill they 
wished to be passed. As the Senate would be generally a 
more capable set of men, it would be wrong to disable them 
from any preparation of the business, especially of that 
which was most important, and, in our republics, worse 
prepared than any other. The gentleman, in pursuance of 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 159 

his principle, ought to carry the restraint to the amendment, 
as well as the originating of money bills ; since an addition 
of a given sum would be equivalent to a distinct proposition 
of it. 

Mr. King differed from Mr. Gerry, and concurred in 
the objections to the proposition. 

Mr. Bead favored the proposition, but would not extend 
the restraint to the case of amendments. 

Mr. Pinckney thinks the question premature. If the 
Senate should be formed on the same proportional represen- 
tation as it stands at present, they should have equal 
power; otherwise, if a different principle should be intro- 
duced. 

Mr. Sherman. As both branches must concur, there 
can be no danger, whichever way the Senate may be formed. 
We establish two branches in order to get more wisdom, \, 
which is particularly needed in the finance business. The 
Senate bear their share of the taxes, and are also the repre- 
sentatives of the people. 'What a man does by another, he 
does by himself,' is a maxim. In Connecticut both 
branches can originate, in all cases, and it has been found 
safe and convenient. Whatever might have been the rea- 
son of the rule as to the House of Lords, it is clear that no 
good arises from it now even there. 

General Pinckney. This distinction prevails in South 
Carolina, and has been a source of pernicious disputes be- 
tween the two branches. The Constitution is now evaded 
by informal schedules of amendments, handed from the 
Senate to the other House. 

Mr. Williamson wishes for a question, chiefly to pre- 
vent re-discussion. The restriction will have one advan- 
tage ; it will oblige some member in the lower branch to 
move, and people can then mark him. 

On the question for excepting money-bills, as proposed 
by Mr. Gerry, — New York, Delaware, Virginia, aye — 3 ; 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 7. 



160 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

The Committee rose, and Mr. Gorham made report, 
which was postponed till to-morrow, to give an opportunity 
for other plans to be proposed — the Report was in the 
words following: 

1. Eesolved, that it is the opinion of this Committee, 
that a national Government ought to be established, con- 
sisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. 

2. Kesolved, that the National Legislature ought to 
consist of two branches. 

3. Resolved, that the members of the first branch of 
the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people 
of the several States for the term of three years, to receive 
fixed stipends by which they may be compensated for the 
devotion of their time to the public service, to be paid out 
of the National Treasury: to be ineligible to any office 
established by a particular State, or under the authority of 
the United States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the 
functions of the first branch,) during the term of service, 
and under the national Government for the space of one 
year after its expiration. 

4. Eesolved, that the members of the second branch of 
the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the indi- 
vidual Legislatures; to be of the age of thirty years at 
least; to hold their offices, for a term sufficient to ensure 
their independence, namely, seven years; to receive fixed 
stipends by which they may be compensated for the devo- 
tion of their time to the public service, to be paid out of 
the National Treasury ; to be ineligible to any office estab- 
lished by a particular State, or under the authority of the 
United States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the 
functions of the second branch,) during the term of ser- 
vice, and under the national Government for the space of 
one year after its expiration. 

5. Resolved, that each branch ought to possess the 
right of originating acts. 

(}. Resolved, that the National Legislature ought to be 
empowered to enjoy the legislative rights vested in Con- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 161 

gress by the Confederation ; and moreover to legislate in 
all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or 
in which the harmony of the United States may be inter- 
rupted by the exercise of individual legislation; to negative 
all laws passed by the several States contravening, in the 
opinion of the National Legislature, the Articles of Union, 
or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union. 

7. Kesolved, that the rights of suffrage in the first 
branch of the National Legislature, ought not to be accord- 
ing to the rule established in the Articles of Confederation, 
but according to some equitable ratio of representation, 
namely, in proportion to the whole number of white and 
other free citizens and inhabitants, of every age, sex and 
condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of 
years, and three -fifths of all other persons, not compre- 
hended in the foregoing description, except Indians not 
paying taxes, in each State. 

8. Kesolved, that the right of suffrage in the second 
branch of the National Legislature, ought to be according 
to the rule established for the first. 

9. Resolved, that a National Executive be instituted, to 
consist of a single person ; to be chosen by the National 
Legislature, for the term of seven years; with power to 
carry into execution the national laws ; to appoint to offices 
in cases not otherwise provided for; to be ineligible a sec- 
ond time; and to be removable on impeachment and convic- 
tion of malpractices or neglect of duty; to receive a fixed 
stipend by which he may be compensated for the devotion 
of his time to the public service, to be paid out of the 
National Treasury. 

10. Resolved, that the national Executive shall have a 
right to negative any legislative act, which shall not be 
afterwards passed by two-thirds of each branch of the 
national Legislature. 

11. Resolved, that a national Judiciary be established, 

to consist of one supreme tribunal, the Judges of which 

shall be appointed by the second branch of the national 
11 



162 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour,, 
and to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compen- 
sation for their services, in which no increase or diminu- 
tion shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in. 
office at the time of such increase or diminution. 

12. Resolved, that the national Legislature be empow- 
ered to appoint inferior tribunals. 

13. Resolved, that the jurisdiction of the national Ju- 
diciary shall extend to all cases which respect the collection of 
the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, 
and questions which involve the national peace and harmony. 

14. Resolved, that provision ought to be made for the 
admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the 
United States, whether from a voluntary junction of gov- 
ernment and territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a 
number of voices in the national Legislature less than the 
whole. 

15. Resolved, that provision ought to be made for the 
continuance of Congress and their authoritie's and privileges, 
until a given day, after the reform of the Articles of Union 
shall be adopted, and for the completion of all their engage- 
ments. 

16. Resolved, that a republican constitution, and its- 
existing laws, ought to be guaranteed to each State by the 
United States. 

17. Resolved, that provision ought to be made for the 
amendment of the Articles of Union, whensoever it shall 
seem necessary. 

18. Resolved, that the Legislative, Executive and Judi- 
ciary powers within the several States ought to be bound by 
oath to support the Articles of Union. 

19. Resolved, that the amendments which shall be 
offered to the Confederation by the Convention ought, at a 
proper time or times after the approbation of Congress, to 
be submitted to an assembly or assemblies recommended by 
the several Legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the peo- 
ple to consider and decide thereon. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 163 

Thursday, June 14th. 

Mr. Patterson observed to the Convention, that it was 
the wish of several Deputations, particularly that of New 
Jersey, that further time might be allowed them to contem- 
plate the plan reported from the Committee of the Whole, 
and to digest one purely federal, and contradistinguished 
from the reported plan. He said, they hoped to have such 
an one ready by to-morrow to be laid before the Conven- 
tion; and the Convention adjourned that leisure might be 
given for the purpose. 

Friday, June 15th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Patterson laid before the Conven- 
tion the plan which he said several of the Deputations 
wished to be substituted in place of that proposed by Mr. 
Randolph. After some little discussion of the most proper 
mode of giving it a fair deliberation, it was agreed, that it 
should be referred to a Committee of the Whole ; and that, 
in order to place the two plans in due comparison, the other 
should be recommitted. At the earnest request of Mr. 
Lansing and some other gentlemen, it was also agreed that 
the Convention should not go into Committee of the Whole 
on the subject till to-morrow; by which delay the friends of 
the plan proposed by Mr. Patterson would be better pre- 
pared to explain and support it, and all would have an 
opportunity of taking copies. * 

* This plan had been concerted among the Deputation, or members thereof, from 
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and perhaps Mr. Martin, from Mary- 
land, who made with them a common cause, though on different principles. Connec- 
ticut and New York were against a departure from the principle of the Confederation, 
wishing rather to add a few new powers to Congress than to substitute a National 
Government. The States of New Jersey and Delaware were opposed to a National 
Government, because its patrons considered a proportional representation of the 
States as the basis of it. The eagerness displayed by the members opposed to a 
National Government, from these different motives, began now to produce serious 
anxiety for the result of the Convention. Mr. Dickinson said to Mr. Madison, " You 
see the consequence of pushing things too far. Some of the members from the small 
States wish for two branches in the General Legislature, and are friends to a good 
National Government ; but we would sooner submit to foreign power, than submit to 
be deprived in both branches of the legislature, of an equality of suffrage, and 
thereby be thrown under the domination of the larger States." 



164: DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

The propositions from New Jersey, moved by Mr. 
Patterson, were in the words following: 

1. Eesolved, that the Articles of Confederation ought 
to so be revised, corrected and enlarged, as to render the 
Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of govern- 
ment, and the preservation of the Union. 

2. Resolved, that, in addition to the powers vested in 
the United States in Congress, by the present existing 
Articles of Confederation, they be authorized to pass acts 
for raising a revenue, by levying a duty or duties on all 
goods or merchandizes of foreign growth or manufacture, 
imported into any part of the United States; by stamps on 
paper, vellum or parchment ; and by a postage on all letters 
or packages passing through the general post-office; to be 
applied to such Federal purposes as they shall deem proper 
and expedient; to make rules and regulations for the col- 
lection thereof; and the same, from time to time, to alter 
and amend in such manner as they shall think proper; to 
pass acts for the regulation of trade and commerce, as well 
with foreign nations as with each other; provided that all 
punishments, fines, forfeitures and penalties, to be incurred 
for contravening such acts, rules and regulations, shall be 
adjudged by the common law Judiciaries of the State in 
which any offence contrary to the true intent and meaning 
of such acts, rules, and regulations, shall have been com- 
mitted or perpetrated, with liberty of commencing in the 
first instance all suits and prosecutions for that purpose in 
the Superior common law Judiciary in such State; subject, 
nevertheless, for the correction of all errors, both in law and 
fact, in rendering judgment, to an appeal to the Judiciary 
of the United States. 

3. Resolved, that whenever requisitions shall be neces- 
sary, instead of the rule for making requisitions mentioned 
in the Articles of Confederation, the United States in 
Congress be authorized to make such requisitions in pro- 
portion to the whole number of white and other free citizens 
and inhabitants, of every age, sex, and condition, including 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 165 

those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three- 
fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the forego- 
ing description, except Indians not paying taxes; that, if 
such requisitions be not complied with, in the time specified 
therein, to direct the collection thereof in the non-comply- 
ing States; and for that purpose to devise and pass acts 
directing and authorizing the same; provided, that none of 
the powers hereby vested in the United States in Congress, 

shall be exercised without the consent of at least 

States; and in that proportion, if the number of confed- 
erated States should hereafter be increased or dimin- 
ished. 

4. Resolved, that the United States in Congress be 

authorized to elect a Federal Executive, to consist of 

persons, to continue in office for the term of years ; 

to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation 
for their services, in which no increase nor diminution shall 
be made so as to affect the persons composing the Execu- 
tive at the time of such increase or diminution ; to be paid 
out of the Federal treasury ; to be incapable of holding any 
other office or appointment during their time of service, 

and for years thereafter: to be ineligible a second 

time, and removeable by Congress, on application by a 
majority of the Executives of the several States; that the 
Executive, besides their general authority to execute the 
Federal acts, ought to appoint all Federal officers not other- 
wise provided for, and to direct all military operations ; pro- 
vided, that none of the persons composing the Federal 
Executive shall, on any occasion, take command of any 
troops, so as personally to conduct any military enterprise, 
as General, or in any other capacity. 

5. Resolved, that a Federal Judiciary be established, to 
consist of a supreme tribunal, the Judges of which to be 
appointed by the Executive, and to hold their offices during 
good behaviour ; to receive punctually, at stated times, a 
fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase 
nor diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons 



166 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution. 
That the Judiciary so established shall have authority to 
hear and determine, in the first instance, on all impeach- 
ments of Federal officers; and by way of appeal, in the 
dernier resort, in all cases touching the rights of ambassa- 
dors; in all cases of captures from an enemy; in all 
cases of piracies and felonies on the high seas; in *all 
cases in which foreigners may be interested; in the 
construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise 
on any of the acts for the regulation of trade, or the collec- 
tion of the Federal revenue; that none of the Judiciary 
shall, during the time they remain in office, be capable of 
receiving or holding any other office or appointment during 
their term of service, or for thereafter. 

6. Resolved, that all acts of the United States in Con- 
gress, made by virtue and in pursuance of the powers 
hereby, and by the Articles of Confederation, vested in 
them, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority 
of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the 
respective States, so far forth as those acts or treaties shall 
relate to the said States or their citizens; and that the 
Judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby in 
their decisions, anything in the respective laws of the in- 
dividual States to the contrary notwithstanding: and that if 
any State, or any body of men in any State, shall oppose or 
prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties, 
the Federal Executive shall be authorized to call forth the 
power of the Confederated States, or so much thereof as 
may be necessary, to enforce and compel an obedience to 
such acts, or an observance of such treaties. 

7. Resolved, that provision be made for the admission 
of new States into the Union. 

8. Resolved, that the rule for naturalization ought to 
be same in every State. 

9. Resolved, that a citizen of one State committing an 
offence in another State of the Union, shall be deemed 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 167 

guilty of the same offence as if it had been committed by a 
citizen of the State in which the offence was committed.* 
Adjourned. 

Saturday, June 16th. 

In Committee of the Whole, on the Resolutions proposed 
by Mr. Patterson and Mr. Randolph, — Mr. Lansing called 
for the reading of the first Resolution of each plan, which 
he considered as involving principles directly in contrast. 
That of Mr. Patterson, says he, sustains the sovereignty of 
the respective States, that of Mr. Randolph destroys it. 
The latter requires a negative on all the laws of the partic- 
ular States, the former only certain general power for the 
general good. The plan of Mr. Randolph in short absorbs 
all power, except what may be exercised in the little local 
matters of the States which are not objects worthy of the 
supreme cognizance. He grounded his preference of Mr. 
Patterson's plan, chiefly, on two objections to that of Mr. 
Randolph, — first, want of power in the Convention to 
discuss and propose it ; secondly, the improbability of its 
being adopted. 

1. He was decidedly of opinion that the power of the 
Convention was restrained to amendments of a Federal 
nature, and having for their basis the Confederacy in being. 
The acts of Congress, the tenor of the acts of the States, 
the commissions produced by the several Deputations, all 
proved this. And this limitation of the power to an amend- 
ment of the Confederacy marked the opinion of the States, 
that it was unnecessary and improper to go further. He 
was sure that this was the case with his State. New York 

*This copy of Mr. Patterson's propositions varies in a few clauses from that in 
the printed Journal furnished from the papers of Mr. Brearly, a colleague of Mr. 
Patterson. A confidence is felt, notwithstanding, in its accuracy. That the copy in 
the Journal is not entirely correct, is shown by the ensuing speech of Mr. Wilson 
(June 16), in which he refers to the mode of removing the Executive " by impeach- 
ment and conviction " as a feature in the Virginia plan forming one of its contrasts 
to that of Mr. Patterson, which proposed a removal " on application of a majority of 
the Executives of the States." In the copy printed in the Journal, the two modes are 
combined in the same clause ; whether through inadvertence, or as a contemplated 
amendment does not appear. 



168 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

would never have concurred in sending Deputies to the 
Convention, if she had supposed the deliberations were to 
turn on a consolidation of the States, and a National Gov- 
ernment. 

2. Was it probable that the States would adopt and 
ratify a scheme, which they had never authorized us to 
propose, and which so far exceeded what they regarded as 
sufficient ? We see by their several acts, particularly in 
relation to the plan of revenue proposed by Congress in 
1783, not authorized by the Articles of Confederation, what 
were the ideas they then entertained. Can so great a 
change be supposed to have already taken place ? To rely 
on any change which is hereafter to take place in the senti- 
ments of the people, would be trusting to too great an 
uncertainty. AVe know only what their present sentiments 
are. And it is in vain to propose what will not accord with 
these. The States will never feel a sufficient confidence in 
a General Government, to give it a negative on their laws. 
The scheme is itself totally novel. There is no parallel to 
it to be found. The authority of Congress is familiar to 
the people, and an augmentation of the powers of Congress 
will be readily approved by them. 

Mr. Patterson said, as he had on a former occasion 
given his sentiments on the plan proposed by Mr. Ran- 
dolph, he would now, avoiding repetition as much as possi- 
ble, give his reasons in favor of that proposed by himself. 
He preferred it because it accorded, -first, with the powers 
of the Convention; secondly, with the sentiments of the 
people. If the Confederacy was radically wrong, let us 
return to our States, and obtain larger powers, not assume 
them ourselves. I came here not to speak my own senti- 
ments, but the sentiments of those who sent me. Our 
object is not such a government as may be best in itself, 
but such a one as our constituents have authorized us to 
prepare, and as they will approve. If we argue the matter 
on the supposition that no confederacy at present exists, it 
cannot be denied that all the States stand on the footing of 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 169 

equal sovereignty. All, therefore, must concur before any 
can be bound. If a proportional representation be right, 
why do we not vote so here ? If we argue on the fact that 
a Federal compact actually exists, and consult the articles 
of it, we still find an equal sovereignty to be the basis of it. 
He reads the fifth Article of the Confederation, giving each 
State a vote ; and the thirteenth, declaring that no alteration 
shall be made without unanimous consent. This is the 
nature of all treaties. What is unanimously done, must be 
unanimously undone. It was observed (by Mr. Wilson) 
that the larger States gave up the point, not because it was 
right, but because the circumstances of the moment urged 
the concession. Be it so. Are they for that reason at lib- 
erty to take it back? Can the donor resume his gift with- 
out the consent of the donee? This doctrine may be 
convenient, but it is a doctrine that will sacrifice the lesser^ 
States. The larger States acceded readily to the Confeder- 
acy. It was the small ones that came in reluctantly and 
slowly. New Jersey and Maryland were the two last; the 
former objecting to the want of power in Congress over 
trade ; both of them to the want of power to appropriate the 
vacant territory to the benefit of the whole. If the sove- 
reignty of the States is to be maintained, the representa- 
tives must be drawn immediately from the States, not from 
the people ; and we have no power to vary the idea of equal 
sovereignty. The only expedient that will cure the difficulty 
is that of throwing the States into hotchpot. To say that 
this is impracticable, will not make it so. Let it be tried, 
and we shall see whether the citizens of Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania and Virginia accede to it. It will be objected, 
that coercion will be impracticable. But will it be more so 
in one plan than the other ? Its efficacy will depend on the 
quantum of power collected, not on its being drawn from the 
States, or from the individuals ; and according to his plan it 
may be exerted on individuals as well as according to that of 
Mr. Bandolph. A distinct Executive and Judiciary also 
were equally provided by his plan. It is urged, that two 



1T0 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

branches in the Legislature are necessary. Why ? For the 
purpose of a check. But the reason for the precaution is 
not applicable to this case. Within a particular State, where 
party heats prevail, such a check may be necessary. In 
such a body as Congress it is less necessary ; and, besides, 
the Delegations of the different States are checks on each 
other. Do the people at large complain of Congress? No. 
What they wish is, that Congress may have more power. 
If the power now proposed be not enough, the people here- 
after will make additions to it. With proper powers Con- 
gress will act with more energy and wisdom than the 
proposed National Legislature ; being fewer in number, and 
more secreted and refined by the mode of election. The 
plan of Mr. Kandolph will also be enormously expensive. 
Allowing Georgia and Delaware two representatives each in 
the popular branch, the aggregate number of that branch 
will be one hundred and eighty. Add to it half as many 
for the other branch, and you have two hundred and seventy 
members, coming once at least a year, from the most distant 
as well as the most central parts of the Kepublic. In the 
present deranged state of our finances, can so expensive a 
system be seriously thought of? By enlarging the powers 
of Congress, the greatest part of this expense will be saved, 
and all purposes will be answered. At least a trial ought 
to be made. 

Mr. Wilson entered into a contrast of the principal 
points of the two plans, so far, he said, as there had been 
time to examine the one last proposed. These points 
were : — 1. In the Virginia plan there are two, and in some 
degree three, branches in the Legislature; in the plan from 
New Jersey there is to be a single Legislature only. 2. 
representation of the people at large is the basis of one; 
the State Legislatures the pillars of the other. 3. Propor- 
tional representation prevails in one, equality of suffrage in 
the other. 4. A single Executive Magistrate is at the head 
of the one; a plurality is held out in the other. 5. In the 
■one, a majority of the people of the United States must pre- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 171 

vail ; in the other, a minority may prevail. 6. The National 
Legislature is to make laws in all cases to which the sepa- 
rate States are incompetent, &c. ; in place of this, Congress 
are to have additional power in a few cases only. 7. A 
negative on the laws of the States ; in place of this, coercion 
to be substituted. 8. The Executive to be removable on 
impeachment and conviction, in one plan ; in the other, to 
be removable at the instance of a majority of the Executives 
of the States. 9. Revision of the laws provided for, in one ; 
no such check in the other. 10. Inferior national tribunals, 
in one; none such in the other. 11. In the one, jurisdic- 
tion of national tribunals to extend, &c. ; an appellate juris- 
diction only allowed in the other. 12. Here, the jurisdic- 
tion is to extend to all cases affecting the national peace and 
harmony; there, a few cases only are marked out. 13. 
Finally, the ratification is, in this, to be by the people them- 
selves; in that, by the legislative authorities, according to 
the thirteenth Article of the Confederation. 

With regard to the power of the Convention, he con- 
ceived himself authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at 
liberty to propose any thing. In this particular, he felt 
himself perfectly indifferent to the two plans. 

With regard to the sentiments of the people, he conceived 
it difficult to know precisely what they are. Those of the 
particular circle in which one moved were commonly mis- 
taken for the general voice. He could not persuade him- 
self that the State Governments and sovereignties were so 
much the idols of the people, nor a National Government 
so obnoxious to them, as some supposed. Why should a 
National Government be unpopular? Has it less dignity?/ 
Will each citizen enjoy under it less liberty or protection? 
Will a citizen of Delaware be degraded by becoming a 
citizen of the United States? Where do the people look at 
present for relief from the evils of which they complain? 
Is it from an internal reform of their governments? No, 
sir. It is from the national councils that relief is expected. 
For these reasons, he did not fear that the people would 



172 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

not follow us into a National Government; and it will be a 
further recommendation of Mr. Kandolph's plan, that it is 
to be submitted to them, and not to the Legislatures, for 
ratification. 

Proceeding now to the first point on which he had con- 
trasted the two plans, he observed, that, anxious as he was 
for some augmentation of the Federal powers, it would be 
with extreme reluctance, indeed, that he could ever consent 
to give powers to Congress. He had two reasons, either 
of which was sufficient, — first, Congress, as a legislative 
body, does not stand on the people ; secondly, it is a single 
body. 

1. He would not repeat the remarks he had formerly 
made on the principles of representation. He would only 
say, that an inequality in it has ever been a poison con- 
taminating every branch of government, fin Great Britain, 
where this poison has had a full operation, the security of 
private rights is owing entirely to the purity of her tribu- 
nals of justice, the judges of which are neither appointed 
nor paid by a venal parliament. The political liberty of 
that nation, owing to the inequality of representation, is at 
the mercy of its rulers A He means not to insinuate that 
there is any parallel between the situation of that country 
and ours, at present. But it is a lesson we ought not to 
disregard, that the smallest bodies in Great Britain are 
notoriously the most corrupt. Every other source of influ- 
ence must also be stronger in small than in large bodies of 
men. When Lord Chesterfield had told us that one of the 
Dutch provinces had been seduced into the views of France, 
he need not have added, that it was not Holland, but one of 
the smallest of them. There are facts among ourselves 
which are known to all. Passing over others, we will only 
remark that the Impost, so anxiously wished for by the 
public, was defeated not by any of the larger States in the 
Union. 

/ 2. Congress is a single Legislature. Despotism comes 
pn mankind in different shapes, sometimes in an Executive 



178.7.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 173 

sometimes in a military one. Is there no danger of a 
Legislative despotism ? Theory and practice both proclaim 
it. If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can 
be neither liberty nor stability ; and it can only be restrained 
by dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent 
branches. In a single House there is no check, but the 
inadequate one, of the virtue and good sense of those who 
compose it. } 

On another great point, the contrast was equally favor- 
able to the plan reported by the Committee of the Whole. 
It vested the Executive powers in a single magistrate. The 
plan of New Jersey, vested them in a plurality. In order 
to control the Legislative authority, you must divide it. In 
order to control the Executive you must unite it. One man 
will be more responsible than three. Three will contend 
among themselves, till one becomes the master of his col- 
leagues. In the triumvirates of Borne, first, Caesar, then 
Augustus, are witnesses of this truth. The Kings of 
Sparta, and the Consuls of Rome, prove also the factious 
consequences of dividing the Executive magistracy. Hav- 
ing already taken up so much time, he would not, he said, 
proceed to any of the other points. Those on which he had 
dwelt are sufficient of themselves; and on the decision of 
them the fate of the others will depend. 

Mr. Pinckney. The whole comes to this, as he con- 
ceived. Give New Jersey an equal vote, and she will dis- 
miss her scruples, and concur in the National system. He 
thought the Convention authorized to go any length, in 
recommending, which they found necessary to remedy the 
evils which produced this Convention. 

Mr. Ellsworth proposed, as a more distinctive form of 
collecting the mind of the Committee on the subject, " that 
the Legislative power of the United States should remain 
in Congress." This was not seconded, though it seemed 
better calculated for the purpose than the first proposition 
of Mr. Patterson, in place of which Mr. Ellsworth wished 
to substitute it. 



174 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Randolph was not scrupulous on the point of 
power. When the salvation of the Republic was at stake, 
it would be treason to our trust, not to propose what we 
found necessary. He painted in strong colours the imbe- 
cility of the existing confederacy, and the danger of delay- 
ing a substantial reform. In answer to the objection 
drawn from the sense of our constituents, as denoted by 
their acts relating to the Convention and the objects of 
their deliberation, he observed, that, as each State acted 
separately in the case, it would have been indecent for it to 
have charged the existing Constitution, with all the vices 
which it might have perceived in it. The first State that 
set on foot this experiment would not have been justified in 
going so far, ignorant as it was of the opinion of others, 
and sensible as it must have been of the uncertainty of a 
successful issue to the experiment. There are reasons cer- 
tainly of a peculiar nature, where the ordinary cautions 
must be dispensed with ; and this is certainly one of them. 
He would not, as far as depended on him, leave anything 
that seemed necessary, undone. The present moment is 
favourable, and is probably the last that will offer. 

The true question is, whether we shall adhere to the 
Federal plan, or introduce the National plan. The insuffi- 
ciency of the former has been fully displayed by the trial 
already made. There are but two modes by which the end 
of a General Government ^an be attained: the first, by 
coercion, as proposed by Mr. Patterson's plan ; the second, 
by real legislation, as proposed by the other plan. Coer- 
cion he pronounced to be impracticable, expensive, cruel to 
individuals. It tended, also, to habituate the instruments 
of it to shed the blood, and riot in the spoils, of their fel- 
low citizens, and consequently trained them up for the ser- 
vice of ambition. We must resort therefore to a national 
legislation over individuals; for which Congress are unfit. 
To vest such power in them would be blending the Legisla- 
tive with the Executive, contrary to the received maxim on 
this subject. If the union of these powers, heretofore, in 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 175 

Congress lias been safe, it lias been owing to the general 
impotency of that body. Congress are, moreover,not elect- 
ed by the people, but by the Legislatures, who retain even 
a power of recall. They have therefore no will of their 
own ; they are a mere diplomatic body, and are always ob- 
sequious to the views of the States, who are always en- 
croaching on the authority of the United States. A pro- 
vision for harmony among the States, as in trade, natur- 
alization, &c. ; for crushing rebellion, whenever it may rear 
its crest; and for certain other general benefits, must be 
made. The powers for these purposes can never be given 
to a body inadequate as Congress are in point of represen- 
tation, elected in the mode in which they are, and possess- 
ing no more confidence than they do: for notwithstanding 
what has been said to the contrary, his own experience sat- 
isfied him, that a rooted distrust of Congress pretty gener- 
ally prevailed. A National Government alone, properly 
constituted, will answer the purpose ; and he begged it to 
be considered that the present is the last moment for estab • 
lishing one. After this select experiment, the people will 
yield to despair. 

The Committee rose, and the House adjourned. 



Monday, June 18th. 

In Committee of the Whole, on the propositions of Mr. 
Patterson and Mr. Kandolph, — On motion of Mr. Dick- 
inson, to postpone the first Eesolution in Mr. Patterson's 
plan, in order to take up the following, viz.: "that the 
Articles of Confederation ought to be revised and amended, 
so as to render the Government of the United States ade- 
quate to the exigencies, the preservation, and the prosperity 
of the Union," — the postponement was agreed to by ten 
States; Pennsylvania, divided. 

Mr. Hamilton had been hitherto silent on the business 
before the Convention, partly from respect to others whose 
superior abilities, age and experience, rendered him unwill- 



176 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ing to bring forward ideas dissimilar to theirs ; and partly 
from his delicate situation with respect to his own State, to 
whose sentiments, as expressed by his colleagues, he could 
by no means accede. The crisis, however, which now 
marked our affairs, was too serious to permit any scruples 
whatever to prevail over the duty imposed on every man to 
contribute his efforts for the public safety and happiness. 
He was obliged, therefore, to declare himself unfriendly to 
both plans. He was particularly opposed to that from New 
Jersey, being fully convinced, that no amendment of the 
Confederation, leaving the States in possession of their 
sovereignty, could possibly answer the purpose. On the 
other hand, he confessed he was much discouraged by the 
amazing extent of country, in expecting the desired bless- 
ings from any general sovereignty that could be substituted. 
As to the powers of the Convention, he thought the doubts 
started on that subject had arisen from distinctions and 
reasonings too subtle. A federal government he conceived 
to mean an association of independent communities into 
one. Different confederacies have different powers, and 
exercise them in different ways. In some instances, the 
powers are exercised over collective bodies, in others, over 
individuals, as in the German Diet; and among ourselves, 
in cases of piracy. Great latitude, therefore, must be given 
to the signification of the term. The plan last proposed 
departs, itself, from the federal idea, as understood by 
some, since it is to operate eventually on individuals. He 
agreed, moreover, with the honorable gentleman from Vir- 
ginia (Mr. Kandolph), that we owed it to our country, to 
do, on this emergency, whatever we should deem essential 
to its happiness. The States sent us here to provide for 
the exigencies of the Union. To rely on and propose any 
plan not adequate to these exigencies, merely because it was 
not clearly within our powers, would be to sacrifice the 
means to the end. It may be said, that the Stdies cannot 
ratify a plan not within the purview of the Article of the 
Confederation providing for alterations and amendments. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 177 

But may not the States themselves, in which no constitu- 
tional authority equal to this purpose exists in the Legisla- 
tures, have had in view a reference to the people at large ? 
In the Senate of New York, a proviso was moved, that no 
act of the Convention should be binding until it should be 
referred to the people and ratified; and the motion was lost 
by a single voice only, the reason assigned against it 
being, that it might possibly be found an inconvenient 
shackle. 

The great question is, what provision shall we make for 
the happiness of our country ? He would first make a com- 
parative examination of the two plans — prove that there 
were essential defects in both — and point out such changes 
as might render a national one efficacious. The great and 
essential principles necessary for the support of govern- 
ment are : 1. An active and constant interest in supporting 
it. This principle does not exist in the States, in favor of 
the Federal Government. They have evidently in a high 
degree, the esprit de corps. They constantly pursue inter- 
nal interests adverse to those of the whole. They have 
their particular debts, their particular plans of finance, &c. 
All these, when opposed to, invariably prevail over, the 
requisitions and plans of Congress. 2. The love of power. 
Men love power. The same remarks are applicable to this 
principle. The States have constantly shown a disposition 
rather to regain the powers delegated by them, than to part 
with more, or to give effect to what they had parted with. 
The ambition of their demagogues is known to hate the con- 
trol of the General Government. It may be remarked, too, 
that the citizens have not that anxiety to prevent a dissolu- 
tion of the General Government, as of the particular gov- 
ernments. A dissolution of the latter would be fatal ; of 
the former, would still leave the purposes of government 
attainable to a considerable degree. Consider what such a 
State as Virginia will be in a few years, a few compared 
with the life of nations. How strongly will it feel its 

importance and self-sufficiency ! 3. An habitual attachment 
12 



178 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

of the people. The whole force of this tie is on the side of the 
State Government. Its sovereignty is immediately before 
the eyes of the people ; its protection is immediately enjoyed 
by them. From its hand distributive justice, and all those 
acts which familiarize and endear a government to a people, 
are dispensed to them. 4. Force, by which may be under- 
stood a coercion of laics or coercion of arms. Congress have 
not the former, except in few cases. In particular States, 
this coercion is nearly sufficient ; though he held it, in most 
cases, not entirely so. A certain portion of military force 
is absolutely necessary in large communities. Massachu- 
setts is now feeling this necessity, and making provision for 
it. But how can this force be exerted on the States collec- 
tively ? It is impossible. It amounts to a war between the 
two parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle specta- 
tors. They will interpose; the confusion will increase; and 
a dissolution of the Union will ensue. 5. Influence, — he 
did not mean corruption, but a dispensation of those regu- 
lar honors and emoluments which produce an attachment to 
the government. Almost all the weight of these is on the 
side of the States ; and must continue so as long as the States 
continue to exist. /All the passions, then, we see, of avarice, 
ambition, interest, Svhich govern most individuals, and all 
public bodies, fall into the current of the States, and do not 
flow into the stream of the General Government. The 
former, therefore, will generally be an overmatch for the 
General Government, and render any confederacy in its 
very nature precarious. Theory is in this case fully con- 
firmed by experience. The Amphictyonic Council had, it 
would seem, ample powers for general purposes. It had, in 
particular, the power of fining and using force against, 
delinquent members. What was the consequence? Their 
decrees were mere signals of war. The Phocian war is a 
striking example of it. Philip at length, taking advantage 
of their disunion, and insinuating himself into their coun- 
cils, made himself master of their fortunes. The German 
confederacy affords another lesson. The authority of 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 179 

Charlemagne seemed to be as great as could be necessary. 
The great feudal chiefs, however, exercising their local 
sovereignties, soon felt the spirit, and found the means, of 
encroachments, which reduced the Imperial authority to a 
nominal sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded, which, 
though aided by a Prince at its head, of great authority 
independently of his imperial attributes, is a striking illus- 
tration of the weakness of confederated governments. 
Other examples instruct us in the same truth. The Swiss 
Cantons have scarce any union at all, and have been more 
than once at war with one another. How then are all these 
evils to be avoided ? Only by such a complete sovereignty 
in the General Government as will turn all the strong- 
principles and passions above-mentioned on its side. Does 
the scheme of New Jersey produce this effect ? Does it 
afford any substantial remedy whatever ? On the contrary 
it labors under great defects, and the defect of some of its 
provisions will destroy the efficacy of others. It gives a 
direct revenue to Congress, but this will not be sufficient. 
The balance can only be supplied by requisitions; which 
experience proves cannot be relied on. If States are to 
deliberate on the mode, they will also deliberate on the 
object of the supplies, and will grant or not grant, as 
they approve or disapprove of it. The delinquency of one 
will invite and countenance it in others. Quotas too, must, 
in the nature of things, be so unequal, as to produce the 
same evil. To what standard will you resort? Land is a 
fallacious one. Compare Holland with Russia; France, or 
England, with other countries of Europe; Pennsylvania 
with North Carolina, — will the relative pecuniary abilities, 
in those instances, correspond with the relative value of 
land ? Take numbers of inhabitants for the rule, and make 
like comparison of different countries, and you will find it 
to be equally unjust. The different degrees of industry 
and improvement in different countries render the first object 
a precarious measure of wealth. Much depends, too, on situ- 
ation. Connecticut, New Jersey, and North Carolina, not 



180 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

being commercial States, and contributing to the wealth of 
the commercial ones, can never bear quotas assessed by the 
ordinary rules of proportion. They will, and must, fail in 
their duty. Their example will be followed, — and the 
union itself be dissolved. Whence, then, is the national 
revenue to be drawn ? From commerce ; even from exports, 
which, notwithstanding the common opinion, are fit objects 
of moderate taxation; from excise, etc., etc. — These, though 
not equal, are less unequal than quotas. Another destruc- 
tive ingredient in the plan is that equality of suffrage 
which is so much desired by the small States. It is not in 
human nature that Virginia and the large States should 
consent to it; or, if they did, that they should long abide 
by it. It shocks too much all ideas of justice, and every 
human feeling. Bad principles in a government, though 
slow, are sure in their operation, and will gradually destroy 
it. A doubt has been raised whether Congress at present 
have a right to keep ships or troops in time of peace. He 
leans to the negative. Mr. Patterson's plan provides no 
remedy. If the powers proposed were adequate, the organ- 
ization of Congress is such, that they could never be properly 
and effectually exercised. The members of Congress, being 
chosen by the States and subject to recall, represent all the 
local prejudices. Should the powers be found effectual, they 
will from time to time be heaped on them, till a tyrannic 
sway shall be established. The General power, whatever 
be its form, if it preserves itself, must swallow up the state 
powers. Otherwise, it will be swallowed up by them. It 
is against all the principles of a good government, to vest the 
requisite powers in such a body as Congress. Two sovereign- 
ties cannot co-exist within the same limits. Giving powers 
to Congress must eventuate in a bad government, or in no 
government. The plan of New Jersey, therefore, will not do. 
What, then, is to be done ? Here he was embarrassed. The 
extent of the country to be governed discouraged him. The 
expense of a General Government was also formidable; 
unless there were such a diminution of expense on the side 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 181 

of the State Governments, as the case would admit. If 
they were extinguished, he was persuaded that great econ- 
omy might be obtained by substituting a General Govern- 
ment. He did not mean, however, to shock the public 
opinion by proposing such a measure. On the other hand, 
he saw no other necessity for declining it. They are not 
necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce, 
revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authorities, he was 
aware, would be necessary. There must be district tribu- 
nals; corporations for local purposes. But cui bono the 
vast and expensive apparatus now appertaining to the States ? 
The only difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to 
him, was that of drawing representatives from the extremes 
to the centre of the community. What inducements can 
be offered that will suffice ? The moderate wages for the 
first branch could only be a bait to little demagogues. 
Three dollars, or thereabouts, he supposed, would be the 
utmost. The Senate, he feared, from a similar cause, would 
be filled by certain undertakers, who wish for particular 
offices under the government. This view of the subject 
almost led him to despair that a republican government 
could be established over so great an extent. He was 
sensible, at the same time, that it would be unwise to pro- 
pose one of any other form. In his private opinion, he 
had no scruple in declaring, supported as he was by the 
opinion of so many of the wise and good, that the British 
Government was the best in the world ; and that he doubted 
much whether any thing short of it would do in America. 
He hoped gentlemen of different opinions would bear with 
him in this, and begged them to recollect the change of 
opinion on this subject which had taken place, and was 
still going on. It was once thought that the power of 
Congress was amply sufficient to secure the end of their 
institution. The error was now seen by every one. The 
members most tenacious of republicanism, he observed, 
were as loud as any in declaiming against the vices of 
democracy. This progress of the public mind led him to 



182 DEBATES IN THE [1T8T. 

anticipate the time, when others as well as himself, 
would join in the praise bestowed by Mr. Neckar on the 
British Constitution, namely, that it is the only government 
in the world "which unites public strength with individual 
security." In every community where industry is encouraged, 
there will be a division of it into the few and the many. 
Hence, separate interests will arise. ( There will be debtors 
and creditors, &c. Give all power to the many, they will 
oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will 
oppress the many. Both, therefore, ought to have the 
power, that each may defend itself against the other. To 
the want of this check we owe our paper-money, instal- 
ment laws, &c. To the proper adjustment of it the British 
owe the excellence of their Constitution. Their House of 
Lords is a most noble institution. Having nothing to 
hope for by a change, and a sufficient interest, by means of 
their property, in being faithful to the national interest, 
they form a permanent barrier against every pernicious 
innovation, whether attempted on the part of the Crown or 
of the Commons. No temporary Senate will have firmness 
enough to answer the purpose. The Senate of Maryland 
which seems to be so much appealed to, has not yet been suffi- 
ciently tried. Had the people been unanimous and eager in 
the late appeal to them on the subject of a paper emission, 
they would have yielded to the torrent. Their acquiescing 
in such an appeal is a proof of it. Gentlemen differ in 
their opinions concerning the necessary checks, from the 
different estimates they form of the human passions. They 
suppose seven years a sufficient period to give the Senate 
an adequate firmness, from not duly considering the amazing 
violence and turbulence of the democratic spirit. When a 
great object of government is pursued, which seizes the 
popular passions, they spread like wild-fire and become 
irresistible. He appealed to the gentlemen from the New 
England States, whether experience had not there veri- 
fied the remark. As to the Executive, it seemed to be 
admitted that no good one could be established on republic 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 183 

can principles. Was not this giving up the merits of the 
question; for can there be a good government without a 
good Executive? The English model was the only good 
one on this subject. The hereditary interest of the King 
was so interwoven with that of the nation, and his personal 
emolument so great, that he was placed above the danger of 
being corrupted from abroad; and at the same time was 
both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controlled, to 
answer the purpose of the institution at home. One of the 
weak sides of republics was their being liable to foreign 
influence and corruption. Men of little character, acquir- 
ing great power, become easily the tools of intermeddling 
neighbours. Sweden was a striking instance. The French 
and English had each their parties during the late revolu- 
tion, which was effected by the predominant influence of the 
former. "What is the inference from all these observations ? 
T&at we ought to go as far, in order to attain stability and 
permanency, as republican principles will admit. Let one 
branch of the Legislature hold their places for life, or at 
least during good behaviour. Let the Executive, also, be 
for life. He appealed to the feelings of the members pres- 
ent, whether a term of seven years would induce the sacri- 
fices of private affairs which an acceptance of public trust 
would require, so as to ensure the services of the best citi- 
zens. On this plan, we should have in the Senate a per- 
manent will, a weighty interest which would answer essen- 
tial purposes. But is this a republican government, it will 
be asked? Yes, if all the magistrates are appointed and 
vacancies are filled by the people, or a process of election 
originating with the people, He was sensible that an 
Executive, constituted as he proposed would have in fact 
but little of the power and independence that might be 
necessary. On the other plan of appointing him for seven 
years, he thought the Executive ought to have but little 
power. He would be ambitious, with the means of 
making creatures; and as the object of his ambition 
would be to prolong his power, it is probable that 



184 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

in case of war he would avail himself of the emergency, 
to evade or refuse a degradation from his place. 
An Executive for life has not this motive for forget- 
ting his fidelity, and will therefore be a safer deposi- 
tory of power. It will be objected, probably, that such an 
Executive will be an elective monarch, and will give birth to 
the tumults which characterize that form of government. 
He _ would reply, that monarch is an indefinite term. It 
marks not either the degree or duration of power. If this 
Executive magistrate would be a monarch for life, the other 
proposed by the Report from the Committee of the Whole 
would be a monarch for seven years. The circumstance of 
being elective was also applicable to both. It had been ob- 
served by judicious writers, that elective monarchies would 
be the best if they could be guarded against the tumults 
excited by the ambition and intrigues of competitors. He 
was not sure that tumults were an inseparable evil. He 
thought this character of elective monarchies had been 
taken rather from particular cases, than from general prin- 
ciples. The election of Roman Emperors was made by the 
army. In Poland the election is made by great rival 
princes, with independent power, and ample means of 
raising commotions. In the German Empire, the appoint- 
ment is made by the Electors and Princes, who have equal 
motives and means for exciting cabals and parties. Might 
not such a mode of election be devised among ourselves, as 
will defend the community against these effects in any 
dangerous degree ? Having made these observations, he 
would read to the Committee a sketch of a plan which he 
should prefer to either of those under consideration. He 
was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most members. 
But will such a plan be adopted out of doors ? In return 
he would ask, will the people adopt the other plan ? At 
present they will adopt neither. But he sees the Union 
dissolving, or already dissolved — he sees evils operating in 
the States which must soon cure the people of their fond- 
ness for democracies — he sees that a great progress has 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 185 

been already made, and is still going on, in the public 
mind. He thinks, therefore, that the people will in time 
be unshackled from their prejudices ; and whenever that 
happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at stopping 
where the plan of Mr. Randolph would place them, but be 
ready to go as far at least as he proposes. He did not 
mean to offer the paper he had sketched as a proposition to 
the Committee. It was meant only to give a more correct 
view of his ideas, and to suggest the amendments which he 
should probably propose to the plan of Mr. Randolph, in 
the proper stages of its future discussion. He reads his 
sketch in the words following : to wit. 

"I. The supreme Legislative power of the United 
States of America to be vested in two different bodies of 
men ; the one to be called the Assembly, the other the 
Senate ; who together shall form the Legislature of the 
United States, with power to pass all laws whatsoever, sub- 
ject to the negative hereafter mentioned. 

" II. The Assembly to consist of persons elected by the 
people to serve for three years. 

"III. The Senate to consist of persons elected to serve 
during good behaviour ; their election to be made by electors 
chosen for that purpose by the people. In order to this, 
the States to be divided into election districts. On the 
death, removal or resignation of any Senator, his place to 
be filled out of the district from which he came. 

" IV. The supreme Executive authority of the United 
States to be vested in a Governor, to be elected to serve 
during good behaviour ; the election to be made by Electors 
chosen by the people in the Election Districts aforesaid. 
The authorities and functions of the Executive to be as fol- 
lows : to have a negative on all laws about to be passed, and the 
execution of all laws passed ; to have the direction of war when 
authorized or begun ; to have, with the advice and approba- 
tion of the Senate, the power of making all treaties ; to have 
the sole appointment of the heads or chief officers of the 
Departments of Finance, War, and Foreign Affairs; to have 



186 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the nomination of all other officers (ambassadors to foreign 
nations included,) subject to the approbation or rejection of 
the Senate; to have the power of pardoning all offences 
except treason, ' which he shall not pardon without the 
approbation of the Senate. 

"V. On the death, resignation, or removal of the Gov- 
ernor, his authorities to be exercised by the President of 
the Senate till a successor be appointed. 

" VI. The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war; 
the power of advising and approving all treaties; the power 
of approving or rejecting all appointments of officers, except 
the heads or chiefs of the Departments of Finance, War, 
and Foreign Affairs. 

"VII. The supreme Judicial authority to be vested in 
Judges, to hold their offices during good behaviour, with 
adequate and permanent salaries. This court to have origi- 
nal jurisdiction in all causes of capture, and an appellative 
jurisdiction in all causes in which the revenues of the Gen- 
eral Government, or the citizens of foreign nations, are con- 
cerned. 

" VIII. The Legislature of the United States to have 
power to institute courts in each State for the determination 
of all matters of general concern. 

"IX. The Governor, Senators, and all officers of the 
United States, to be liable to impeachment for mal-, and 
corrupt conduct; and upon conviction to be removed from 
office, and disqualified for holding any place of trust or 
profit : all impeachments to be tried by a Court to consist of 

the Chief , or Judge of the Superior Court of Law of 

each State, provided such Judge shall hold his place during 
good behaviour and have a permanent salary. 

"X. All laws of the particular States contrary to the 
Constitution or laws of the United States to be utterly void ; 
and the better to prevent such laws being passed, the Gov- 
ernor or President of each State shall be appointed by the 
General Government, and shall have a negative upon the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 187 

laws about to be passed in the State of which he is the 
Governor or President. 

" XI. No State to have any forces land or naval; and the 
militia of all the States to be under the sole and exclusive 
direction of the United States, the officers of which to be 
appointed and commissioned by them." 

On these several articles he entered into explanatory 
observations* corresponding with the principles of his in- 
troductory reasoning. 

The Committee rose, and the House adjourned. 



Tuesday, June 19th. 

In Committee of the Whole, on the propositions of Mr. 
Patterson, — The substitute offered yesterday by Mr. Dick- 
inson being rejected by a vote now taken on it, — Con- 
necticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, aye — 4 ; Mas- 
sachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, no — 6 ; Maryland, divided, — Mr. Pat- 
terson's plan was again at large before the Committee. 

Mr. Madison. Much stress has been laid by some 
gentlemen on the want of power in the Convention to pro- 
pose any other than a federal plan. To what had been 
answered by others, he would only add, that neither of the 
characteristics attached to a federal plan would support this 
objection. One characteristic was that in a federal govern- 
ment the power was exercised not on the people individually, 
but on the people collectively, on the States. Yet in some 
instances, as in piracies, captures, &c, the existing Confed- 
eracy, and in many instances the amendments to it proposed 

*The speech introducing the plan, as above taken down and written out, was seen 
by Mr. Hamilton, who approved its correctness, with one or two verbal changes, 
which were made as he suggested. The explanatory observations which did not im- 
mediately follow, were to have been furnished by Mr. H., who did not find leisure at 
the time to write them out, and they were not obtained. Judge Yates, in his notes, 
appears to have consolidated the explanatory with the introductory observations of 
Mr. Hamilton (under date of July 19th, a typographical error). It was in the former, 
Mr. Madison observed, that Mr. Hamilton, in speaking of popular governments, 
however modified, made the remark attributed to him by Judge Yates, that they 
were " but pork still, with a little change of sauce." 



188 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

by Mr. Patterson, must operate immediately on individ- 
uals. The other characteristic was that & federal govern- 
ment derived its appointments not immediately from the 
people, but from the States which they respectively com- 
posed. Here, too, were facts on the other side. In two of 
the States Connecticut and Rhode Island, the Delegates to 
Congress were chosen, not by the Legislatures, but by the 
people at large ; and the plan of Mr. Patterson intended 
no change in this particular. 

It had been alleged (by Mr. Patterson), that the Con- 
federation, having been formed by unanimous consent, 
could be dissolved by unanimous consent only. Does 
this doctrine result from the nature of compacts ? Does 
it arise from any particular stipulation in the Articles 
of Confederation ? If we consider the Federal Union as 
analagous to the fundamental compact by which individ- 
uals compose one society, and which must, in its 
theoretic origin at least, have been the unanimous act of 
the component members, it cannot be said that no dissolu- 
tion of the compact can be effected without unanimous 
consent. A breach of the fundamental principles of the 
compact by a part of the society, would certainly absolve 
the other part from their obligations to it. If the breach of 
any article by any of the parties, does not set the others at 
liberty, it is because the contrary is implied in the compact 
itself, and particularly by that law of it which gives an 
indefinite authority to the majority to bind the whole, in all 
cases. This latter circumstance shows, that we are not to 
consider the Federal Union as analagous to the social com- 
pact of individuals : for if it were so, a majority would have 
a right to bind the rest, and even to form a new Constitution 
for the whole ; which the gentleman from New Jersey 
would be among the last to admit. If we consider the 
Federal Union as analogous, not to the social compacts 
among individual men, but to the Conventions among 
individual States, what is the doctrine resulting from these 
Conventions ? Clearly, according to the expositors of the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 189 

law of nations, that a breach of any one article by any one 
party, leaves all the other parties at liberty to consider the 
whole convention as dissolved, unless they choose rather to 
compel the delinquent party to repair the breach. In some 
treaties, indeed, it is expressly stipulated, that a violation 
of particular articles shall not have this consequence, and 
even that particular articles shall remain in force during 
war which is in general understood to dissolve all subsisting 
treaties. But are there any exceptions of this sort to the 
Articles of Confederation ? So far from it, that there is 
not even an express stipulation that force shall be used to 
compel an offending member of the Union to discharge its 
duty. He observed, that the violations of the Federal 
Articles had been numerous and notorious. Among the 
most notorious was an act of New Jersey herself ; by which 
she expressly refused to comply with a constitutional 
requisition of Congress, and yielded no further to the 
expostulations of their Deputies, than barely to rescind her 
vote of refusal, without passing any positive act of compli- 
ance. He did not wish to draw any rigid inferences from 
these observations. He thought it proper, however, that 
the true nature of the existing Confederacy should be 
investigated, and he was not anxious to strengthen the 
foundations on which it now stands. 

Proceeding to the consideration of Mr. Patterson's 
plan, he stated the object of a proper plan to be twofold, — 
first, to preserve the Union ; secondly, to provide a Govern- 
ment that will remedy the evils felt by the States, both in 
their united and individual capacities. Examine Mr. Pat- 
terson's plan, and say whether it promises satisfaction in 
these respects. 

1. Will it prevent the violations of the law of nations 
and of treaties which, if not prevented, must involve us in 
the calamities of foreign wars ? The tendency of the 
States to these violations has been manifested in sundry 
instances. The files of Congress contain complaints, 
already from almost every nation with which treaties have 



190 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

been formed. Hitherto indulgence has been shown to us. 
This cannot be the permanent disposition of foreign nations. 
A rupture with other powers is among the greatest of 
national calamities. It ought, therefore, to be effectually 
provided, that no part of a nation shall have it in its power to 
bring them on the whole. The existing Confederacy does 
not sufficiently provide against this evil. The proposed 
amendment to it does not supply the omission. It leaves 
the will of the States as uncontrolled as ever. 

2. Will it prevent encroachments on the Federal 
authority ? A tendency to such encroachments has been 
sufficiently exemplified among ourselves, as well as in every 
other confederated republic, ancient and modern. By the 
Federal Articles, transactions with the Indians appertain to 
Congress, yet in several instances the States have entered 
into treaties and wars with them. In like manner, no two 
or more States can form among themselves any treaties, &c, 
without the consent of Congress : yet Virginia and Mary- 
land, in one instance — Pennsylvania and New Jersey in 
another — have entered into compacts without previous 
application or subsequent apology. No State, again, can of 
right raise troops in time of peace with the like consent. 
Of all cases of the league, this seems to require the most 
scrupulous observance. Has not Massachusetts, notwith- 
standing, the most powerful member of the Union, already 
raised a body of troops ? Is she not now augmenting them, 
without having even deigned to apprise Congress of her 
intentions? In fine, have we not seen the public land dealt 
out to Conneticut to bribe her acquiescence in the decree 
constitutionally awarded against her claim on the terri- 
tory of Pennsylvania? For no other possible motive can 
account for the policy of Congress in that measure. If we 
recur to the examples of other confederacies, we shall find 
in all of them the same tendency of the parts to encroach 
on the authority of the whole. He then reviewed the 
Amphictyonic and Ach?ean confederacies, among the 
ancients, and the Helvetic, Germanic, and Belgic, among 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 191 

tlie moderns ; tracing their analogy to the United States in 
the constitution and extent of their federal authorities ; in 
the tendency of the particular members to usurp on these 
authorities, and to bring confusion and ruin on the whole. 
He observed, that the plan of Mr. Patterson, besides 
omitting a control over the States, as a general defence of 
the Federal prerogatives, was particularly defective in two 
of its provisions. In the first place, its ratification was not 
to be by the people at large; but by the Legislatures. It 
could not, therefore, render the acts of Congress, in pursu- 
ance of their powers, even legally paramount to the acts of 
the States. And in the second place, it gave to the Federal 
tribunal an appellate jurisdiction only even in the criminal 
cases enumerated. The necessity of any such provision 
supposed a danger of undue acquittal in the State tribu- 
nals, — of what avail would an appellate tribunal be after 
an acquittal? Besides, in the most, if not all, of the 
States, the Executives have, by their respective Constitu- 
tions, the right of pardoning, — how could this be taken 
from them by a legislative ratification only ? 

3. Will it prevent trespasses of the States on each 
other? Of these enough has been already seen. He 
instanced acts of Virginia and Maryland, which gave a 
preference to their own citizens in cases where the citizens 
of other States are entitled to equality of privileges by the 
Articles of Confederation. He considered the emissions of 
paper-money, and other kindred measures, as also aggres- 
sions. The States, relatively to one another, being each of 
them either debtor or creditor, the creditor States must 
suffer unjustly from every emission by the debtor States. 
We have seen retaliating acts on the subject, which threat- 
ened danger, not to the harmony only, but the tranquillity 
of the Union. The plan of Mr. Patterson, not giving 
even a negative on the acts of the States, left them as much 
at liberty as ever to execute their unrighteous projects 
against each other. 

4. Will it secure the internal tranquillity of the States 



192 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

themselves? The insurrections in Massachusetts admon- 
ished all the States of the danger to which they were ex- 
posed. Yet the plan of Mr. Patterson contained no pro- 
visions for supplying the defect of the Confederation on 
this point. According to the republican theory, indeed, 
right and power being both vested in the majority, are held 
to be synonymous. According to fact and experience, a 
minority may, in an appeal to force, be an overmatch for 
the majority ; — in the first place, if the minority happen 
to include all such as possess the skill and habits of mili- 
tary life, with such as possess the great pecuniary re- 
sources, one-third may conquer the remaining two-thirds; 
in the second place, one -third of those who participate in 
the choice of rulers, may be rendered a majority by the 
accession of those whose poverty disqualifies them from a 
suffrage, and who, for obvious reasons, must be more ready 
to join the standard of sedition than that of established 
government; and, in the third place, where slavery exists, 
the republican theory becomes still more fallacious. 

5. Will it secure a good internal legislation and admin- 
istration to the particular States ? In developing the evils 
which vitiate the political system of the United States, it is 
proper to take into view those which prevail within the 
States individually, as well as those which affect them 
collectively; since the former indirectly affect the whole, 
and there is great reason to believe that the pressure of 
them had a full share in the motives which produced the 
present Convention. Under this head he enumerated and 
animadverted on, — first, the multiplicity of the laws passed 
by the several States ; secondly, the mutability of their 
laws ; thirdly, the injustice of them ; and fourthly, the im- 
potence of them ; — observing that Mr. Patterson's plan 
contained no remedy for this dreadful class of evils, and 
could not therefore be received as an adequate provision 
for the exigencies of the community. 

6. Will it secure the Union against the influence of 
foreign powers over its members? He pretended not to 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 193 

say that any such influence had yet been tried; but it was 
naturally to be expected that occasions would produce it. 
As lessons which claimed particular attention, he cited the 
intrigues practiced among the Amphictyonic confederates, 
first by the Kings of Persia, and afterwards fatally, by 
Philip of Macedon ; among the Achaeans, first by Macedon, 
mid afterwards, no less fatally, by Rome ; among the Swiss, 
by Austria, France and the lesser neighbouring powers; 
among the members of the Germanic body, by France, 
England, Spain and Russia; and in the Belgic republic, by 
all the great neighbouring powers. The plan of Mr. Pat- 
terson, not giving to the general councils any negative on 
the will of the particular States, left the door open for the 
like pernicious machinations among ourselves. 

7. He begged the smaller States, which were most 
attached to Mr. Patterson's plan, to consider the situation 
in which it would leave them. In the first place they 
would continue to bear the whole expense of maintaining 
their Delegates in Congress. It ought not to be said, that, 
if they were willing to bear this burthen, no others had a 
right to complain. As far as it led the smaller States to 
forbear keeping up a representation, by which the public 
business was delayed, it was evidently a matter of common 
concern. An examination of the minutes of Congress 
would satisfy every one, that the public business had been 
frequently delayed by this cause ; and that the States most 
frequently unrepresented in Congress were not the larger 
States. He reminded the Convention of another conse- 
quence of leaving on a small State the burden of maintain- 
ing a representation in Congress. During a considerable 
period of the war, one of the Representatives of Delaware, 
in whom alone, before the signing of the Confederation,, 
the entire vote of that State, and after that event one half 
of its vote, frequently resided, was a citizen and resident 
of Pennsylvania, and held an office in his own State incom- 
patible with an appointment from it to Congress. During 
another period, the same State was represented by three 



194 DEBATES IN THE L 1787 * 

Delegates, two of whom were citizens of Pennsylvania, and 
the third a citizen of New Jersey. These expedients must 
have been intended to avoid the burden of supporting Del- 
egates from their own State. But whatever might have 
been the cause, was not in effect the vote of one State 
doubled, and the influence of another increased by it? In 
the second place the coercion on which the efficacy of 
the plan depends can never be exerted but on themselves. 
The larger States will be impregnable, the smaller only can 
feel the vengeance of it. He illustrated the position by 
the history of the Amphictyonic confederates ; and the ban 
of the German Empire. It was the cob-web which could 
entangle the weak, but would be the sport of the strong. 

8. He begged them to consider the situation in which 
they would remain, in case their pertinacious adherence to 
an inadmissible plan should prevent the adoption of any 
plan. The contemplation of such an event was painful; 
but it would be prudent to submit to the task of examining 
it at a distance, that the means of escaping it might be the 
more readily embraced. Let the union of the States be 
dissolved, and one of two consequences must happen. 
Either the States must remain individually independent 
and sovereign ; or two or more confederacies must be formed 
among them. In the first event, would the small States be 
more secure against the ambition and power of their larger 
neighbours, than they would be under a General Govern- 
ment pervading with equal energy every part of the Empire, 
and having an equal interest in protecting every part against 
every other part? In the second, can the smaller expect 
that their larger neighbours would confederate with them 
on the principle of the present Confederacy, which gives to 
each member an equal suffrage; or that they would exact 
less severe concessions from the smaller States, than are 
proposed in the scheme of Mr. Kandolph. 

The great difficulty lies in the affair of representation; 
and if this could be adjusted, all others would be surmount- 
able. It was admitted by both the gentlemen from New 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 195 

Jersey, (Mr. Brearly and Mr. Patterson,) that it would 
not he just to allow Virginia, which was sixteen times as 
large as Delaware, an equal vote only. Their language was, 
that it would not be safe for Delaware to allow Virginia 
sixteen times as many votes. The expedient proposed by 
them was, that all the States should be thrown into one 
mass, and a new partition be made into thirteen equal parts. 
Would such a scheme be practicable? The dissimilarities 
existing in the rules of property, as well as in the manners, 
habits and prejudices, of different States, amounted to a 
prohibition of the attempt. It had been found impossible 
for the power of one of the most absolute princes in Europe 
(the King of France,) directed by the wisdom of one of the 
most enlightened and patriotic ministers (Mr. Neckar) that 
any age has produced, to equalize, in some points only, the 
different usages and regulations of the different provinces. 
But admitting a general amalgamation and repartition of 
the States to be practicable, and the danger apprehended 
by the smaller States from a proportional representation to 
be real, — would not a particular and voluntary coalition of 
these with their neighbours, be less inconvenient to the 
whole community, and equally effectual for their own safety ? 
If New Jersey or Delaware conceived that an advantage 
would accrue to them from an equalization of the States, in 
which case they would necessarily form a junction with 
their neighbours, why might not this end be attained by 
leaving them at liberty by the Constitution to form such a 
junction whenever they pleased? And why should they 
wish to obtrude a like arrangement on all the States, when 
it was, to say the least, extremely difficult, would be obnox- 
ious to many of the States, and when neither the incon- 
venience, nor the benefit of the expedient to themselves, 
would be lessened by confining it to themselves? The 
prospect of many new States to the westward was another 
consideration of importance. If they should come into the 
Union at all, they would come when they contained but 
few inhabitants. If they should be entitled to vote accord- 



196 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ing to their proportion of inhabitants, all would be right 
and safe. Let them have an equal vote, and a more objec- 
tionable minority than ever, might give law to the whole. 

On a question of postponing generally the first propo- 
sition of Mr. Patterson's plan, it was agreed to, — New 
York and New Jersey only being, no. 

On the question, moved by Mr. King, whether the Com- 
mittee should rise, and Mr. Randolph's proposition be 
reported without alteration, which was in fact a question 
whether Mr. Randolph's should be adhered to as preferable 
to those of Mr. Patterson, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, aye — 7 ; New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no — 3 ; 
Maryland, divided. 

Mr. Randolph's plan was reported from the Committee 
[q. v. June 13th] being before the house, and — 

The first Resolution, " that a national Government ought 
to be established, consisting, &c," being taken up, 

Mr. Wilson observed that, by a national Government, 
he did not mean one that would swallow up the State Gov- 
ernments, as seemed to be wished by some gentlemen. He 
was tenacious of the idea of preserving the latter. He 
thought, contrary to the opinion of Colonel Hamilton, that 
they might not only subsist, but subsist on friendly terms 
with the former. They were absolutely necessary for 
certain purposes, which the former could not reach. All 
large governments must be subdivided into lesser juris- 
dictions. As examples he mentioned Persia, Rome, and 
particularly the divisions and subdivisions of England by 
Alfred. 

Colonel Hamilton coincided with the proposition as it 
stood in the Report. He had not been understood yesterday. 
By an abolition of the States, he meant that no boundary 
could be drawn between the National and State Legislatures ; 
that the former must therefore have indefinite authority. 
If it were limited at all, the rivalship of the States would 
gradually subvert it. Even as corporations, the extent of 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 197 

some of them, as Virginia, Massachusetts, &c, would be 
formidable. As States, he thought they ought to be abol- 
ished. But he admitted the necessity of leaving in them 
subordinate jurisdictions. The examples of Persia and the 
Roman Empire, cited by Mr. Wilson, were, he thought, in 
favor of his doctrine, the great powers delegated to the 
Satraps and Proconsuls having frequently produced revolts 
and schemes of independence. 

Mr. King wished, as every thing depended on this propo- 
sition, that no objection might be improperly indulged 
against the phraseology of it. He conceived that the 
import of the term "States," "sovereignty," "national" 
" federal," had been often used and implied in the discus- 
sions inaccurately and delusively. The States were not 
" sovereigns " in the sense contended for by some. They 
did not possess the peculiar features of sovereignty, — they 
could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties. 
Considering them as political beings, they were dumb, for 
they could not speak to any foreign sovereign whatever. 
They were deaf, for they could not hear any propositions 
from such sovereign. They had not even the organs or 
faculties of defence or offence, for they could not of them- 
selves raise troops or equip vessels, for war. On the other 
side, if the union of the States comprises the idea of a con- 
federation, it comprises that also of consolidation. A union 
of the States is a union of the men composing them, from 
whence a national character results to the whole. Congress 
can act alone without the States; they can act, and their 
acts will be binding, against the instructions of the States. 
If they declare war, war is de jure declared; captures made 
in pursuance of it are lawful; no acts of the States can vary 
the situation or prevent the judicial consequences. If the 
States, therefore, retained some portion of their sovereignty > 
they had certainly divested themselves of essential portions 
of it, If they formed a confederacy in some respects, they 
formed a nation in others. The Convention could clearly 
deliberate on and propose any alterations that Congress 



198 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

could have done under the Federal Articles. And could 
not Congress propose, by virtue of the last Article, a change 
in any article whatever, — and as well that relating to the 
equality of suffrage, as any other? He made these remarks 
to obviate some scruples which had been expressed. He 
doubted much the practicability of annihilating the States; 
but thought that much of their power ought to be taken 
from them. 

Mr. Martin said, he considered that the separation from 
Great Britain placed the thirteen States in a state of nature 
towards each other ; that they would have remained in that 
state till this time, but for the Confederation; that they 
entered into the Confederation on the footing of equality; 
that they met now to amend it, on the same footing; and 
that he could never accede to a plan that would introduce 
an inequality, and lay ten States at the mercy of Virginia, 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. 

Mr. Wilson could not admit the doctrine that when the 
colonies became independent of Great Britain, they became 
independent also of each other. He read the Declaration 
of Independence, observing thereon, that the United Colo- 
nies were declared to be free and independent States ; and 
inferring, that they were independent, not individually but 
unitedly, and that they were confederated, as they were 
independent States. 

Colonel Hamilton assented to the doctrine of Mr. 
Wilson. He denied the doctrine that the States were 
thrown into a state of nature. He was not yet prepared to 
admit the doctrine that the Confederacy could be dissolved 
by partial infractions of it. He admitted that the States 
met now on an equal footing, but could see no inference 
from that against concerting a change of the system in this 
particular. He took this occasion of observing, for the 
purpose of appeasing the fear of the small States, that two 
circumstances would render them secure under a national 
Government in which they might lose the equality of rank 
which they now held: one was the local situation of the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 199 

-three largest States, Virginia, Massachusetts and Penn- 
sylvania. They were separated from each other by distance 
of place, and equally so, by all the peculiarities which dis- 
tinguish the interests of one State from those of another. 
No combination, therefore, could be dreaded. In the 
second place, as there was a gradation in the States, from 
Virginia, the largest, down to Delaware, the smallest, it 
would always happen that ambitious combinations among a 
few States might and would be counteracted by defensive 
combinations of greater extent among the rest. No combi- 
nation has been seen among the large counties, merely as 
such, against lesser counties. The more close the union 
of the States, and the more complete the authority of the 
whole, the less opportunity will be allowed to the stronger 
States to injure the weaker. 
Adjourned. 

Wednesday, June 20th. 

In Convention, — Mr. William Blount, from North 
Carolina, took his seat. 

The first Resolution of the Report of the Committee of 
the Whole being before the House — 

Mr. Ellsworth, seconded by Mr. Gorham, moves to 
alter it, so as to run " that the government of the United 
States ought to consist of a supreme Legislative, Execu- 
tive and Judiciary." This alteration, he said, would drop 
the word national, and retain the proper title " the United 
States." He could not admit the doctrine that a breach of 
any of the Federal Articles could dissolve the whole. It 
would be highly dangerous not to consider the Confedera- 
tion as still subsisting. He wished, also, the plan of the 
Convention to go forth as an amendment of the Articles of 
the Confederation, since, under this idea the authority of 
the Legislatures could ratify it. If they are unwilling, the 
people will be so too. If the plan goes forth to the people 
for ratification, several succeeding conventions within the 
■States would be unavoidable. He did not like these con- 



200 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ventions. They were better fitted to pull dowii than to 
build up constitutions. 

Mr. Randolph did not object to the change of expres- 
sion, but apprised the gentleman who wished for it, that he 
did not admit it for the reasons assigned; particularly that 
of getting rid of a reference to the people for ratification. 

The motion of Mr. Ellsworth was acquiesced in, nem. 
con. 

The second Resolution, "that the national legislature 
ought to consist of two branches," being taken up, the 
word "national" struck out, as of course. 

Mr. Lansing observed, that the true question here was, 
whether the Convention would adhere to, or depart from, the 
foundation of the present confederacy; and moved, instead 
of the second Resolution, " that the powers of legislation 
be vested in the United States in Congress." He had 
already assigned two reasons against such an innovation as 
was proposed, — first, the want of competent powers in the 
Convention ; secondly, the state of the public mind. It had 
been observed by (Mr. Madison), in discussing the first 
point, that in two States the Delegates to Congress were 
chosen by the people. Notwithstanding the first appear- 
ance of this remark, it had in fact no weight, as the Dele- 
gates, however chosen, did not represent the people, merely 
as so many individuals; but as forming a sovereign State. 
Mr. Randolph put it, he said, on its true footing, namely 
that the public safety superseded the scruple arising from 
the review of our powers. But in order to feel the force of 
this consideration, the same impression must be had of the 
public danger. He had not himself the same impression, 
and could not therefore dismiss his scruple. Mr. Wilson 
contended, that, as the Convention were only to recommend, 
they might recommend what they pleased. He differed 
much from him. Any act whatever of so respectable a body 
must have a great effect; and if it does not succeed will be 
a source of great dissensions. He admitted that there was 
no certain criterion of the public mind on the subject. He 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 201 

therefore recurred to the evidence of it given by the oppo- 
sition in the States to the scheme of an Impost. It could 
not be expected that those possessing sovereignty could 
ever voluntarily part with it. It was not to be expected 
from any one State, much less from thirteen. He pro- 
ceeded to make some observations on the plan itself, and 
the arguments urged in support of it. The point of repre- 
sentation could receive no elucidation from the case of 
England. The corruption of the boroughs did not proceed 
from their comparative smallness; but from the actual few- 
ness of the inhabitants, some of them not having more than 
one or two. A great inequality existed in the counties of 
England. Yet the like complaint of peculiar corruption in 
the small ones had not been made. It had been said that 
Congress represent the State prejudices, — will not any 
other body whether chosen by the Legislatures or people of 
the States, also represent their prejudices? It had been 
asserted by his colleague (Colonel Hamilton), that there 
was no coincidence of interests among the large States that 
ought to excite fears of oppression in the smaller. If it 
were true that such a uniformity of interests existed among 
the States, there was equal safety for all of them whether 
the representation remained as heretofore, or were pro- 
portioned as now proposed. It is proposed that the General 
Legislature shall have a negative on the laws of the States. 
Is it conceivable that there will be leisure for such a task? 
There will, on the most moderate calculation, be as many 
acts sent up from the States as there are days in the year. 
Will the members of the General Legislature be competent 
judges? Will a gentleman from Georgia be a judge of the 
expediency of a law which is to operate in New Hampshire ? 
Such a negative would be more injurious than that of Great 
Britain heretofore was. It is said that the National Govern- 
ment must have the influence arising from the grant of offices 
and honors. In order to render such a government effectual, 
he believed such an influence to be necessary. But if the 
States will not agree to it, it is in vain, worse than in vain, 



202 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

to make the proposition. If this influence is to be attained, 
the States must be entirely abolished. Will any one say, 
this would ever be agreed to? He doubted whether any 
General Government, equally beneficial to all, can be attained. 
That now under consideration, he is sure, must be utterly 
unattainable. He had another objection. The system was 
too novel and complex. No man could foresee what its 
operation will be, either with respect to the General Govern- 
ment, or the State Governments. One or other, it has been 
surmised, must absorb the whole. 

Col. Mason did not expect this point would have been 
reagitated. The essential differences between the two plans 
had been clearly stated. The principal objections against 
that of Mr. Kandolph were, the want of power, and the 
want of practicability. There can be no weight in the first, 
as the fiat is not to be here, but in the people. He thought 
with his colleague ( Mr. Kandolph,) that there were, 
besides certain crises, in which all the ordinary cautions 
yielded to public necessity. He gave as an example, the 
eventual treaty with Great Britain, in forming which the 
Commissioners of the United States had boldly disregarded 
the improvident shackles of Congress; had given to their 
country an honorable and happy peace, and, instead of being 
censured for the transgression of their powers, had raised 
to themselves a monument more durable than brass. The 
impracticability of gaining the public concurrence, he 
thought, was still more groundless. Mr. Lansing had cited 
the attempts of Congress to gain an enlargement of their 
powers, and had inferred from the miscarriage of these 
attempts, the hopelessness of the plan which he (Mr. Lan- 
sing) opposed. He thought a very different inference 
ought to have been drawn, viz. that the plan which Mr. 
Lansing espoused, and which proposed to augment the pow- 
ers of Congress, never could be expected to succeed. He 
meant not to throw any reflections on Congress as a body, 
much less on any particular members of it. He meant, 
however, to speak his sentiments without reserve on this 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 203 

subject; it was a privilege of age, and perhaps the only 
compensation which nature had given for the privation of 
so many other enjoyments; and he should not scruple to 
exercise it freely. Is it to be thought that the people of 
America, so watchful over their interests, so jealous of their 
liberties, will give up their all, will surrender both the sword 
and the purse, to the same body, — and that, too, not chosen 
immediately by themselves ? They never will. They never 
ought. Will they trust such a body with the regulation of 
their trade, with the regulation of their taxes, with all the other 
great powers which are in contemplation ? Will they give un- 
bounded confidence to a secret Journal, — to the intrigues, to 
the factions, which in the nature of things appertain to such an 
assembly ? If any man doubts the existence of these characters 
of Congress, let him consult their Journals for the years '78, 
'79, and '80. It will be said, that if the people are averse to 
parting with power, why is it hoped that they will part with 
it to a national Legislature ? The proper answer is, that in 
this case they do not part with power: they only transfer it 
from one set of immediate representatives to another set. 
Much has been said of the unsettled state of the mind of 
the people. He believed the mind of the people of America, 
as elsewhere, was unsettled as to some points, but settled as 
to others. In two points he was sure it was well settled, — 
first, in an attachment to republican government; secondly, 
in an attachment to more than one branch in the Legisla- 
ture. Their constitutions accord so generally in both these 
circumstances, that they seem almost to have been precon- 
certed. This must either have been a miracle, or have 
resulted from the genius of the people. The only excep- 
tions to the establishment of two branches in the Legisla- 
ture are the State of Pennsylvania, and Congress; and the 
latter the only single one not chosen by the people them- 
selves. What has been the consequence ? The people have 
been constantly averse to giving that body further powers. 
It was acknowledged by Mr. Patterson, that his plan could 
not be enforced without military coercion. Does he con- 



204 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

aider the force of this concession ? The most jarring ele- 
ments of nature, fire and water themselves, are not more 
incompatible than such a mixture of civil liberty and mili- 
tary execution. Will the militia march from one State into 
another, in order to collect the arrears of taxes from the 
delinquent members of the Eepublic? Will they maintain 
an army for this purpose? Will not the citizens of the 
invaded State assist one another, till they rise as one man 
and shake off the Union altogether? Kebellion is the only 
case in which the military force of the State can be properly 
exerted against its citizens. In one point of view, he was 
struck with horror at the prospect of recurring to this expe- 
dient. To punish the non-payment of taxes with death was 
a severity not yet adopted by despotism itself; yet this 
unexampled cruelty would be mercy compared to a military 
collection of revenue, in which the bayonet could make no 
discrimination between the innocent and the guilty. He 
took this occasion to repeat, that, notwithstanding his solici- 
tude to establish a national Government, he never would 
agree to abolish the State Governments, or render them 
absolutely insignificant. They were as necessary as the 
General Government, and he would be equally careful to 
preserve them. He was aware of the difficulty of drawing 
the line between them, but hoped it was not insurmountable. 
The convention, though comprising so many distinguished 
characters, could not be expected to make a faultless Gov- 
ernment. And he would prefer trusting to posterity the 
amendment of its defects, rather than to push the experi- 
ment too far. 

Mr. Luther Martin agreed with Colonel Mason, as to 
the importance of the State Governments: he would sup- 
port them at the expense of the General Government, which 
was instituted for the purpose of that support. He saw no 
necessity for two branches; and if it existed, Congress 
might be organized into two. He considered Congress as 
representing the people, being chosen by the Legislatures, 
who were chosen by the people. At any rate, Congress 



1^87.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 205 

represented the Legislature; and it was the Legislatures, 
not the people, who refused to enlarge their powers. Nor 
could the rule of voting have been the ground of objection, 
otherwise ten of the States must always have been ready to 
place further confidence in Congress. The causes of repug- 
nance must therefore be looked for elsewhere. At the sep- 
aration from the British Empire, the people of America 
preferred the establishment of themselves into thirteen 
separate sovereignties, instead of incorporating themselves 
into one. To these they look up for the security of their 
lives, liberties, and properties ; to these they must look up. 
The Federal Government they formed to defend the whole 
against foreign nations in time of war, and to defend the 
lesser States against the ambition of the larger. They are 
afraid of granting power unnecessarily, lest they should 
defeat the original end of the Union ; lest the powers should 
prove dangerous to the sovereignties of the particular 
States which the Union was meant to support; and expose 
the lesser to being swallowed up by the larger. He con- 
ceived also that the people of the States, having already 
vested their powers in their respective Legislatures, could 
not resume them without a dissolution of their Govern- 
ments. He was against conventions in the States — was 
not against assisting States against rebellious subjects — 
thought the federal plan of Mr. Patterson did not require 
coercion more than the national one, as the latter must 
depend for the deficiency of its revenues on requisitions 
and quotas — and that a national judiciary, extended into 
the States, would be ineffectual, and would be viewed with a 
jealousy inconsistent with its usefulness. 

Mr. Sherman seconded and supported Mr. Lansing's 
motion. He admitted two branches to be necessary in the 
State Legislatures, but saw no necessity in a confederacy 
of States. The examples were all of a single council. 
Congress carried us through the war, and perhaps as well as 
any government could have done. The complaints at pres- 
ent are, not that the views of Congress are unwise or un- 



206 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

faithful, but that their powers are insufficient for the 
execution of their views. The national debt, and the want 
of power somewhere to draw forth the national resources, 
are the great matters that press. All the States were sen- 
sible^ of the defect of power in Congress. He thought 
much might be said in apology for the failure of tlie State 
Legislatures, to comply with the Confederation. They 
were afraid of leaning too hard on the people by accumula- 
ting taxes; no constitutional rule had been, or could be 
observed in the quotas; the accounts also were unsettled, 
and every State supposed itself in advance, rather than in 
arrears. For want of a general system, taxes to a due 
amount had not been drawn from trade, which was the most 
convenient resource. As almost all the States had agreed 
to the recommendation of Congress on the subject of an 
impost, it appeared clearly that they were willing to trust 
Congress with power to draw a revenue from trade. There 
is no weight, therefore, in the argument drawn from a dis- 
trust of Congress; for money matters being the most im- 
portant of all, if the people will trust them with power as to 
them, they will trust them with any other necessary pow- 
ers. Congress, indeed, by the Confederation, have in fact 
the right of saying how much the people shall pay, and to 
what purpose it shall be applied; and this right was 
granted to them in the expectation that it would in all cases 
have its effect. If another branch were to be added to 
Congress, to be chosen by the people, it would serve to 
embarrass. The people would not much interest them- 
selves in the elections, a few designing men in the large 
districts would carry their points; and the people would 
have no more confidence in their new representatives than 
in Congress. He saw no reason why the State Legisla- 
tures should be unfriendly, as had been suggested, to Con- 
gress. If they appoint Congress, and approve of their mea- 
sures, they would be rather favourable and partial to them. 
The disparity of ihe States in point of size he perceived 
was the main difficulty. But the large States had not yet 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 207 

suffered from the equality of votes enjoyed by the smaller 
ones. In all great and general points, the interests of all 
the States were the same. The State of Virginia, notwith- 
standing the equality of votes, ratified the Confederation 
without even proposing any alteration. Massachusetts also 
ratified without any material difficulty, &c. In none of the 
ratifications is the want of two branches noticed or com- 
plained of. To consolidate the States, as some have pro- 
posed, would dissolve our treaties with foreign nations, 
which had been formed with us, as confederated States. He 
did not, however, suppose that the creation of two branches 
in the Legislature would have such an effect. If the diffi- 
culty on the subject of representation cannot be otherwise 
got over, he would agree to have two branches, and a pro- 
portional representation in one of them, provided each State 
had an equal voice in the other. This was necessary to 
secure the rights of the lesser States ; otherwise three or 
four of the large States would rule the others as they 
please. Each State, like each individual, had its peculiar 
habits, usages, and manners, which constituted its happi- 
ness. It would not, therefore, give to others a power over 
this happiness, any more than an individual would do, when 
he could avoid it. 

Mr. Wilson urged the necessity of two branches ; 
observed, that if a proper model was not to be found in 
other confederacies, it was not to be wondered at. The 
number of them was small, and the duration of some at 
least short. The Amphictyonic and Achaean were formed 
in the infancy of political science ; and appear, by their 
history and fate, to have contained radical defects. The 
Swiss and Belgic confederacies were held together, not by 
any vital principle of energy, but by the incumbent pressure 
of formidable neighbouring nations. The German owed its 
continuance to the influence of the House of Austria. He 
appealed to our own experience for the defects of our con- 
federacy. He had been six years, of the twelve since com- 
mencement of the Revolution, a member of Congress, and 



208 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

had felt all its weaknesses. He appealed to the recollection 
of others, whether, on many important occasions, the public 
interest had not been obstructed by the small members of 
the Union. The success of the Revolution was owing to 
other causes, than the constitution of Congress. In many 
instances it went on even against the difficulties arising from 
Congress themselves. He admitted that the large States 
did accede, as had been stated to the Confederation in its 
present form. But it was the effect of necessity not choice. 
There are other instances of their yielding, from the same 
motive, to the unreasonable measures of the small States. 
The situation of things is now a little altered. He insisted 
that a jealousy would exist between the State Legislatures 
and the General Legislature ; observing, that the members 
of the former would have views and feelings very distinct 
in this respect from their constituents. A private citizen of 
a State is indifferent whether power be exercised by the 
General or State Legislatures, provided it be exercised most 
for his happiness. His representative has an interest in its 
being exercised by the body to which he belongs. He will 
therefore view the National Legislature with the eye of a 
jealous rival. He observed that the addresses of Congress 
to the people at large had always been better received, and 
produced greater effect, than those made to the Legislatures. 

On the question for postponing, in order to take up Mr. 
Lansing's proposition, " to vest the powers of legislation 
in Congress," — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Dela- 
ware, aye — 4 ; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6; Maryland, 
divided. 

On motion of the Deputies from Delaware, the question 
on the second Resolution in the Report from the Commit- 
tee of the Whole, was postponed till to-morrow. 

Adjourned. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 209 

Thuksday, June 21st. 

In Convention, — Mr. Jonathan Dayton, from New Jer- 
sey, took his seat. 

The second Eesolution in the Eeport from the Commit- 
tee of the Whole, being under consideration,— 

Doctor Johnson. On a comparison of the two plans 
which had been proposed from Virginia and New Jersey, it 
appeared that the peculiarity which characterized the latter 
was its being calculated to preserve the individuality of 
the States. The plan from Virginia did not profess to 
destroy this individuality altogether; but was charged with 
such a tendency. One . gentleman alone (Colonel Hamil- 
ton), in his animadversions on the plan of New Jersey, 
boldly and decisively contended for an abolition of the 
State Governments. Mr. Wilson and the gentleman from 
Virginia, who also were adversaries of the plan of New 
Jersey, held a different language. They wished to leave 
the States in possession of a considerable, though a 
subordinate, jurisdiction. They had not yet, however, 
shewn how this could consist with, or be secured against, 
the general sovereignty and jurisdiction which they 
proposed to give to the National Government. If this 
could be shewn, in such a manner as to satisfy the 
patrons of the New Jersey propositions, that the individu- 
ality of the States would not be endangered, many of their 
objections would no doubt be removed. If this could not 
be shewn, their objections would have their full force. He 
wished it, therefore, to be well considered, whether, in 
case the States, as was proposed, should retain some por- 
tion of sovereignty at least, this portion could be pre- 
served, without allowing them to participate effectually in 
the General Government, without giving them each a dis- 
tinct and equal vote for the purpose of defending them- 
selves in the general councils. 

Mr. Wilson's respect for Doctor Johnson, added to the 

importance of the subject, led him to attempt, unprepared 
14 



210 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

as he was, to solve the difficulty which had been started. 
It was asked, how the General Government and individual- 
ity of the particular States could be reconciled to each 
other, — and how the latter could be secured against the 
former ? Might it not, on the other side, be asked, how the 
former was to be secured against the latter? It was gem 
erally admitted, that a jealousy and rivalship would be 
felt, between the general and particular Governments. As 
the plan now stood, though indeed contrary to his opinion, 
one branch of the General Government (the Senate, or 
second branch) was to be appointed by the State Legisla- 
tures. The State Legislatures, therefore, by this partici- 
pation in the General Government, would have an oppor- 
tunity of defending their rights. Ought not a reciprocal 
opportunity to be given to the General Government of 
defending itself, by having an appointment of some one 
constituent branch of the State Governments. If a security 
be necessary on one side, it would seem reasonable to 
demand it on the other. But taking the matter in a more 
general view, he saw no danger to the States, from the 
General Government. In case a combination should be 
made by the large ones, it would produce a general alarm 
among the rest, and the project would be frustrated. But 
there was no temptation to such a project. The States having 
in general a similar interest, in case of any propositions in 
the National Legislature to encroach on the State Legisla- 
tures, he conceived a general alarm would take place in the 
National Legislature itself; that it would communicate 
itself to the State Legislatures; and would finally spread 
among the people at large. The General Government will 
be as ready to preserve the rights of the States, as the 
latter are to preserve the rights of individuals, — all the 
members of the former having a common interest, as rep- 
resentatives of all the people of the latter, to leave the 
State Governments in possession of what the people wish 
them to retain. He could not discover, therefore, any 
danger whatever on the side from which it was apprehended. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 211 

On the contrary, he conceived, that, in spite of every pre- 
caution, the General Government would be in perpetual 
danger of encroachments from the State Governments. 

Mr. Madison was of opinion, — in the first place, that 
there was less danger of encroachment from the General 
Government than from the State Governments ; and in the 
second place,that the mischiefs from encroachments would 
be less fatal if made by the former, than if made by the 
latter. 

1. All the examples of other confederacies prove the 
greater tendency, in such systems, to anarchy than to 
tyranny; to a disobedience of the members, than usurpa- 
tions of the Federal head. Our own experience had fully 
illustrated this tendency. But it will be said, that the pro- 
posed change in the principles and form of the Union will 
vary the tendency; that the General Government will have 
real and greater powers, and will be derived, in one branch 
at least, from the people, not from the Governments of the 
States. To give full force to this objection, let it be sup- 
posed for a moment that indefinite power should be given to 
the General Legislature, and the States reduced to corpora- 
tions dependent on the General Legislature, — why should 
it follow that the General Government would take from the 
States any branch of their power, as far as its operation was 
beneficial, and its continuance desirable to the people? In 
some of the States, particularly in Connecticut, all the 
townships are incorporated, and have a certain limited juris- 
diction, — have the representatives of the people of the 
townships in the Legislature of the State ever endeavoured 
to despoil the townships of any part of their local authority ? 
As far as this local authority is convenient to the people, 
they are attached to it ; and their representatives, chosen by 
and amenable to them, naturally respect their attachment 
to this, as much as their attachment to any other right or 
interest. The relation of a General Government to State 
Governments is parallel. 

2. Guards were more necessary against encroachments 



212 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

of the State Governments on the General Government, 
than of the latter on the former, The great objection 
made against an abolition of the State Governments was, 
that the General Government could not extend its care to 
all the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of 
the local jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not 
against the probable abuse of the general power, but against 
the imperfect use that could be made of it throughout so 
great an extent of country, and over so great a variety of 
objects. As far as its operation would be practicable, it 
could not in this view be improper; as far as it would be 
impracticable, the convenience of the General Government 
itself would concur with that of the people in the mainte- 
nance of subordinate governments. Were it practicable for 
the General Government to extend its care to every requi- 
site object without the co-operation of the State Govern- 
ments, the people would not be less free as members of one 
great Eepublic, than as members of thirteen small ones. A 
citizen of Delaware was not more free than a citizen of 
Virginia; nor would either be more free than a citizen of 
America. Supposing, therefore, a tendency in the General 
Government to absorb the State Governments, no fatal 
consequence could result. Taking the reverse as the sup- 
position, that a tendency should be left in the State Govern- 
ments towards an independence of the General Govern- 
ment, and the gloomy consequences need not be pointed 
out. The imagination of them must have suggested to the 
States the experiment we are now making, to prevent the 
calamity, and must have formed the chief motive with those 
present to undertake the arduous task. 

On the question for resolving, " that the Legislature 
ought to consist of two branches," — Massachusetts, Con- 
necticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7 ; New York, New Jersey, Dela- 
ware, no — 3 ; Maryland, divided. 

The third Eesolution of the Eeport being taken into 
consideration — 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 213 

General Pinckney moved, "that the first branch, in- 
stead of being elected by the people, should be elected in 
such manner as the Legislature of each State should 
direct." He urged, — first, that this liberty would give 
more satisfaction, as the Legislatures could then accommo- 
date the mode to the convenience and opinions of the peo- 
ple; secondly, that it would avoid the undue influence of 
large counties, which would prevail if the elections were to 
be made in districts, as must be the mode intended by the 
report of the Committee; thirdly, that otherwise disputed 
elections must be referred to the General Legislature, 
which would be attended with intolerable expense and 
trouble to the distant parts of the Eepublic. 

Mr. L. Maktin seconded the motion. 

Col. Hamilton considered the motion as intended man- 
ifestly to transfer the election from the people to the State 
Legislatures, which would essentially vitiate the plan. It 
would increase that State influence which could not be too 
watchfully guarded against. All, too, must admit the pos- 
sibility, in case the General Government should maintain 
itself, that the State Governments might gradually dwindle 
into nothing. The system, therefore, should not be en- 
grafted on what might possibly fail. 

Mr. Mason urged the necessity of retaining the election 
by the people. Whatever inconvenience may attend the 
democratic principle, it must actuate one part of the Gov- 
ernment. It is the only security for the rights of the peo- 
ple. 

Mr. Sherman would like an election by the Legisla- 
tures best, but is content with the plan as it stands. 

Mr. Kutledge could not admit the solidity of the dis- 
tinction between a mediate and immediate election by the 
people. It was the same thing to act by one's self, and to 
act by another. An election by the Legislature would be 
more refined, than an election immediately by the people ; 
and would be more likely to correspond with the sense of 
the whole community. If this Convention had been chosen 



214 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

by the people in districts, it is not to be supposed that such 
proper characters would have been preferred. The Dele- 
gates to Congress, he thought, had also been fitter men 
than would have been appointed by the people at large. 

Mr. Wilson considered the election of the first branch 
by the people not only as the corner-stone, but as the foun- 
dation of the fabric ; and that the difference between a medi- 
ate and immediate election was immense. The difference 
was particularly worthy of notice in this respect, that the 
Legislatures are actuated not merely by the sentiment of 
the people ; but have an official sentiment opposed to that of 
the General Government, and perhaps to that of the people 
themselves. 

Mr. King enlarged on the same distinction. He sup- 
posed the Legislatures would constantly choose men subser- 
vient to their own views, as contrasted to the general inter- 
est; and that they might even devise modes of election that 
would be subversive of the end in view. He remarked sev- 
eral instances in which the views of a State might be at 
variance with those of the General Government; and men- 
tioned particularly a competition between the National 
and State debts, for the most certain and productive funds. 

General Pincjkney was for making the State Govern- 
ments a part of the general system. If they were to be 
abolished, or lose their agency, South Carolina and the 
other States would have but a small share of the benefits of 
Government. 

On the question for General Pinckney's motion, to sub- 
stitute " election to the first branch in such mode as the 
Legislatures should appoint," instead of its being " elected 
by the people," — Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, South 
Carolina, aye — 4: Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylva- 
nia, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 6 ; Maryland 
divided. 

General Pinckney then moved, " that the first branch be 
elected by the people in such mode as the Legislatures should 
direct," but waived it on its being hinted that such a pro- 



1787,] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 215 

vision might be more properly tried in the detail of the 
plan. 

On the question for the election of the first branch " by 
the people" — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; New Jersey, no — 1 ; Maryland 
divided. 

The election of the first branch " for the term of three 
years," being considered, — 

Mr. Randolph moved to strike out "three years," and 
insert "two years." He was sensible that annual elections 
were a source of great mischiefs in the States, yet it was 
the want of such checks against the popular intemperance 
as were now proposed, that rendered them so mischievous. 
He would have preferred annual to biennial, but for the 
extent of the United States, and the inconvenience which 
would result from them to the representatives of the extreme 
},a.rts til the Empire. The people were attached to fre- 
quency of elections. All the Constitutions of the States, 
except that of South Carolina, had established annual elec- 
tions. 

Mr. Dickinson. The idea of annual elections was bor- 
rowed from the ancient usage of England, a country much 
less extensive than ours. He supposed biennial would be 
inconvenient. He preferred triennial; and in order to pre- 
vent the inconvenience of an entire change of the whole 
number at the same moment, suggested a rotation, by an 
annual election of one-third. 

Mr. Ellsworth was opposed to three years, supposing 
that even one year was preferable to two years. The peo- 
ple were fond of frequent elections, and might be safely 
indulged in one branch of the Legislature. He moved for 
" one year." 

Mr. Strong seconded and supported the motion. 

Mr. Wilson, being for making the first branch an 
effectual representation of the people at large, preferred an 
annual election of it. This frequency was most familiar 



216 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

and pleasing to the people. It would not be more incon- 
venient to them than triennial elections, as the people in all 
the States have annual meetings with which the election of 
the national Representatives might be made to coincide. 
He did not conceive that it would be necessary for the 
National Legislature to sit constantly, perhaps not half, 
perhaps not one-fourth of the year. 

Mr. Madison was persuaded that annual elections would 
be extremely inconvenient, and apprehensive that biennial 
would be too much so ; he did not mean inconvenient to the 
electors, but to the Representatives. They would have to 
travel seven or eight hundred miles from the distant parts 
of the Union ; and would probably not be allowed even a 
reimbursement of their expenses. Besides, none of those 
who wished to be re-elected would remain at the seat of 
government, confiding that their absence would not affect 
them. The members of Congress had done this with few 
instances of disappointment. But as the choice was here to 
be made by the people themselves, who would be much less 
complaisant to individuals, and much more susceptible of 
impressions from the presence of a rival candidate, it must 
be supposed that the members from the most distant States 
would travel backwards and forwards at least as often as 
the elections should be repeated. Much was to be said, 
also, on the time requisite for new members, who would 
always form a large proportion, to acquire that knowledge 
of the affairs of the States in general, without which their 
trust could not be usefully discharged. 

Mr. Sherman preferred annual elections, but would be 
content with biennial. He thought the Representatives 
ought to return home and mix with the people. By remain- 
ing at the seat of government, they would acquire the habits 
of the place, which might differ from those of their con- 
stituents. 

Colonel Mason observed, that, the States being differ- 
ently situated, such a rule ought to be formed as would put 
them as nearly as possible on a level. If elections were 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 217 

annual, the middle States would have a great advantage 
over the extreme ones. He wished them to be biennial, 
and the rather as in that case they would coincide with the 
periodical elections of South Carolina, as well of the other 
States. 

Colonel Hamilton urged the necessity of three years. 
There ought to be neither too much nor too little depend- 
ence on the popular sentiments. The checks in the other 
branches of the Government would be but feeble, and would 
need every auxiliary principle that could be interwoven. 
The British House of Commons were elected septennially, 
yet the democratic spirit of the Constitution had not ceased. 
Frequency of elections tended to make the people listless to 
them ; and to facilitate the success of little cabals. This 
evil was complained of in all the States. In Virginia it had 
been lately found necessary to force the attendance and 
voting of the people by severe regulations. 

On the question for striking out " three years," — 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7; New York, 
Delaware, Maryland, no — 3 ; New Jersey divided. 

The motion for " two years " was then inserted, nem. con. 

Adjourned. 

Friday, June 22d. 

In Convention, — The clause in the third Kesolution 
" to receive fixed stipends, to be paid out of the National 
Treasury," being considered,— 

Mr. Ellsworth moved to substitute payment by the 
States, out of their own treasuries: observing, that the 
manners of different States were very different in the style 
of living, and in the profits accruing from the exercise of 
like talents. What would be deemed, therefore, a reason- 
able compensation in some States, in others would be very 
unpopular, and might impede the system of which it made 
a part. 



218 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Williamson favored the idea. He reminded the 
House of the prospect of new States to the westward. They 
would be too poor — would pay little into the common 
treasury — and would have a different interest from the old 
States. He did not think, therefore, that the latter ought to 
pay the expense of men that would be employed in thwart- 
ing their measures and interests. 

Mr. Gorham wished not to refer the matter to the State 
Legislatures, who were always paring down salaries in such 
a manner as to keep out of office men most capable of 
executing the functions of them. He thought, also, it 
would be wrong to fix the compensation by the Constitution, 
because we could not venture to make it as liberal as it 
ought to be, without exciting an enmity against the whole 
plan. Let the National Legislature provide for their own 
wages from time to time, as the State Legislatures do. He 
had not seen this part of their power abused, nor did he 
apprehend an abuse of it. 

Mr. Randolph said he feared we were going too far in 
consulting popular prejudices. Whatever respect might be 
due to them in lesser matters, or in cases where they formed 
the permanent character of the people, he thought it neither 
incumbent on, nor honorable for, the Convention, to sacrifice 
right and justice to that cor sideration. If the States were 
to pay the members of the National Legislature, a depend- 
ence would be created that would vitiate the whole system. 
The whole nation has an interest in the attendance and 
services of the members. The National Treasury therefore 
is the proper fund for supporting them. 

Mr. King urged the danger of creating a dependence on 
the States by leaving to them the payment of the members 
of the National Legislature. He supposed it would be best 
to be explicit as to the compensation to be allowed. A 
reserve on that point, or a reference to the National Leg- 
islature of the quantum, would excite greater opposition 
than any sum that would be actually necessary or 
proper. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 219 

Mr. Sherman contended for referring both the quantum 
and the payment of it to the State Legislatures. 

Mr. Wilson was against fixing the compensation, as 
circumstances would change and call for a change of the 
amount. He thought it of great moment that the mem- 
bers of the National Government should be left as inde- 
pendent as possible of the State Governments in all re- 
spects. 

Mr. Madison concurred in the necessity of preserving 
the compensations for the National Government indepen- 
dent of the State Governments ; but at the same time ap- 
proved of fixing them by the Constitution, which might be 
done by taking a standard which would not vary with cir- 
cumstances. He disliked particularly the policy, suggest- 
ed by Mr. Williamson, of leaving the members from the 
poor States beyond the mountains to the precarious and 
parsimonious support of their constituents. If the West- 
ern States hereafter arising should be admitted into the 
Union, they ought to be considered as equals and as breth- 
ren. If their representatives were to be associated in the 
common councils, it was of common concern that such pro- 
visions should be made as would invite the most capable 
and respectable characters into the service. 

Mr. Hamilton apprehended inconvenience from fixing 
the wages. He was strenuous against making the national 
council dependent on the legislative rewards of the States. 
Those who pay are the masters of those who are paid. 
Payment by the States would be unequal, as the distant 
States would have to pay for the same term of attendance 
and more days in traveling to and from the seat of govern- 
ment. He expatiated emphatically on the difference be- 
tween the feelings and views of the people and the govern- 
ments of the States, arising from the personal interest and 
official inducements which must render the latter unfriendly 
to the General Government. 

Mr. Wilson moved that the salaries of the first branch 



220 DEBATES IN THE ,1787. 

" be ascertained by the National Legislature and be paid 
out of the National Treasury." 

Mr. Madison thought the members of the Legislature too 
much interested, to ascertain their own compensation. It 
would be indecent to put their hands into the public purse 
for the sake of their own pockets. 

On this question, " shall the salaries of the first branch 
be ascertained by the national Legislature?" — New Jer- 
sey, Pennsylvania, aye — 2 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Car- 
olina, no — 7 ; New York, Georgia, divided. 

On the question for striking out "National Treasury," 
as moved by Mr. Ellsworth, — 

Mr. Hamilton renewed his opposition to it. He 
pressed the distinction between the State Governments and 
the people. The former would be the rivals of the General 
Government. The State Legislatures ought not, therefore, 
to be the paymasters of the latter. 

Mr, Ellsworth. If we are jealous of the State Gov- 
ernments, they will be so of us. If on going home I tell 
them, we gave the General Government such powers because 
we could not trust you, will they adopt it? And without 
their approbation it is a nullity. 

On the question, — Massachusetts,* Connecticut, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 4 ; New Jersey, Pennsyl- 
vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no — 5 ; New York, 
Georgia, divided; so it passed in the negative. 

On a question for substituting " adequate compensa- 
tion" in place of "fixed stipends," it was agreed to, nem. 
con., the friends of the latter being willing that the practi- 
cability of fixing the compensation should be considered 
hereafter in forming the details. 

It was then moved by Mr. Butler, that a question be 
taken on both points jointly, to wit, " adequate compensa- 

* It appeared that Massachusetts concurred, not because they thought the State 
Treasury ought to be substituted : but because they thought nothing should be said 
on the subject, in which case it would silently devolve on the National Treasury to 
support the National Legislature. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 221 

tion to be paid out of the National Treasury." It was 
objected to as out of order, the parts having been separately 
decided on. The President referred the question of order 
to the House, and it was determined to be in order, — Con- 
necticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, aye — 6 ; New York, Pennsylvania, Vir- 
ginia, Georgia, no — 4: Massachusetts, divided. The ques- 
tion on the sentence was then postponed by South Caro- 
lina, in right of the State. 

Col. Mason moved to insert " twenty -five years of age 
as a qualification for the members of the first branch." He 
thought it absurd that a man to-day should not be permitted 
by the law to make a bargain for himself, and to-morrow 
should be authorized to manage the affairs of a great nation. 
It was the more extraordinary, as every man carried with 
him, in his own experience, a scale for measuring the defi- 
ciency of young politicians ; since he would, if interrogated, 
be obliged to declare that his political opinions at the age 
of twenty-one were too crude and erroneous to merit an 
influence on public measures. It had been said, that Con- 
gress had proved a good school for our young men. It 
might be so, for any thing he knew; but if it were, he 
chose that they should bear the expense of their own edu- 
cation. 

Mr. Wilson was against abridging the rights of election 
in any shape. It was the same thing whether this were 
done by disqualifying the objects of choice, or the persons 
choosing. The motion tended to damp the efforts of genius 
and of laudable ambition. There was no more reason for 
incapacitating youth than age, where the requisite qualifica- 
tions were found. Many instances might be mentioned of 
signal services, rendered in high stations, to the public, 
before the age of twenty-five. The present Mr. Pitt and 
Lord Bolingbroke were striking instances. 

On the question for inserting " twenty-five years of 
a g e >" — Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Vir- 



222 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye, — 7 ; Massachu- 
setts, Pennsylvania, Georgia, no, — 3 ; New York, divided. 

Mr. Gorham moved to strike out the last member of the 
third Resolution, concerning ineligibility of members of the 
first branch to office during the term of their membership, 
and for one year after. He considered it unnecessary and 
injurious. It was true, abuses had been displayed in Great 
Britain; but no one could say how far they might have 
contributed to preserve the due influence of the Government, 
nor what might have ensued in case the contrary theory had 
been tried. 

Mr. Butler opposed it. This precaution against in- 
trigue was necessary. He appealed to the example of 
Great Britain, where men get into Parliament that they 
might get offices for themselves or their friends. This was 
the source of the corruption that ruined their government. 

Mr. King thought we were refining too much. Such a 
restriction on the members would discourage merit. It 
would also give a pretext to the Executive for bad appoint- 
ments, as he might always plead this as a bar to the choice 
he wished to have made. 

Mr. Wilson was against fettering elections, and dis- 
couraging merit. He suggested, also, the fatal consequence 
in time of war, of rendering, perhaps, the best commanders 
ineligible; appealed to our situation during the late war, 
and indirectly leading to a recollection of the appointment 
of the Commander-in-Chief out of Congress. 

Colonel Mason was for shutting the door at all events 
against corruption. He enlarged on the venality and 
abuses, in this particular, in Great Britain; and alluded to 
the multiplicity of foreign embassies by Congress. The 
disqualification he regarded as a corner-stone in the fabric. 

Colonel Hamilton. There are inconveniences on both 
sides. We must take man as we find him ; and if we expect 
him to serve the public, must interest his passions in doing 
so. A reliance on pure patriotism had been the source of 
many of our errors. He thought the remark of Mr. Gor- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 223 

ham a just one. It was impossible to say what would be 
the effect in Great Britain of such a reform as had been 
urged. It was known that one of the ablest politicians (Mr. 
Hume) had pronounced all that influence on the side of the 
Crown which went under the name of corruption, an essen- 
tial part of the weight which maintained the equilibrium of 
the Constitution. 

On Mr. Goeham's motion for striking out " ineligibil- 
ity," it was lost by an equal division of the votes, — Massa- 
chusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 4; 
Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no, — 4 
New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, divided. 

Adjourned. 

Satueday, June 23d. 

In Convention, — the third Resolution being resumed, — 

On the question, yesterday postponed by South Carolina, 
for agreeing to the whole sentence, "for allowing an ade- 
quate compensation, to be paid out of the Treasury of the 
United States," — Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, Virginia, aye — 5 ; Connecticut, New York, Del- 
aware, North Carolina, South Carolina, no — 5 ; Georgia, 
divided. So the question was lost, and the sentence not 
inserted. 

General Pinckney moves to strike out the ineligibility 
of members of the first branch to offices established " by a 
particular State." He argued from the inconvenience to 
which such a restriction would expose both the members of 
the first branch, and the States wishing for their services; 
and from the smallness of the object to be attained by the 
restriction. It would seem from the ideas of some, that we 
are erecting a kingdom to be divided against itself: he dis- 
approved such a fetter on the Legislature. 

Mr. Sheeman seconds the motion. It would seem that 
we are erecting a kingdom at war with itself. The Legis- 
lature ought not to be fettered in such a case. 



224 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

On the question, — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Geor- 
gia, aye — 8; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no 
— 3. 

Mr. Madison renewed his motion, yesterday made and 
waived, to render the members of the first branch " ineligi- 
ble during their term of service, and for one year after, to 
such offices only, as should be established, or the emolu- 
ment augmented, by the Legislature of the United States 
during the time of their being members." He supposed 
that the unnecessary creation of offices, and increase of 
salaries, were the evils most experienced, and that if the 
door was shut against them, it might properly be left open 
for the appointment of members to other offices as an 
encouragement to the legislative service. 

Mr. Alexander Martin seconded the motion. 

Mr. Butler. The amendment does not go far enough, 
and would be easily evaded. 

Mr. Butledge was for preserving the Legislature as 
pure as possible, by shutting the door against appointments 
of its own members to office, which was one source of its 
corruption. 

Mr. Mason. The motion of my colleague is but a par- 
tial remedy for the evil. He appealed to him as a witness 
of the shameful partiality of the Legislature of Virginia 
to its own members. He enlarged on the abuses and cor- 
ruption in the British Parliament connected with the 
appointment of its members. He could not suppose that a 
sufficient number of citizens could not be found who would 
be ready, without the inducement of eligibility to offices, 
to undertake the Legislative service. Genius and virtue, 
it may be said, ought to be encouraged. Genius, for aught 
he knew, might; but that virtue should be encouraged by 
such a species of venality, was an idea that at least had the 
merit of being new. 

Mr. King remarked that we were refining too much in 
this business; and that the idea of preventing intrigue and 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 225 

solicitation of offices was chimerical. You say, that no 
member shall himself be eligible to any office. Will this 
restrain him from availing himself of the same means 
which would gain appointments for himself, to gain them 
for his son, his brother, or any other object of his par- 
tiality? We were losing, therefore, the advantages on one 
side, without avoiding the evils on the other. 

Mr. Wilson supported the motion. The proper cure, 
he said, for corruption in the Legislature was to take from 
it the power of appointing to offices. One branch of cor- 
ruption would, indeed, remain, that of creating unnecessary 
offices, or granting unnecessary salaries, and for that the 
amendment would be a proper remedy. He animadverted 
on the impropriety of stigmatizing with the name of venality 
the laudable ambition of rising into the honourable offices 
of the Government, — an ambition most likely to be felt in 
the early and most incorrupt period of life, and which all 
Avise and free governments had deemed it sound policy to 
oherish, not to check. The members of the Legislature 
have, perhaps, the hardest and least profitable task of any 
who engage in the service of the State. Ought this merit 
to be made a disqualification ? 

Mr. Sherman observed that the motion did not go far 
enough. It might be evaded by the creation of a new office, 
the translation to it of a person from another office, and the 
appointment of a member of the Legislature to the latter. 
A new embassy might be established to a new Court, and 
an ambassador taken from another, in order to create a 
vacancy for a favorite member. He admitted that incon- 
veniences lay on both sides. He hoped there would be 
sufficient inducements to the public service without resort- 
ing to the prospect of desirable offices ; and on the whole 
was rather against the motion of Mr. Madison. 

Mr. Gerry thought, there was great weight in the 
objection of Mr. Sherman. He added, as another objection 
against admitting the eligibility of members in any case, 
that it would produce intrigues of ambitious men for dis- 



226 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

placing proper officers, in order to create vacancies for 
themselves. In answer to Mr. King, he observed, that, 
although members, if disqualified themselves, might still 
intrigue and cabal for their sons, brothers, <fec, yet as their 
own interests would be dearer to them than those of their 
nearest connexions, it might be expected they would go 
greater lengths to promote them. 

Mr. Madison had been led to this motion, as a middle 
ground between an eligibility in all cases and an absolute 
disqualification. He admitted the probable abuses of an 
eligibility of the members to offices particularly within the 
gift of the Legislature. He had witnessed the partiality 
of such bodies to their own members, as had been remarked 
of the Virginia Assembly by his colleague (Colonel Mason). 
He appealed, however, to him in turn to vouch another fact 
not less notorious in Virginia, that the backwardness of the 
best citizens to engage in the Legislative service gave but too 
great success to unfit characters. The question was not to 
be viewed on one side only. The advantages and disadvan- 
tages on both ought to be fairly compared. The objects to 
be aimed at were to fill all offices with the fittest characters, 
and to draw the wisest and most worthy citizens into the 
legislative service. If, on one hand, public bodies were 
partial to their own members, on the other, they were as apt 
to be misled by taking characters on report, or the author- 
ity of patrons and dependents. All who had been con- 
cerned in the appointment of strangers, on those recom- 
mendations must be sensible of this truth. Nor would the 
partialities of such bodies be obviated by disqualifying their 
own members. Candidates for office would hover round the 
seat of government, or be found among the residents there, 
and practise all the means of courting the favor of the 
members. A great proportion of the appointments made 
by the States were evidently brought about in this way. 
In the General Government, the evil must be still greater, 
the characters of distant States being much less known 
throughout the United States, than those of the distant parts 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 227 

of the same State. The elections byCongress had generally 
turned on men living at the Seat of the Federal Govern- 
ment, or in its neighbourhood. As to the next object, the 
impulse to the legislative service was evinced by experience 
to be in general too feeble with those best qualified for it. 
This inconvenience would also be more felt in the National 
Government than in the State Governments, as the sacri- 
fices required from the distant members would be much 
greater, and the pecuniary provisions, probably, more dis- 
proportionate. It would therefore be impolitic to add fresh 
objections to the legislative service by an absolute dis- 
qualification of its members. The point in question was, 
whether this would be an objection with the most capable 
citizens. Arguing from experience, he concluded that it 
would. The legislature of Virginia would probably have 
been without many of its best members, if in that situation 
they had been ineligible to Congress, to the Government, 
and other honourable offices of the State. 

Mr. Butler thought characters fit for office would never 
be unknown. 

Colonel Mason. If the members of the Legislature are 
disqualified, still the honours of the State will induce those 
who aspire to them to enter that service, as the field in 
which they can best display and improve their talents, and 
lay the train for their subsequent advancement. 

Mr. Jenifer remarked, that in Maryland the Senators, 
chosen for five years, could hold no other office ; and that 
this circumstance gained them the greatest confidence of 
the people. 

On the question for agreeing to the motion of Mr. 
Madison, — Connecticut, New Jersey, aye — 2 ; New York, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Caro- 
lina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 8 ; Massachusetts, 
divided. 

Mr. Sherman moved to insert the words, " and incapable 
of holding" after the words "ineligible to," which was 
agreed to without opposition. 



228 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

The word "established," and the words "under the 
national government," were struck out of the third Resolu- 
tion. 

Mr. Spaight called for a division of the question, in 
consequence of which it was so put as that it turned on the 
first member of it, on the ineligibility of members during 
the term for ivhich they ivere elected — whereon the States 
were, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Mary- 
land, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 8, 
Pennsylvania, Georgia, no — 2 ; Massachusetts, divided. 

On the second member of the sentence, extending in- 
eligibility of members to one year after the term for which 
they were elected, — 

Colonel Mason thought this -essential to guard against 
evasions by resignations, and stipulations for office to be 
fulfilled at the expiration of the legislative term. 

Mr. Gerry had known such a case. 

Mr. Hamilton. Evasions could not be prevented, — as 
by proxies — by friends holding for a year, and then open- 
ing the way, &c. 

Mr. Rutledge admitted the possibility of evasions, but 
was for contracting them as far as possible. On the ques- 
tion, — New York, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, 
aye — 4 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Vir- 
ginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 6; Pennsylvania, 
divided. 

Adjourned. 

Monday, June 25th. 

In Convention, — The fourth Resolution being taken 
up, 

Mr. Pinckney spoke as follows: 

The efficacy of the system will depend on this article. 
In order to form a right judgment in the case, it will be 
proper to examine the situation of this country more accu- 
rately than it has yet been done. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 229 

The people of the United States are perhaps the most 
singular of any we are acquainted with. Among them there 
are fewer distinctions of fortune, and less of rank, than 
among the inhabitants of any other nation. Every free- 
man has a right to the same protection and security ; and a 
very moderate share of property entitles them to the pos- 
session of all the honors and privileges the public , can 
bestow. Hence, arises a greater equality than is to be 
found among the people of any other country ; and an equal- 
ity which is more likely to continue. I say, this equality 
is likely to continue ; because in a new country, possessing 
immense tracts of uncultivated lands, where every tempta- 
tion is offered to emigration, and where industry must be 
rewarded with competency, there will be few poor, and few 
dependent. Every member of the society almost will en- 
joy an equal power of arriving at the supreme offices, and 
consequently of directing the strength and sentiments of 
the whole community. None will be excluded by birth, and 
few by fortune, from voting for proper persons to fill the 
offices of government. The whole community will enjoy, 
in the fullest sense, that kind of political liberty which 
consists in the power, the members of the State reserve to 
themselves, of arriving at the public offices, or at least of 
having votes in the nomination of those who fill them. 

If this state of things is true, and the prospect of its 
continuance probable, it is perhaps not politic to endeavour 
too close an imitation of a government calculated for a peo- 
ple whose situation is, and whose views ought to be, ex- 
tremely different. 

Much has been said of the Constitution of Great Britain. 
I. will confess that I believe it to be the best constitution 
in existence; but, at the same time, I am confident it is one 
that will not or cannot be introduced into this country, for 
many centuries. If it were proper to go here into a his- 
torical dissertation on the British Constitution, it might 
easily be shown that the peculiar excellence, the distin- 
guishing feature, of that government cannot possibly be 



230 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

introduced into our system — that its balance between the 
Crown and the people cannot be made a part of our Con- 
stitution, — that we neither have nor can have the members 
to compose it, nor the rights, privileges and properties of 
so distinct a class of citizens to guard, — that the materials 
for forming this balance or check do not exist, nor is there 
a necessity for having so permanent a part of our Legisla- 
tive, until the Executive power is so constituted as to have 
something fixed and dangerous in its principle. By this I 
mean a sole, hereditary, though limited Executive. 

That we cannot have a proper body for forming a 
Legislative balance between the inordinate power of the 
Executive and the people, is evident from a review of the 
accidents and circumstances which gave rise to the peerage 
of Great Britain. I believe it is well ascertained, that the 
parts which compose the British Constitution arose imme- 
diately from the forests of Germany; but the antiquity of 
the establishment of nobility is by no means clearly defined. 
Some authors are of opinion that the dignity denoted by 
the title of dux and comes, was derived from the old Roman, 
to the German, Empire; while others are of opinion that 
they existed among the Germans long before the Romans 
were acquainted with them. The institution, however, of 
nobility is immemorial among the nations who may properly 
be termed the ancestors of Great Britain. At the time 
they were summoned in England to become a part of the 
national council, the circumstances which contributed to 
make them a constituent part of that Constitution, must be 
well known to all gentlemen who have had industry and 
curiosity enough to investigate the subject. The nobles, 
with their possessions and dependents, composed a body 
permanent in their nature, and formidable in point of 
power. They had a distinct interest both from the King 
and the people, — an interest which could only be repre- 
sented by themselves, and the guardianship of which could 
not be safely intrusted to others. At the time they were 
originally called to form a part of the national council, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 231 

necessity perhaps, as much as other causes induced the 
monarch to look up to them. It was necessary to demand 
the aid of his subjects in personal and pecuniary services. 
The power and possessions of the nobility would not permit 
taxation from any assembly of which they were not a part: 
and the blending of the deputies of the commons with them, 
and thus forming what they called their parler-ment, was 
perhaps as much the effect of chance as of any thing else. 
The commons were at that time completely subordinate to 
the nobles, whose consequence and influence seem to have 
been the only reasons for their superiority ; a superiority so 
degrading to the commons, that in the first summons, we find 
the peers are called upon to consult, the commons to consent. 
From this time the peers have composed a part of the 
British Legislature; and notwithstanding their power and 
influence have diminished, and those of the commons have 
increased, yet still they have always formed an excellent 
balance against either the encroachments of the Crown or 
the people. 

I have said that such a body cannot exist in this country 
for ages; and that until the situation of our people is 
exceedingly changed, no necessity will exist for so perma- 
nent a part of the Legislature. To illustrate this, I have 
remarked that the people of the United States are more 
equal in their circumstances than the people of any other 
country; that they have very few rich men among them — 
by rich men I mean those whose riches may have a dan- 
gerous influence, or such as are esteemed rich in Europe — 
perhaps there are not one hundred such on the continent; 
that it is not probable this number will be greatly increased; 
that the genius of the people, their mediocrity of situation, 
and the prospects which are afforded their industry, in a 
country which must be a new one for centuries, are unfav- 
orable to the rapid distinction of ranks. The destruction 
of the right of primogeniture, and the equal division of 
the property of intestates, will also have an effect to pre- 
serve this mediocrity; for laws invariably affect the man- 



232 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ners of a people. On the other hand, that vast extent of 
unpeopled territory, which opens to the frugal and industri- 
ous a sure road to competency and independence, will effectu- 
ally prevent, for a considerable time, the increase of the 
poor or discontented, and be the means of preserving that 
equality of condition which so eminently distinguishes us. 

If equality is, as I contend, the leading feature of the 
United States, where, then, are the riches and wealth whose 
representation and protection is the peculiar province of 
this permanent body? Are they in the hands of the few 
*vho may be called rich, — in the possession of less than a 
hundred citizens? Certainly not. They are in the great 
body of the people, among whom there are no men of 
health, and very few of real poverty. Is it probable that 
a change will be created, and that a new order of men will 
arise? If under the British government for a century no 
such change was produced, I think it may be fairly con- 
cluded it will not take place while even the semblance of 
republicanism remains. How is the change to be effected? 
Where are the sources from whence it is to flow? From 
the landed interest ? No. That is too unproductive, 
and too much divided in most of the States. From the 
monied interest ? If such exists at present, little is to be 
apprehended from that source. Is it to spring from com- 
merce? I believe it would be the first instance in which a 
nobility sprang from merchants. Besides, sir, I apprehend 
that on this point the policy of the United States has been 
much mistaken. We have unwisely considered ourselves 
as the inhabitants of an old, instead of a new, country. We 
have adopted the maxims of a state full of people, and 
manufactures, and established in credit. We have deserted 
our true interest, and instead of applying closely to those 
improvements in domestic policy which would have ensured 
the future importance of our commerce, we have rashly and 
prematurely engaged in schemes as extensive as they are 
imprudent. This, however, is an error which daily cor- 
rects itself; and I have no doubt that a few more severe 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 233 

trials will convince us, that very different commercial prin- 
ciples ought to govern the conduct of these States. 

The people of this country are not only very different 
from the inhabitants of any state we are acquainted with in 
the modern world, but I assert that their situation is dis- 
tinct from either the people of Greece or Rome, or of any 
states we are acquainted with among the ancients. Can the 
orders introduced by the institution of Solon, can they be 
found in the United States ? Can the military habits and 
manners of Sparta be resembled to our habits and manners ? 
Are the distinction of patrician and plebeian known among 
us? Can the Helvetic or Belgic confederacies, or can the 
unwieldy, unmeaning body called the Germanic Empire, can 
they be said to possess either the same, or a situation like 
ours ? I apprehend, not. They are perfectly different, in 
their distinctions of rank, their constitutions, their manners 
and their policy. 

Our true situation appears to me to be this, — a new 
extensive country, containing within itself the materials for 
forming a government capable of extending to its citizens 
all the blessings of civil and religious liberty — capable of 
making them happy at home. This is the great end of 
republican establishments. We mistake the object of our 
Government, if we hope or wish that it is to make us re- 
spectable abroad. Conquest or superiority among other 
powers is not, or ought not ever to be, the object of repub- 
lican systems. If they are sufficiently active and energetic 
to rescue us from contempt, and preserve our domestic hap- 
piness and security, it is all we can expect from them, — it 
is more than almost any other government ensures to its 
citizens. 

I believe this observation will be found generally true, 
— that no two people are so exactly alike in their situation 
or circumstances, as to admit the exercise of the same gov- 
ernment with equal benefit ; that a system must be suited to 
the habits and genius of the people it is to govern, and 
must grow out of them. 



234 DEBATES IN THE [178T. 

The people of the United States may be divided into 
three classes, — professional men, who must, from their par- 
ticular pursuits, always have a considerable weight in the 
government, while it remains popular, — commercial men, 
who may or may not have weight, as a wise or injudicious 
commercial policy is pursued. If that commercial policy is 
pursued which I conceive to be the true one, the merchants 
of this country will not, or ought not, for a considerable 
time, to have much weight in the political scale. The third 
is the landed interest, the owners and cultivators of the soil, 
who are, and ought ever to be, the governing spring in the 
system. These three classes, however distinct in their pur- 
suits, are individually equal in the political scale, and may 
be easily proved to have but one interest. The dependence 
of each on the other is mutual. The merchant depends on 
the planter. Both must, in private as well as public affairs, 
be connected with the professional men; who in their turn 
must in some measure depend on them. Hence it is clear, 
from this manifest connexion, and the equality which I 
before stated exists, and must, for the reasons then assigned, 
continue, that after all there is one, but one great and 
equal body of citizens composing the inhabitants of this 
country, among whom there are no distinctions of rank, and 
very few or none of fortune. 

For a people thus circumstanced are we, then, to form 
a Government; and the question is, what sort of govern- 
ment is best suited to them ? 

Will it be the British Government ? No. Why ? Because 
Great Britain contains three orders of people distinct in 
their situation, their possessions, and their principles. 
These orders, combined, form the great body of the nation ; 
and as in national expenses the wealth of the whole com- 
munity must contribute, so ought each component part to 
be duly and properly represented. No other combination 
of power could form this due representation, but the one 
that exists. Neither the peers or the people could repre- 
sent the royalty; nor could the royalty and the people form 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 235 

a proper representation for the peers. Each, therefore, 
must of necessity be represented by itself, or the sign 
of itself; and this accidental mixture has certainly formed 
a Government admirably well balanced. 

But the United States contain but one order that can be 
assimilated to the British nation — this is the order of 
Commons. They will not, surely then, attempt to form a 
Government consisting of three branches two of which 
shall have nothing to represent. They will not have an 
Executive and Senate [hereditary], because the King and 
Lords of England are so. The same reasons do not exist, 
and therefore the same provisions are not necessary. 

We must, as has been observed, suit our Government 
to the people it is to direct. These are, I believe, as active, 
intelligent and susceptible of good government as any 
people in the world. The confusion which has produced 
the present relaxed state is not owing to them. It is owing 
to the weakness and [defects] of a government incapable 
of combining the various interests it is intended to unite, 
and destitute of energy. All that we have to do, then, is 
to distribute the powers of government in such a manner, 
and for such limited periods, as, while it gives a proper 
degree of permanency to the magistrate, will reserve to the 
people the right of election they will not or ought not fre- 
quently to part with. I am of opinion that this may easily 
be done; and that, with some amendments, the propositions 
before the Committee will fully answer this end. 

No position appears to me more true than this ; that the 
General Government cannot effectually exist without reserv- 
ing to the States the possession of their local rights. They 
are the instruments upon which the Union must frequently 
depend for the support and execution of their powers, how- 
ever immediately operating upon the people, and not upon 
the States. 

Much has been said about the propriety of abolishing 
the distinction of State Governments, and having but one 



236 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

general system. Suffer me for a moment to examine this 
question.* 

The mode of constituting the second branch being under 
consideration, the word " national " was struck out, and 
" United States" inserted. 

Mr. Gorham inclined to a compromise as to the rule of 
proportion. He thought there was some weight in the ob • 
jections of the small States. If Virginia should have six- 
teen votes, and Delaware with several other States together 
sixteen, those from Virginia would be more likely to unite 
than the others, and would therefore have an undue influ- 
ence. This remark was applicable not only to States, but 
to counties or other districts of the same State. Accord- 
ingly the Constitution of Massachusetts, had provided that 
the representatives of the larger districts should not be in 
an exact ratio to their numbers ; and experience, he thought, 
had shown the provision to be expedient. 

Mr. Read. The States have heretofore been in a sort 
of partnership. They ought to adjust their old affairs be- 
fore they opened a new account. He brought into view the 
appropriation of the common interest in the western lands 
to the use of particular States. Let justice be done on this 
head; let the fund be applied fairly and equally to the dis- 
charge of the general debt ; and the smaller States, who had 
been injured, would listen then, perhaps, to those ideas of 
just representation which had been held out. 

Mr. Gorham could not see how the Convention could 
interpose in the case. Errors, he allowed, had been com- 
mitted on the subject. But Congress were now using their 
endeavours to rectify them. The best remedy would be 
such a government as would have vigor enough to do jus- 
tice throughout. This was certainly the best chance that 
could be afforded to the smaller States. 

Mr. Wilson. The question is, shall the members of the 
second branch be chosen by the Legislatures of the States? 
When he considered the amazing extent of country — 



* The residue of this speech was not furnished, like the above, by Mr. Piuckney. 



178?.-] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 237 

the immense population which is to fill it — the influ- 
ence of the Government we are to form will have, not 
only on the present generation of our people and their mul- 
tiplied posterity, but on the whole globe, — he was lost 
in the magnitude of the object. The project of Henry IY. 
and his statesmen, was but the picture in miniature of the 
great portrait to be exhibited. He was opposed to an elec- 
tion by the State Legislatures. In explaining his reasons 
it was necessary to observe the twofold relation in which 
the people would stand, — first, as citizens of the General 
Government; and secondly as citizens of their particular 
State. The General Government was meant for them in the 
first capacity ; the State Governments in the second. Both 
governments were derived from the people — both meant 
for the people — both, therefore, ought to be regulated on 
the same principles. The same train of ideas which be- 
longed to the relation of the citizens to their State Govern- 
ments, were applicable to their relation to the General Gov- 
ernment; and in forming the latter we ought to proceed by 
abstracting as much as possible from the idea of the State 
Governments. With respect to the province and object of 
the General Government they should be considered as hav- 
ing no existence. The election of the second branch by the 
Legislatures will introduce and cherish local interests and 
local prejudices. The General Government is not an assem- 
blage of States, but of individuals, for certain political pur- 
poses ; it is not meant for the States, but for the individuals 
composing them ; the individuals, therefore, not the States, 
ought to be represented in it. A proportion in this repre- 
sentation can be preserved in the second, as well as in the 
first, branch; and the election can be made by electors 
chosen by the people for that purpose. He moved an 
amendment to that effect; which was not seconded. 

Mr. Ellsworth saw no reason for departing from the 
mode contained in the Report. Whoever chooses the mem- 
ber, he will be a citizen of the State he is to represent ; and 
will feel the same spirit, and act the same part, whether he 



238 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

be appointed by the people or the Legislature. Every 
State has its particular views and prejudices, which will find 
their way into the general council, through whatever chan- 
nel they may flow. Wisdom was one of the characteristics 
which it was in contemplation to give the second branch, — 
would not more of it issue from the Legislatures than from 
an immediate election by the people ? He urged the neces- 
sity of maintaining the existence and agency of the States. 
Without their co-operation it would be impossible to sup- 
port a republican government over so great an extent of 
country. An army could scarcely render it practicable. 
The largest States are the worst governed. Virginia is 
obliged to acknowledge her incapacity to extend her gov- 
ernment to Kentucky. Massachusetts cannot keep the 
peace one hundred miles from her capital, and is now 
forming an army for its support. How long Pennsylvania 
may be free from a like situation, cannot be foreseen. If 
the principles and materials of our Government are not 
adequate to the extent of these single States, how can it be 
imagined that they can support a single government 
throughout the United States? The only chance of sup- 
porting a General Government lies in grafting it on those 
of the individual States. 

Doctor Johnson urged the necessity of preserving the 
State Governments, which would be at the mercy of the 
General Government on Mr. Wilson's plan. 

Mr. Madison thought it would obviate difficulty if the 
present Resolution were postponed, and the eighth taken 
up, which is to fix the right of suffrage in the second 
branch. 

Mr. Williamson professed himself a friend to such a 
system as would secure the existence of the State Govern- 
ments. The happiness of the people depended on it. He 
was at a loss to give his vote as to the Senate unlil he 
knew the number of its members. In order to ascertain 
this, he moved to insert, after " second branch of the Na- 
tional Legislature," the words, " who shall bear such pro- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 239 

portion to the number of the first branch as one to .* 

He was not seconded. 

Mr. Mason. It has been agreed on all hands that an 
efficient government is necessary ; that, to render it such, it 
ought to have the faculty of self-defence; that to render its 
different branches effectual, each of them ought to have the 
same power of self-defence. He did not wonder that such 
an agreement should have prevailed on these points He 
only wondered that there should be any disagreement about 
the necessity of allowing the State Governments the same 
self-defence. If they are to be preserved, as he conceived 
to be essential, they certainly ought to have this power; and 
the only mode left of giving it to them was by allowing 
them to appoint the second branch of the National Legis- 
lature. 

Mr. Butler, observing that we were put to difficulties 
at every step by the uncertainty whether an equality or a 
ratio of representation would prevail finally in the second 
branch, moved to postpone the fourth Eesolution, and to 
proceed to the eighth Eesolution on that point. Mr. Mad- 
ison seconded him. 

On the question, — New York, Virginia, South Carolina, 
Georgia, aye — 4 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jer- 
sey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, 
no— 7. 

On a question to postpone the fourth, and take up the 
seventh, Eesolution, — Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5; Massachusetts, Connec- 
ticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no 

— 6. 

On the question to agree, " that the members of the 
second branch be chosen by the individual Legislatures," 

— Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, aye — 9; Pennsylvania, Virginia, no — 2.* 

* It must be kept in view that the largest States, particularly Pennsylvania and 
Virginia, always considered the choice of the second branch by the State Legislate 



240 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

On a question on the clause requiring the age of thirty- 
years at least, — it was unanimously agreed to. 

On a question to strike out the words, " sufficient to 
ensure their independence," after the word " term," — it 
was agreed to. 

The clause, that the second branch hold their offices for 
a term of " seven years," being considered, — 

Mr. Gokham suggests a term of "four years," one 
fourth to be elected every year. 

Mr. Randolph supported the idea of rotation, as favor- 
able to the wisdom and stability of the corps; which might 
possibly be always sitting, and aiding the Executive, and 
moves, after " seven years," to add, " to go out in fixed pro- 
portion," which was agreed to. 

Mr. Williamson suggests " six years," as more conven- 
ient for rotation than seven years. 

Mr. Sherman seconds him. 

Mr. Read proposed that they should hold their offices 
"during good behaviour." Mr. R. Morris seconds him. 

General Pinckney proposed "four years." A longer 
time would fix them at the seat of government. They 
would acquire an interest there, perhaps transfer their 
property, and lose sight of the States they represent. Un- 
der these circumstances, the distant States would labor un- 
der great disadvantages. 

Mr. Sherman moved to strike out " seven years," in 
order to take questions on the several propositions. 

On the question to strike out " seven," — Massachu- 
setts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 7 ; Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Virginia, no — 3; Maryland divided. 

On the question to insert " six years," which failed, five 
States being, aye ; five, no ; and one, divided, — Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, aye — 

ii res as opposed to a proportional representation, to which they were attached as a 
fundamental principle of just government. The smaller States, who had opposite 
views, were reinforced by the members from the large States most anxious to secure 
the importance of the State Governments. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 2±1 

5 ; Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no — 5 ; Maryland divided. 

On a motion to adjourn, the votes were, five for, five 
against it ; and one divided, — Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye — 5 ; Massachusetts, 
New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 
5 ; Maryland divided. 

On the question for " five years," it was lost, — Con- 
necticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, 
aye — 5 ; Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, South 
Carolina, Georgia, no — 5 ; Maryland divided. 

Adjourned. 

Tuesday, June 26th. 

In Convention, — The duration of the second branch 
being under consideration, — 

Mr. Gorham moved to fill the blank with " six years," 
one-third of the members to go out every second year. 

Mr. Wilson seconded the motion. 

General Pinckney opposed six years, in favor of four 
years. The States, he said, had different interests. Those 
of the Southern, and of South Carolina in particular, were 
different from the Northern. If the Senators should be 
appointed for a long term, they would settle in the State 
where they exercised their functions, and would in a little 
time be rather the representatives of that, than of the State 
appointing them. 

Mr. Read moved that the term be nine years. This 
would admit of a very convenient rotation, one-third going 
out triennially. He would still prefer "during good be- 
haviour ; " but being little supported in that idea, he was 
willing to take the longest term that could be obtained. 

Mr. Broom seconded the motion. 

Mr. Madison. In order to judge of the form to be 

given to this institution, it will be proper to take a view of 

the ends to be served by it. These were, — first, to protect 
16 



242 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the people against their rulers, secondly, to protect the 
people against the transient impressions into which they 
themselves might be led. A people deliberating in a 
temperate moment, and with the experience of other nations 
before them, on the plan of government most likely to 
secure their happiness, would first be aware, that those 
charged with the public happiness might betray their trust. 
An obvious precaution against this danger would be, to 
divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might 
watch and check each other. In this they would be gov- 
erned by the same prudence which has prevailed in organ- 
izing the subordinate departments of government, where all 
business liable to abuses is made to pass through separate 
hands, the one being a check on the other. It would next 
occur to such a people, that they themselves were liable to 
temporary errors, through want of information as to their 
true interest ; and that men chosen for a short term, and 
employed but a small portion of that in public affairs, might 
err from the same cause. This reflection would naturally 
suggest, that the government be so constituted as that one 
of its branches might have an opportunity of acquiring a 
competent knowledge of the public interests. Another 
reflection equally becoming a people on such an occasion, 
would be, that they themselves, as well as a numerous body 
of representatives, were liable to err, also, from fickleness 
and passion. A necessary fence against this danger would 
be, to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited 
number, and firmness, might seasonably interpose against 
impetuous counsels. It ought, finally, to occur to a people 
deliberating on a government for themselves, that as dif- 
ferent interests necessarily result from the liberty meant to 
be secured, the major interest might, under sudden im- 
pulses, be tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In 
all civilized countries the people fall into different classes, 
having a real or supposed difference of interests. There 
will be creditors and debtors ; farmers, merchants, and 
manufacturers. There will be, particularly, the distinction 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 243 

of rich and poor. It was true, as had been observed (by 
Mr. Pinckney), we had not among us those hereditary dis- 
tinctions of rank which were a great source of the contests 
in the ancient governments, as well as the modern States of 
Europe ; nor those extremes of wealth or poverty, which 
characterize the latter. We cannot, however, be regarded, 
even at this time, as one homogeneous mass, in which every 
thing that affects a part will affect in the same manner the 
whole. In framing a system which we wish to last for 
ages, we should not lose sight of the changes which ages 
will produce. An increase of population will of necessity 
increase the proportion of those who will labor under all the 
hardships of life, and secretly sigh for a more equal dis- 
tribution of its blessings. These may in time outnumber 
those who are placed above the feelings of indigence. Ac- 
cording to the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide 
into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have 
yet been made in this country ; but symptoms of a levelling 
spirit, as we have understood, have sufficiently appeared in 
a certain quarter, to give notice of the future danger. How 
is this danger to be guarded against, on the republican 
principles? How is the danger, in all cases of interested 
coalitions to oppress the minority, to be guarded against ? 
Among other means, by the establishment of a body, in the 
government, sufficiently respectable for its wisdom and 
virtue to aid, on such emergencies, the preponderance of 
justice, by throwing its weight into that scale. Such being 
the objects of the second branch in the proposed Govern- 
ment, he thought a considerable duration ought to be given 
to it. He did not conceive that the term of nine years 
could threaten any real danger ; but, in pursuing his par- 
ticular ideas on the subject, he should require that the long 
term allowed to the second branch should not commence 
till such a period of life as would render a perpetual dis- 
qualification to be re-elected, little inconvenient, either in a 
public or private view. He observed, that as it was more 
than probable we were now digesting a plan which in its 



244 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

operation would decide for ever the fate of republican 
government, we ought, not only to provide every guard to 
liberty that its preservation could require, but be equally 
careful to supply the defects which our own experience had 
particularly pointed out. 

Mr. Sherman. Government is instituted for those who 
live under it. It ought, therefore to be so constituted as 
not to be dangerous to their liberties. The more perma- 
nency it has, the worse, if it be a bad government. Fre- 
quent elections are necessary to preserve the good behaviour 
of rulers. They also tend to give permanency to the 
government, by preserving that good behaviour, because it 
ensures their re-election. In Connecticut elections have 
been very frequent, yet great stability and uniformity, both 
as to persons and measures, have been experienced from its 
original establishment to the present time; a period of 
more than a hundred and thirty years. He wished to have 
provision made for steadiness and wisdom, in the system to 
be adopted ; but he thought six, or four, years would be 
sufficient. He should be content with either. 

Mr Bead wished it to be considered by the small States 
that it was their interest that we should become one people 
as much as possible; that State attachments should be 
extinguished as much as possible; that the Senate should 
be so constituted as to have the feelings of citizens of the 
whole. 

Mr. Hamilton. He did not mean to enter particularly 
into the subject. He concurred with Mr. Madison in think- 
ing we were now to decide forever the fate of republican 
government ; and that if we did not give to that form due 
stability and wisdom, it would be disgraced and lost among 
ourselves, disgraced and lost to mankind forever. He 
acknowledged himself not to think favorably of republican 
government ; but addressed his remarks to those who did 
think favorably of it, in order to prevail on them to tone 
their government as high as possible. He professed himself 
to be as zealous an advocate for liberty as any man what- 



[1787. FEDERAL CONVENTION. 245. 

ever; and trusted he should be as willing, a martyr to it, 
though he differed as to the form in which it was most 
eligible. He concurred also, in the general observations 
of Mr. Madison on the subject, which might be supported 
by others if it were necessary. It was certainly true, that 
nothing like an equality of property existed; that an 
inequality would exist as long as liberty existed, and that it 
would unavoidably result from that very liberty itself. This 
inequality of property constituted the great and fundamen- 
tal distinction in society. When the Tribunitial power had 
levelled the boundary between the patricians andplebeians, 
what followed ? The distinction between rich and poor was 
substituted. He meant not, however, to enlarge on the 
subject. He rose principally to remark, that Mr. Sherman 
seemed not to recollect that one branch of the proposed 
Government was so formed as to render it particularly the 
guardians of the poorer orders of citizens; nor to have 
adverted to the true causes of the stability which had been 
exemplified in Connecticut. Under the British system, as 
well as the Federal, many of the great powers appertaining 
to government, particularly all those relating to foreign 
nations, were not in the hands of the government there. 
Their internal affairs, also, were extremely simple, owing 
to sundry causes, many of which were peculiar to that 
country. Of late the Government had entirely given way 
to the people, and had in fact suspended many of its ordi- 
nary functions, in order to prevent those turbulent scenes 
which had appeared elsewhere. He asks Mr. Sherman, 
whether the State, at this time, dare impose and collect a 
tax on the people ? To these causes, and not to the fre- 
quency of elections, the effect, as far as it existed, ought to 
be chiefly ascribed. 

Mr. Gerry wished we could be united in our ideas con- 
cerning a permanent Government All aim at the same 
end, but there are great differences as to the means. One 
circumstance, he thought, should be carefully attended to. 
There was not a one-thousandth part of our fellow-citizens 



246 DEBATES IN THE [178-7. 

who were not against every approach towards monarchy, — 
will they ever agree to a plan which seems to make such an 
approach ? The Convention ought to be extremely cautious 
in what they hold out to the people. Whatever plan may 
be proposed will be espoused with warmth by many, out of 
respect to the quarter it proceeds from, as well as from an 
approbation of the plan itself. And if the plan should be 
of such a nature as to rouse a violent opposition, it is easy 
to foresee that discord and confusion will ensue; and it is 
even possible that we may become a prey to foreign pow- 
ers. He did not deny the position of Mr. Madison, that 
the majority will generally violate justice when they have 
an interest in so doing; but did not think there was any 
such temptation In this country. Our situation was differ- 
ent from that of Great Britain ; and the great body of lands 
yet to be parcelled out and settled would very much pro- 
long the difference. Notwithstanding the symptoms of in- 
justice which had marked many of our public councils, they 
had not proceeded so far as not to leave hopes that there 
would be a sufficient sense of justice and virtue for the pur- 
pose of government. He admitted the evils arising from a 
frequency of elections, and would agree to give the Senate 
a duration of four or five years. A longer term would de- 
feat itself. It never would be adopted by the people. 

Mr. Wilson did not mean to repeat what had fallen 
from others, but would add an observation or two which he 
believed had not yet been suggested. Every nation may 
be regarded in two relations, first, to its own citizens; sec- 
ondly, to foreign nations. It is, therefore, not only liable 
to anarchy and tyranny within, but has wars to avoid and 
treaties to obtain from abroad. The Senate will probably 
be the depository of the powers concerning the latter ob- 
jects. It ought therefore to be made respectable in the 
eyes of foreign nations. The true reason why Great Brit- 
ain has not yet listened to a commercial treaty with us has 
been, because she had no confidence in the stability or 
efficacy of our Government. Nine years, with a rotation, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 2±7 

will provide these desirable qualities ; and give our Govern- 
ment an advantage in this respect over monarchy itself. 
In a monarchy, much must always depend on the temper 
of the man. In such a body, the personal character will 
be lost in the political. He would add another observa- 
tion. The popular objection against appointing any public 
body for a long term, was, that it might, by gradual en- 
croachments, prolong itself, first into a body for life, and 
finally become a hereditary one. It would be a satisfactory 
answer to this objection, that as one-third would go out 
triennially, there would be always three divisions holding 
their places for unequal times, and consequently acting 
under the influence of different views, and different im- 
pulses. 

On the question for nine years, one-third to go out 
triennially, — Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye — 3 ; 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Mary- 
land, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 8. 

On the question for six years, one-third to go out bien- 
nially, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Dela- 
ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye — 7 ; New 
York, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 4. 

The clause of the fourth Resolution, " to receive fixed 
stipends by which they may be compensated for their ser- 
vices " being considered, — 

General Pinckney proposed, that no salary should be 
allowed As this (the Senatorial) branch was meant to 
represent the wealth of the country, it ought to be com- 
posed of persons of wealth ; and if no allowance was to be 
made, the wealthy alone would undertake the service. He 
moved to strike out the clause. 

Doctor Franklin seconded the motion. He wished the 
Convention to stand fair with the people. There were in it 
a number of young men who would probably be of the 
Senate. If lucrative appointments should be recommended, 
we might be chargeable with having carved out places for 
ourselves. 



248 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

On the question, — Massachusetts, Connecticut,* Penn- 
sylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, aye — 5 ; New York, 
New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, 
no — 6. 

Mr. Williamson moved to change the expression into 
these words, to wit, " to receive a compensation for the 
devotion of their time to the public service." The motion 
was seconded by Mr. Ellsworth, and agreed to by all the 
States except South Carolina. It seemed to be meant only 
to get rid of the word " fixed," and leave greater room for 
modifying the provision on this point. 

Mr. Ellsworth moved to strike out, " to be paid out of 
the National Treasury," and insert, "to be paid by their 
respective States." If the Senate was meant to strengthen 
the Government, it ought to have the confidence of the 
States. The States will have an interest in keeping up a 
representation, and will make such provision for supporting 
the members as will ensure their attendance. 

Mr. Madison considered this as a departure from a 
fundamental principle, and subverting the end intended by 
allowing the Senate a duration of six years. They would, 
if this motion should be agreed to, hold their places during 
pleasure; during the pleasure of the State Legislatures. 
One great end of the institution was, that being a firm, 
wise and impartial body, it might not only give stability to 
the General Government, in its operations on individuals, 
but hold an even balance among different States. The 
motion would make the Senate, like Congress, the mere 
agents and advocates of State interests and views, instead 
of being the impartial umpires and guardians of justice 
and the general good. Congress had lately, by the estab- 
lishment of a board with full powers to decide on the mutual 
claims between the United States and the individual States, 
fairly acknowledged themselves to be unfit for discharging 
this part of the business referred to them by the Confeder- 
ation. 

* Quere. Whether Connecticut should not be, no, and Delaware, aye? J. M. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 249 

Mr. Dayton considered the payment of the Senate by 
the States as fatal to their independence. He was decided 
for paying them out of the National Treasury. 

On the question of payment of the Senate to be left to 
the States, as moved by Mr. Ellsworth, it passed in the 
negative, — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, South 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5 ; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no — 6. 

Col. Mason. He did not rise to make any motion, but 
to hint an idea which seemed to be proper for consideration. 
One important object in constituting the Senate was, to 
secure the rights of property. To give them weight and 
firmness for this purpose, a considerable duration in office 
was thought necessary. But a longer term than six years 
would be of no avail in this respect, if needy persons should 
be appointed. He suggested, therefore, the propriety of 
annexing to the office a qualification of property. He 
thought this would be very practicable ; as the rules of tax- 
ation would supply a scale for measuring the degree of 
wealth possessed by every man. 

A question was then taken, whether the words "to be 
paid out of the National Treasury," should stand, — Massa- 
chusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye 
— 5 ; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6. 

Mr. Butler moved to strike out the ineligibility of 
Senators to State offices. 

Mr. Williamson seconded the motion. 

Mr. Wilson remarked the additional dependence this 
would create in the Senators on the States. The longer the* 
time, he observed, allotted to the officer the more complete 
will be the dependence, if it exists at all. 

General Pinckney was for making the States, as much 
as could be conveniently done, a part of the General Gov- 
ernment. If the Senate was to be appointed by the States, 
it ought, in pursuance of the same idea, to be paid by 
the States; and the States ought not to be barred from 



250 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

the opportunity of calling members of it into offices at home. 
Such a restriction would also discourage the ablest men 
from going into the Senate. 

Mr. Williamson moved a Resolution, so penned as to 
admit of the two following questions, — first, whether the 
members of the Senate should be ineligible to, and incapa- 
ble of holding, offices under the United States; secondly, 
whether, &c, under the particular States. 

On the question to postpone, in order to consider Mr. 
Williamson's Resolution, — Connecticut, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8; Massachusetts, New York, 
New Jersey, no — 3. 

Mr. Gerry and Mr. Madison move to add to Mr. William- 
son's first question, " and for one year thereafter." 

On this amendment, — Connecticut, New York, Dela- 
ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
aye — 7 ; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia, 
no — 4. 

On Mr. Williamson's first question as amended, viz., 
"ineligible and incapable &c. for one year &c." — agreed to 
unanimously. 

On the second question as to ineligibility, &c. to State 
offices, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, aye — 3; 
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 8. 

The fifth Resolution, " that each branch have the right 
of originating acts," was agreed to, nem. con. 

Adjourned. 

Wednesday, June 27th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Rutledge moved to postpone the 
sixth Resolution, defining the powers of Congress, in order 
to take up the seventh and eighth, which involved the most 
fundamental points, the rules of suffrage in the two branches; 
which was agreed to, nem. con. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 251 

A question being proposed on the seventh Besolution, 
declaring that the suffrage in the first branch should be 
according to an equitable ratio, — 

Mr. L. Martin contended, at great length, and with 
great eagerness, that the General Government was meant 
merely to preserve the State Governments, not to govern 
individuals. That its powers ought to be kept within 
narrow limits. That if too little power was given to it, 
more might be added; but that if too much, it could never 
be resumed. That individuals, as such, have little to do, 
but with their own States; that the General Government 
has no more to apprehend from the States composing the 
Union, while it pursues proper measures, than a government 
over individuals has to apprehend from its subjects. That 
to resort to the citizens at large for their sanction to a new 
government, will be throwing them back into a state of 
nature; that the dissolution of the State Governments is 
involved in the nature of the process ; that the people have 
no right to do this, without the consent of those to whom 
they have delegated their power for State purposes. 
Through their tongues only they can speak, through their 
ears only can hear. That the States have shewn a good 
disposition to comply with the acts of Congress, weak, 
contemptibly weak, as that body has been; and have failed 
through inability alone to comply. That the heaviness of the 
private debts, and the waste of property during the war, 
were the chief causes of this inability, — that he did not 
conceive the instances mentioned by Mr. Madison, of com- 
pacts between Virginia and Maryland, between Pennsyl- 
vania and New Jersey, or of troops raised by Massachusetts 
for defence against the rebels, to be violations of the Articles 
of Confederation. That an equal vote in each State was 
essential to the Federal idea, and was founded in justice 
and freedom, not merely in policy. That though the States 
may give up this right of sovereignty, yet they had not, 
and ought not. That the States, like individuals, were in a 
state of nature equally sovereign and free. In order to 



252 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

prove that individuals in a state of nature are equally free 
and independent, he read passages from Locke, Vattel, 
Lord Somers, Priestley. To prove that the case is the same 
with states, till they surrender their equal sovereignty, he 
read other passages in Locke and Vattel, and also Ruther- 
ford. That the States, being equal, cannot treat or con- 
federate so as to give up an equality of votes, without 
giving up their liberty. That the propositions on the table 
were a system of slavery for ten States. That as Virginia, 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania have forty-two ninetieths 
of the votes, they can do as they please, without a miraculous 
union of the other ten. That they will have nothing to do 
but to gain over one of the ten, to make them complete 
masters of the rest; that they can then appoint an Execu- 
tive, and Judiciary, and Legislature for them, as they please. 
That there was, and would continue, a national predilection 
and partiality in men for their own States ; that the states, 
particularly the smaller, would never allow a negative to be 
exercised over their laws: that no State, in ratifying the 
Confederation, had objected to the equality of votes; that 
the complaints at present ran not against this equality, but 
the want of power. That sixteen members from Virginia 
would be more likely to act in concert, than a like number 
formed of members from different States. That instead of 
a junction of the small States as a remedy, he thought a 
division of the large States w T ould be more eligible. This 
was the substance of a speech which was continued more 
than three hours. He was too much exhausted, he said, to 
finish his remarks, and reminded the House that he should 
to-morrow resume them. 
Adjourned. 

Thursday, June 28th. 

In Convention, — Mr. L. Martin resumed his discourse, 
contending that the General Government ought to be formed 
for the States, not for individuals; that if the States 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 253 

were to have votes in proportion to their numbers of people, 
it would be the same thing, whether their Kepresentatives 
were chosen by the Legislatures or the people; the smaller 
States would be equally enslaved. That if the large 
States have the same interest with the smaller, 
as was urged, there could be no danger in giving them an 
equal vote; they would not injure themselves, and they 
could not injure the large ones, on that supposition, without 
injuring themselves ; and if the interests were not the same, 
the inequality of suffrage would be dangerous to the smaller 
States. That it will be in vain to propose any plan offen- 
sive to the rulers of the States, whose influence over the 
people will certainly prevent their adopting it. That the 
large States were weak at present in proportion to their 
extent; and could only be made formidable to the small 
ones by the weight of their votes. That in case a dissolu- 
tion of the Union should take place, the small States would 
have nothing to fear from their power; that if, in such a 
case, the three great States should league themselves 
together, the other ten could do so too ; and that he had 
rather see partial confederacies take place, than the plan on 
the table. This was the substance of the residue of his 
discourse, which was delivered with much diffuseness, and 
considerable vehemence. 

Mr. Lansing and Mr. Dayton moved to strike out 
" not," so that the seventh article might read, " that the 
right of suffrage in the first branch ought to be according 
to the rule established by the Confederation." 

Mr. Dayton expressed great anxiety that the question 
might not be put till to -morrow, Governor Livingston 
being kept away by indisposition, and the representation of 
New Jersey thereby suspended. 

Mr. Williamson thought, that, if any political truth 
could be grounded on mathematical demonstration, it was, 
that if the States were equally sovereign now, and parted with 
equal proportions of sovereignty, that they would remain 
equally sovereign. He could not comprehend how the 



254 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

smaller States would be injured in the case, and wished 
some gentleman would vouchsafe a solution of it. He 
observed that the small States, if they had a plurality of 
votes, would have an interest in throwing the burdens off 
their own shoulders on those of the large ones. He begged 
that the expected addition of new States from the westward 
might be taken into view. They would be small States ; 
they would be poor States ; they would be unable to pay in 
proportion to their numbers, their distance from market 
rendering the produce of their labor less valuable; they 
would consequently be tempted to combine for the purpose 
of laying burdens on commerce and consumption which 
would fall with greater weight on the old States. 

Mr. Madison said, he was much disposed to concur in 
any expedient, not inconsistent with fundamental principles, 
that could remove the difficulty concerning the rule of 
representation. But he could neither be convinced that the 
rule contended for was just, nor that it was necessary for 
the safety of the small States against the large States. 
That it was not just, had been conceded by Mr. Brearly 
and Mr. Patterson themselves. The expedient proposed 
by them was a new partition of the territory of the United 
States. The fallacy of the reasoning drawn from the 
equality of sovereign states, in the formation of compacts, 
lay in confounding mere treaties, in which were specified 
certain duties to which the parties were to be bound, and 
certain rules by which their subjects were to be reciprocally 
governed in their intercourse, with a compact by which an 
authority was created paramount to the parties, and making 
laws for the government of them. If France, England and 
Spain were to enter into a treaty for the regulation of com- 
merce, &c, with the Prince of Monacho, and four or five 
other of the smallest sovereigns of Europe, they would not 
hesitate to treat as equals, and to make the regula- 
tions perfectly reciprocal. Would the case be the same, 
if a Council were to be formed of deputies from each, with 
authority and discretion to raise money, levy troops, deter- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 255 

mine the value of coin, etc. ? Would thirty or forty mil- 
lions of people submit their fortunes into the hands of a 
few thousands ? If they did, it would only prove that they 
expected more from the terror of their superior force, than 
they feared from the selfishness of their feeble associates. 
Why are counties of the same States represented in pro- 
portion to their numbers ? Is it because the representatives 
are chosen by the people themselves ? So will be the Rep- 
resentatives in the National Legislature. Is it because the 
larger have more at stake than the smaller? The case will 
be the same with the larger and smaller States. Is it 
because the laws are to operate immediately on their per- 
sons and properties ? The same is the case, in some degree, 
as the Articles of Confederation stand ; the same will be the 
case, in a far greater degree, under the plan proposed to be 
substituted. In the cases of captures, of piracies, and of 
offences in a Federal army, the property and persons of 
individuals depend on the laws of Congress. By the plan 
proposed a complete power of taxation, the highest prerog- 
ative of supremacy, is proposed to be vested in the National 
Government. Many other powers are added which assimi- 
late it to the government of individual States. The negative 
proposed on the State laws will make it an essential branch 
of the State Legislatures, and of course will require that it 
should be exercised by a body, established on like princi- 
ples with the branches of those Legislatures. That it is 
not necessary to secure the small States against the large 
ones, he conceived to be equally obvious. Was a combina- 
tion of the large ones dreaded? This must arise either 
from some interest common to Virginia, Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania, and distinguishing them from the other 
States; or from the mere circumstance of similarity of size. 
Did any such common interest exist? In point of situa- 
tion, they could not have been more effectually separated 
from each other, by the most jealous citizen of the most 
jealous States. In point of manners, religion, and the 
other circumstances which sometimes beget affection 



256 DEBATES IN THtt 1787. 

between different communities, they were not more assimi- 
lated than the other States. In point of the staple produc- 
tions, they were as dissimilar as any three other States in 
the Union. The staple of Massachusetts was fish, of 
Pennsylvania flour, of Virginia tobacco. Was a combina- 
tion to be apprehended from the mere circumstance of 
equality of size? Experience suggested no such danger. 
The Journals of Congress did not present any peculiar 
association of these States in the votes recorded. It had 
never been seen that different counties in the same State, 
conformable in extent, but disagreeing in other circum- 
stances, betrayed a propensity to such combinations. 
Experience rather taught a contrary lesson. Among indi- 
viduals of superior eminence and weight in society, rival- 
ships were much more frequent than coalitions. Among 
independent nations, pre-eminent over their neighbours, the 
same remark was verified. Carthage and Rome tore one 
another to pieces, instead of uniting their forces to devour the 
weaker nations of the earth. The Houses of Austria and 
France were hostile as long as they remained the greatest 
powers of Europe. England and France have succeeded to 
the pre-eminence and to the enmity. To this principle we 
owe perhaps our liberty. A coalition between those powers 
would have been fatal to us. Among the principal mem- 
bers of the ancient and modern confederacies, we find 
the same effect from the same cause. The contentions, not 
the coalitions, of Sparta, Athens, and Thebes, proved fatal 
to the smaller members of the Amphictyonic confederacy. 
The contentions, not the combinations, of Russia and Aus- 
tria, have distracted and oppressed the Germau Empire. 
Were the large States formidable, singly, to their smaller 
neighbours? On this supposition, the latter ought to wish 
for such a General Government as will operate with equal 
energy on the former as on themselves. . The more lax the 
band, the more liberty the larger will have to avail them- 
selves of their superior force. Here again, experience was 
an instructive monitor. What is the situation of the weak 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION 257 

compared with the strong, in those stages of civilization in 
which the violence of individuals is least controlled by an 
efficient government ? The heroic period of ancient Greece, 
the feudal licentiousness of the middle ages of Europe, the 
existing condition of the American savages, answer this 
question. What is the situation of the minor sovereigns 
in the great society of independent nations, in which the more 
powerful are under no control, but the nominal authority of 
the law of nations? Is not the danger to the former ex- 
actly in proportion to their weakness? But there are cases 
still more in point. What was the condition of the weaker 
members of the Amphictyonic confederacy? Plutarch (see 
Life of Themistocles) will inform us, that it happened but 
too often, that the strongest cities corrupted and awed the 
weaker, and that judgment went in favor of the more pow- 
erful party. What is the condition of the lesser States in 
the German confederacy ? We all know that they are ex- 
ceedingly trampled upon, and that they owe their safety, as 
far as they enjoy it, partly to their enlisting themselves 
under the rival banners of the pre-eminent members, partly 
to alliances with neighbouring princes, which the constitu- 
tion of the Empire does not prohibit. What is the state of 
things in the lax system of the Dutch confederacy? Hol- 
land contains about half the people, supplies about half the 
money, and by her influence silently and indirectly governs 
the whole republic. In a word, the two extremes before 
us are, a perfect separation, and a perfect incorporation of 
the thirteen States. In the first case, they would be inde- 
pendent nations, subject to no law but the law of nations. 
In the last they would be mere counties of one entire re- 
public, subject to one common law. In the first case, the 
smaller States would have every thing to fear from the 
larger. In the last they would have nothing to fear. The 
true policy of the small States, therefore, lies in promoting 
those principles, and that form of government, which will 
most approximate the States to the condition of counties. 
Another consideration may be added. If the General Gov- 



258 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ernment be feeble, the larger States, distrusting its contin- 
uance, and foreseeing that their importance and security 
may depend on their own size and strength, will never sub- 
mit to a partition. Give to the General Government suffi- 
cient energy and permanency, and you remove the objection. 
Gradual partitions of the large, and junctions of the small 
States, will be facilitated, and time may effect that equaliza- 
tion which is wished for by the small States now, but can 
never be accomplished at once. 

Mr. Wilson. The leading argument of those who con- 
tend for equality of votes among the States is, that the 
States, as such, being equal, and being represented, not as 
districts of individuals, but in their political and corporate 
capacities, are entitled to an equality of suffrage. Accord- 
ing to this mode of reasoning, the representation of the bor- 
oughs in England, which has been allowed on all hands to 
be the rotten part of the Constitution, is perfectly right and 
proper. They are, like the States, represented in their 
corporate capacity; like the States, therefore, they are en- 
titled to equal voices — Old Sarum to as many as London. 
And instead of the injury supposed hitherto to be done to 
London, the true ground of complaint lies with Old Sarum ; 
for London instead of two, which is her proper share, sends 
four representatives to Parliament. 

Mr. Sherman. The question is, not what rights natur- 
ally belong to man, but how they may be most equally and 
effectually guarded in society. And if some give up more 
than others, in order to obtain this end, there can be no 
room for complaint. To do otherwise, to require an equal 
concession from all, if it would create danger to the rights 
of some, would be sacrificing the end to the means. The 
rich man who enters into society along with the poor man 
gives up more than the poor man, yet with an equal vote he 
is equally safe. Were he to have more votes than the poor 
man, in proportion to his superior stake, the rights of the 
poor man would immediately cease to be secure. This con- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 259 

sideration prevailed when the Articles of Confederation were 
formed. 

The determination of the question, for striking out the 
word " not," was put off till to-morrow, at the request of the 
Deputies from New York. 

Doctor Fkanklin. Mr. President, The small progress 
we have made after four or five weeks close attendance and 
continual reasonings with each other — our different senti- 
ments on almost every question, several of the last produ- 
cing as many noes as ayes — is, methinks, a melancholy 
proof of the imperfection of the human understanding. We 
indeed seem to feel our own want of political wisdom, since I 
we have been running about in search of it. We have gone 
back to ancient history for models of government, and ex- 
amined the different forms of those republics which, having 
been formed with seeds of their own dissolution, now no 
longer exist. And we have viewed modern states all round 
Europe, but find none of their constitutions suitable to our 
circumstances. 

In this situation of this Assembly, groping as it were in 
the dark to find political truth, and scarce able to distin- 
guish it when presented to us, how has it happened, Sir, 
that we have not hitherto once thought of humbly applying 
to the Father of lights, to illuminate our understandings ? 
In the beginning of the contest with Great Britain, when 
we were sensible of danger, we had daily prayer in this 
room for the divine protection. Our prayers, Sir, were 
heard, and they were graciously answered. All of us who 
were engaged in the struggle must have observed frequent 
instances of a superintending Providence in our favor. To 
that kind Providence we owe this happy opportunity of 
consulting in peace on the means of establishing our future 
national felicity. And have we now forgotten that power- 
ful friend? Or do we imagine that we no longer need his 
assistance? I have lived, Sir, a long time, and the longer 
I live, the more convincing proofs I see of this truth — 
that God governs in the affairs of men. And if a sparrow 



260 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

cannot fall to the ground without his notice, is it probable 
that an empire can rise without his aid? We have been 
assured, Sir, in the sacred writings, that " except the Lord 
build the house they labor in vain that build it." I firmly 
believe this: and I also believe that without his concurring 
aid we shall succeed in this political building no better than 
the builders of Babel. We shall be divided by our little 
partial local interests; our projects will be confounded; and 
we ourselves shall become a reproach and by-word down to 
future ages. And what is worse, mankind may hereafter, 
from this unfortunate instance, despair of establishing gov- 
ernments by human wisdom, and leave it to chance, war and 
conquest. 

I therefore beg leave to move — that henceforth prayers 
imploring the assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on 
our deliberations, be held in this Assembly every morning 
before we proceed to business, and that one or more of the 
clergy of this city be requested to officiate in that service. 

Mr. Sherman seconded the motion. 

Mr. Hamilton and several others expressed their appre- 
hensions, that, however proper such a resolution might 
have been at the beginning of the Convention, it might at 
this late day, in the first place, bring on it some disagree- 
able animadversions; and in the second, lead the public to 
believe that the embarrassments and dissensions within the 
Convention had suggested this measure. It was answered, 
by Doctor Franklin, Mr. Sherman, and others, that the 
past omission of a duty could not justify a further omission ; 
that the rejection of such a proposition would expose the 
Convention to more unpleasant animadversions than the 
adoption of it; and that the alarm out of doors that might 
be excited for the state of things within would at least be 
as likely to do good as ill. 

Mr. Williamson observed, that the true cause of the 
omission could not be mistaken. The Convention had no 
funds. 

Mr. Randolph proposed, in order to give a favorable 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 261 

aspect to the measure, that a sermon be preached at the re- 
quest of the Convention on the Fourth of July, the anni- 
versary of Independence; and thenceforward prayers, &c, 
to he read in the Convention every morning. Doctor 
Fkanklin seconded this motion. After several unsuccessful 
attempts for silently postponing this matter by adjourning, 
the adjournment was at length carried, without any vote on 
the motion. 



Friday, June 29th. 

In Convention. — Doctor Johnson. The controversy 
must be endless whilst gentlemen differ in the grounds of 
their arguments; those on one side considering the States 
as districts of people composing one political society: those 
on the other, considering them as so many political soci- 
eties. The fact is, that the States do exist as political 
societies, and a government is to be formed for them in 
their political capacity, as well as for the individuals com- 
posing them. Does it not seem to follow, that if the 
States, as such, are to exist, they must be armed with some 
power of self-defence ? This is the idea of Colonel Mason, 
who appears to have looked to the bottom of this matter. Be- 
sides the aristocratic and other interests, which ought to 
have the means of defending themselves, the States have 
their interests as such, and are equally entitled to like 
means. On the whole he thought, that, as in some re- 
spects the States are to be considered in their political 
capacity, and in others as districts of individual citizens, 
the two ideas embraced on different sides, instead of being 
opposed to each other, ought to be combined; that in one 
branch the people ought to be represented, in the other the 
States. 

Mr. Gorham. The States, as now confederated, have 
no doubt a right to refuse to be consolidated, or to be 
formed into any new system. But he wished the small 
States, which seemed most ready to object, to consider 



262 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

which are to give up most, they or the larger ones. He 
conceived that a rupture of the Union would be an event 
unhappy for all ; but surely the large States would be least 
unable to take care of themselves, and to make connections 
with one another. The weak, therefore, were most inter- 
ested in establishing some general system for maintaining 
order. If, among individuals composed partly of weak, and 
partly of strong, the former most need the protection of 
law and government, the case is exactly the same with weak 
and powerful States. What would be the situation of 
Delaware, (for these things he found must be spoken out, 
and it might as well be done at first as last), what would 
be the situation of Delaware in case of a separation of the 
States? Would she not be at the mercy of Pennsylvania? 
Would not her true interest lie in being consolidated with 
her: and ought she not now to wish for such a union with 
Pennsylvania, under one Government, as will put it out of 
the power of Pennsylvania to oppress her ? Nothing can 
be more ideal than the danger apprehended by the States 
from their being formed into one nation. Massachusetts 
was originally three colonies, viz. ; old Massachusetts, Ply- 
mouth, and the Province of Maine. These apprehensions 
existed then. An incorporation took place ; all parties were 
safe and satisfied; and every distinction is now forgotten. 
The case was similar with Connecticut and New Haven 
The dread of union was reciprocal ; the consequence of it 
equally salutary and satisfactory. In like manner, New- 
Jersey has been made one society out of two parts. Should 
a separation of the States take place, the fate of New Jer- 
sey would be worst of all. She has no foreign commerce, 
and can have but little. Pennsylvania and New York will 
continue to levy taxes on her consumption. If she consults 
her interest, she would beg of all things to be annihilated. 
The apprehensions of the small States ought to be appeased 
by another reflection. Massachusetts will be divided. The 
Province of Maine is already considered as approaching the 
term of its annexation to it: and Pennsylvania will probably 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 263 

not increase, considering the present state of her popula- 
tion, and other events that may happen. On the whole, he 
considered a union of the States as necessary to their hap- 
piness, and a firm General Government as necessary to their 
union. He should consider it his duty, if his colleagues 
viewed the matter in the same light he did, to stay here as 
long as any other State would remain with them, in order 
to agree on some plan that could, with propriety, be recom- 
mended to the people. 

Mr. Ellsworth did not despair. He still trusted that 
some good plan of government would be devised and 
adopted. 

Mr. Read. He should have no objection to the system 
if it were truly national, but it has too much of a federal 
mixture in it. The little States, he thought, had not much 
to fear. He suspected that the large States felt their want 
of energy, and wished for a General Government to supply 
the defect. Massachusetts was evidently laboring under 
her weakness, and he believed Delaware would not be in 
much danger if in her neighbourhood. Delaware had en- 
joyed tranquillity, and he flattered himself would continue 
to do so. He was not, however, so selfish as not to wish 
for a good General Government. In order to obtain one, 
the whole States must be incorporated. If the States re- 
main, the representatives of the large ones will stick to- 
gether, and carry every thing before them. The Executive, 
also, will be chosen under the influence of this partiality, 
and will betray it in his administration. These jealousies 
are inseparable from the scheme of leaving the States in 
existence. They must be done away. The ungranted lands, 
also, which have been assumed by particular States, must 
be given up. He repeated his approbation of the plan of 
Mr. Hamilton, and wished it to be substituted for that on 
the table. 

Mr. Madison agreed with Doctor Johnson, that the 
mixed nature of the Government ought to be kept in view; 
but thought too much stress was laid on the rank of the 



264 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

States as political societies. There was a gradation, lie 
observed, from the smallest corporation, with the most 
limited powers, to the largest empire, with the most perfect 
sovereignty. He pointed out the limitations on the sover- 
eignty of the States, as now confederated. Their laws, in 
relation to the paramount law of the Confederacy, were 
analagous to that of bye-laws to the supreme law within a 
State. Under the proposed Government the powers of the 
States will be much farther reduced. According to the 
views of every member, the General Government will have 
powers far beyond those exercised by the British Parlia- 
ment when the States were part of the British Empire. It 
will, in particular, have the power, without the consent of 
the State Legislatures, to levy money directly from the 
people themselves; and therefore, not to divest such unequal 
portions of the people as composed the several States of an 
equal voice, would subject the system to the reproaches and 
evils which have resulted from the vicious representation 
in Great Britain. 

He entreated the gentlemen representing the small 
States to renounce a principle which was confessedly unjust ; 
which could never be admitted; and which, if admitted, 
must infuse mortality into a Constitution which we wished 
to last forever. He prayed them to ponder well the con- 
sequences of suffering the Confederacy to go to pieces. It 
had been said that the want of energy in the large States 
would be a security to the small. It was forgotten that 
this want of energy proceeded from the supposed security 
of the States against all external danger. Let each State 
depend on itself for its security, and let apprehensions arise 
of danger from distant powers or from neighbouring 
States, and the languishing condition of all the States, 
large as well as small, would soon be transformed into vig- 
orous and high-toned Governments. His great fear was, 
that their Governments would then have too much energy ; 
that this might not only be formidable in the large to the 
small States, but fatal to the internal liberty of all. The 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 265 

same causes which have rendered the old world the theatre 
of incessant wars, and have banished liberty from the face 
of it, would soon produce the same effects here. The weak- 
ness and jealousy of the small States would quickly intro- 
duce some regular military force, against sudden danger 
from their powerful neighbours. The example would be 
followed by others, and would soon become universal. In 
time of actual war, great discretionary powers are con- 
stantly given to the Executive magistrate. Constant appre- 
hension of war has the same tendency to render the head 
too large for the body. A standing military force, with 
an overgrown Executive, will not long be safe companions 
to liberty. The means of defence against foreign danger 
have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. 
Among the Eomans it was a standing maxim, to excite a 
war whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all 
Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, 
have enslaved, the people. It is, perhaps, questionable, 
whether the best concerted system of absolute power in 
Europe, could maintain itself, in a situation where no alarms 
of externa] danger could tame the people to the domestic 
yoke. The insular situation of Great Britain was the prin- 
cipal cause of her being an exception to the general fate of 
Europe. It has rendered less defence necessary, and ad- 
mitted a kind of defence, which could not be used for the 
purpose of oppression. These consequences, he conceived, 
ought to be apprehended, whether the States should run 
into a total separation from each other, or should enter into 
partial confederacies. Either event would be truly deplor- 
able; and those who might be accessory to either, could 
never be forgiven by their country , nor by themselves. 

*Mr. Hamilton observed, that individuals forming 
political societies modify their rights differently, with 
regard to suffrage. Examples of it are found in all the 
States. In all of them, some individuals are deprived of 
the right altogether, not having the requisite qualification 

* From this date he was absent till the 13th of August. 



266 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

of property. In some of the States, the right of suffrage is 
allowed in some cases, and refused in others. To vote for 
a member in one branch, a certain quantum of property; to 
vote for a member in another branch of the Legislature, a 
higher quantum of property, is required. In like manner, 
States may modify their right of suffrage differently, the 
larger exercising a larger, the smaller a smaller, share of it. 
But as States are a collection of individual men, which 
ought we to respect most, the rights of the people compos- 
ing them, or of the artificial beings resulting from the com- 
position? Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd 
than to sacrifice the former to the latter. It has been said, 
that if the smaller States renounce their equality, they re- 
nounce at the same time their liberty. The truth is, it is a 
contest for power, not for liberty. Will the men composing 
the small States be less free than those composing the 
larger? The State of Delaware having forty thousand 
souls will lose power, if she has one-tenth only of the votes 
allowed to Pennsylvania having four hundred thousand; but 
will the people of Delaware be less free, if each citizen has 
an equal vote with each citizen of Pennsylvania? He ad- 
mitted that common residence within the same State would 
produce a certain degree of attachment; and that this prin- 
ciple might have a certain influence on public affairs. He 
thought, however, that this might, by some precautions, be 
in a great measure excluded; and that no material inconve- 
nience could result from it ; as there could not be any ground 
for combination among the States whose influence was most 
dreaded. The only considerable distinction of interests lay 
between the carrying and non-carrying States, which di- 
vides, instead of uniting, the largest States. No consider- 
able inconvenience had been found from the division of 
the State of New York into different districts of different 
sizes. 

Some of the consequences of a dissolution of the Union, 
and the establishment of partial confederacies, had been 
pointed out. He would add another of a most serious 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 267 

nature. Alliances will immediately be formed with differ- 
ent rival and hostile nations of Europe, who will foment >/ 
disturbances among ourselves, and make us parties to all 
their own quarrels. Foreign nations having American do- 
minion are, and must be, jealous of us. Their representa- 
tives betray the utmost anxiety for our fate, and for the re- 
sult of this meeting, which must have an essential influence 
on it. It had been said, that respectability in the eyes of 
foreign nations was not the object at which we aimed; 
that the proper object of republican government was 
domestic tranquillity and happiness. This was an ideal 
distinction. No government could give us tranquillity 
and happiness at home, which did not possess sufficient 
stability and strength to make us respectable abroad. This 
was the critical moment for forming such a government. 
We should run every risk in trusting to future amend- 
ments. As yet we retain the habits of union. We are 
weak, and sensible of our weakness. Henceforward, the 
motives will become feebler, and the difficulties greater. It 
is a miracle that we are now here, exercising our tranquil 
and free deliberations on the subject. It would be madness 
to trust to future miracles. A thousand causes must ob- 
struct a reproduction of them. 

Mr. Pierce considered the equality of votes under the 
Confederation as the great source of the public difficulties. 
The members of Congress were advocates for local advan- 
tages. State distinctions must be sacrificed, as far as the 
general good required, but without destroying the States. 
Though from a small State, he felt himself a citizen of the 
United States. 

Mr. Gerry urged, that we never were independent 
States, were not such now, and never could be, even on the 
principles of the Confederation. The States, and the advo- 
cates for them, were intoxicated with the idea of their 
sovereignty. He was a member of Congress at the time the 
Federal Articles were formed. The injustice of allowing 
each State an equal vote was long insisted on. He voted 



268 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

for it, but it was against his judgment, and under the 
pressure of public danger, and the obstinacy of the lesser 
States. The present Confederation he considered as dis- 
solving. The fate of the Union will be decided by the 
Convention. If they do not agree on something, few dele- 
gates will probably be appointed to Congress. If they do, 
Congress will probably be kept up till the new system 
should be adopted. He lamented that, instead of coming 
here like a band of brothers, belonging to the same family, 
we seem to have brought with us the spirit of political 
negotiators. 

Mr. L. Martin remarked, that the language, of the 
States being sovereign and independent, was once familiar 
and understood; though it seemed now so strange and 
obscure. He read those passages in the Articles of Con- 
federation which describe them in that language. 

On the question, as moved by Mr Lansing, shall the 
word "not" be struck out? — Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Delaware, aye — 4; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6 ; 
Maryland, divided. 

On the motion to agree to the clause as reported, " that 
the rule of suffrage in the first branch ought not to be 
according to that established by the Articles of the Con- 
federation," — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6; Connecticut, 
New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no — 4; Maryland, 
divided. 

Doctor Johnson and Mr. Ellsworth moved to postpone 
the residue of the clause, and take up the eighth Resolution. 

On the question, — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9; Massachusetts, Delaware, no 
— 2. 

Mr. Ellsworth moved, " that the rule of suffrage in 
the second branch be the same with that established by the 
Articles of Confederation." He was not sorry on the whole, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 269 

he said, that the vote just passed had determined against 
this rule in the first branch. He hoped it would become a 
ground of compromise with regard to the second branch. 
We were partly national, partly federal. The proportional 
representation in the first branch was conformable to the 
national principle, and would secure the large States against 
the small. An equality of voices was conformable to the 
federal principle, and was necessary to secure the small 
States against the large. He trusted that on this middle 
ground a compromise would take place. He did not see 
that it could on any other, and if no compromise should take 
place, our meeting would not only be in vain, but worse 
than in vain. To the eastward, he was sure Massachusetts 
was the only State that would listen to a proposition for 
excluding the States, as equal political societies, from an 
equal voice in both branches. The others would risk every 
consequence rather than part with so dear a right. An 
attempt to deprive them of it was at once cutting the body 
of America in two, and, as he supposed would be the case, 
somewhere about this part of it. The large States he con- 
ceived would, notwithstanding the equality of votes, have 
an influence that would maintain their superiority. Holland, 
as had been admitted (by-Mr. Madison), had, notwithstand- 
ing a like equality in the Dutch confederacy, a prevailing 
influence in the public measures. The power of self-defence 
was essential to the small States. Nature had given it to 
the smallest insect of the creation. He could never admit 
that there was no danger of combinations among the large 
States. They will like individuals find out and avail them- 
selves of the advantage to be gained by it. It was true the 
danger would be greater if they were contiguous, and had 
a more immediate and common interest. A defensive com- 
bination of the small States was rendered more difficult by 
their greater number. He would mention another consider- 
ation of great weight. The existing Confederation was 
founded on the equality of the States in the article of 
suffrage, — was it meant to pay no regard to this antecedent 



270 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

plighted faith. Let a strong Executive, a Judiciary, and 
Legislative power, be created, but let not too much be 
attempted, by which all may be lost. He was not in general 
a half-way man, yet he preferred doing half the good we 
could, rather than do nothing at all. The other half may 
be added when the necessity shall be more fully experienced. 

Mr. Baldwin could have wished that the powers of the 
general Legislature had been defined, before the mode of 
constituting it had been agitated. He should vote against 
the motion of Mr. Ellsworth, though he did not like the 
Resolution as it stood m the Report of the Committee of 
the Whole. He thought the second branch ought to be 
the representation of property, and that, in forming it, 
therefore, some reference ought to be had to the relative 
wealth of their constituents, and to the principles on which 
the Senate of Massachusetts was constituted. He concurred 
with those who thought it would be impossible for the 
General Legislature to extend its cares to the local matters 
of the States. 

Adjourned. 

Saturday, June 30th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Brearly moved that the President 
write to the Executive of New Hampshire, informing it 
that the business depending before the Convention was of 
such a nature as to require the immediate attendance of the 
Deputies of that State. In support of his motion, he ob- 
served that the difficulties of the subject, and the diversity 
of opinions called for all the assistance we could possibly 
obtain. (It was well understood that the object was to 
add New Hampshire to the number of States opposed to 
the doctrine of proportional representation, which it was 
presumed, from her relative size, she must be adverse to). 

Mr. Patterson seconded the motion. 

Mr. Rutledge could see neither the necessity nor pro- 
priety of such a measure. They are not unapprized of the 



1^8^.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 271 

meeting, and can attend if they choose. Ehode Island 
might as well be urged to appoint and send deputies. Are 
we to suspend the business until the Deputies arrive ? If 
we proceed, he hoped all the great points would be adjusted 
before the letter could produce its effect. 

Mr. King said he had written more than once as a 
private correspondent, and the answer gave him every 
reason to expect that State would be represented very 
shortly, if it should be so at all. Circumstances of a per- 
sonal nature had hitherto prevented it. A letter could 
have no effect. 

Mr. Wilson wished to know, whether it would be con- 
sistent with the rule or reason of secrecy, to communicate 
to New Hampshire that the business was of such a nature 
as the motion described. It would spread a great alarm. 
Besides, he doubted the propriety of soliciting any State 
on the subject, the meeting being merely voluntary. 

On motion of Mr. Brearly, 

New York, New Jersey, aye — 2 ; Massachusetts, Con- 
necticut, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no — 5 ; 
Maryland, divided ; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Georgia, not 
on the floor. 

The motion of Mr. Ellsworth being resumed, for 
allowing each State an equal vote in the second branch, — 

Mr. Wilson did not expect such a motion after the 
establishment of the contrary principle in the first branch ; 
and considering the reasons which would oppose it, even if 
an equal vote had been allowed in the first branch. The 
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Ellsworth) had pro- 
nounced, that if the motion should not be acceded to, of all 
the States north of Pennsylvania one only would agree to 
any General Government. He entertained more favourable 
hopes of Connecticut and of the other Northern States. 
He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause, and that they 
would not abandon a country to which they were bound by 
so many strong and endearing ties. But should the de- 
plored event happen, it would neither stagger his sentiments 



272 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

nor his duty. If the minority of the people of America 
refuse to coalesce with the majority on just and proper 
principles ; if a separation must take place, it could never 
happen on better grounds. The votes of yesterday against 
the just principle of representation, were as twenty-two to 
ninety, of the people of America. Taking the opinions to 
be the same on this point, and he was sure, if there was any 
room for change, it could not be on the side of the majority, 
the question will be, shall less than one-fourth of the United 
States withdraw themselves from the Union, or shall more 
than three-fourths renounce the inherent, indisputable and 
unalienable rights of men, in favor of the artificial system 
of States ? If issue must be joined, it was on this point he 
would choose to join it. The gentleman from Connecticut, 
in supposing that the preponderance secured to the majority 
in the first branch had removed the objections to an 
equality of votes in the second branch for the security 
of the minority, narrowed the case extremely. Such an 
equality will enable the minority to control, in all cases 
whatsoever, the sentiments and interests of the majority. 
Seven States will control six : seven States, according to 
the estimates that had been used, composed twenty-four 
ninetieths of the whole people. It would be in the power, 
then, of less than one-third to overrule two-thirds, whenever 
a question should happen to divide the States in that man. 
ner. Can we forget for whom we are forming a Govern- 
ment ? Is it ior men, or for the imaginary beings called 
States ? Will our honest constituents be satisfied with 
metaphysical distinctions ? Will they, ought they to, be 
satisfied with being told, that the one-third compose the 
greater number of States ? The rule of suffrage ought on 
every principle to be the same in the second as in the first 
branch. If the Government be not laid on this foundation, 
it can be neither solid nor lasting. Any other principle 
will be local, confined and temporary. This will expand 
with the expansion, aud grow with the growth of the United 
States. Much has been said of an imaginary combination 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 273 

of three States. Sometimes a danger of monarchy, some- 
times of aristocracy, has been charged on it. No explana- 
tion, however, of the danger has been vouchsafed. It would 
be easy to prove, both from reason and history, that rival - 
ships would be more probable than coalitions ; and that 
there are no coinciding interests that could produce the 
latter. No answer has yet been given to the observations 
of Mr. Madison on this subject. Should the Executive 
magistrate be taken from one of the large States, Would not 
the other two be thereby thrown into the scale with the 
other States ? Whence, then, the danger of monarchy ? 
Are the people of the three large States more aristocratic 
than those of the small ones ? Whence, then, the danger 
of aristocracy from their influence ? It is all a mere 
illusion of names. We talk of States, till we forget what 
they are composed of. Is a real and fair majority the 
natural hot-bed of aristocracy? It is a part of the defini- 
tion of this species of government, or rather of tyranny, 
that the smaller number governs the greater. It is true 
that a majority of States in the second branch cannot carry 
a law against a majority of the people in the first. But 
this removes half only of the objection. Bad governments 
are of two sorts, — first, that which does too little ; secondly, 
that which does too much; that which fails through weak- 
ness, and that which destroys through oppression. Under 
which of these evils do the United States at present groan? 
Under the weakness and inefficiency of its government. To 
remedy this weakness we have been sent to this Con- 
vention. If the motion should be agreed to, we shall leave 
the United States fettered precisely as heretofore; with 
the additional mortification of seeing the good purposes of 
the fair representation of the people in the first branch, 
defeated in the second. Twenty-four will still control 
sixty-six. He lamented that such a disagreement should 
prevail on the point of representation ; as he did not foresee 
that it would happen on the other point most contested, 

the boundary between the general and the local authorities. 
18 



274 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

He thought the States necessary and valuable parts of a 
good system. 

Mr. Ellswokth. The capital objection of Mr. Wilson. 
"that the minority will rule the majority," is not true. 
The power is given to the few to save them from being de- 
stroyed by the many. If an equality of votes had been given 
to them in both branches, the objection might have had 
weight. Is it a novel thing that the few should have a 
check on the many ? Is it not the case in the British Con- 
stitution, the wisdom of which so many gentlemen have 
united in applauding? Have not the House of Lords, who 
form so small a proportion of the nation, a negative on the 
laws, as a necessary defence of their peculiar rights against 
the encroachments of the Commons ? No instance of a 
confederacy has existed in which an equality of voices has 
not been exercised by the members of it. We are running 
from one extreme to another. We are razing the foun- 
dations of the building, when we need only repair the roof. 
No salutary measure has been lost for want of a majority 
of the States to favor it. If security be all that the great 
States wish for, the first branch secures them. The danger 
of combinations among them is not imaginary. Although 
no particular abuses could be foreseen by him, the possibil- 
ity of them would be sufficient to alarm him. But he could 
easily conceive cases in which they might result from such 
combinations. Suppose, that, in pursuance of some com- 
mercial treaty or arrangement, three or four free ports and 
no more were to be established, would not combinations be 
formed in favor of Boston, Philadelphia, and some port of 
the Chesapeake? A like concert might be formed in the 
appointment of the great offices. He appealed again to the 
obligations of the Federal compact, which was still in force, 
and which had been entered into with so much solemnity ; 
persuading himself that some regard would still be paid to 
the plighted faith under which each State, small as well as 
great, held an equal right of suffrage in the general coun- 
cils. His remarks were not the result of partial or local 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 275 

views. The State he represented (Connecticut) held a mid- 
dle rank. 

Mr. Madison did justice to the able and close reasoning 
of Mr. Ellsworth, but must observe that it did not always 
accord with itself. On another occasion, the large States 
were described by him as the aristocratic States, ready to 
oppress the small. Now the small are the House of Lords, 
requiring a negative to defend them against the more nu- 
merous Commons. Mr. Ellsworth had also erred in say- 
ing that no instance had existed in which confederated 
states had not retained to themselves a perfect equality of 
suffrage. Passing over the German system, in which the 
King of Prussia has nine voices, he reminded Mr. Ells- 
worth of the Lycian confederacy, in which the component 
members had votes proportioned to their importance, and 
which Montesquieu recommends as the fittest model for 
that form of government. Had the fact been as stated by 
Mr. Ellsworth, it would have been of little avail to him, or 
rather would have strengthened the arguments against him ; 
the history and fate of the several confederacies, modern as 
well as ancient, demonstrating some radical vice in their 
structure. In reply to the appeal of Mr. Ellsworth to the 
faith plighted in the existing federal compact, he remarked, 
that the party claiming from others an adherence to a com- 
mon engagement, ought at least to be guiltless itself of a 
violation. Of all the States, however, Connecticut was per- 
haps least able to urge this plea. Besides the various 
omissions to perform the stipulated acts, from which no 
State was free, the Legislature of that State had, by a pretty 
recent vote, positively refused to pass a law for complying 
with the requisitions of Congress, and had transmitted a 
copy of the vote to Congress. It was urged, he said, con- 
tinually, that an equality of votes in the second branch was 
not only necessary to secure the small, but would be per- 
fectly safe to the large ones; whose majority in the first 
branch was an effectual bulwark. But notwithstanding this 
apparent defence, the majority of States might still injure 



276 DEBATES IN THE [1.787. 

the majority of the people. In the first place, they could 
obstruct the wishes and interests of the majority. Secondly, 
they could extort measures repugnant to the wishes and 
interest of the majority. Thirdly, they could impose mea- 
sures adverse thereto; as the second branch will probably 
exercise some great powers, in which the first will not par- 
ticipate. He admitted that every peculiar interest, whether 
in any class of citizens, or any description of States, ought 
to be secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger 
of attack, there ought to be given a constitutional power of 
defence. But he contended that the States were divided 
into different interests, not by their difference of size, but 
other circumstances; the most material of which resulted 
partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their 
having or not having slaves. These two causes concurred 
in forming the great division of interests in the United 
States. It did not lie between the large and small States. 
It lay between the Northern and Southern; and if any de- 
fensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given 
to these two interests. He was so strongly impressed with 
this important truth, that he had been casting about in his 
mind for some expedient that would answer the purpose. 
The one which had occurred was, that, instead of propor- 
tioning the votes of the States in both branches, to their 
respective numbers of inhabitants, computing the slaves in 
the ratio of five to three, they should be represented in one 
branch according to the number of free inhabitants only ; 
and in the other according to the whole number, counting 
the slaves as free. By this arrangement the Southern 
scale would have the advantage in one House, and the 
Northern in the other. He had been restrained from pro- 
posing this expedient by two considerations ; one was his 
unwillingness to urge any diversity of interests on an occa- 
sion where it is but too apt to arise of itself; the other was 
the inequality of powers that must be vested in the two 
branches, and which would destroy the equilibrium of 
interests. 



1^87.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 277 

Mr. Ellsworth assured the House, that, whatever might 
be thought of the Representatives of Connecticut, the 
State was entirely Federal in her disposition. He appealed 
to her great exertions during the war, in supplying both 
men and money. The muster - rolls would show she had 
more troops in the field than Virginia. If she had been 
delinquent, it had been from inability, and not more so 
than other States. 

Mr. Sherman. Mr. Madison animadverted on the 
delinquency of the States, when his object required him to 
prove that the constitution of Congress was faulty. Con- 
gress is not to blame for the faults of the States. Their 
measures have been right, and the only thing wanting has 
been a further power in Congress to render them effectual. 

Mr. Davie was much embarrassed, and wished for 
explanations. The Report of the Committee, allowing the 
Legislatures to choose the Senate, and establishing a pro- 
portional representation in it, seemed to be impracticable. 
There will, according to this rule, be ninety members in the 
outset, and the number will increase as new States are added. 
It was impossible that so numerous a body could possess 
the activity and other qualities required in it. Were he to 
vote on the comparative merits of the Report, as it stood, 
and the amendment, he should be constrained to prefer the 
latter. The appointment of the Senate by electors, chosen 
by the people for that purpose, was, he conceived, liable to 
an insuperable difficulty. The larger counties or districts, 
thrown into a general district, would certainly prevail over 
the smaller counties or districts, and merit in the latter 
would be excluded altogether. The report, therefore, seemed 
to be right in referring the appointment to the Legislatures^ 
whose agency in the general system did not appear to him 
objectionable, as it did to some others. The fact was, that 
the local prejudices and interests which could not be denied 
to exist, would find their way into the national councils, 
whether the Representatives should be chosen by the Legis- 
latures, or by the people themselves. On the other hand, 



278 DEBATES IN THE [1T8T. 

if a proportional representation was attended with insuper- 
able difficulties, the making the Senate the representative of 
the States looked like bringing us back to Congress again, 
and shutting out all the advantages expected from it. 
Under this view of the subject, he could not vote for any 
plan for the Senate yet proposed. He thought that, in 
general, there were extremes on both sides. AVe were 
.partly federal, partly national, in our union ; and he did not 
see why the Government might not in some respects ope- 
rate on the States, in others on the people. 

Mr. Wilson admitted the question concerning the num- 
ber of Senators to be embarrassing. If the smallest States 
be allowed one, and the others in proportion, the Senate will 
certainly be too numerous. He looked forward to the time 
when the smallest States will contain a hundred thousand 
souls at least. Let there be then one Senator in each, for 
every hundred thousand souls, and let the States not having 
that number of inhabitants be allowed one. He was will- 
ing himself to submit to this temporary concession to the 
small States; and threw out the idea as a ground of com- 
promise. 

Doctor Fkanklin. The diversity of opinions turns on 
two points. If a proportional representation takes place, 
the small States contend that their liberties will be in dan- 
ger. If an equality of votes is to be put in its place, the 
large States say their money will be in danger. When a 
broad table is to be made, and the edges of planks do not 
fit, the artist takes a little from both, and makes a good 
joint. In like manner, here, both sides must part from 
some of their demands, in order that they may join in some 
accommodating proposition. He had prepared one which 
he would read, that it might lie on the table for considera- 
tion. The proposition was in the words following: 

" That the Legislatures of the several States shall 
choose and send an equal number of delegates, namely, 

, who are to compose the second branch of the 

General Legislature. 



1^87.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 279 

" That in all cases or questions wherein the sovereignty 
of individual States may be affected, or whereby their 
authority over their own citizens may be diminished, or the 
authority of the General Government within the several 
States augmented, each State shall have equal suffrage. 

" That in the appointment of all civil officers of the Gen- 
eral Government, in the election of whom the second branch 
may by the constitution have part, each State shall have 
equal suffrage. 

" That in fixing the salaries of such officers, and in all 
allowances for public services, and generally in all appro- 
priations and dispositions of money to be drawn out of the 
general Treasury; and in all laws for supplying that Trea- 
sury, the Delegates of the several States shall have suffrage 
in proportion to the sums which their respective States do 
actually contribute to the Treasury." 

Where a ship had many owners, this was the rule of 
deciding on her expedition. He had been one of the min- 
isters from this country to France during the joint war, and 
would have been very glad if allowed to vote in distributing 
the money to carry it on. 

Mr. King observed, that the simple question was, 
whether each State should have an equal vote in the second 
branch ; that it must be apparent to those gentlemen who 
liked neither the motion for this quality, nor the Keport as 
it stood, that the Report was as susceptible of melioration 
as the motion ; that a reform would be nugatory and nomi- 
nal only, if we should make another Congress of the pro- 
posed Senate ; that if the adherence to an equality of votes 
was fixed and unalterable, there could not be less obstinacy on 
the other side ; and that we were in fact cut asunder already, 
and it was in vain to shut our eyes against it. That he 
was, however, filled with astonishment, that, if we were 
convinced that every man in America was secured in all his 
rights, we should be ready to sacrifice this substantial good 
io the phantom of State sovereignty. That his feelings 
were more harrowed and his fears more agitated for his 



280 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

country than he could express; that he conceived this to be 
the last opportunity of providing for its liberty and happi- 
ness: that he could not, therefore, but repeat his amaze- 
ment, that when a just government, founded on a fair 
representation of the people of America, was within our 
reach, we should renounce the blessing, from an attachment 
to the ideal freedom and importance of States. That should 
this wonderful illusion continue to prevail, his mind was 
prepared for every event, rather than sit down under a 
Government founded on a vicious principle of representa- 
tion, and which must be as short-lived as it would be unjust. 
He might prevail on himself to accede to some such expe- 
dient as had been hinted by Mr. Wilson; but he never 
could listen to an equality of votes as proposed in the 
motion. 

Mr. Dayton. When assertion is given for proof, and 
terror substituted for argument, he presumed they would 
have no effect, however eloquently spoken. It should have 
been shown that the evils we have experienced have pro- 
ceeded from the equality now objected to; and that the 
seeds of dissolution for the State Governments are not sown 
in the General Government. He considered the system on 
the table as a novelty, an amphibious monster; and was 
persuaded that it never would be received by the people. 

Mr. Maktin would never confederate, if it could not be 
done on just principles. 

Mr. Madison would acquiesce in the concession hinted 
by Mr. Wilson, on condition that a due independence should 
be given to the Senate. The plan in its present shape 
makes the Senate absolutely dependent on the States. The 
Senate, therefore, is only another edition of Congress. He 
knew the faults of that body, and had used a bold language 
against it. Still he would preserve the State rights as care- 
fully as the trial by jury. 

Mr. Bedford contended, that there was no middle way 
between a perfect consolidation, and a mere confederacy of 
the States. The first is out of the question; and in the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 281 

latter tney must continue, if not perfectly, yet equally, 
sovereign. If political societies possess ambition, avarice, 
and all the other passions which render them formidable to 
each other, ought we not to view them in this light here? 
Will not the same motives operate in America as elsewhere ? 
If any gentleman doubts it, let him look at the votes. Have 
they not been dictated by interest, by ambition ? Are not 
the large States evidently seeking to aggrandize themselves 
at the expense of the small? They think, no doubt, that 
they have right on their side, but interest had blinded their 
eyes. Look at Georgia. Though a small State at present, 
she is actuated by the prospect of soon being a great one. 
South Carolina is actuated both by present interest, and 
future prospects. She hopes, too, to see the other States 
cut down to her own dimensions. North Carolina has the 
same motives of present and future interest. Virginia fol- 
lows. Maryland is not on that side of the question. Penn- 
sylvania has a direct and future interest. Massachusetts has 
a decided and palpable interest in the part she takes. Can it 
be expected that the small States will act from pure disinter- 
estedness. Look at Great Britain. Is the representation there 
less unequal ? But we shall be told again, that that is the rot- 
ten part of the Constitution. Have not the boroughs, however, 
held fast their constitutional rights ? And are we to act with 
greater purity than the rest of mankind? An exact pro- 
portion in the representation is not preserved in any one of 
the States. Will it be said that an inequality of power 
will not result from an inequality of votes. Give the 
opportunity, an ambition will not fail to abuse it. The 
whole history of mankind proves it. The three large 
States have a common interest to bind them together in 
commerce. But whether a combination, as we supposed, 
or a competition, as others supposed, shall take place among 
them, in either case the small States must be ruined. We 
must, like Solon, make such a government as the people 
will approve. Will the smaller States ever agree to the 
proposed degradation of them? It is not true that the 



282 DEBATES IN THE [178T. 

people will not agree to enlarge the powers of the present 
Congress. The language of the people has been, that 
Congress ought to have the power of collecting an impost, 
and of coercing the States where it may be necessary. On 
the first point they have been explicit, and, in a manner, 
unanimous in their declarations. And must they not agree 
to this, and similar measures, if they ever mean to dis- 
charge their engagements ? The little States are willing to 
observe their engagements, but will meet the large ones on 
no ground but that of the Confederation. "VVe have been 
told, with a dictatorial air, that this is the last moment for a 
fair trial in favor of a good government. It will be the 
last, indeed, if the propositions reported from the Com- 
mittee go forth to the people. He was under no apprehen- 
sions. The large States dare not dissolve the Confedera- 
tion. If they do, the small ones will find some foreign 
ally, of more honour and good faith, who will take them by 
the hand, and do them justice. He did not mean, by this, 
to intimidate or alarm. It was a natural consequence, which 
ought to be avoided by enlarging the Federal powers, not 
annihilating the Federal system. This is what the people 
expect. All agree in the necessity of a more efficient 
government, and why not make such an one as they desire ? 

Mr. Ellsworth. Under a National Government, he 
should participate in the national security, as remarked by 
Mr. King ; but that was all. What he wanted was domes- 
tic happiness. The National Government could not descend 
to the local objects on which this depended. It could only 
embrace objects of a general nature. He turned his eyes, 
therefore, for the preservation of his rights, to the State 
Governments. From these alone he could derive the great- 
est happiness he expects in this life. His happiness depends 
on their existence, as much as a new - born infant on its 
mother for nourishment. If this reasoning was not satis- 
factory, he had nothing to add that could be so. 

Mr. King was for preserving the States in a subordinate 
degree, and as far as they could be necessary for the pur- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 283 

poses stated by Mr. Ellsworth. He did not think a full 
answer had been given to those who apprehended a danger- 
ous encroachment on their jurisdictions. Expedients might be 
devised, as he conceived, that would give them all the secu- 
rity the nature of things would admit of. In the establish- 
ment of societies, the Constitution was to the Legislature, 
what the laws were to individuals. As the fundamental 
rights of individuals are secured by express provisions in 
the State Constitutions, why may not a like security be pro- 
vided for the rights of States in the National Constitution? 
The Articles of Union between England and Scotland fur- 
nish an example of such a provision, in favor of sundry 
rights of Scotland. When that union was in agitation, the 
same language of apprehension which has been heard from 
the smaller States, was in the mouths of the Scotch patriots. 
The articles, however, have not been violated, and the 
Scotch have found an increase of prosperity and happiness. 
He was aware that this will be called a mere paper security. 
He thought it a sufficient answer to say, that if fundamental 
articles of compact are no sufficient defence against physi- 
cal power, neither will there be any safety against it, if 
there be no compact. He could not sit down without tak- 
ing some notice of the language of the honorable gentle- 
man from Delaware (Mr. Bedford). It was not he that 
had uttered a dictatorial language. This intemperance had 
marked the honorable gentleman himself. It was not he 
who, with a vehemence unprecedented in that House, had 
declared himself ready to turn his hopes from our common 
country, and court the protection of some foreign hand. 
This, too, was the language of the honorable member him- 
self. He was grieved that such a thought had entered his 
heart. He was more grieved that such an expression had 
dropped from his lips. The gentleman could only excuse 
it to himself on the score of passion. For himself, what- 
ever might be his distress, he would never court relief from 
a foreign power. 
Adjourned. 



>> 



284 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Monday, July 2d. 

In Convention, — On the question for allowing each 
State one vote in the second branch, as moved by Mr. 
Ellswoeth, it was lost, by an equal division of votes, — 
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland,* 
aye — 5; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Car- 
olina, South Carolina, no — 5; Georgia, divided (Mr. Bald- 
win aye, Mr. Houston, no),. 

Mr. Pinckney thought an equality of votes in the sec- 
ond branch inadmissible. At the same time, candor 
obliged him to admit, that the large States would feel a 
partiality for their own citizens, and give them a preference 
in appointments: that they might also find some common 
points in their commercial interests, and promote treaties 
favorable to them. There is a ljeal distinction between the 
Northern and Southern interests. North Carolina, South 
Carolina and Georgia, in their rice and indigo, had a pecu- 
liar interest which might be sacrificed. How, then, shall 
the larger States be prevented from administering the 
General Government as they please, without being them- 
selves unduly subjected to the will of the smaller? By 
allowing them some, but not a full, proportion. He was 
extremely anxious that something should be done, consider- 
ing this as the last appeal to a regular experiment. Con- 
gress have failed in almost every effort for an amendment of 
the Federal system. Nothing has prevented a dissolution 
of it, but the appointment of this Convention ; and he could 
not express his alarms for the consequence of such an 
event, He read his motion to form the States into classes, 
with an apportionment of Senators among them (see Article 
4, of his plan— May 29th, page 61). 

General Pinckney was willing the motion might be con- 
sidered. He did not entirely approve it. He liked better 
the motion of Doctor Franklin, (q. v. June 30, page 278). 

* Mr. Jenifer not bein^r present, Mr. Martin alone voted. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 285 

Some compromise seemed to be necessary, the States being 
exactly divided on the question for an equality of votes in 
the second branch. He proposed that a Committee consist- 
ing of a member from each State should be appointed to 
devise and report some compromise. 

Mr. L. Martin had no objection to a commitment, but 
no modifications whatever could reconcile the smaller States 
to the least diminution of their equal sovereignty. 

Mr. Sherman. We are now at full stop; and nobody, 
he supposed, meant that we should break up without doing 
something. A committee he thought most likely to hit on 
some expedient. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris* thought a Committee advis- 
able, as the Convention had been equally divided. He had 
a stronger reason also. The mode of appointing the sec- 
ond branch tended, he was sure, to defeat the object of it. 
What is this object? To check the precipitation, change- 
ableness, and excesses of the first branch. Every man of 
observation had seen in the democratic branches of the 
State Legislatures, precipitation — in Congress, change- 
ableness — in every department, excesses against personal 
liberty, private property, and personal safety. What qual- 
ities are necessary to constitute a check in this case ? Abil- 
ities and virtue are equally necessary in both branches. 
Something more, then, is now wanted. In the first place, 
the checking branch must have a personal interest in 
checking the other branch. One interest must be opposed 
to another interest. Vices, as they exist, must be turned 
against each other. In the second place, it must have 
great personal property; it must have the aristocratic spirit; 
it must love to lord it through pride. Pride is, indeed, the 
great principle that actuates both the poor and the rich. 
It is this principle which in the former resists, in the latter 
abuses, authority. In the third place it should be inde- 
pendent. In religion the creature is apt to forget its Cre- 

* He had just returned from New York, having left the Convention a few days 
after it commenced business. 



286 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ator. That it is otherwise in political affairs, the late de- 
bates here are an unhappy proof. The aristocratic body should 
be as independent, and as firm, as the democratic. If the 
members of it are to revert to a dependence on the demo- 
cratic choice, the democratic scale will preponderate. All 
the guards contrived by America have not restrained the 
Senatorial branches of the Legislatures from a servile com- 
plaisance to the democratic. If the second branch is to be 
dependent, we are better without it. To make it independ- 
ent, it should be for life. It will then do wrong, it will be 
said. He believed so ; he hoped so. The rich will strive 
to establish their dominion, and enslave the rest. They 
always did. They always will. The proper security 
against them is to form them into a separate interest. The 
two forces will then control each other. Let the rich mix 
with the poor, and in a commercial country they will estab- 
lish an oligarchy. Take away commerce, and the demo- 
cracy will triumph. Thus it has been all the world over. 
So it will be among us. Reason tells us we are but men ; 
and we are not to expect any particular interference of 
Heaven in our favor. By thus combining, and setting 
apart, the aristocratic interest, the popular interest will be 
combined against it. There will be a mutual check and 
mutual security. In the fourth place, an independence for 
life, involves the necessary permanency. If we change our 
measures nobody will trust us, — and how avoid a change 
of measures, but by avoiding a change of men ? Ask any 
man if he confides in Congress — if he confides in the State 
of Pennsylvania — if he will lend his money, or enter into 
contract? He will tell you, no. He sees no stability. He 
can repose no confidence. If Great Britain were to explain 
her refusal to treat with us, the same reasoning would be 
employed. He disliked the exclusion of the second branch 
from holding offices. It is dangerous. It is like the im- 
prudent exclusion of the military officers, during the war, 
from civil appointments. It deprives the Executive of the 
principal source of influence. If danger be apprehended 



1^87.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 287 

from the Executive, what a left-handed way is this of obvi- 
ating it! If the son, the brother, or the friend can be ap- 
pointed, the danger may be even increased, as the disquali- 
fied father, &c. can then boast of a disinterestedness which 
he does not possess. - Besides, shall the best, the most able, 
the most virtuous citizens not be permitted to hold offices ? 
Who then are to hold them? He was also against paying 
the Senators. They will pay themselves, if they can. If 
they cannot, they will be rich, and can do without it. Of 
such the second branch ought to consist ; and none but such 
can compose it, if they are not to be paid. He contended 
that the Executive should appoint the Senate, and fill up 
vacancies. This gets rid of the difficulty in the present 
question. You may begin with any ratio you please, it will 
come to the same thing. The members being independent, 
and for life, may be taken as well from one place as from 
another. It should be considered, too, how the scheme 
could be carried through the States. He hoped there was 
strength of mind enough in this House to look truth in the 
face. He did not hesitate, therefore, to say that loaves and 
fishes must bribe the demagogues. They must be made to 
expect higher offices under the General, than the State 
Governments. A Senate for life will be a noble bait. 
Without such captivating prospects, the popular leaders 
will oppose and defeat the plan. He perceived that the 
first branch was to be chosen by the people of the States, 
the second by those chosen by the people. Is not here a 
government by the States — a government by compact be- 
tween Virginia in the first and second branch, Massachu- 
setts in the first and second branch, &c? This is going 
back to mere treaty. It is no government at all. It is al- 
together dependent on the States, and will act over again 
the part which Congress has acted. A firm government 
alone can protect our liberties. He fears the influence of 
the rich. They will have the same effect here as elsewhere, 
if we do not, by such a government, keep them within their 
proper spheres. We should remember that the people- 



288 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

never act from reason alone. The/ rich will take the ad- 
vantage of their passions, and awake these the instruments 
for oppressing them. The result of the contest will be a 
violent aristocracy, or a more violent despotism. The 
schemes of the rich will be favoured by the extent of the 
country. The people in such distant parts cannot commu- 
nicate and act in concert. They will be the dupes of those 
who have more knowledge and intercourse. The only secu- 
rity against encroachments, will be a select and sagacious 
body of men, instituted to watch against them on all sides. 
He meant only to hint these observations, without ground- 
ing any motion on them. 

Mr. Randolph favored the commitment, though he did not 
expect much benefit from the expedient. He animadverted 
on the warm and rash language of Mr. Bedford on Satur- 
day; reminded the small States that if the large States 
should combine, some danger of which he did not deny, 
there would be a check in the revisionary power of the Ex- 
ecutive; and intimated, that, in order to render this still 
more effectual, he would agree, that in the choice of an 
Executive each State should have an equal vote. He was 
persuaded that two such opposite bodies as Mr. Morris had 
planned could never long co-exist. Dissensions would 
arise, as has been seen even between the Senate and House 
of Delegates in Maryland; appeals would be made to the 
people; and in a little time commotions would be the result. 
He was far from thinking the large States could subsist of 
themselves, any more than the small; an avulsion would 
involve the whole in ruin ; and he was determined to pursue 
such a scheme of government as would secure us against 
such a calamity. 

Mr. Strong was for the commitment ; and hoped the mode 
of constituting both branches would be referred. If they 
should be established on different principles, contentions 
would prevail, and there would never be a concurrence in 
necessary measures. 

Doctor Williamson. If we do not concede on both 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 289 

sides, out business must soon be at end. He approved of 
the commitment, supposing that, as the Committee would 
be a smaller body, a compromise would be pursued with 
more coolness. 

Mr. Wilson objected to the Committee, because it would 
decide according to that very rule of voting, which was 
opposed on one side. Experience in Congress had also 
proved the inutility of Committees consisting of members 
from each State. 

Mr. Lansing would not oppose the commitment, though 
expecting little advantage from it. 

Mr. Madison opposed the commitment. He had rarely 
seen any other effect than delay from such committees in 
Congress. Any scheme of compromise that could be pro- 
posed in the Committee might as easily be proposed in the 
House ; and the report of the Committee, where it contained 
merely the opinion of the Committee, would neither shorten 
the discussion, nor influence the decision of the House. 

Mr. Gerry was for the commitment. Something must 
be done, or we shall disappoint not only America, but the 
whole world. He suggested a consideration of the state we 
should be thrown into by the failure of the Union. We 
should be without an umpire to decide controversies, and 
must be at the mercy of events. What, too, is to become 
of our treaties — what of our foreign debts — what of our 
domestic ? We must make concessions on both sides. 
Without these, the Constitutions of the several States would 
never have been formed. 

On the question for committing, generally, — Massa- 
chusetts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 
9 ; New Jersey, Delaware, no — 2. 

On the question for committing it " to a member from 
each State," — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 10 ; Pennsylvania, no — 1. 

The Committee, elected by ballot, were. Mr. Gerry, Mr. 

19 J ■ 



290 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Ellsworth, Mr. Yates, Mr. Patterson, Dr. Franklin, Mr. 
Bedford, Mr. Martin, Mr. Mason, Mr. Davy, Mr Rut- 
ledge, Mr. Baldwin. 

That time might be given to the Committee, and to 
such as chose to attend to the celebrations on the anni- 
versary of Independence the Convention adjourned till 
Thursday. 

Thursday, July 5th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Gerry delivered in, from the- 
Committee appointed on Monday last, the following Report : 

" The Committee to whom was referred the eighth Reso- 
lution of the Report from the Committee of the Whole 
House, and so much of the seventh as has not been decided 
on, submit the following Report : 

" That the subsequent propositions be recommended to 
the Convention on condition that both shall be generally 
adopted. 

" 1. That in the first branch of the Legislature each of 
the States now in the Union shall be allowed one member 
for every forty thousand inhabitants, of the description 
reported in the seventh Resolution of the Committee of the 
Whole House : that each State not containing that number 
shall be allowed one member : that all bills for raising 
or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the 
officers of the Government of the United States, shall 
originate in the first branch of the Legislature, and shall 
not be altered or amended by the second branch ; and that 
no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury but in 
pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the first 
branch. 

" 2. That in the second branch, each State shall have 
an equal vote." * 

*This Report was founded on a motion in the Committee made by Doctor 
Franklin. It was barely acquiesced in by the members from the States opposed to 
an equity of votes in the second branch, and was evidently considered by the mem- 
be-s on the other side, as a gaining of their point. A motion was made by Mr Sher- 
man, (who ;ictod in the place of Mr. Ellsworth who was kept away by indisposi- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 291 

Mr. Gorham observed, that, as the report consisted of 
propositions mutually conditional, he wished to hear some 
explanations touching the grounds on which the conditions 
were estimated. 

Mr. Gerry. The Committee were of different opinions, 
as well as the Deputations from which the Committee were 
taken ; and agreed to the Report merely in order that some 
ground of accommodation might be proposed. Those 
opposed to the equality of votes have only assented con- 
ditionally; and if the other side do not generally agree, 
will not be under any obligation to support the Report. 

Mr. Wilson thought the Committee had exceeded their 
powers. 

Mr. Martin was for taking the question on the whole 
Report. 

Mr. Wilson was for a division of the question; other- 
wise it would be a leap in the dark. 

Mr. Madison could not regard the privilege of origi- 
nating money bills as any concession on the side of the 
small States. Experience proved that it had no effect. If 
seven States in the upper branch wished a bill to be origi- 
nated, they might surely find some member from some of 
the same States in the lower branch, who would originate 
it. The restriction as to amendments was of as little 
consequence. Amendments could be handed privately by 
the Senate to members in the other House. Bills could 
be negatived, that they might be sent up in the desired 
shape. If the Senate should yield to the obstinacy of the 
first branch, the use of that body as a check, would be lost. 
If the first branch should yield to that of the Senate, the 
privilege would be nugatory. Experience had also shown, 
both in Great Britain, and the States having a similar 

tion), in the Committee, to the following effect, "that each State should have an 
equal vote in the second branch ; provided that no decision therein should prevail 
unless the majority of States concurring should also comprise a majority of the 
inhabitants of the United States." This motion was not much deliberated on, nor 
approved, in the Committee. A similar proviso had been proposed, in the debates on 
the Articles of Confederation, in 1777, to the articles giving certain powers to " nine 
States." See Journals of Congress for 1777, page 462. 



292 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

regulation, that it was a source of frequent and obstinate 
altercations. These considerations had produced a rejection 
of a like motion on a former occasion, when judged by its 
own merits. It could not, therefore, be deemed any con- 
cession on the present, and left in force all the objections 
which had prevailed against allowing each State an equal 
voice. He conceived that the Convention was reduced to 
the alternative, of either departing from justice in order to 
conciliate the smaller States, and the minority of the people 
of the United States, or of displeasing these, by justly 
gratifying the larger States and the majority of the people. 
He could not himself hesitate as to the option he ought to 
make. The Convention, with justice and a majority of the 
people on their side, had nothing to fear. With injustice 
and the minority on their side, they had every thing to fear. 
It was in vain to purchase concord in the Convention on 
terms which would perpetuate discord among their con- 
stituents. The Convention ought to pursue a plan which 
would bear the test of examination, which would be espoused 
and supported by the enlightened and impartial part of 
America, and which they could themselves vindicate and 
urge. It should be considered, that, although at first many 
may judge of the system recommended by their opinion of 
the Convention, yet finally all will judge of the Convention 
by the system. The merits of the system alone can finally 
and effectually obtain the public suffrage. He was not 
apprehensive that the people of the small States would 
obstinately refuse to accede to a government founded on 
just principles, and promising them substantial protection. 
He could not suspect that Delaware would brave the conse- 
quences of seeking her fortunes apart from the other 
States, rather than submit to such a Government; much 
less could he suspect that she would pursue the rash policy, 
of courting foreign support, which the warmth of one of 
her ^Representatives (Mr. Bedford) had suggested; or if 
she should, that any foreign nation would be so rash as to 
hearken to the overture. As little could he suspect that the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 293 

people of New Jersey, notwithstanding the decided tone of 
the gentleman from that State, would choose rather to stand 
on their own legs, and bid defiance to events, than to 
acquiesce under an establishment founded on principles the 
justice of which they could not dispute, and absolutely 
necessary to redeem them from the exactions levied on them 
by the commerce of the neighbouring States. A review of 
other States would prove that there was as little reason to 
apprehend an inflexible opposition elsewhere. Harmony 
in the Convention was, no doubt, much to be desired. Satis- 
faction to all the States, in the first instance, still more 
so. But if the principal States comprehending a majority 
of the people of the United States, should concur in a just 
and judicious plan, he had the firmest hopes that all the 
other States would by degrees accede to it. 

Mr. Butlee said, he could not let down his idea of the 
people of America so far as to believe they would, from mere 
respect to the Convention, adopt a plan evidently unjust. 
He did not consider the privilege concerning money bills 
as of any consequence. He urged, that the second branch 
ought to represent the States according to f heir property. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris thought the form as well as 
the matter of the Report objectionable. It seemed, in the 
first place, to render amendment impracticable. In the 
next place, it seemed to involve a pledge to agree to the 
second part, if the first should be agreed to. He conceived 
the whole aspect of it to be wrong. He came here as a 
Representative of America; he flattered himself he came 
here in some degree as a Representative of the whole hu- 
man race; for the whole human race will be affected by the 
proceedings of this Convention. He wished gentlemen to 
extend their views beyond the present moment of time; 
beyond the narrow limits of place from which they derive 
their political origin. If he were to believe some things 
which he had heard, he should suppose that we were assem- 
bled to truck and bargain for our particular States. He 
cannot descend to think that any gentlemen are really actu- 



294 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

ated by these views. We must look forward to the effects 
of what we do. These alone ought to guide us. Much has 
been said of the sentiments of the people. They were un- 
known. They could not be known. All that we can infer 
is, that, if the plan we recommend be reasonable and right, 
all who have reasonable minds and sound intentions will 
embrace it, notwithstanding what had been said by some 
gentlemen. Let us suppose that the larger States shall 
agree, and that the smaller refuse ; and let us trace the con- 
sequences. The opponents of the system in the smaller 
States will no doubt make a party, and a noise for a time, 
but the ties of interest, of kindred, and of common habits, 
which connect them with other States, will be too strong 
to be easily broken. In New Jersey, particularly, he was 
sure a great many would follow the sentiments of Pennsyl- 
vania and New York. This country must be united. If 
persuasion does not unite it, the sword will. He begged 
this consideration might have its due weight. The scenes 
of horror attending civil commotion cannot be described; 
and the conclusion of them will be worse than the term of 
their continuance. The stronger party will then make 
traitors of the weaker ; and the gallows and halter will fin- 
ish the work of the sword. How far foreign powers would 
be ready to take part in the confusions, he would not say. 
Threats that they will be invited have, it seems, been 
thrown out. He drew the melancholy picture of foreign 
intrusions, as exhibited in the history of Germany, and 
urged it as a standing lesson to other nations. He trusted 
that the gentlemen who may have hazarded such expres- 
sions did not entertain them till they reached their own 
lips. But returning to the Report, he could not think it in 
any respect calculated for the public good. As the second 
branch is now constituted, there will be constant disputes 
and appeals to the States, which will undermine the Gen- 
eral Government, and control and annihilate the first 
branch. Suppose that the Delegates from Massachusetts 
and Rhode Island, in the upper house, disagree, and that 



1T87.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 295 

the former are outvoted. What results? They will imme- 
diately declare that their State will not abide by the decis- 
ion, and make such representations as will produce that 
effect. The same may 'happen as to Virginia and other 
States. Of what avail, then, will be what is on paper? 
State attachments, and State importance have been the bane 
of this country. We cannot annihilate, but we may per- 
haps take out the teeth of, the serpents. He wished our 
ideas to be enlarged to the true interest of man, instead of 
being circumscribed within the narrow compass of a par- 
ticular spot. And, after all, how little can be the motive 
yielded by selfishness for such a policy ? Who can say, 
whether he himself, much less whether his children, will 
the next year be an inhabitant of this or that State ? 

Mr. Bedford. He found that what he had said, as to 
the small States being taken by the hand, had been mis- 
understood, — and he rose to explain. He did not mean 
that the small States would court the aid and interposition 
of foreign powers. He meant that they would not con- 
sider the federal compact as dissolved until it should be so 
by the acts of the large States. In this case, the conse- 
quence of the breach of faith on their part, and the readi- 
ness of the small States to fulfil their engagements, would 
be that foreign nations having demands on this Country, 
would find it their interest to take the small States by the 
hand, in order to do themselves justice. This was what he 
meant. But no man can forsee to what extremities the 
small States may be driven by oppression. He observed, 
also, in apology, that some allowance ought to be made, for 
the habits of his profession, in which warmth was natural 
and sometimes necessary. But is there not an apology in 
what was said by (Mr. Gouverneuk Morris), that the 
sword is to unite — by Mr. Gorham, that Delaware must be 
annexed to Pennsylvania, and New Jersey divided between 
Pennsylvania and New York? To hear such language 
without emotion, would be to renounce the feelings of a 
Jinan and the duty of a citizen. As to the propositions of 



296 DEBATES IN THE [178 if. 

the Committee, the lesser States have thought it necessary 
to have a security somewhere. This has been thought 
necessary for the Executive magistrate of the proposed 
government, who has a sort of negative on the laws ; and is 
it not of more importance that the States should be pro- 
tected, than that the Executive branch of the Government 
should be protected ? In order to obtain this, the smaller 
States have conceded as to the constitution of the first 
branch, and as to money bills. If they be not gratified by 
correspondent concessions, as to the second branch, is it to 
be supposed they will ever accede to the plan? And 
what will be the consequence, if nothing should be done? 
The condition of the United States requires that somethings 
should be immediately done. It will be better that a defec- 
tive plan should be adopted, than that none should be 
recommended. He saw no reason why defects might not be 
supplied by meetings ten, fifteen or twenty years hence. 

Mr. Ellsworth said, he had not attended the proceed- 
ings of the Committee, but was ready to accede to the com- 
promise they had reported. Some compromise was neces- 
sary ; and he saw none more convenient or reasonable. 

Mr. Williamson hoped that the expressions of indi- 
viduals would not be taken for the sense of their colleagues, 
much less of their States, which was not and could not be 
known. He hoped, also, that the meaning of those expres- 
sions would not be misconstrued or exaggerated. He did 
not conceive that (Mr. Gouvep.neur Morris) meant that 
the sword ought to be drawn against the smaller States. 
He only pointed out the probable consequences of anarchy 
in the United States. A similar exposition ought to be given 
of the expressions of (Mr. Gorham). He was ready to 
hear the Keport discussed; but thought the propositions 
contained in it the most objectionable of any he had yet 
heard. 

Mr. Patterson said that he had, when the report was 
agreed to in the Committee, reserved to himself the right 
of freely discussing it. He acknowledged that the warmth 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 297 

complained of was improper ; but he thought the sword aud 
the gallows little calculated to produce conviction. He com- 
plained of the manner in which Mr. Madison and Mr. 
G. Morris had treated the small States. 

Mr. Gerry. Though he had assented to the Keport in 
the Committee, he had very material objections to it. We 
were, however, in a peculiar situation. We were neither 
the same nation, nor different nations. We ought not, 
therefore, to pursue the one or the other of these ideas too 
closely. If no compromise should take place, what will be 
the consequence. A secession he foresaw would take place ; 
for some gentlemen seemed decided on it. Two different 
plans will be proposed, and the result no man could foresee. 
If we do not come to some agreement among ourselves, 
some foreign sword will probably do the work for us. 

Mr. Mason. The Report was meant not as specific 
propositions to be adopted, but merely as a general ground 
of accommodation. There must be some accommodation on 
this point, or we shall make little further progress in the 
work. Accommodation was the object of the House in the 
appointment of the Committee, and of the Committee in the 
report they had made. And, however liable the Report 
might be to objections, he thought it preferable to an ap- 
peal to the world by the different sides, as had been talked 
of by some gentlemen. It could not be more inconvenient 
to any gentleman to remain absent from his private affairs, 
than it was for him, but he would bury his bones in this 
city, rather than expose his country to the consequences of 
a dissolution of the Convention without any thing being 
done. 

The first proposition in the Report for fixing the repre- 
sentation in the first branch, " one member for every forty 
thousand inhabitants," being taken up, — 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris objected to that scale of ap- 
portionment. He thought property ought to be taken into 
the estimate as well as the number of inhabitants. Life 
and liberty were generally said to be of more value than 



298 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

property. An accurate view of the matter would, neverthe- 
less, prove that property was the main object of society. 
The savage state was more favorable to liberty than the civ- 
ilized ; and sufficiently so to life. It was preferred by all 
men who had not acquired a taste for property ; it was only 
renounced for the sake of property which could only be 
secured by the restraints of regular government. These 
ideas might appear to some new, but they were neverthe- 
less just. If property, then, was the main object of gov- 
ernment, certainly it ought to be one measure of the influ- 
ence due to those who were to be affected by the govern- 
ment. He looked forward, also, to that range of new 
States which would soon be formed in the West. He 
thought the rule of representation ought to be so fixed, as 
to secure to the Atlantic States a prevalence in the national 
councils. The new States will know less of the public in- 
terest than these; will have an interest in many respects 
different ; in particular will be little scrupulous of involv- 
ing the community in wars the burdens and operations of 
which would fall chiefly on the maritime States. Provis- 
ion ought, therefore, to be made to prevent the maritime 
States from being hereafter outvoted by them. He thought 
this might be easily done, by irrevocably fixing the num- 
ber of representatives which the Atlantic States should re- 
spectively have, and the number which each new State will 
have. This would not be unjust, as the western settlers 
would previously know the conditions on which they were 
io possess their lands. It would be politic, as it would 
recommend the plan to the present, as well as future, inter- 
est of the States which must decide the fate of it. 

Mr. Kutledge. The gentleman last up had spoken 
some of his sentiments precisely. Property was certainly 
the principal object of society. If numbers should be made 
the rule of representation, the Atlantic States would be 
subjected to the western. He moved that the first propo- 
sition in the Report be postponed, in order to take up the 
following, viz. : " that the suffrages of the several States be 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 299 

regulated and proportioned according to the sums to be 
paid towards the general revenue by the inhabitants of each 
State respectively; that an apportionment of suffrages, 
according to the ratio aforesaid shall be made and regulated 
at the end of years from the first meeting of the Legis- 
lature of the United States, and at the end of every 

years ; but that for the present, and until the period above 

mentioned, the suffrages shall be for New Hampshire , 

for Massachusetts , &c." 

Col. Mason said, the case of new States was not unno- 
ticed in the Committee; but it was thought, and he was 
himself decidedly of opinion, that if they made a part of the 
Union, they ought to be subject to no unfavorable discrim- 
inations. Obvious considerations required it. 

Mr. Eandolph concurred with Mr. Mason. 

On the question on Mr. Rutledge's motion, — South 
Carolina, aye — 1 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, no — 9 ; Georgia, not on the floor. Ad- 
journed. 

Friday, July 6th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to 
commit so much of the Report as relates to " one member 
for every forty thousand inhabitants." His view was, that 
they might absolutely fix the number for each State in the 
first instance ; leaving the Legislature at liberty to provide 
for changes in the relative importance of the States, and for 
the case of new States. 

Mr. Wilson seconded the motion; but with a view of 
leaving the Committee under no implied shackles. 

Mr. Gorham apprehended great inconvenience from fix- 
ing directly the number of Representatives to be allowed to 
each State. He thought the number of inhabitants the true 
guide, though perhaps some departure might be expedient 
from the full proportion. The States, also, would vary in 



300 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

their relative extent by separations of parts of the largest 
States. A part of Virginia is now on the point of a sepa- 
ration. In the province of Maine, a Convention is at this 
time deliberating on a separation from Massachusetts. In 
such events the number of Representatives ought certainly 
be reduced. He hoped to see all the States made small by 
proper divisions, instead of their becoming formidable as 
Avas apprehended to the small States. He conceived, that, 
let the government be modified as it might, there would be 
a constant tendency in the State Governments to encroach 
upon it; it was of importance, therefore, that the extent of 
the States should be reduced as much, and as fast, as possi- 
ble. The stronger the government shall be made in the 
first instance, the more easily will these divisions be effected ; 
as it will be of less consequence in the opinion of the 
States, whether they be of great or small extent. 

Mr. Gerry did not think with his colleague, that the 
larger States ought to be cut up. This policy has been 
inculcated by the middling and small States, ungenerously 
and contrary to the spirit of the Confederation. Ambitious 
men will be apt to solicit needless divisions, till the States 
be reduced to the size of counties. If this policy should 
still actuate the small States, the large ones could not con- 
federate safely with them ; but would be obliged to consult 
their safety by confederating only with one another. He 
favored the commitment, and thought that representation 
ought to be in the combined ratio of numbers of inhabitants 
and of wealth, and not of either singly. 

Mr. King wished the clause to be committed chiefly in 
order to detach it from the Report, with which it had no 
connection. He thought, also, that the ratio of represen- 
tation proposed could not be safely fixed, since in a century 
and an half our computed increase of population would 
carry the number of Representatives to an enormous excess ; 
that the number of inhabitants was not the proper index of 
ability and wealth ; that property was the primary object 
of society ; and that, in fixing a ratio, this ought not to be 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 301 

excluded from the estimate. With regard to new States, 
he observed that there was something peculiar in the busi- 
ness, which had not been noticed. The United States were 
now admitted to be proprietors of the country North West 
of the Ohio. Congress, by one of their ordinances, have 
impolitically laid it out into ten States, and have made it a 
fundamental article of compact with those who may become 
settlers, that as soon as the number in any one State shall 
?qual that of the smallest of the thirteen original States, it 
nay claim admission into the Union. Delaware does not 
3ontain, it is computed, more than thirty-five thousand 
souls ; and for obvious reasons will not increase much for a 
considerable time. It is possible, then, that if this plan be 
persisted in by Congress, ten new votes may be added, 
without a greater addition of inhabitants than are repre- 
sented by the single vote of Pennsylvania. The plan, as it 
respects one of the new States, is already irrevocable ; the 
sale of the lands having commenced, and the purchasers and 
settlers will immediately become entitled to all the privi- 
leges of the compact. 

Mr. Butler agreed to the commitment, if the Committee 
were to be left at liberty. He was persuaded, that, the 
more the subject was examined, the less it would appear 
that the number of inhabitants would be a proper rule of 
proportion. If there were no other objection, the change- 
ableness of the standard would be sufficient. He concurred 
with those who thought some balance was necessary between 
the old and the new States. He contended strenuously, 
that property was the only just measure of representation. 
This was the great object of government ; the great cause 
of war ; the great means of carrying it on. 

Mr. Pinckney saw no good reason for committing. The 
value of land had been found, on full investigation, to be an 
impracticable rule. The contributions of revenue, includ- 
ing imports and exports, must be too changeable in their 
amount ; too difficult to be adjusted ; and too injurious to 
the non-commercial States. The number of inhabitants 



302 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

appeared to him the only just and practicable rule. He 
thought the blacks ought to stand on an equality with the 
whites ; but would agree to the ratio settled by Congress. 
He contended that Congress had no right, under the Articles 
of Confederation, to authorize the admission of new States, 
no such case having been provided for. 

Mr. Davy was for committing the clause, in order to 
get at the merits of the question arising on the Report. 
He seemed to think that wealth or property ought to be 
represented in the second branch ; and numbers in the first 
branch. 

On the motion for committing, as made by Mr. Gouver- 
neur Morris, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 
7 ; New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no — 3 ; Maryland, 
divided. 

The members appointed by ballot were Mr. Gouverneur 
Morris, Mr. Gorham, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Rutledge, Mr. 
King. 

Mr. "Wilson signified, that his view in agreeing to the 
commitment was, that the Committee might consider the 
propriety of adopting a scale similar to that established by 
the Constitution of Massachusetts, which would give an 
advantage to the small States without substantially depart- 
ing from the rule of proportion. 

Mr. Wilson and Mr. Mason moved to postpone the 
clause relating to money bills, in order to take up the 
clause relating to an equality of votes in the second branch. 

On the question of postponement, — New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
North Carolina, no — 3. 

The clause relating to equality of votes being under 
<»,onsideration, — 

Doctor Franklin observed, that this question could not 
be properly put by itself, the Committee having reported 
several propositions as mutual conditions of each other. He 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 303 

could not vote for it if separately taken ; but should vote for 
the whole together. 

Colonel Mason perceived the difficulty, and suggested a 
reference of the rest of the Report to the Committee just 
appointed, that the whole might be brought into one view. 

Mr. Randolph disliked the reference to that Committee, 
as it consisted of members from States opposed to the 
wishes of the small States, and could not, therefore, be 
acceptable to the latter. 

Mr. Martin and Mr. Jenifer moved to postpone the 
clause till the Committee last appointed should report. 

Mr. Madison observed, that if the uncommitted part of 
the Report was connected with the part just committed, it 
ought also to be committed ; if not connected, it need not 
be postponed till report should be made. 

On the question for postponing, moved by Mr. Martin 
and Mr. Jenifer, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye — 6 ; Pennsylvania, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, no — 3; Massachusetts, New 
York, divided. 

The first clause, relating to the originating of money 
bills, was then resumed. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was opposed to a restriction 
of this right in either branch, considered merely in itself, 
and as unconnected with the point of representation in the 
second branch. It will disable the second branch from 
proposing its own money plans, and give the people an 
opportunity of judging, by comparison, of the merits of 
those proposed by the first branch. 

Mr. Wilson could see nothing like a concession here, 
on the part of the smaller States. If both branches were 
to say yes or no, it was of little consequence which 
should say yes or no first, which last. If either was, indis- 
criminately, to have the right of originating, the reverse of 
the Report would, he thought, be most proper ; since it was 
a maxim, that the least numerous body was the fittest for 
deliberation — the most numerous, for decision. He oh- 



304 DEBATES IN THE [1T8T. 

served that this discrimination had been transcribed from 
the British into several American Constitutions. But he 
was persuaded that, on examination of the American experi- 
ments, it would be found to be a ' trifle light as air.' Nor 
could he ever discover the advantage of it in the parliamen- 
tary history of Great Britain. He hoped, if there was any 
advantage in the privilege, that it would be pointed out. 

Mr. Williamson thought that if the privilege were not 
common to both branches, it ought rather to be confined to 
the second, as the bills in that case would be more narrowly 
watched, than if they originated with the branch having 
most of the popular confidence. 

Mr. Mason. The consideration which weighed with 
the Committee was, that the first branch would be the im- 
mediate representatives of the people ; the second would 
not. Should the latter have the power of giving away the 
people's money, they might soon forget the source from 
whence they received it. We might soon have an aris- 
tocracy. He had been much concerned at the principles 
which had been advanced by some gentlemen, but had the 
satisfaction to find they did not generally prevail. He was 
a friend to proportional representation in both branches , 
but supposed that some points must be yielded for the sake 
of accommodation. 

Mr. Wilson. If he had proposed that the second branch 
should have an independent disposal of public money, the 
observations of Colonel Mason would have been a satis- 
factory answer. But nothing could be farther from what 
he had said. His question was, how is the power of the 
first branch increased, or that of the second diminished, by 
giving the proposed privilege to the former ? Where is 
the difference, in which branch it begins, if both must con- 
cur, in the end ? 

Mr. Gerry would not say that the concession was a 
sufficient one on the part of the small States. But he 
could not but regard it in the light of a concession. It 
would make it a constitutional principle, that the second 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 305 

branch were not possessed of the confidence of the people 
in money matters, which would lessen their weight and 
influence. In the next place, if the second branch were 
dispossessed of the privilege, they would be deprived of 
the opportunity which their continuance in office three 
times as long as the first branch would give them, of 
making three successive essays in favor of a particular 
point. 

Mr. Pinckney thought it evident that the concession 
was wholly on one side, that of the large States; the priv- 
ilege of originating money bills being of no account. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris had waited to [hear the good 
effects of the restriction. As to the alarm sounded, of an 
aristocracy, his creed was that there never was, nor ever 
will be, a civilized society without an aristocracy. His en- 
deavour was, to keep it as much as possible from doing mis- 
chief. The restriction, if it has any real operation, will 
deprive us of the services of the second branch in digesting 
and proposing money bills, of which it will be more capa- 
ble than the first branch. It will take away the responsi- 
bility of the second branch, the great security for good be- 
haviour. It will always leave a plea, as to an obnoxious 
money bill, that it was disliked, but could not be constitu- 
tionally amended, nor safely rejected. It will be a danger- 
ous source of disputes between the two Houses. We should 
either take the British Constitution altogether, or make one 
for ourselves. The Executive there has dissolved two 
Houses, as the only cure for such disputes. Will our 
Executive be able to apply such a remedy? Every law, 
directly or indirectly, takes money out of the pockets of the 
people. Again, what use may be made of such a privilege 
in case of great emergency? Suppose an enemy at the 
door, and money instantly and absolutely necessary for re- 
pelling him, — may not the popular branch avail itself of 
this duresse, to extort concessions from the Senate, de- 
structive of the Constitution itself? He illustrated this 

danger by the example of the Long Parliament's expe- 
20 



306 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

dients for subverting the House of Lords; concluding, on 
the whole, that the restriction would be either useless or 
pernicious. 

Doctor Franklin did not mean to go into a justification 
of the Report ; but as it had been asked what would be the 
use of restraining the second branch from meddling with 
money bills, he could not but remark, that it was always of 
importance that the people should know who had disposed 
of their money, and how it had been disposed of. It was a 
maxim, that those who feel, can best judge. This end 
would, he thought, be best attained, if money affairs were 
to be confined to the immediate representatives of the peo- 
ple. This was his inducement to concur in the Report. 
As to the danger or difficulty that might arise from a nega- 
tive in the second branch, where the people would not be 
proportionally represented, it might easily be got over by 
declaring that there should be no such negative ; or, if that 
will not do, by declaring that there be no such branch at all. 

Mr. Martin said, that it was understood in the Com- 
mittee, that the difficulties and disputes which had been 
apprehended should be guarded against in the detailing of 
the plan. 

Mr. Wilson. The difficulties and disputes will increase 
with the attempts to define and obviate them. Queen Ann 
was obliged to dissolve her Parliament in order to termi- 
nate one of these obstinate disputes between the two houses. 
Had it not been for the mediation of the Crown, no one 
can say what the result would have been. The point is still 
sab jadice in England. He approved of the principles laid 
down by the Honourable President* (Doctor Franklin) his 
colleague, as to the expediency of keeping the people in- 
formed of their money affairs. But thought they would 
know as much, and be as well satisfied, in one way as in 
the other. 

General Pinckney was astonished that this point should 

* He was at that time President of the State of Pennsylvania. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 307 

have been considered as a concession. He remarked, that 
the restriction as to money bills had been rejected on the 
merits singly considered, by eight States against three; 
and that the very States which now called it a concession 
were then against it, as nugatory or improper in itself. 

On the question whether the clause relating to money 
bills in the Report of the Committee consisting of a mem- 
ber from each State, should stand as part of the Report, — 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Caro- 
lina, aye — 5 ; Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, no — 
3; Massachusetts, New York, Georgia, divided. 

A question was then raised, whether the question was 
carried in the affirmative; there being but five ayes, out of 
eleven States present. For the words of the Rule, see May 
28th. 

On this question, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; New York, Virginia, no 
— 2. 

( In several preceding instances like votes had sub 
silentio been entered as decided in the affirmative. ) 

Adjourned. 

Saturday, July 7th. 

In Convention, — The question, shall the clause " allow- 
ing each State one vote in the second branch, stand as part 
of the Report," being taken up, — 

Mr. Gerry. This is the critical question. He had 
rather agree to it than have no accommodation. A Gov- 
ernment short of a proper national plan, if generally accept- 
able, would be preferable to a proper one which, if it could 
be carried at all, would operate on discontented States. He 
thought it would be best to suspend this question till the 
Committee appointed yesterday should make report. 

Mr. Sherman supposed that it was the wish of every- 
one that some General Government should be established. 



308 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

An equal vote in the second branch would, he thought, be 
most likely to give it the necessary vigor. The small States 
have more vigor in their Governments than the large ones; 
the more influence therefore the large ones have, the weaker 
will be the Government. In the large States it will be most 
difficult to collect the real and fair sense of the people. 
Fallacy and undue influence will be practised with most 
success; and improper men will most easily get into office. 
If they vote by States in the second branch, and each State 
has an equal vote, there must be always a majority of 
States, as well as a majority of the people, on the side of 
public measures, and the Government will have decision 
and efficacy. If this be not the case in the second branch, 
there may be a majority of States against public measures ; 
and the difficulty of compelling them to abide by the public 
determination will render the Government feebler than it 
has ever yet been. 

Mr. Wilson was not deficient in a conciliating temper, 
but firmness was sometimes a duty of higher obligation. 
Conciliation was also misapplied in this instance. It was 
pursued here rather among the representatives, than among 
the constituents; and it would be of little consequence if 
not established among the latter; and there could be little 
hope of its beLig established among them, if the founda- 
tion should not be laid in justice and right. 

On the question, shall the words stand as part of the 
Report ? — Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, 
Maryland, North Carolina, aye — 6; Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
South Carolina, no — 3; Massachusetts, Georgia, divided.* 

Mr. Gerry thought it would be proper to proceed to 
enumerate and define the powers to be vested in the General 
Government, before a question on the Report should be 
taken as to the rule of representation in the second branch. 

Mr. Madison observed that it would be impossible to 
say what powers could be safely and properly vested in the 

♦Several votes were given here in the affirmative, or were divided, because 
another final question was to bo taken on the whole Report. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 309 

Government, before it was known in what manner the States 
were to be represented in it. He was apprehensive that if 
a just representation were not the basis of the Government, 
it would happen, as it did when the Articles of Confedera- 
tion were depending, that every effectual prerogative would 
be withdrawn or withheld, and the new Government would 
be rendered as impotent and as short-lived as the old. 

Mr. Patterson would not decide whether the privilege 
concerning money bills were a valuable consideration or 
not ; but he considered the mode and rule of representation 
in the first branch as fully so; and that after the establish- 
ment of that point, the small States would never be able to 
defend themselves without an equality of votes in the second 
branch. There was no other ground of accommodation. 
His resolution was fixed. He would meet the large States 
on that ground, and no other. For himself, he should vote 
against the Keport, because it yielded too much. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. He had no resolution un- 
alterably fixed except to do what should finally appear to 
him right. He was against the Report because it main- 
tained the improper constitution of the second branch. It 
made it another Congress, a mere whisp of straw. , It had 
been said (by Mr. Gerry), that the new Government would 
be partly national, partly federal ; that it ought in the 
first quality to protect individuals ; in the second, the State. 
But in what quality was it to protect the aggregate interest 
of the whole ? Among the many provisions which had been 
urged, he had seen none for supporting the dignity and 
splendor of the American Empire. It had been one of our 
greatest misfortunes that the great objects of the nation 
had been sacrificed constantly to local views ; in like manner 
as the general interest of States had been sacrificed to those 
of the counties. What is to be the check in the Senate ? 
None; unless it be to keep the majority of the people from 
injuring particular States. But particular States ought to 
be injured for the sake of a majority of the people, in case 
their conduct should deserve it. Suppose they should insist 



310 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

on claims evidently unjust, and pursue them in a manner 
detrimental to the whole body: suppose they should give 
themselves up to foreign influence: Ought they to be pro- 
tected in such cases? They were originally nothing more 
than colonial corporations. On the Declaration of Inde- 
pendence, a Government was to be formed. The small States 
aware of the necessity of preventing anarchy, and taking 
advantage of the moment, extorted from the large ones an 
equality of votes. Standing now on that ground, they 
demand, under the new system, greater rights, as men, than 
their fellow-citizens of the large States. The proper answer 
to them is, that the same necessity of which they formerly 
took advantage does not now exist ; and that the large States 
are at liberty now to consider what is right, rather than 
what may be expedient. We must have an efficient Govern- 
ment, and if there be an efficiency in the local Governments, 
the former is impossible. Germany alone proves it. Not- 
withstanding their common Diet, notwithstanding the great 
prerogatives of the Emperor, as head of the Empire, and 
his vast resources, as sovereign of his particular dominions, 
no union is maintained; foreign influence disturbs every 
internal operation, and there is no energy whatever in the 
general government. Whence does this proceed? From 
the energy of the local authorities; from its being con- 
sidered of more consequence to support the Prince of Hesse, 
than the happiness of the people of Germany. Do gentle- 
men wish this to be the case here? Good God, Sir, is it 
possible they can so delude themselves? What if all the 
Charters and Constitutions of the States were thrown into 
the fire, and all their demagogues into the ocean — what 
would it be to the happiness of America? And will not 
this be the case here, if we pursue the train in which the 
business lies? We shall establish an Aulic Council, with- 
out an Emperor to execute its decrees. The same circum- 
stances which unite the people here unite them in Germany. 
They have there a common language, a common law, com- 
mon usages and manners, and a common interest in being 



J 787-] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 311 

united; yet their local jurisdictions destroy every tie. The 
case was the same in the Grecian states. The United 
Netherlands are at this time torn in factions. With 
these examples before our eyes, shall we form establish- 
ments which must necessarily produce the same effects ? It 
is of no consequence from what districts the second branch 
shall be drawn, if it be so constituted as to yield an asylum 
against these evils. As it is now constituted, he must be 
against its being drawn from the States in equal portions; 
but shall be ready to join in devising such an amendment 
of the plan as will be most likely to secure our liberty and 
happiness. 

Mr. Sherman and Mr. Ellsworth moved to postpone 
the question on the Report from the Committee of a mem- 
ber from each State, in order to wait for the Report from 
■the Committee of five last appointed, — Massachusetts, Con- 
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, 
aye — 6 ; New York, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- 
lina, Georgia, no — 5. 
Adjourned. 

Monday, July 9th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Daniel Carroll, from Maryland, 
took his seat. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris delivered a Report from the 
Committee of five members, to whom was committed the 
clause in the Report of the Committee consisting of a mem- 
ber from each State, stating the proper ratio of represen- 
tatives in the first branch to be as one to every forty 
thousand inhabitants, as follows, viz : 

" The Committee to whom was referred the first clause 
of the first proposition reported from the Grand Committee, 
beg leave to report : 

" That in the first meeting of the Legislature the first 
branch thereof consist of fifty-six members, of which num- 
ber New Hampshire shall have 2, Massachusetts 7, 



312 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Khode Island 1, Connecticut 4, New York 5, New Jersey 3, 
Pennsylvania 8, Delaware 1, Maryland 4, Virginia 9, North 
Carolina 5, South Carolina 5, Georgia 2. 
.. " But as the present situation of the States may prob- 
ably alter, as well in point of wealth as in the number of 
their inhabitants, that the Legislature be authorized from 
time to time to augment the number of Representatives. 
And in case any of the States shall hereafter be divided, or 
any two or more States united, or any new States created 
within the limits of the United States, the Legislature shall 
possess authority to regulate the number of Representatives 
in any of the foregoing cases, upon the principles of their 
wealth and number of inhabitants." 

Mr. Sherman wished to know, on what principles or 
calculations the Report was founded. It did not appear to 
correspond with any rule of numbers, or of any requisition 
hitherto adopted by Congress. 

Mr. Gorham. Some provision of this sort was neces- 
sary in the outset. The number of blacks and whites,, 
with some regard to supposed wealth, was the general guide. 
Fractions could not be observed. The Legislature is to 
make alterations from time to time, as justice and propriety 
may require. Two objections prevailed against the rule of 
one member for every forty thousand inhabitants. The first 
was, that the representation would soon be too numerous, 
the second that the Western States, who may have a differ- 
ent interest, might, if admitted on that principle, by degrees 
outvote the Atlantic. Both these objections are removed. 
The number will be small in the first instance, and may be 
continued so. And the Atlantic States, having the Govern- 
ment in their own hands, may take care of their own inter- 
est, by dealing out the right of representation in safe 
proportions to the Western States. These were the views 
of the Committee. 

Mr. L. Martin wished to know whether the Committee 
were guided in the ratio by the wealth, or number of 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 313 

inhabitants, of the States, or both ; noting its variations 
from former apportionments by Congress. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris and Mr. Kutledge moved to 
postpone the first paragraph, relating to the number of 
members to be allowed to each State in the first instance 
and to take up the second paragraph, authorizing the Leg- 
islature to alter the number from time to time according to 
wealth and inhabitants. The motion was agreed to, nem. 
con. 

On the question on the second paragraph, taken without 
any debate, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- 
lina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; New York, New Jersey, no — 2. 

Mr. Sherman moved to refer the first part, apportioning 
the representatives, to a Committee of a member from each 
State. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion ; observ- 
ing that this was the only case in which such committees 
were useful. 

Mr. Williamson thought it would be necessary to 
return to the rule of numbers, but that the Western States 
stood on different footing. If their property should be 
rated as high as that of the Atlantic States, then their 
representation ought to hold a like proportion. Otherwise, 
if their property was not to be equally rated. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The Keport is little more 
than a guess. Wealth was not altogether disregarded by 
the Committee. Where it was apparently in favor of one 
State whose numbers were superior to the numbers of 
another, by a fraction only, a member extraordinary was 
allowed to the former ; and so vice versa. The Committee 
meant little more than to bring the matter to a point for 
the consideration of the House. 

Mr. Read asked, why Georgia was allowed two mem- 
bers, when her number of inhabitants had stood below that 
of Delaware ? 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. Such is the rapidity of the 



314 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

population of that State, that before the plan takes effect, 
it will probably be entitled to two Kepresentatives. 

Mr. Kandolph disliked the Keport of the Committee, 
but had been unwilling to object to it. He was apprehen- 
sive that, as the number was not to be changed, till the 
National Legislature should please, a pretext would never 
be wanting to postpone alterations, and keep the power in 
the hands of those possessed of it. He was in favor of the 
commitment to a member from each State. 

Mr. Patterson considered the proposed estimate for 
the future according to the combined rules of numbers and 
wealth, as too vague. For this reason New Jersey was 
against it. He could regard negro slaves in no light but 
as property. They are no free agents, have no personal 
liberty, no faculty of acquiring property, but on the con- 
trary are themselves property, and like other property 
entirely at the will of the master. Has a man in Virginia 
a number of votes in proportion to the number of his 
slaves ? and if negroes are not represented in the States to 
which they belong, why should they be represented in the 
General Government. What is the true principle of repre- 
sentation ? It is an expedient by which an assembly of 
certain individuals, chosen by the people, is substituted in 
place of the inconvenient meeting of the people themselves. 
If such a meeting of the people was actually to take place, 
would the slaves vote ? They would not. Why then should 
they be represented ? He was also against such an indirect 
encouragement of the slave trade ; observing that Congress, 
in their Act relating to the change of the eighth Article of 
Confederation, had been ashamed to use the term "slaves," 
and had substituted a description. 

Mr. Madison reminded Mr. Patterson that his doc- 
trine of representation, which was in its principle the gen- 
uine one, must forever silence the pretensions of the small 
States to an equality of votes with the large ones. They 
ought to vote in the same proportion in which their 
citizens would do, if the people of all the States were col- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 315 

lectively met. He suggested as a proper ground of com- 
promise, that in the first branch the States should be rep- 
resented according to their number of free inhabitants ; and 
in the second, which had for one of its primary objects the 
guardianship of property, according to the whole number, 
including slaves. 

Mr. Butler urged warmly the justice and necessity of 
regarding wealth in the apportionment of representation. 

Mr. King had always expected, that, as the Southern 
States are the richest, they would not league themselves 
with the Northern, unless some respect were paid to their 
superior Avealth. If the latter expect those preferential 
distinctions in commerce, and other advantages which they 
will derive from the connexion, they must not expect to re- 
ceive them without allowing some advantages in return. 
Eleven out of thirteen of the States had agreed to consider 
slaves in the apportionment of taxation; and taxation and 
representation ought to go together. 

On the question for committing the first paragraph of 
the Report to a member from each State, — Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary- 
land, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9; New 
York, South Carolina, no — 2. 

The Committee appointed were Messrs. King, Sherman, 
Yates, Brearly, Gouverneur Morris, Read, Carroll, 
Madison, Williamson, Rutledge, Houston. 

Adjourned. 



Tuesday, July 10th. 

In Convention, — Mr. King reported, from the Commit- 
tee yesterday appointed, " that the States at the first meet- 
ing of the General Legislature, should be represented by 
sixty -five members, in the following proportions, to wit: — 
New Hampshire, by 3 ; Massachusetts, 8 ; Rhode Island, 1 ; 
Connecticut, 5; New York, 6; New Jersey, 4; Pennsylvania, 



316 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

8 ; Delaware, 1 ; Maryland, 6 ; Virginia, 10 ; North Carolina, 
5; South Carolina, 5; Georgia, 3." 

Mr. Rutledge moved that New Hampshire be reduced 
from three to two members. Her numbers did not entitle 
her to three, and it was a poor State. 

General Pinckney seconds the motion. 

Mr. King. New Hampshire has probably more than 
120,000 inhabitants, and has an extensive country of toler- 
able fertility. Its inhabitants may therefore be expected to 
increase fast. He remarked that the four Eastern States, 
having 800,000 souls, have one - third fewer representatives 
than the four Southern States, having not more than 700,- 
000 souls, rating the blacks as five for three. The Eastern 
people will advert to these circumstances, and be dissatis- 
fied. He believed them to be very desirous of uniting with 
their Southern brethren, but did not think it prudent to 
rely so far on that disposition, as to subject them to any 
gross inequality. He was fully convinced that the question 
concerning a difference of interests did not lie where it had 
hitherto been discussed, between the great and small States ; 
but between the Southern and Eastern. For this reason he 
had been ready to yield something, in the proportion of 
representatives, for the security of the Southern. No 
principle would justify the giving them a majority. The}- 
were brought as near an equality as was possible. He was 
not averse to giving them a still greater security, but did 
not see how it could be done. 

General Pinckney. The Report before it was committed 
was more favorable to the Southern States than as it now 
stands. If they are to form so considerable a minority, 
and the regulation of trade is to be given to the General 
Government, they will be nothing more than overseers for 
the Northern States. He did not expect the Southern 
States to be raised to a majority of representatives; but 
wished them to have something like an equality. At 
present, by the alterations of the Committee in favor of 
the Northern States, they are removed further from it than 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 317 

they were before. One member indeed had been added to 
Virginia, which he was glad of, as he considered her as a 
Southern State. He was glad also that the members of 
Georgia were increased. 

Mr. Williamson was not for reducing New Hampshire 
from three to two, but for reducing some others. The 
Southern interest must be extremely endangered by the 
present arrangement. The Northern States are to have a 
majority in the first instance, and the means of perpetua- 
ting it. 

Mr. Dayton observed, that the line between Northern 
and Southern interest had been improperly drawn; that 
Pennsylvania was the dividing State, there being six on 
each side of her. 

General Pinckney urged the reduction; dwelt on the 
superior wealth of the Southern States, and insisted on its 
having its due weight in the Government. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris regretted the turn of the 
debate. The States, he found, had many representatives on 
the floor. Few, he feared, were to be deemed the Repre- 
sentatives of America. He thought the Southern States 
have, by the Report, more than their share of representa- 
tion. Property ought to have its weight, but not all the 
weight. If the Southern States are to supply money, the 
Northern States are to spill their blood. Besides, the 
probable revenue to be expected from the Southern States 
has been greatly overrated. He was against reducing New 
Hampshire. 

Mr. Randolph was opposed to a reduction of New 
Hampshire, not because she had a full title to three mem- 
bers ; but because it was in his contemplation, first, to make 
it the duty, instead of leaving it to the discretion, of the 
Legislature to regulate the representation by a periodical 
census; secondly, to require more than a bare majority of 
votes in the Legislature, in certain cases, and particularly 
in commercial cases. 

On the question for reducing New Hampshire from 



318 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

three to two Representatives, it passed in the negative, — 
North Carolina,* South Carolina, aye — 2; Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary- 
land, Virginia, Georgia,* no — 8. 

General Pinckney and Mr. Alexander Martin moved 
that six Representatives, instead of five, be allowed to North 
Carolina. 

On the question it passed in the negative, — North Caro- 
lina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary- 
land, Virginia, no — 7. 

General Pinckney and Mr. Butler made the same mo- 
tion in favor of South Carolina. 

On the question, it passed in the negative, — Delaware, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 4; Massa- 
chusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva- 
nia, Maryland, Virginia, no — 7. 

General Pinckney and Mr. Houston moved that Geor- 
gia be allowed four instead of three Representatives ; urg- 
ing the unexampled celerity of its population. 

On the question, it passed in the negative, — Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 4 ; Massa- 
chusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva- 
nia, Delaware, Maryland, no — 7. 

Mr. Madison moved that the number allowed to each 
State be doubled. A majority of a Quorum of sixty-five 
members was too small a number to represent the whole in- 
habitants of the United States. They would not possess 
enough of the confidence of the people, and would be too 
sparsely taken from the people, to bring with them all the 
local information which would be frequently wanted. 
Double the number will not be too great, even with the 
future additions from the new States. The additional expense 
was too inconsiderable to be regarded in so important a 
case. And as far as the augmentation might be unpopular 

* In the printed Journal, North Carolina, no; Georgia, aye. 



1^87.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 319 

on that score, the objection was overbalanced by its effect 
on the hopes of a greater number of the popular candidates. 

Mr. Ellsworth urged the objection of expense; and 
that the greater the number, the more slowly would the 
business proceed; and the less probably be decided as it 
ought, at last. He thought the number of representatives 
too great in most of the State Legislatures; and that a large 
number was less necessary in the General Legislature, than 
in those of the States ; as its business would relate to a few 
great national objects only. 

Mr. Sherman would have preferred fifty to sixty -five. 
The great distance they will have to travel will render their 
attendance precarious, and will make it difficult to prevail 
on a sufficient number of fit men to undertake the service. 
He observed that the expected increase from new States 
also deserved consideration. 

Mr. Gerry was for increasing the number beyond sixty- 
five. The larger the number, the less the danger of their 
being corrupted. The people are accustomed to, and fond 
of, a numerous representation; and will consider their 
rights as better secured by it. The danger of excess in 
the number may be guarded against by fixing a point with- 
in which the number shall always be kept. 

Colonel Mason admitted, that the objection drawn from 
the consideration of expense had weight both in itself, and 
as the people might be affected by it. But he thought it 
outweighed by the objections against the smallness of the 
number. Thirty- eight will, he supposes, as being a major- 
ity of sixty-five, form a quorum. Twenty will be a major- 
ity of thirty-eight. This was certainly too small a number 
to make laws for America. They would neither bring with 
them all the necessary information relative to various local 
interests, nor possess the necessary confidence of the peo- 
ple. After doubling the number, the laws might still be 
made by so few as almost to be objectionable on that 
account. 

Mr. Eead was in favor of the motion. Two of the 



320 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

States (Delaware and Rhode Island) would have but a 
single member if the aggregate number should remain at 
sixty-five; and in case of accident to either of these, one 
State would have no Representative present to give explan- 
ations or informations of its interests or wishes. The peo- 
ple would not place their confidence in so small a number. 
He hoped the objects of the General Government would be 
much more numerous than seemed to be expected by some 
gentlemen, and that they would become more and more so. 
As to the new States, the highest number of Representa- 
tives for the whole might be limited, and all danger of ex- 
cess thereby prevented. Mr. Rutledge opposed the mo- 
tion. The Representatives were too numerous in all the 
States. The full number allotted to the States may be ex- 
pected to attend, and the lowest possible quorum should not 
therefore be considered. The interests of their constitu- 
ents will urge their attendance too strongly for it to be 
omitted: and he supposed the General Legislature would 
not sit more than six or eight weeks in the year. 

On the question for doubling the number, it passed in 
the negative, — Delaware, Virginia, aye — 2 ; Massachu- 
setts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 9. 

On the question for agreeing to the apportionment of 
Representatives, as amended by the last Committee, it 
passed in the affirmative, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, 
Virginia, North Carolina, aye — 9 ; South Carolina, Georgia, 
no — 2. 

Mr. Broom gave notice to the House, that he had con- 
curred with a reserve to himself of an intention to claim for 
his State an equal voice in the second branch ; which he 
thought could not be denied after this concession of the 
the small States as to the first branch. 

Mr. Randolph moved, as an amendment to the Report 
of the Committee of five, " that in order to ascertain the 
alterations in the population and wealth of the several 



[1787. FEDERAL CONVENTION. 321 

States, the Legislature should be required to cause a cen- 
sus and estimate to be taken within one year after its first 

meeting ; and every ■ years thereafter ; and that the 

Legislature arrange the representation accordingly." 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris opposed it, as fettering the 
Legislature too much. Advantage may be taken of it in 
time of war or the apprehension of it, by new States to 
extort particular favors. If the mode was to be fixed for 
taking a census, it might certainly be extremely inconveni- 
ent : if unfixed, the Legislature may use such a mode as 
will defeat the object ; and perpetuate the inequality. He 
was always against such shackles on the Legislature. They 
had been found very pernicious in most of the State Con- 
stitutions. He dwelt much on the danger of throwing such 
a preponderance into the western scale ; suggesting that in 
time the western people would outnumber the Atlantic 
States. He wished therefore to put it in the power of the 
latter to keep a majority of votes in their own hands. It 
was objected, he said, that, if the Legislature are left at 
liberty, they will never re-adjust the representation. He 
admitted that this was possible, but he did not think it prob- 
able, unless the reasons against a revision of it were very 
urgent ; and in this case, it ought not to be done. 

It was moved to postpone the proposition of Mr. Ran- 
dolph, in order to take up the following, viz : " that the 
Committee of eleven, to whom was referred the Report o£ 
the Committee of five on the subject of Representation, be 
requested to furnish the Convention with the principles on 
which they grounded the report ; " which was disagreed 
to, — South Carolina alone voting in the affirmative. 

Adjourned. 

Wednesday, July 11th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Randolph's motion, requiring the 

Legislature to take a periodical census for the purpose of 

redressing inequalities in the representation was resumed. 
21 



322 DEBATES IN THE [1787.. 

Mr. Sherman was against shackling the Legislature too 
much. We ought to choose wise and good men, and then 
confide in them. 

Mr. Mason. The greater the difficulty we find in fixing 
a proper rule of representation, the more unwilling ought 
we be to throw the task from ourselves on the General 
Legislature. He did not object to the conjectural ratio 
which was to prevail in the outset ; but considered a revis- 
ion from time to time, according to some permanent and 
precise standard, as essential to the fair representation 
required in the first branch. According to the present 
population of America, the northern part of it had a right 
to preponderate, and he could not deny it. But he wished 
it not to preponderate hereafter, when the reason no longer 
continued. From the nature of man, we may be sure that 
those who have power in their hands will not give it up, 
while they can retain it. On the contrary, we know that 
they will always, when they can, rather increase it. If the 
Southern States, therefore, should have three-fourths of the 
people of America within their limits, the Northern will 
hold fast the majority of Representatives. One-fourth will 
govern the three-fourths. The Southern States will com- 
plain, but they may complain from generation to generation 
without redress. Unless some principle, therefore, which 
will do justice to them hereafter, shall be inserted in the 
Constitution, disagreeable as the declaration was to him, 
he must declare he could neither vote for the system here, 
nor support it in his State. Strong objections had been 
drawn from the danger to the Atlantic interests from new 
Western States. Ought we to sacrifice what we know to be 
right in itself, lest it should prove favourable to States which 
are not yet in existence ? If the Western States are to be 
admitted into the Union, as they arise, they must, he would 
repeat, be treated as equals, and subjected to no degrading 
discriminations. They will have the same pride, and other 
passions, which we have; and will either not unite with, or 
will speedily revolt from, the Union, if they are not in all 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 323 

respects placed on an equal footing with their brethren. It 
has been said, they will be poor, and unable to make equal 
contributions to the general treasury. He did not know 
but that, in time, they would be both more numerous and 
more wealthy, than their Atlantic brethren. The extent 
and fertility of their soil made this probable; and though 
Spain might for a time deprive them of the natural outlet 
for their productions, yet she will, because she must, finally 
yield to their demands. He urged that numbers of inhabi- 
tants, though not always a precise standard of wealth, was 
sufficiently so for every substantial purpose. 

Mr. Williamson was for making it a duty of the Legis- 
lature to do what was right, and not leaving it at liberty to 
do or not to do it. He moved that Mr. Kandolph's propo- 
sitions be postponed, in order to consider the following, 
" that in order to ascertain the alterations that may happen 
in the population and wealth of the States, a census shall be 
taken of the free white inhabitants, and three-fifths of those 
of other descriptions on the first year after this government 

shall have been adopted, and every year thereafter ; 

and that the representation be regulated accordingly." 

Mr. Eandolph agreed that Mr. Williamson's proposi- 
tion should stand in place of his. He observed that the 
ratio fixed for the first meeting was a mere conjecture; that 
it placed the power in the hands of that part of America 
which could not always be entitled to it; that this power- 
would not be voluntarily renounced; and that it was conse- 
quently the duty of the Convention to secure - its renuncia- 
tion, when justice might so require, by some constitutional 
provisions. If equality between great and small States be 
inadmissible, because in that case unequal numbers of con- 
stituents would be represented by equal numbers of votes, 
was it not equally inadmissible, that a larger and more 
populous district of America should hereafter have less 
representation than a smaller and less populous district ? If 
a fair representation of the people be not secured, the in- 
justice of the Government will shake it to its foundations. 



324: DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

What relates to suffrage, is justly stated by the celebrated 
Montesquieu as a fundamental article in Republican Gov- 
ernments. If the danger suggested by Mr. Gouverneur 
Morris be real, of advantage being taken of the Legislature 
in pressing moments, it was an additional reason for tying 
their hands in such a manner, that they could not sacrifice 
their trust to momentary considerations. Congress have 
pledged the public faith to new States, that they shall be 
admitted on equal terms. They never would, nor ought to, 
accede on any other. The census must be taken under the 
direction of the General Legislature. The States will be 
too much interested, to take an impartial one for them- 
selves. 

Mr. Butler and General Pinckney insisted that blacks 
be included in the rule of representation equally with the 
whites; and for that purpose moved that the words " three - 
fifths " be struck out. 

Mr. Gerry thought that three-fifths of them was, to say 
the least, the full proportion that could be admitted. 

Mr. Gorham. This ratio was fixed by Congress as a 
rule of taxation. Then, it was urged, by the Delegates 
representing the States having slaves, that the blacks were 
still more inferior to freemen. At present, when the ratio 
of representation is to be established, we are assured that 
they are equal to freemen. The arguments on the former 
occasion had convinced him, that three-fifths was pretty near 
the just proportion, and he should vote according to the 
same opinion now. 

Mr. Butler insisted that the labor of a slave in South 
Carolina was as productive and valuable, as that of a free- 
man in Massachusetts; that as wealth was the great means 
of defence and utility to the nation, they were equally val- 
uable to it with freemen; and that consequently an equal 
representation ought to be allowed for them in a govern- 
ment which was instituted principally for the protection of 
property, and was itself to be supported by property. 

Mr. Mason could not agree to the motion, notwithstand- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 325 

ing it was favourable to Virginia, because he thought it un- 
just. It was certain that the slaves were valuable, as they 
raised the value of land, increased the exports and imports, 
and of course the revenue, would supply the means of feed- 
ing and supporting an army, and might in cases of emer- 
gency become themselves soldiers. As in these important 
respects they were useful to the community at large, they 
ought not to be excluded from the estimate of representa- 
tion. He could not, however, regard them as equal to free- 
men, and could not vote for them as such. He added, as 
worthy of remark, that the Southern States have this pecu- 
liar species of property, over and above the other species of 
property common to all the States. 

Mr. Williamson reminded Mr. Gorham that if the 
Southern States contended for the inferiority of blacks to 
whites when taxation was in view, the Eastern States, on 
the same occasion, contended for their equality. He did 
not, however, either then or now, concur in either extreme, 
but approved of the ratio of three - fifths. 

On Mr. Butler's motion, for considering blacks as 
equal to whites in the apportionment of representation, — 
Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 3 ; Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, no - — 7 ; New York, not on the floor. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris said he had several objections 
to the proposition of Mr. Williamson. In the first place, 
it fettered the Legislature too much. In the second place, 
it would exclude some States altogether who would not 
have a sufficient number to entitle them to a single repre- 
sentation. In the third place, it will not consist with the 
resolution passed on Saturday last, authorizing the Legis- 
lature to adjust the representation from time to time on the 
principles of population and wealth; nor with the princi- 
ples of equity. If slaves were to be considered as inhabi- 
tants, not as wealth, then the said Eesolution would not be 
pursued; if as wealth, then why is no other wealth but 
slaves included? These objections may perhaps be removed 



326 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

by amendments. His great objection was, that the number 
of inhabitants was not a proper standard of wealth. The 
amazing difference between the comparative numbers and 
wealth of different countries rendered all reasoning super- 
fluous on the subject. Numbers might with greater pro- 
priety be deemed a measure of strength, than of wealth; 
yet the late defence made by Great Britain, against her 
numerous enemies proved, in the clearest manner, that it is 
entirely fallacious even in this respect. 

Mr. King thought there was great force in the objections 
of Mr. Gouverneur Morris. He would, however, accede 
to the proposition for the sake of doing something. 

Mr. Rutledge contended for the admission of wealth 
in the estimate by which representation should be regula- 
ted. The Western States will not be able to contribute in 
proportion to their numbers ; they should not therefore be 
represented in that proportion. The Atlantic States will 
not concur in such a plan. He moved that, " at the end of 

years after the first meeting of the Legislature, and 

of every years thereafter, the Legislature shall pro- 
portion the representation according to the principles of 
wealth and population." 

Mr. Sherman thought the number of people alone the 
best rule for measuring wealth as well as representation ; 
and that if the Legislature were to be governed by wealth, 
they would be obliged to estimate it by numbers. He was 
at first for leaving the matter wholly to the discretion of 
the Legislature; but he had been convinced by the observa- 
tion of (Mr. Randolph and Mr. Mason), that the periods 
and the rule, of revising the representation, ought to be 
fixed by the Constitution. 

Mr. Read thought, the Legislature ought not to be too 
much shackled. It would make the Constitution like 
religious creeds, embarrassing to those bound to conform 
to them, and more likely to produce dissatisfaction and 
schism, than harmony and union. 

Mr. Mason objected to Mr. Rutledge's motion, as re- 






1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 32i 

quiring of the Legislature something too indefinite and 
impracticable, and leaving them a pretext for doing noth- 
ing. 

Mr. Wilson had himself no objection to leaving the 
Legislature entirely at liberty, but considered wealth as an 
impracticable rule. 

Mr. Gorham. If the Convention, who are compar- 
atively so little biassed by local views, are so much per- 
plexed, how can it be expected that the Legislature here- 
after, under the full bias of those views will be able to 
settle a standard? He was convinced, by the arguments of 
others and his own reflections, that the Convention ought 
to fix some standard or other. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The argument of others and 
his own reflections had led him to a very different conclu- 
sion. If we cannot agree on a rule that will be just at this 
iime, how can we expect to find one that will be just in all 
times to come ? Surely those who come after us will judge 
better of things present, than we can of things future. He 
could not persuade himself that numbers would be a just 
rule at any time. The remarks of (Mr. Mason) relative to 
the Western country had not changed his opinion on that 
head. Among other objections, it must be apparent, they 
would not be able to furnish men equally enlightened, to 
share in the administration of our common interests. The 
busy haunts of men, not the remote wilderness, was the 
proper school of political talents. If the western people 
get the power into their hands, they will ruin the Atlantic 
interests. The back members are always most averse to the 
best measures. He mentioned the case of Pennsylvania 
formerly. The lower part of the State had the power in the 
first instance. They kept it in their own hands, and the 
country was the better for it. Another objection with him. 
against admitting the blacks into the census, was, that the 
people of Pennsylvania would revolt at the idea of being 
put on a footing with slaves. They would reject any plan 
that was to have such an effect. Two objections had been 



328 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

raised against leaving the adjustment of the representation, 
from time to time, to the discretion of the Legislature. 
The first was, they would be unwilling to revise it at all. 
The second, that, by referring to wealth, they would be 
bound by a rule which, if willing, they would be unable to 
execute. The first objection distrusts their fidelity. But 
if their duty, their honor, and their oaths, will not bind 
them, let us not put into their hands our liberty, and all our 
other great interests ; let us have no government at all. In 
the second place, if these ties will bind them, we need not 
distrust the practicability of the rule. It was followed in 
part by the Committee in the apportionment of Represen- 
tatives yesterday reported to the House. The best course 
that could be taken would be to leave the interests of the 
people to the representatives of the people. 

Mr. Madison was not a little surprised to hear this im- 
plicit confidence urged by a member who, on all occasions, 
had inculcated so strongly the political depravity of men, 
and the necessity of checking one vice and interest by op- 
posing to them another vice and interest. If the represen- 
tatives of the people would be bound by the ties he had 
mentioned, what need was there of a Senate ? What of a 
revisionary power? But his reasoning was not only in- 
consistent with his former reasoning, but with itself. At 
the same time that he recommended this implicit confidence 
to the Southern States in the Northern majority, he was 
still more zealous in exhorting all to a jealousy of a western 
majority. To reconcile the gentleman with himself, it 
must be imagined that he determined the human character 
by the points of the compass. The truth was, that all men 
having power ought to be distrusted, to a certain degree. 
The case of Pennsylvania had been mentioned, where it was 
admitted that those who were possessed of the power in the 
original settlement never admitted the new settlements to a 
due share of it. England was a still more striking example. 
The power there had long been in the hands of the bor- 
oughs — of the minority — who had opposed and defeated 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 32$ 

every reform which had been attempted. Virginia was, in 
a less degree, another example. With regard to the West- 
ern States, he was clear and firm in opinion, that no un- 
favourable distinctions were admissible, either in point of 
justice or policy. He thought also, that the hope of con- 
tributions to the Treasury from them had been much under- 
rated. Future contributions, it seemed to be understood 
on all hands, would be principally levied on imports and 
exports. The extent and fertility of the Western soil 
would for a long time give to agriculture a preference over 
manufactures. Trials would be repeated till some articles 
could be raised from it, that would bear a transportation to 
places where they could be exchanged for imported man- 
ufactures. Whenever the Mississippi should be opened to 
them, which would of necessity be the case as soon as their 
population would subject them to any considerable share of 
the public burden, imposts on their trade could be collected 
with less expense, and greater certainty, than on that of the 
Atlantic States. In the mean time, as their supplies must 
pass through the Atlantic States, their contributions would 
be levied in the same manner with those of the Atlantic 
States. He could not agree that any substantial objection 
lay against fixing numbers for the perpetual standard of 
representation. It was said, that representation and tax- 
ation were to go together ; that taxation and wealth ought to 
go together ; that population and wealth were not measures 
of each other. He admitted that in different climates, under 
different forms of government, and in different stages of 
civilization, the inference was perfectly just. He would 
admit that in no situation numbers of inhabitants were an 
accurate measure of wealth. He contended, however, that 
in the United States it was sufficiently so for the object in 
contemplation. Although their climate varied consider- 
ably, yet as the governments, the laws, and the manners of 
all, were nearly the same, and the intercourse between dif- 
ferent parts perfectly free, population, industry, arts, and 
the value of labor, would constantly tend to equalize them- 



330 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

selves. The value of labor might be considered as the 
principal criterion of wealth and ability to support taxes; 
and this would find its level in different places, where the 
intercourse should be easy and free, with as much cer- 
tainty as the value of money or any other thing. Where- 
ever labor would yield most, people would resort ; till the 
competition should destroy the inequality. Hence it is 
that the people are constantly swarming from the more, to 
the less, populous places — from Europe to America — 
from the Northern and middle parts of the United States 
to the Southern and Western. They go where land is 
cheaper, because there labor is dearer. If it be true that 
the same quantity of produce raised on the banks of the 
Ohio is of less value than on the Delaware, it is also 
true that the same labor will raise twice or thrice the 
quantity in the former, that it will raise in the latter situ- 
ation. 

Colonel Mason agreed with Mr. G. Morris, that we 
ought to leave the interests of the people to the repre- 
sentatives of the people ; but the objection was, that the 
Legislature would cease to be the representatives of the 
people. It would continue so no longer than the States 
now containing a majority of the people should retain that 
majority. As soon as the southern and western population 
should predominate, which must happen in a few years, the 
power would be in the hands of the minority, and would 
never be yielded to the majority, unless provided for by the 
Constitution. 

On the question for postponing Mr. Williamson's 
motion, in order to consider that of Mr. Rutledge, it 
passed in the negative, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5 ; Connecticut, 
New Jersey, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no — 5. 

On the question on the first clause of Mr. Williamson's 
motion, as to taking a census of the free inhabitants, it 
passed in the affirmative, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 331 

New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, aye — 
6 ; Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 4. 

The next clause as to three-fifths of the negroes being 
considered, — 

Mr. King, being much opposed to fixing numbers as 
the rule of representation, was particularly so on account 
of the blacks. He thought the admission of them along 
with whites at all, would excite great discontent among 
the States having no slaves. He had never said, as to any 
particular point, that he would in no event acquiesce in and 
support it ; but he would say that if in any case such a 
declaration was to be made by him, it would be in this 
He remarked that in the temporary allotment of representa- 
tives made by the Committee, the Southern States had 
received more than the number of their white and three- 
fifths of their black inhabitants entitled them to. 

Mr. Sherman. South Carolina had no more beyond 
her proportion than New York and New Hampshire ; nor 
either of them more than was necessary in order to avoid 
fractions, or reducing them below their proportion. 
Georgia had more ; but the rapid growth of that State 
seemed to justify it In general the allotment might not 
be just, but considering all circumstances he was satisfied 
with it. 

Mr. Gorham supported the propriety of establishing 
numbers as the rule. He said that in Massachusetts esti- 
mates had been taken in the different towns, and that 
persons had been curious enough to compare these esti- 
mates with the respective numbers of people; and it had 
been found, even including Boston, that the most exact 
proportion prevailed between numbers and property. He 
was aware that there might be some weight in what had 
fallen from his colleague, as to the umbrage which might be 
taken by the people of the Eastern States. But he recol- 
lected that when the proposition of Congress for changing 
the eighth Article of the Confederation was before the 
Legislature of Massachusetts, the only difficulty then was, 



332 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

to satisfy them that the negroes ought not to have been 
counted equally with the whites, instead of being counted 
in the ratio of three-fifths only.* 

Mr. Wilson did not well see, on what principle the 
admission of blacks in the proportion of three-fifths could 
be explained. Are they admitted as citizens — then why 
are they not admitted on an equality with white citizens? 
Are they admitted as property — then why is not other prop- 
erty admitted into the computation ? These were difficulties, 
however, which he thought must be overruled by the 
necessity of compromise. He had some apprehensions also, 
from the tendency of the blending of the blacks with the 
whites, to give disgust to the people of Pennsylvania, as 
had been intimated by his colleague (Mr. Gouverneur 
Morris). But he differed from him in thinking numbers of 
inhabitants so incorrect a measure of wealth. He had seen 
the western settlements of Pennsylvania, and on a compari- 
son of them with the city of Philadelphia could discover 
little other difference, than that property was more un- 
equally divided here than there. Taking the same number 
in the aggregate, in the two situations, he believed there 
would be little difference in their wealth and ability to 
contribute to the public wants. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was compelled to declare him- 
self reduced to the dilemma of doing injustice to the 
Southern States, or to human nature ; and he must there- 
fore do it to the former. For he could never agree to give 
such encouragement to the slave trade, as would be given 
by allowing them a representation for their negroes ; and 
he did not believe those States would ever confederate on 
terms that would deprive them of that trade. 

On the question for agreeing to include three-fifths of 
the blacks, — Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, 
aye — 4; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela- 
ware, Maryland, f South Carolina, no — 6. 

*They were then to have been a rule of taxation only. 

t Mr. Carroll said, in explanation of the vote of Maryland, that he wished the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 333 

On the question as to taking the census " the first year 
after the meeting of the Legislature," — Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 7; Connecticut, Maryland, 
Georgia, no — 3. 

On filling the blank for the periodical census with fif- 
teen years, — agreed to, nem. con. 

Mr. Madison moved to add, after " fifteen years," the 
words "at least," that the Legislature might anticipate 
when circumstances were likely to render a particular year 
inconvenient. 

On this motion, for adding " at least," it passed in the 
negative, the States being equally divided, — Massachusetts, 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 5 ; 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary- 
land, no — 5. 

A change in the phraseology of the other clause, so as 
to read, " and the Legislature shall alter or augment the 
representation accordingly," was agreed to, nem. con. 

On the question on the whole resolution of Mr. Wil- 
liamson, as amended, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New 
Jersey, Delaware Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia, no — 9 ; so it was rejected unani- 
mously. 

Adjourned. 

Thursday, July 12th. 

In Convention, — Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to add 
to the clause empowering the Legislature to vary the rep- 
resentation according to the principles of wealth and num- 
bers of inhabitants, a proviso, " that taxation shall be in 
proportion to representation." 

Mr. Butler contended again, that representation should 
be according to the full number of inhabitants, including 

phraseology to be so altered as to obviate, if possible, the danger which had been 
expressed of giving umbrage to the Eastern and Middle States. 



334 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

all the blacks; admitting the justice of Mr. Gouveeneur 
Morris's motion. 

Mr. Mason also admitted the justice of the principle, 
but was afraid embarrassments might be occasioned to the 
Legislature by it. It might drive the Legislature to the 
plan of requisitions. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris admitted that some objections 
lay against his motion, but supposed they would be removed 
by restraining the rule to direct taxation. With regard to 
indirect taxes on exports and imports, and on consumption, 
the rule would be inapplicable. Notwithstanding what had 
been said to the contrary, he was persuaded that the im- 
ports and consumption were pretty nearly equal through- 
out the Union. 

General Pinckney liked the idea. He thought it so 
just that it could not be objected to; but foresaw, that, if 
the revision of the census was left to the discretion of the 
Legislature, it would never be carried into execution. The 
rule must be fixed, and the execution of it enforced, by the 
Constitution. He was alarmed at what was said* yester- 
day, concerning the negroes. He was now again alarmed 
at what had been thrown out concerning the taxing of ex- 
ports. South Carolina has in one year exported to the 
amount of £600,000 sterling, all which was the fruit of 
the labor of her blacks. Will she be represented in pro- 
portion to this amount? She will not. Neither ought she 
then to be subject to a tax on it. He hoped a clause would 
be inserted in the system, restraining the Legislature from 
taxing exports. 

Mr. Wilson approved the principle, but could not see 
how it could be carried into execution ; unless restrained to 
direct taxation. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris having so varied his motion 
by inserting the word " direct," it passed nem. con., as 
follows: "provided always that direct taxation ought to be 
proportioned to representation." 

* By Mr. Gouveeneur Morris. 



1787.] FEDERAL. CONVENTION. 335 

Mr. Davie said it was high time now to speak out. He 
saw that it was meant by some gentlemen to deprive the 
Southern States of any share of representation for their 
blacks. He was sure that North Carolina would never 
confederate on any terms that did not rate them at least as 
three -fifths. If the Eastern States meant, therefore, to 
exclude them altogether, the business was at an end. 

Doctor Johnson thought that wealth and population 
were the true, equitable rules of representation; but he 
conceived that these two principles resolved themselves into 
one, population being the best measure of wealth. He 
concluded, therefore, that the number of people ought to 
be established as the rule, and that all descriptions, includ- 
ing blacks equally with the whites, ought to fall within the 
computation. As various opinions had been expressed on 
the subject, he would move that a committee might be 
appointed to take them into consideration, and report them. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. It had been said that it is 
high time to speak out. As one member, he would candidly 
do so. He came here to form a compact for the good of 
America. He was ready to do so with all the States. He 
hoped, and believed, that all would enter into such a com- 
pact. If they would not, he was ready to join with any 
States that would. But as the compact was to be volun- 
tary, it is in vain for the Eastern States to insist on what 
the Southern States will never agree to. It is equally vain 
for the latter to require, what the other States can never 
admit; and he verily believed the people of Pennsylvania 
will never agree to a representation of negroes. What can 
be desired by these States more than has been already pro- 
posed — that the Legislature shall from time to time 
regulate representation according to population and wealth ? 

General Pinckney desired that the rule of wealth should 
be ascertained, and not left to the pleasure of the Legisla- 
ture ; and that property in slaves should not be exposed to 
danger, under a government instituted for the protection of 
property. 



336 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

The first clause in the Keport of the first Grand Com- 
mittee was postponed. 

Mr. Ellsworth, in order to carry into effect the princi- 
ple established, moved to add to the last clause adopted by 
the House the words following, " and that the rule of con- 
tribution by direct taxation, for the support of the Govern- 
ment of the United States, shall be the number of white 
inhabitants, and three-fifths of every other description in 
the several States, until some other rule that shall more 
accurately ascertain the wealth of the several States can 
be devised and adopted by the Legislature." 

Mr. Butler seconded the motion, in order that it might 
be committed. 

Mr. Kandolph was not satisfied with the motion. The 
danger will be revived, that the ingenuity of the Legisla- 
ture may evade or pervert the rule, so as to perpetuate the 
power where it shall be lodged in the first instance. He 
proposed, in lieu of Mr. Ellsworth's motion, "that in 
order to ascertain the alterations in representation that may 
be required, from time to time, by changes in the relative 
circumstances of the States, a census shall be taken within 
two years from the first meeting of the General Legisla- 
ture of the United States, and once within the term of 

every years afterwards, of all the inhabitants, in the 

manner and according to the ratio recommended by Con- 
gress, in their Resolution of the eighteenth day of April, 
1783, (rating the blacks at three -fifths of their number) ; 
and that the Legislature of the United States shall arrange 
the representation accordingly." He urged strenuously 
that express security ought to be provided for including 
slaves in the ratio of representation. He lamented that 
such a species of property existed. But as it did exist, the 
holders of it would require this security. It was perceived 
that the design was entertained by some of excluding 
slaves altogether ; the Legislature therefore ought not to be 
left at liberty. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 337 

Mr. Ellsworth withdraws his motion, and seconds that 
of Mr. Eandolph. 

Mr. Wilson observed, that less umbrage would perhaps 
be taken against an admission of the slaves into the rule of 
representation, if it should be so expressed as to make them 
indirectly only an ingredient in the rule, by saying that 
they should enter into the rule of taxation; and as repre- 
sentation was to be according to taxation, the end would be 
equally attained. He accordingly moved, and was seconded, 
so to alter the last clause adopted by the House, that, 
together with the amendment proposed, the whole should 
read as follows: " provided always that the representation 
ought to be proportioned according to direct taxation; and 
in order to ascertain the alterations in the direct taxation 
which may be required from time to time by the changes in 
the relative circumstances of the States, Resolved, that a 
census be taken within two years from the first meeting of 
the Legislature of the United States, and once within the 

term of every years afterwards, of all the inhabitants 

of the United States, in the manner and according to the 
ratio recommended by Congress in their Resolution of the 
eighteenth day of April, 1783; and that the Legislature of 
the United States shall proportion the direct taxation 
accordingly." 

Mr. King. Although this amendment varies the aspect 

somewhat, he had still two powerful objections against 

tying down the Legislature to the rule of numbers, — first, 

they were at this time an uncertain index of the relative 

wealth of the States ; secondly, if they were a just index at this 

time, it cannot be supposed always to continue so. He was 

far from wishing to retain any unjust advantage whatever 

in one part of the Republic. If justice was not the basis of 

the connection, it could not be of long duration. He must 

be short-sighted indeed who does not foresee, that, whenever 

the Southern States shall be more numerous than the 

Northern, they can and will hold a language that will awe 

them into justice. If they threaten to separate now in case 
22 



338 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

injury shall be done them, will their threats be less urgent 
or effectual when force shall back their demands. Even in 
the intervening period, there will be no point of time at 
which they will not be able to say, do us justice or we will 
separate. He urged the necessity of placing confidence to 
a certain degree in every government, and did not conceive 
that the proposed confidence, as to a periodical re- adjust- 
ment of the representation, exceeded that degree. 

Mr. Pinckney moved to amend Mr. ^Randolph's motion, 
so as to make "blacks equal to the whites in the ratio of 
representation." This he urged was nothing more than 
justice. The blacks are the laborers, the peasants, of 
the Southern States. They are as productive of pecuniary 
resources as those of the Northern States. They add 
equally to the wealth, and, considering money as the sinew 
of war, to the strength, of the nation. It will also be politic 
with regard to the Northern States, as taxation is to keep 
pace with representation. 

General Pinckney moves to insert six years instead of 
two, as the period, computing from the first meeting of the 
Legislature, within which the first census should be taken. 
On this question for inserting six years, instead of " two," 
in the proposition of Mr. Wilson, it passed in the affirma- 
tive, — Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
South Carolina, aye — 5 ; Massachusetts, Virginia, North 
Carolina, Georgia, no — 4 ; Delaware, divided. 

On the question for filling the blank for the periodical 
census with twenty years, it passed in the negative, — Con- 
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, aye — 3 ; Massachu- 
setts, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, no — 7. 

On the question for ten years, it passed in the affirma- 
tive, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 
8 ; Connecticut, New Jersey, no — 2. 

On Mr. Pinckney's motion, for rating blacks as equal 
to whites, instead of as three-fifths, — South Carolina, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 339 

Georgia, aye — 2; Massachusetts, Connecticut (Doctor 
Johnson, aye), New Jersey, Pennsylvania (three against 
two), Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no — 8. 

Mr. Randolph's proposition, as varied by Mr Wilson, 
being read for taking the question on the whole, — 

Mr. Gekey urged that the principle of it could not be 
carried into execution, as the States were not to be taxed as 
States. With regard to taxes on imposts, he conceived 
they would be no more productive where there were no 
slaves, than where there were ; the consumption being 
greater. 

Mr Ellsworth. In case of a poll-tax there would be 
no difficulty. But there would probably be none. The 
sum allotted to a State may be levied without difficulty, 
according to the plan used by the State in raising its own 
supplies. 

On the question on the whole proposition, as propor- 
tioning representation to direct taxation, and both to the 
white and three-fifths of the black inhabitants, and requir- 
ing a census within six years, and within every ten years 
afterwards, — Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Vir- 
ginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye — 6 ; New Jersey, 
Delaware, no — 2 ; Massachusetts, South Carolina, divided. 

Adjourned. 

Friday, July 13th. 

In Convention, — It being moved to postpone the clause 
in the Report of the Committee of Eleven as to the origi- 
nating of money bills in the first branch, in order to take up 
the following, " that in the second branch each State shall 
have an equal voice," — 

Mr. Gerry moved to add, as an amendment to the last 
clause agreed to by the house, " that from the first meeting 
of the Legislature of the United States till a census shall 
be taken, all moneys to be raised for supplying the public 
Treasury by direct taxation shall be assessed on the inhabi- 



340 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

tants of the several States according to the number of their 
Representatives respectively in the first branch." He said 
this would be as just before as after the census, according 
to the general principle that taxation and representation 
ought to go together. 

Mr. Williamson feared that New Hampshire will have 
reason to complain. Three members were allotted to her as 
a liberal allowance, for this reason among others, that she 
might not suppose any advantage to have been taken of her 
absence. As she was still absent, and had no opportunity 
of deciding whether she would choose to retain the number 
on the condition of her being taxed in proportion to it, he 
thought the number ought to be reduced from three to two, 
before the question was taken on Mr. G-erry's motion. 

Mr. Read could not approve of the proposition. He 
had observed, he said, in the Committee a backwardness in 
some of the members from the large States, to take their 
full proportion of Representatives. He did not then see 
the motive. He now suspects it was to avoid their due 
share of taxation. He had no objection to a just and 
accurate adjustment of representation and taxation to each 
other. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris and Mr. Madison answered, 
that the charge itself involved an acquittal ; since, notwith- 
standing the augmentation of the number of members 
allotted to Massachusetts and Virginia, the motion for pro- 
portioning the burdens thereto was made by a member 
from the former State, and was approved by Mr. Madison, 
from the latter, who was on the Committee. Mr. Gouver- 
neur Morris said, that he thought Pennsylvania had her 
due share in eight members ; and he could not in candour 
ask for more. Mr. Madison said, that having always con- 
ceived that the difference of interest in the United States 
lay not between the large and small, but the Northern and 
Southern States, and finding that the number of members 
allotted to the Northern States was greatly superior, he 
should have preferred an addition of two members to the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 341 

Southern States, to wit, one to North and one to South 
Carolina, rather than of one member to Virginia. He liked 
the present motion, because it tended to moderate the views 
both of the opponents and advocates for rating very high 
the negroes. 

Mr. Ellsworth noped the proposition would be with- 
drawn. It entered too much into detail. The general 
principle was already sufficiently settled. As fractions can- 
not be regarded in apportioning the number of Eepresenta- 
tives, the rule will be unjust, until an actual census shall 
be made. After that, taxation may be precisely propor- 
tioned, according to the principle established, to the number 
of inhabitants. 

Mr. Wilson hoped the motion would not be withdrawn. 
If it should, it will be made from another quarter. The 
rule will be as reasonable and just before, as after, a census. 
As to fractional numbers, the census will not destroy, but 
ascertain them. And they will have the same effect after, 
as before, the census; for as he understands the rule, it is 
to be adjusted not to the number of inhabitants, but of 
Representatives. 

Mr. Sherman opposed the motion. He thought the 
Legislature ought to be left at liberty; in which case they 
would probably conform to the principles observed by Con- 
gress. 

Mr. Mason did not know that Virginia would be a loser 
by the proposed regulation, but had some scruple as to the 
justice of it. He doubted much whether the conjectural 
rule which was to precede the census would be as just as it 
would be rendered by an actual census. 

Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Sherman moved to postpone 
the motion of Mr. Gerry. 

On the question, it passed in the negative, — Connecti- 
cut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, aye — 4 ; Massachu- 
setts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- 
lina, Georgia, no — 6. 

On the question on Mr Gerry's motion, it passed in the 



342 DEBATES IN THE [1T8T. 

negative, the States being equally divided, — Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, 
aye — 5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, 
Virginia> no — 5. 

Mr. Gerry finding that the loss of the question had pro- 
ceeded from an objection, with some, to the proposed assess- 
ment of direct taxes on the inhabitants of the States, which 
might restrain the Legislature to a poll-tax, moved his pro- 
position again, but so varied as to authorize the assessment 
on the States, which leaves the mode to the Legislature, 
viz: "that from the first meeting of the Legislature of the 
United States, until a census shall be taken, all moneys for 
supplying the public Treasury by direct taxation shall be 
raised from the said several States, according to the num- 
ber of their Representatives respectively in the first branch." 

On this varied question it passed in the affirmative, — 
Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, aye — 5; Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, 
Maryland, no — 4; Pennsylvania, divided. 

On the motion of Mr. Randolph, the vote of Monday 
last, authorizing the Legislature to adjust, from time to 
time, the representation upon the principles of wealth and 
numbers of inhabitants, was reconsidered by common con- 
sent, in order to strike out tvealth and adjust the resolution 
to that requiring periodical revisions according to the num- 
ber of whites and three-fifths of the blacks. The motion 
was in the words following: — "But as the present situation 
of the States may probably alter in the number of their in- 
habitants, that the Legislature of the United States be 
authorized, from time to time, to apportion the number of 
Representatives ; and in case any of the States shall here- 
after be divided, or any two or more States united, or new 
States created within the limits of the United States, the 
Legislature of the United States shall possess authority to 
regulate the number of Representatives in any of the fore- 
going cases, upon the principle of their number of inhabit- 
ants, according to the provisions hereafter mentioned." 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 343 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris opposed the alteration, as 
leaving still an incoherence. If negroes were to be viewed 
as inhabitants, and the revision was to proceed on the prin- 
ciple of numbers of inhabitants, they ought to be added in 
their entire number, and not in the proportion of three- 
fifths. If as property, the word wealth was right; and 
striking it out would produce the very inconsistency which 
it was meant to get rid of. The train of business, and the 
late turn which it had taken, had led him, he said, into 
deep meditation on it, and he would candidly state the re- 
sult. A distinction had been set up, and urged, between 
the Northern and Southern States. He had hitherto con- 
sidered this doctrine as heretical. He still thought the 
distinction groundless. He sees, however, that it is per- 
sisted in; and the Southern gentlemen will not be satisfied 
unless they see the way open to their gaining a majority in 
the public councils. The consequence of such a transfer of 
power from the maritime to the interior and landed inter- 
est, will, he foresees, be such an oppression to commerce, 
that he shall be obliged to vote for the vicious principle of 
equality in the second branch, in order to provide some de- 
fence for the Northern States against it. But to come 
more to the point, either this distinction is fictitious or 
real ; if fictitious, let it be dismissed, and let us proceed 
with due confidence. If it be real, instead of attempting to 
blend incompatible things, let us at once take a friendly 
leave of each other. There can be no end of demands for 
security, if every particular interest is to be entitled to it. 
The Eastern States may claim it for their fishery, and for 
other objects, as the Southern States claim it for their pe- 
culiar objects. In this struggle between the two ends of 
the Union, what part ought the Middle States, in point of 
policy, to take? To join their Eastern brethren, according 
to his ideas. If the Southern States get the power into 
their hands, and be joined, as they will be, with the inte- 
rior country, they will inevitably bring on a war with Spain 
for the Mississippi. This language is already held. The 



344 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

interior country, having no property nor interest ex- 
posed on the' sea, will be little affected by such a war. He 
wished to know what security the Northern and Middle 
States will have against this danger. It has been said that 
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia only, will in 
a little time have a majority of the people of America. 
They must in that case include the great exterior country, 
and everything was to be apprehended from their getting 
the power into their hands. 

Mr. Butler. The security the Southern States want is 
that their negroes may not be taken from them, which some 
gentlemen within or without doors have a very good mind 
to do. It was not supposed that North Carolina, South 
Carolina and Georgia would have more people than all the 
other States, but many more relatively to the other States, 
than they now have. The people and strength of America 
are evidently bearing southwardly, and south westwardly. 

Mr. Wilson. If a general declaration would satisfy 
any gentleman, he had no indisposition to declare his sen- 
timents. Conceiving that all men, wherever placed, have 
equal rights, and are equally entitled to confidence, he 
viewed without apprehension the period when a few States 
should contain the superior number of people. The major- 
ity of people, wherever found, ought in all questions, to 
govern the minority. If the interior country should acquire 
this majority, it will not only have the right, but will avail 
itself of it, whether we will or no. This jealousy misled 
the policy of Great Britain with regard to America. The 
fatal maxims espoused by her were, that the Colonies were 
growing too fast, and that their growth must be stinted in 
time. What were the consequences ? First, enmity on 
our part, then actual separation. Like consequences will 
result on the part of the interior settlements, if like jealousy 
and policy be pursued on ours. Further, if numbers be not 
a proper rule, why is not some better rule pointed out ? 
No one has yet ventured to attempt it. Congress have 
never been able to discover a better. No State, as far as 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 345 

he had heard, had suggested any other. In 1783, after 
elaborate discussion of a measure of wealth, all were satisfied 
then, as they now are, that the rule of numbers does not 
differ much from the combined rule of numbers and wealth. 
Again, he could not agree that property was the sole or 
primary object of government and society. The cultivation 
and improvement of the human mind was the most noble 
object. With respect to this object, as well as to other 
personal rights, numbers were surely the natural and pre- 
cise measure of representation. And with respect to prop- 
erty, they could not vary much from the precise measure. 
In no point of view, however, could the establishment of 
numbers, as the rule of representation in the first branch, 
vary his opinion as to the impropriety of letting a vicious 
principle into the second branch. 

On the question to strike out wealth, and to make the 
change as moved by Mr. Randolph, it passed in the affir- 
mative, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Penn- 
sylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- 
lina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; Delaware, divided. 

Mr. Read moved to insert, after the word "divided," 
" or enlarged by addition of territory ; " which was agreed 
to, nem con.* 

Adjourned. 



Saturday, July 14th. 

In Convention, — Mr. L. Martin called for the question on 
the whole Report, including the parts relating .to the orig- 
ination of money bills, and the equality of votes in the 
second branch. 

Mr. Gerry wished, before the question should be put, 
that the attention of the House might be turned to the dan- 
gers apprehended from Western States. He was for ad- 
mitting them on liberal terms, but not for putting ourselves 
into their hands. They will, if they acquire power, like all 

* His object probably was to provide for such cases as an enlargement of Dela- 
ware by annexing to it the peninsula on the East side of the Chesapeake. 



346 DEBATES IN, THE [1787. 

men, abuse it. They will oppress commerce, and drain our 
wealth into the Western country. To guard against these 
consequences, he thought it necessary to limit the number 
of new States to be admitted into the Union, in such a 
manner that they should never be able to outnumber the 
Atlantic States. He accordingly moved, " that in order to 
secure the liberties of the States already confederated, the 
number of Representatives in the first branch, of the States 
which shall hereafter be established, shall never exceed in 
number, the Representatives from such of the States as shall 
accede to this Confederation." 

Mr. King seconded the motion. 

Mr. Sherman thought there was no probability that the 
number of future States would exceed that of the existing 
States. If the event should ever happen, it was too remote 
to be taken into consideration at this time. Besides, we 
are providing for our posterity, for our children and our 
grand children, who would be as likely to be citizens of 
new western States, as of the old States. On this consider- 
ation alone, we ought to make no such discrimination as 
was proposed by the motion. 

Mr. Gerry. If some of our children should remove, 
others will stay behind, and he thought incumbent on us to 
provide for their interests. There was a rage of emigra- 
tion from the Eastern States to the western country, and he 
did not wish those remaining behind to be at the mercy of 
the emigrants. Besides, foreigners are resorting to that 
country, and it is uncertain what turn things may take 
there. 

On the question for agreeing to the motion of Mr. Gerry, 
it passed in the negative, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maryland, aye — 4 ; New Jersey, Virginia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 5; Pennsylvania, 
divided. 

Mr. Rutledge proposed to reconsider the two proposi- 
tions touching the originating of money bills in the first, 
and the equality of votes in the second, branch. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 347 

Mr. Sherman was for the question on the whole at once. 
It was, he said, a conciliatory plan ; it had been considered 
in all its parts ; a great deal of time had been spent upon it ; 
and if any part should now be altered, it would be necessary 
to go over the whole ground again. 

Mr. L. Martin urged the question on the whole. He 
did not like many parts of it. He did not like having two 
branches, nor the inequality of votes in the first branch. 
He was willing, however, to make trial of the plan, rather 
than do nothing. 

Mr. Wilson traced the progress of the report through 
its several stages; remarking, that when on the question 
concerning an equality of votes, the House was divided, our 
constituents, had they voted as their Representatives did, 
would have stood as two-thirds against the equality, and 
one-third only in favor of it. This fact would ere long be 
known, and it would appear that this fundamental point has 
been carried by one-third against two-thirds. What hopes 
will our constituents entertain when they find that the 
essential principles of justice have been violated in the out- 
set of the Government? As to the privilege of originating 
money bills, it was not considered by any as of much mo- 
ment, and by many as improper in itself. He hoped both 
clauses would be reconsidered. The equality of votes was 
a point of such critical importance, that every opportunity 
ought to be allowed for discussing and collecting the mind 
of the Convention upon it. 

Mr. L. Martin denies that there were two-thirds against 
the equality of votes. The States that please to call them- 
selves large, are the weakest in the Union. Look at Mas- 
sachusetts — look at Virginia — are they efficient States ? 
He was for letting a separation taka p^ac 3 , h they desired 
it. He had rather there should be two confederacies, than 
one founded on any other principle than an equality of 
votes in the second branch at least. 

Mr. Wilson was not surprised that those who say that 
a minority does more than a majority, should say the mi- 



348 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

nority is stronger than the majority. He supposed the next 
assertion will be, that they are richer also ; though he hardly 
expected it would be persisted in, when the States shall be 
called on for taxes and troops. 

Mr. Gerry also animadverted on Mr. L. Martin's re- 
marks on the weakness of Massachusetts. He favored the 
reconsideration, with a view, not of destroying the equality 
of votes, but of providing that the States should vote per 
capita, which, he said, would prevent the delays and incon- 
veniences that had been experienced in Congress, and would 
give a national aspect and spirit to the management of busi- 
ness. He did not approve of a reconsideration of the 
clause relating to money bills. It was of great conse- 
quence. It was the corner stone of the accommodation. If 
any member of the Convention had the exclusive privilege 
of making propositions, would any one say that it would 
give him no advantage over other members? The Report 
was not altogether to his mind ; but he would agree to it as 
it stood, rather than throw it out altogether. 

The reconsideration being tacitly agreed to, — 

Mr. Pinckney moved, that, instead of an equality of 
votes, the States should be represented in the second 
branch as follows: New Hampshire by two members; 
Massachusetts, four; Rhode Island, one; Connecticut, 
three; New York, three; New Jersey, two; Pennsylvania, 
four; Delaware, one; Maryland, three; Virginia, five; North 
Carolina, three; South Carolina, three: Georgia, two; mak- 
ing in the whole, thirty-six. 

Mr. Wilson seconds the motion. 

Mr. Dayton. The smaller States can never give up 
their equality. For himself, he would in no event yield 
that security for their rights. 

Mr. Sherman urged the equality of votes, not so much 
as a security for the small States, as for the State Govern- 
ments, which could not be preserved unless they were rep- 
resented, and had a negative in the General Government. 
He had no objection to the members in the second branch 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 349 

voting per capita, as had been suggested by (Mr. Gerry. ) 
Mr. Madison concurred in this motion of Mr. Pinckney, 
as a reasonable compromise. 

Mr. Gerry said, he should like the motion, but could 
9ee no hope of success. An accommodation must take 
place, and it was apparent from what had been seen, that it 
could not do so on the ground of the motion. He was 
utterly against a partial confederacy, leaving other States 
to accede or not accede, as had been intimated. 

Mr. King said, it was always with regret that he dif- 
fered from his colleagues, but it was his duty to differ from 
(Mr. Gerry) on this occasion. He considered the pro- 
posed Government as substantially and formally a General 
and National Government over the people of America. 
There never will be a case in which it will act as a Federal 
Government, on the States and not on the individual citi- 
zens. And is it not a clear principle, that in a free govern- 
ment, those who are to be the objects of a government, 
ought to influence the operations of it? What reason can 
be assigned, why the same rule of representation should 
not prevail in the second, as in the first, branch ? He could 
conceive none. On the contrary, every view of the subject 
that presented itself seemed to require it. Two objections 
had been raised against it, drawn, first, from the terms of 
the existing compact; secondly, from a supposed danger to 
the smaller States. As to the first objection, he thought it 
inapplicable. According to the existing Confederation, 
the rule by which the public burdens is to be apportioned is 
fixed, and must be pursued. In the proposed Government, 
it cannot be fixed, because indirect taxation is to be substi- 
tuted. The Legislature, therefore, will have full discretion 
to impose taxes in such modes and proportions as they may 
judge expedient. As to the second objection, he thought it 
of as little weight. The General Government can never 
wish to intrude on the State Governments. There could 
be no temptation. None had been pointed out. In 
order to prevent the interference of measures which seemed 



350 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

most likely to happen, he would have no objection to 
throwing all the State debts into the Federal debt, making 
one aggregate debt of about $70,000,000, and leaving it to 
be discharged by the General Government. According to 
the idea of securing the State Governments, there ought to 
be three distinct legislative branches. The second was 
admitted to be necessary, and was actually meant, to check 
the first branch, to give more wisdom, system and stability 
to the Government; and ought clearly, as it was to operate 
on the people, to be proportioned to them. For the third 
purpose of securing the States, there ought then to be a 
third branch, representing the States as such, and guarding, 
by equal votes, their rights and dignities. He would not 
pretend to be as thoroughly acquainted with his immediate 
constituents as his colleagues, but it was his firm belief 
that Massachusetts would never be prevailed on to yield to 
an equality of votes. In New York, (he was sorry to be 
obliged to say anything relative to that State in the absence 
of its representatives, but the occasion required it,) in 
New York he had seen that the most powerful argument 
used by the considerate opponents to the grant of the Im- 
post to Congress, was pointed against the vicious constitu- 
tion of Congress with regard to representation and suffrage. 
He was sure that no government would last that was not 
founded on just principles. He preferred the doing of 
nothing, to an allowance of an equal vote to all the States, 
It would be better, he thought, to submit to a little more 
confusion and convulsion, than to submit to such an evil. 
It was difficult to say what the views of different gentlemen 
might be. Perhaps there might be some who thought no 
Government co-extensive with the United States could be 
established with a hope of its answering the purpose. Per- 
haps there might be other fixed opinions incompatible with 
the object we are pursuing. If there were, he thought it 
but candid, that gentlemen should speak out, that we might 
understand one another. 

Mr. Strong. The Convention had been much divided 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 351 

in opinion. In order to avoid the consequences of it, an 
accommodation had been proposed. A committee had been 
appointed; and though some of the members of it were 
averse to an equality of votes, a report had been made in 
favor of it. It is agreed, on all hands, that Congress are 
nearly at an end. If no accommodation takes place, the 
Union itself must soon be dissolved. It has been suggested 
that if we cannot come to any general agreement, the prin- 
cipal States may form and recommend a scheme of govern- 
ment. But will the small States, in that case, ever accede 
to it? Is it probable that the large States themselves will, 
under such circumstances, embrace and ratify it? He 
thought the small States had made a considerable conces- 
sion, in the article of money bills, and that they might nat- 
urally expect some concessions on the other side. From this 
view of the matter, he was compelled to give his vote for the 
Report taken altogether. 

Mr. Madison expressed his apprehensions that if the 
proper foundation of government was destroyed, by substi- 
tuting an equality in place of a proportional representation, 
no proper superstructure would be raised. If the small 
States really wish for a government armed with the powers 
necessary to secure their liberties, and to enforce obedience 
on the larger members as well as themselves, he could not 
help thinking them extremely mistaken in the means. He 
reminded them of the consequences of laying the existing 
Confederation on improper principles. All the principal 
parties to its compilation joined immediately in mutilating 
and fettering the Government, in such a manner that it has 
disappointed every hope placed on it. He appealed to the 
doctrine and arguments used by themselves, on a former 
occasion. It had been very properly observed (by Mr. 
Patterson), that representation was an expedient by which 
the meeting of the people themselves was rendered unnec- 
essary ; and that the representatives ought therefore to bear 
a proportion to the votes which their constituents, if con- 
vened, would respectively have. Was not this remark r ; 



352 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

applicable to one branch of the representation as to the 
other? But it had been said that the Government would, 
in its operation, be partly federal, partly national; that 
although in the latter respect the representatives of the peo- 
ple ought to be in proportion to the people, yet in the 
former, it ought to be according to the number of States. 
If there was any solidity in this distinction, he was ready 
to abide by it ; if there was none, it ought to be abandoned. 
In all cases where the General Government is to act on the 
people, let the people be represented, and the votes be pro- 
portional. In all cases where the Government is to act on 
the States as such, in like manner as Congress now acts on 
them, let the States be represented and the votes be equal. 
This was the true ground of compromise, if there was any 
ground at all. But he denied that there was any ground. 
He called for a single instance in which the ' General Gov- 
ernment was not to operate on the people individually. The 
practicability of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for 
the States as political bodies, had been exploded on all 
hands. He observed that the people of the large States 
would, in some way or other, secure to themselves a weight 
proportioned to the importance accruing from their superior 
numbers. If they could not effect it by a proportional rep- 
resentation in the Government, they would probably accede 
to no government which did not, in a great measure, depend 
for its efficacy on their voluntary co-operation; in which 
case they would indirectly secure their object. The exist- 
ing Confederacy proved that where the acts of the General 
Government were to be executed by the particular Govern- 
ments, the latter had a weight in proportion to their import- 
ance. No one would say, that, either in Congress or out of 
Congress, Delaware had equal weight with Pennsylvania. 
If the latter was to supply ten times as much money as the 
former, and no compulsion could be used, it was of ten 
times more importance, that she should voluntarily furnish 
the supply. In the Dutch Confederacy the votes of the 
provinces were equal. But Holland, which supplies about 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 353 

half the money, governed the whole Republic. He enumer- 
ated the objections against an equality of votes in the 
second branch, notwithstanding the proportional represen- 
tation in the first. 1. The minority could negative the will 
of the majority of the people. 2. They could extort mea- 
sures, by making them a condition of their assent to other 
necessary measures. 3. They could obtrude measures on 
the majority, by virtue of the peculiar powers which would 
be vested in the Senate. 4. The evil, instead of being 
cured by time, would increase with every new State that 
should be admitted, as they must all be admitted on the 
principle of equality. 5. The perpetuity it would give to 
the preponderance of the Northern against the Southern 
scale, was a serious consideration. It seemed now to be 
pretty well understood, that the real difference of interests 
lay, not between the large and small, but between the North- 
ern and Southern States. The institution of slavery, and 
its consequences, formed the line of discrimination. There 
were five States on the Southern, eight on the Northern 
side of this line. Should a proportional representation take 
place, it was true, the Northern would still outnumber the 
other ; but not in the same degree, at this time ; and every 
day would tend towards an equilibrium. 

Mr. Wilson would add a few words only. If equality 
in the second branch was an error that time would correct, 
he should be less anxious to exclude it, being sensible that 
perfection was unattainable in any plan ; but being a funda- 
mental and a perpetual error it ought by all means to be 
avoided. A vice in the representation, like an error in 
the first concoction, must be followed by disease, convul- 
sions, and finally death itself. The justice of the general 
principle of proportional representation has not, in argu- 
ment at least, been yet contradicted. But it is said that a 
departure from it, so far as to give the States an equal vote 
in one branch of the Legislature, is essential to their preser- 
vation. He had considered this position maturely, but 
could not see its application. That the States ought to be 

2io 



354 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

preserved, he admitted. But does it follow, that an equality 
of votes is necessary for the purpose ? Is there any reason 
to suppose that, if their preservation should depend more 
on the large than on the small States, the security of 
the States against the general government, would be 
diminished ? Are the large States less attached to 
their existence, more likely to commit suicide, than the 
small ? An equal vote, then,- is not necessary, as far 
as he can conceive, and is liable, among other objections, 
to this insuperable one, — the great fault of the existing 
Confederacy is its inactivity. It has never been a com- 
plaint against Congress that they governed over much. 
The complaint has been, that they have governed too little. 
To remedy this defect we were sent here. Shall we effect 
the cure by establishing an equality of votes, as is pro- 
posed ? No : this very equality carries us directly to 
Congress, — to the system which is our duty to rectify. 
The small States cannot indeed act, by virtue of this equal- 
ity, but they may control the government, as they have done 
in Congress. This very measure is here prosecuted by a 
minority of the people of America. Is then, the object of 
the Convention likely to be accomplished in this way ? 
Will not our constituents say, we sent you to form an effi- 
cient government, and you have given us one, more complex, 
indeed, but having all the weakness of the former govern- 
ment. He was anxious for uniting all the States under one 
government. He knew there were some respectable men 
who preferred three Confederacies, united by offensive and 
defensive alliances. Many things maybe plausibly said, 
some things may be justly said, in favor of such a project. 
He could not, however, concur in it himself ; but he 
thought nothing so pernicious as bad first principles. 

Mr. Ellsworth asked two questions, — one of Mr. 
Wilson, whether he had ever seen a good measure fail in 
Congress for want of a majority of States in its favor ? He 
had himself never known such an instance. The other of 
Mr. Madison, whether a negative lodged with the majority 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 355 

of the States, even the smallest, could be more dangerous 
than the qualified negative proposed to be lodged in a single 
Executive Magistrate, who must be taken from some one 
State ? 

Mr. Sherman signified that his expectation was that 
the General Legislature would in some cases act on the 
federal principle, of requiring quotas. But he thought it 
ought to be empowered to carry their own plans into exe- 
cution, if the States should fail to supply their respective 
quotas. 

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Pinckney's motion, 
for allowing New Hampshire two; Massachusetts four, &c, 
it passed in the negative, — Pennsylvania, Maryland, Vir- 
ginia, South Carolina, aye — 4; Massachusetts, (Mr. King, 
aye, Mr. Gorham absent), Connecticut, New Jersey, Dela- 
ware, North Carolina, Georgia, no — 6. 

Adjourned. 

Monday, July 16th. 

In Convention, — On the question for agreeing to the 
whole Report, as amended, and including the equality of 
votes in the second branch, it passed in the affirmative, — 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Caro- 
lina, (Mr. Spaight, no) aye — 5; Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
South Carolina, Georgia, no — 4; Massachusetts, divided, 
(Mr. Gerry, Mr. Strong, aye; Mr. King, Mr. Gorham, no). 

The whole thus passed is in the words following, viz. 

" Resolved, that in the original formation of the Legis- 
lature of the United States, the first branch thereof shall 
consist of sixty-five members, of which number New Hamp- 
shire shall send, 3; Massachusetts, 8; Rhode Island, 1; 
Connecticut, 5; New York, 6; New Jersey, 4; Pennsylvania, 
8 ; Delaware, 1 ; Maryland, 6 ; Virginia, 10 ; North Carolina, 
5 ; South Carolina, 5 ; Georgia, 3. But as the present situa- 
tion of the States may probably alter in the number of 
their inhabitants, the Legislature of the United States shall 



356 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

be authorized, from time to time, to apportion the number 
of Representatives, and in case any of the States shall here- 
after be divided, or enlarged by addition of territory, or 
any two or more States united, or any new States created 
within the limits of the United States, the Legislature of 
the United States shall possess authority to regulate the 
number of Representatives in any of the foregoing cases, 
upon the principle of their number of inhabitants, accord- 
ing to the provisions hereafter mentioned ^provided always, 
that representation ought to be proportioned according to 
direct taxation. And in order to ascertain the alteration in 
the direct taxation, which may be required from time to 
time by the changes in the relative circumstances of the 
States — 

"Resolved, that a census be taken within six years from 
the first meeting of the Legislature of the United States, 
and once within the term of every ten years afterwards, of 
all the inhabitants of the United States, in the mariner and 
according to the ratio recommended by Congress in their 
Resolution of the eighteenth day of April, 1783; and that 
the Legislature of the United States shall proportion the 
direct taxation accordingly. 

"Resolved, that all bills for raising or appropriating 
money, and for fixing the salaries of officers of the Govern- 
ment of the United States, shall originate in the first 
branch of the Legislature of the United States ; and shall 
not be altered or amended in the second branch; and that 
no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury, but in 
pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the first 
branch. 

" Resolved, that in the second branch of the Legislature 
of the United States, each State shall have an equal vote." 

The sixth Resolution in the Report from the Committee 
of the Whole House, which had been postponed, in order to 
consider the seventh and eighth Resolutions, was now 
resumed, (see the Resolution.) 

" That the National Legislature ought to possess the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 357 

legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation," 
was agreed to, nem. con. 

" And moreover to legislate in all cases to which 
the separate States are incompetent ; or in which the 
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the 
exercise of individual legislation," being read for a 
question, — 

Mr. Butler calls for some explanation of the extent of 
this power ; particularly of the word incompetent. The 
vagueness of the terms rendered it impossible for any pre- 
cise judgment to be formed. 

Mr. Gorham. The vagueness of the terms constitutes 
the propriety of them. We are now establishing general 
principles, to be extended hereafter into details, which will 
be precise and explicit. 

Mr. Kutledge urged the objection started by Mr. 
Butler ; and moved that a clause should be committed, to 
the end that a specification of the powers comprised in the 
general terms, might be reported. 

On the question for commitment, the votes were equally 
divided, — Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, South Car- 
olina, Georgia, aye — 5 ; Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, no — 5. So it 
was lost. 

Mr. Bandolph. The vote of this morning (involving 
an equality of suffrage in the second branch) had embar- 
rassed the business extremely. All the powers given in 
the Beport from the Committee of the Whole were founded 
on the supposition that a proportional representation was to 
prevail in both branches of the Legislature. When he 
came here this morning, his purpose was to have offered 
some propositions that might, if possible, have united a 
great majority of votes, and particularly might provide 
against the danger suspected on the part of the smaller 
States, by enumerating the cases in which it might lie, and 
allowing an equality of votes in such cases. But finding 



358 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

from the preceding vote, that they persist in demanding an 
equal vote in all cases ; that they have succeeded in obtain- 
ing it ; and that New York, if present, would probably be 
on the same side ; he could not but think we were unpre- 
pared to discuss this subject further. It will probably be 
in vain to come to any final decision, with a bare majority 
on either side. For these reasons he wished the Conven- 
tion to adjourn, that the large States might consider the 
steps proper to be taken, in the present solemn crisis of the 
business ; and that the small States might also deliberate 
on the means of conciliation. 

Mr. Patterson thought with Mr. Eandolph, that it was 
high time for the Convention to adjourn ; that the rule of 
secrecy ought to be rescinded ; and that our constituents 
should be consulted. No conciliation could be admissible 
on the part of the smaller States, on any other ground than 
that of an equality of votes in the second branch. If Mr. 
Randolph would reduce to form his motion for an adjourn- 
ment sine die, he would second it with all his heart. 

General Pinckney wished to know of Mr. Randolph, 
whether he meant an adjournment sine die, or only an 
adjournment for the day. If the former was meant, it dif- 
fered much from his idea. He could not think of going to 
South Carolina and returning again to this place. Besides 
it was chimerical, to suppose that the States, if consulted, 
would ever accord separately and beforehand. 

Mr. Randolph had never entertained an idea of an 
adjournment sine die ; and was sorry that his meaning had 
been so readily and strangely misinterpreted. He had in 
view merely an adjournment till to-morrow, in order that 
some conciliatory experiment might, if possible, be devised; 
and that in case the smaller States should continue to hold 
back, the larger might then take such measures — he would 
not say what — as might be necessary. 

Mr. Patterson seconded the adjournment till to-mor- 
row, as an opportunity seemed to be wished by the larger 
States to deliberate further on conciliatory expedients. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 359 

On the question for adjourning till to-morrow, the States 
were equally divided, — New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Mary- 
land, Virginia, North Carolina, aye — 5 ; Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Delaware, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 5 ; so 
it was lost. 

Mr. Broom thought it his duty to declare his opinion 
against an adjournment sine die, as had been urged by Mr. 
Patterson. Such a measure, he thought, would be fatal. 
Something must be done by the Convention, though it 
should be by a bare majority. 

Mr. Gerry observed that Massachusetts was opposed to 
•an adjournment, because they saw no new ground of com- 
promise. But as it seemed to be the opinion of so many 
States that a trial should be made, the State would now con- 
cur in the adjournment. 

Mr. Rutledge could see no need of an adjournment, 
because he could see no chance of a compromise. The lit- 
tle States were fixed. They had repeatedly and solemnly 
declared themselves to be so. All that the large States, 
then, had to do was, to decide whether they Would yield or 
not. For his part, he conceived, that, although we could 
not do what we thought best in itself, we ought to do some- 
thing. Had we not better keep the Government up a little 
longer, hoping that another convention will supply our 
omissions, than abandon every thing to hazard? Our con- 
stituents will be very little satisfied with us if we take the 
latter course. 

Mr. Randolph and Mr. King renewed the motion to 
adjourn till to-morrow. 

On the question, — Massachusetts, New Jersey, Penn- 
sylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- 
lina, aye — 7 ; Connecticut, Delaware, no — 2 ; Georgia, 
divided. 

Adjourned. 

[ On the morning following, before the hour of the 
Convention, a number of the members from the larger 



360 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

States, by common agreement, met for the purpose of con- 
sulting on the proper steps to be taken in consequence of 
the vote in favor of an equal representation in the second 
branch, and the apparent inflexibility of the smaller States 
on that point. Several members from the latter States also 
attended. The time was wasted in vague conversation on 
the subject, without any specific proposition or agreement. 
It appeared, indeed, that the opinions of the members who 
disliked the equality of votes differed much as to the im- 
portance of that point ; and as to the policy of risking a fail- 
ure of any general act of the Convention by inflexibly 
opposing it. Several of them — supposing that no good 
government could or would be built on that foundation; 
and that, as a division of the Convention into two opinions 
was unavoidable, it would be better that the side compris- 
ing the principal States, and a majority of the people of 
America, should propose a scheme of government to the 
States, than that a scheme should be proposed on the other 
side — would have concurred in a firm opposition to the 
smaller States, and in a separate recommendation, if event- 
ually necessary. Others seemed inclined to yield to the 
smaller States, and to concur in such an act, however im- 
perfect and exceptionable, as might be agreed on by the 
Convention as a body, though decided by a bare majority 
of States and by a minority of the people of the United 
States. It is probable that the result of this consultation 
satisfied the smaller States, that they had nothing to appre- 
hend from a union of the larger in any plan whatever 
against the equality of votes in the second branch. ] 



Tuesday, July 17th. 

In Convention,— My. Gouverneur Morris moved to re- 
consider the whole Resolution agreed to yesterday concern- 
ing the constitution of the two branches of the Legislature. 
His object was to bring the House to a consideration, in the 
abstract, of the powers nec3ssary to be vested in the General 



IT 87 -] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 361 

Government. It had been said, Let us know how the gov- 
ernment is to be modelled, and then we can determine what 
powers can be properly given to it. He thought the most 
eligible course was, first to determine on the necessary pow- 
ers, and then so to modify the Government, as that it might 
be justly and properly enabled to administer them. He 
feared, if we proceeded to a consideration of the powers, 
whilst the vote of yesterday, including an equality of the 
States in the second branch, remained in force, a reference 
to it, either mental or expressed, would mix itself with the 
merits of every question concerning the powers. This 
motion was not seconded. [ It was probably approved by 
several members who either despaired of success, or were 
apprehensive that the attempt would inflame the jealousies 
of the smaller States.] 

The sixth Resolution in the Report of the Committee of 
the Whole, relating to the powers, which had been post- 
poned in order to consider the seventh and eighth, relating 
to the constitution, of the National Legislature, was now 
resumed. 

Mr. Sherman observed, that it would be difficult to draw 
the line between the powers of the General Legislature, 
and those to be left with the States; that he did not like the 
definition contained in the Resolution; and proposed, in its 
place, to the words "individual legislation," inclusive, to 
insert "to make laws binding on the people of the United 
States in all cases which may concern the common interests 
of the Union ; but not to interfere with the government of 
the individual States in any matters of internal police which 
respect the government of such States only, and wherein 
the general welfare of the United States is not concerned." 

Mr. Wilson seconded the amendment, as better express- 
ing the general principle. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris opposed it. The internal 
police, as it would be called and understood by the States, 
ought to be infringed in many cases, as in the case of pa- 



362 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

per-money, and other tricks by which citizens of other 
States may be affected. 

Mr. Sherman, in explanation of his idea, read an enum- 
eration of powers, including the power of levying taxes on 
trade, but not the power of direct taxation. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris remarked the omission, and 
inferred, that, for the deficiencies of taxes on consumption, 
it must have been the meaning of Mr. Sherman that the 
General Government should recur to quotas and requisi- 
tions, which are subversive of the idea of government. 

Mr. Sherman acknowledged that his enumeration did 
not include direct taxation. Some provision, he supposed, 
must be made for supplying the deficiency of other tax- 
ation, but he had not formed any. 

On the question on Mr. Sherman's motion, it passed in 
the negative, — Connecticut, Maryland, aye — 2 ; Massa- 
chusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 8. 

Mr. Bedford moved that the second member of the 
sixth Eesolution be so altered as to read, " and moreover to 
legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, 
and also in those to which the States are severally incom- 
petent, or in which the harmony of the United States may 
be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation." 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconds the motion. 

Mr. Kandolph. This is a formidable idea, indeed. It 
involves the power of violating all the laws and Constitu- 
tions of the States, and of intermeddling with their police. 
The last member of the sentence is also superfluous, being 
included in the first. 

Mr. Bedford. It is not more extensive or formidable 
than the clause as it stands: no State being separately com- 
petent to legislate for the general interest of the Union. 

On the question for agreeing to Mr. Bedford's motion, 
it passed in the affirmative, — Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, aye — 
f> ; Connecticut, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 4. 



178?.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 363 

On the sentence as amended, it passed in the affirma- 
tive, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsyl- 
vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye 
— 8 ; South Carolina, Georgia, no — 2. 

The next clause, "To negative all laws passed by the 
several States contravening, in the opinion of the National 
Legislature, the Articles of Union, or any treaties subsist- 
ing under the authority of the Union," was then taken up. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris opposed this power as likely 
to be terrible to the States, and not necessary if sufficient 
Legislative authority should be given to the General 
Government. 

Mr. Sherman thought it unnecessary; as the Courts of 
the States would not consider as valid any law contravening 
the authority of the Union, and which the Legislature 
would wish to be negatived. 

Mr. L. Martin considered the power as improper and 
inadmissible. Shall all the laws of the States be sent up 
to the General Legislature before they shall be permitted 
to operate? 

Mr. Madison considered the negative on the laws of the 
States as essential to the efficacy and security of the Gen- 
eral Government. The necessity of a General Government 
proceeds from the propensity of the States to pursue their 
particular interests in opposition to the general 
interest. This propensity will continue to disturb the 
system unless effectually controlled. Nothing short of a 
negative on their laws will control it. They will pass laws 
which will accomplish their injurious objects before they 
can be repealed by the General Legislature, or set aside by 
the National tribunals. Confidence cannot be put in the 
state tribunals as guardians of the National authority and 
interests. In all the States these are more or less depend- 
ent on the Legislatures. In Georgia they are appointed 
annually by the Legislature. In Khode Island the Judges 
who refused to execute an unconstitutional law were dis- 
placed, and others substituted, by the Legislature, who 



364 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

would be the willing instruments of the wicked and arbi- 
trary plans of their masters. A power of negativing the 
improper laws of the States is at once the most mild and 
certain means of preserving the harmony of the system. 
Its utility is sufficiently displayed in the British system. 
Nothing could maintain the harmony and subordination of 
the various parts of the Empire, but the prerogative by 
which the Crown stifles in the birth every act of every 
part tending to discord or encroachment. It is true the 
prerogative is sometimes misapplied, through ignorance or 
partiality to one particular part of the Empire ; but we have 
not the same reason to fear such misapplications in our 
system. As to the sending all laws up to the National 
Legislature, that might be rendered unnecessary by some 
emanation of the power into the States, so far at least as to 
give a temporary effect to laws of immediate necessity. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was more and more opposed 
to the negative. The proposal of it would disgust all the 
States. A law that ought to be negatived, will be set aside 
in the Judiciary department ; and if that security should fail, 
may be repealed by a National law. 

Mr. Sherman. Such a power involves a wrong principle, 
to wit, that a law of a State contrary to the Articles of the 
Union would, if not negatived, be valid and operative. 

Mr. Pinckney urged the necessity of the negative. 

On the question for agreeing to the power of negativing 
laws of States, &c. it passed in the negative, — Massachu- 
setts, Virginia, North Carolina, aye — 3 ; Connecticut, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no — 7. 

Mr. L. Martin moved the following resolution, " That 
the Legislative acts of the United States made by virtue 
and in pursuance of the Articles of Union, and all treaties 
made and ratified under the authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme law of the respective States, as far as 
those acts or treaties shall relate to the said States, or their 
citizens and inhabitants; and that the Judiciaries of the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 365 

several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, 
anything in the respective laws of the individual States to 
the contrary notwithstanding; 1 ' which was agreed to, nem. 
con. 

The ninth Eesolution being taken up, the first clause, 
" That a National Executive be instituted, to consist of a 
single person," was agreed to, nem. con. 

The next clause, " To be chosen by the National Legis- 
ture," being considered, — 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was pointedly against his be- 
ing so chosen. He will be the mere creature of the Legis- 
lature, if appointed and impeachable by that body. He 
ought to be elected by the people at large, by the free- 
holders of the country. That difficulties attend this mode, 
he admits. But they have been found superable in New 
York and in Connecticut, and would, he believed, be found 
so in the case of an Executive for the United States. If 
the people should elect, they will never fail to prefer some 
man of distinguished character, or services ; some man, if 
he might so speak, of continental reputation. If the Leg- 
islature elect, it will be the work of intrigue, of cabal, and 
of faction ; it will be like the election of a pope by a con- 
clave of cardinals; real merit will rarely be the title to the 
appointment. He moved to strike out " National Legisla- 
ture," and insert " citizens of the United States." 

Mr. Sherman thought that the sense of the nation would 
be better expressed by the Legislature, than by the people 
at large. The latter will never be sufficiently informed of 
characters, and besides will never give a majority of votes 
to any one man. They will generally vote for some man in 
their own State, and the largest State will have the best 
chance for the appointment. If the choice be made by the 
Legislature, a majority of voices may be made necessary to 
constitute an election. 

Mr. Wilson. Two arguments have been urged against 
an election of the Executive magistrate by the people. The 
first is, the example of Poland, where an election of the 



366 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

supreme magistrate is attended with the most dangerous 
commotions. The cases, he observed, were totally dissim- 
ilar. The Polish nobles have resources and dependants 
which enable them to appear in force, and to threaten the 
Republic as well as each other. In the next place, the 
electors all assemble at one place; which would not be the 
case with us. The second argument is, that a majority of 
the people would never concur. It might be answered, 
that the. concurrence of a majority of the people is not a 
necessary principle of election, nor required as such in any 
of the States. But allowing the objection all its force, it 
may be obviated by the expedient used in Massachusetts, 
where the Legislature, by a majority of voices, decide in 
case a majority of the people do not concur in favor of one 
of the candidates. This would restrain the choice to a 
good nomination at least, and prevent in a great degree 
intrigue and cabal. A particular objection with him against 
an absolute election by the Legislature was, that the Exec- 
utive in that case would be too dependent to stand the me- 
diator between the intrigues and sinister views of the Repre- 
sentatives and the general liberties and interests of the 
people. 

Mr. Pinckney did not expect this question would again 
have been brought forward ; an election by the people being 
liable to the most obvious and striking objections. They 
will be led by a few active and designing men. The most 
populous States, by combining in favor of the same indi- 
vidual, will be able to carry their points. The national 
Legislature being most immediately interested in the laws 
made by themselves, will be most attentive to the choice of 
a fit man to carry them properly into execution. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. It is said, that in case of an 
election by the people the populous States will combine and 
elect whom they please. Just the reverse. The people of 
such States cannot combine. If there be any combination, 
it must be among their Representatives in the Legislature. 
It is said, the people will be led by a few designing men. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 367 

This might happen in a small district. It can never happen 
throughout the continent. In the election of a Governor 
of New York, it sometimes is the case in particular spots, 
that the activity and intrigues of little partizans are suc- 
cessful; but the general voice of the State is never influ- 
enced by such artifices. It is said, the multitude will be 
uninformed. It is true they would be uninformed of what 
passed in the Legislative conclave, if the election were to 
be made there; but they will not be uninformed of those 
great and illustrious characters which have merited their 
esteem and confidence. If the Executive be chosen by the 
national Legislature, he will not be independent of it; and 
if not independent, usurpation and tyranny on the part of 
the Legislature will be the consequence. This was the case 
in England in the last century. It has been the case in 
Holland, where their Senates have engrossed all power. It 
has been the case everywhere. He was surprised that an 
election by the people at large should ever have been likened 
to the Polish election of the first Magistrate. An election 
by the Legislature will bear a real likeness to the election 
by the Diet of Poland. The great must be the electors in 
both cases, and the corruption and cabal which are known 
to characterize the one would soon find their way into the 
other. Appointments made by numerous bodies are always 
worse than those made by single responsible individuals or 
by the people at large. 

Col. Mason. It is curious to remark the different 
language held at different times. At one moment we are 
told that the Legislature is entitled to thorough confidence, 
and to indefinite power. At another, that it will be governed 
by intrigue and corruption, and cannot be trusted at all. 
But not to, dwell on this inconsistency, he would observe 
that a government which is to last ought at least to be 
practicable. Would this be the case if the proposed election 
should be left to the people at large? He conceived it 
would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper 
character for Chief Magistrate to the people, as it would, t- 



- -~i 



368 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

refer a trial of colors to a blind man. The extent of the 
country renders it impossible, that the people can have the 
requisite capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of 
the candidates. 

Mr. Wilson could not see the contrariety stated by Col. 
Mason. The Legislature might deserve confidence in some 
respects, and distrust in others. In acts which were to 
affect them and their constituents precisely alike, confidence 
was due; in others, jealousy was warranted. The appoint- 
ment to great offices, where the Legislature might feel 
many motives not common to the public, confidence was 
surely misplaced. This branch of business, it was notori- 
ous, was the most corruptly managed, of any that had been 
committed to legislative bodies. 

Mr. Williamson conceived that there was the same dif- 
ference between an election in this case, by the people and 
by the Legislature, as between an appointment by lot and 
l>y choice. There are at present distinguished characters, 
who are known perhaps to almost every man. This will 
not always be the case. The people will be sure to vote for 
some man in their own State; and the largest State will be 
sure to succeed. This will not be Virginia, however. Her 
slaves will have no suffrage. As the salary of the Execu- 
tive will be fixed and he will not be eligible a second time, 
there will not be such a dependence on the Legislature as 
has been imagined. 

On the question on an election by the people instead of 
the Legislature, it passed in the negative, — Pennsylvania, 
aye — 1; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Dela- 
ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, no — 9. 

Mr. L. Martin moved that the Executive be chosen by 
Electors appointed by the several Legislatures of the indi- 
vidual States. 

Mr. Broom seconds. 

On the question it passed in the negative, — Delaware, 
Maryland, aye — 2 ; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jer- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION, 369 

sey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- 
lina, Georgia, no — 8. 

On the question on the words, " to be chosen by the 
National Legislature," it passed unanimously in the affirma- 
tive. 

" For the term of seven years," — postponed, nem. con., 
on motion of Mr. Houston and Mr. Gouverneur Morris. 

" To carry into execution the national laws," — agreed 
to, nem. con. 

" To appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided 
for," — agreed to nem. con. 

" To be ineligible a second time," — Mr. Houston moved 
to strike out this clause. 

Mr. Sherman seconds the motion. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris espoused the motion. The 
ineligibility proposed by the clause as it stood, tended to 
destroy the great motive to good behaviour, the hope of 
being rewarded by a re -appointment. It was saying to him, 
make hay while the sun shines. 

On the question for striking out, as moved by Mr. 
Houston, it passed in the affirmative, — Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Georgia, 
aye — 6 ; Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- 
lina, no — 4. 

The clause, "for the term of seven years," being 
resumed, — 

Mr. Broom was for a shorter term, since the Executive 
Magistrate was now to be re-eligible. Had he remained 
ineligible a second time, he should have preferred a longer 
term. 

Doctor M'Clurg* moved to strike out seven years, and 
insert "during good behaviour." By striking out the 
words declaring him not re-eligible, he was put into a 
situation that would keep him dependent forever on the 

♦The probable object of this motion was merely to enforce the argument against 
the re-eligibility of. the Executive magistrate, by holding out a tenure during good 
behaviour as the alternative for keeping him independent of the Legislature. 
24 



370 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Legislature ; and he conceived the independence of the 
Executive to be equally essential with that of the Judiciary 
department. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion. He 
expressed great pleasure in hearing it. This was the way 
to get a good Government. His fear that so valuable an 
ingredient would not be attained had led him to take the 
part he had done. He was indifferent how the Executive 
should be chosen, provided he held his place by this tenure. 

Mr. Broom highly approved the motion. It obviated 
all his difficulties. 

Mr. Sherman considered such a tenure as by do means 
safe or admissible. As the Executive Magistrate is now 
re-eligible, he will be on good behaviour as far as will be 
necessary. If he behaves well, he will be continued ; if 
otherwise, displaced, on a succeeding election. 

Mr. Madison.* If it be essential to the preservation of 
liberty that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary 
powers be separate, it is essential to a maintenance of the 
separation, that they should be independent of each other. 
The Executive could not be independent of the Legislature, 
if dependent on the pleasure of that branch for a re- 
appointment. Why was it determined that the Judges 
should not hold their places by such a tenure ? Because 
they might be tempted to cultivate the Legislature, by an 
undue complaisance, and thus render the Legislature the 
virtual expositor, as well as the maker of the laws. In like 
manner, a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature 
would render it the executor as well as the maker of laws ; 
and then, according to the observation of Montesquieu, 
tyrannical laws may be made that they may be executed in 
a tyrannical manner. There was an analogy between the 
Executive and Judiciary departments in several respects. 

* The view here taken of the subject was meant to aid in parrying the animad- 
versions likely to fall on the motion of Doctor McClurg, for whom J. M. had a par- 
ticular regard. The Doctor, though possessing talents of the highest order, was 
modest and unaccustomed to exert them in public debate. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 371 

The latter executed the laws in certain cases as the former 
did in others. The former expounded and applied them 
for certain purposes, as the latter did for others. The 
difference between them seemed to consist chiefly in two 
circumstances, — first, the collective interest and security- 
were much more in the power belonging to the Executive, 
than to the Judiciary, department ; secondly, in the admin- 
istration of the former, much greater latitude is left to 
opinion and discretion, than in the administration of the 
latter. But if the second consideration proves that it will 
be more difficult to establish a rule sufficiently precise 
for trying the Executive, than the Judges, and forms an 
objection to the same tenure of office, both considerations 
prove that it might be more dangerous to suffer a union 
between the Executive and Legislative powers, than between 
the Judiciary and Legislative powers. He conceived it to 
be absolutely necessary to a well constituted Republic, that 
the two first should be kept distinct and independent of 
each other. Whether the plan proposed by the motion 
was a proper one, was another question ; as it depended on 
the practicability of instituting a tribunal for impeachments 
as certain and as adequate in the one case, as in the other. 
On the other hand, respect for the mover entitled his pro- 
position to a fair hearing and discussion, until a less objec- 
tionable expedient should be applied for guarding against 
a dangerous union of the Legislative and Executive de- 
partments. 

Colonel Mason. This motion was made some time ago, 
and negatived by a very large majority. He trusted that it 
would be again negatived. It would be impossible to de- 
fine the misbehaviour in such a manner as to subject it to a 
proper trial; and perhaps still more impossible to compel 
so high an offender, holding his office by such a tenure, to 
submit to a trial. He considered an Executive during good 
behaviour as a softer name only for an Executive for life, 
And that the next would be an easy step to hereditary 



372 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

monarchy. If the motion should finally succeed, he might 
himself live to see such a revolution. If he did not, it was 
probable his children or grand children would. He trusted 
there were few men in that House who wished for it. No 
State, he was sure, had so far revolted from republican 
principles, as to have the least bias in its favor. 

Mr. Madison was not apprehensive of being thought to 
favor any step towards monarchy. The real object with him 
was to prevent its introduction. Experience had proved a 
tendency in our government to throw all power into the 
Legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are in 
general little more than cyphers; the Legislatures omnipo- 
tent. If no effectual check be devised for restraining the 
instability and encroachments of the latter, a revolution of 
some kind or other would be inevitable. The preservation 
of republican government therefore required some expe- 
dient for the purpose, but required evidently, at the same 
time, that, in devising it, the genuine principles of that 
form should be kept in view. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was as little a friend to mon- 
archy as any gentleman. He concurred in the opinion that 
the way to keep out monarchical government was to estab- 
lish such a Republican government as would make the peo- 
ple happy, and prevent a desire of change. 

Doct. McClurg was not so much afraid of the shadow 
of monarchy, as to be unwilling to approach it ; nor so wed- 
ded to republican government, as not to be sensible of the 
tyrannies that had been and may be exercised under that 
form. It was an essential object with him to make the 
Executive independent of the Legislature; and the only 
mode left for effecting it, after the vote destroying his 
ineligibility a second time, was to appoint him during 
good behaviour. 

On the question for inserting " during good behaviour," 
in place of "seven years [with a re-eligibility J," it passed 
in the negative, — New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 373 

Virginia, aye — 4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6.* 

On the motion to strike out " seven years," it passed in 
the negative, — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
North Carolina, aye — 4; Connecticut, New Jersey, Mary- 
land, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 6.f 

It was now unanimously agreed that the vote which had 
struck out the words "to be ineligible a second time," 
should be reconsidered to-morrow. 

Adjourned. 

Wednesday, July 18th. 

In Convention, — On motion of Mr. L. Martin to fix to- 
morrow for reconsidering the vote concerning the ineligi- 
bility of the Executive a second time, it passed in the amr- 
mative, — Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Dela- 
ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
aye — 8 ; New Jersey, Georgia, absent. 

The residue of the ninth Resolution, concerning the 
Executive, was postponed till to-morrow. 

The tenth Resolution, " that the Executive shall have a 
right to negative legislative acts not afterwards passed by 
two-thirds of each branch," was passed, nem. con. 

The eleventh Resolution, "that a National Judiciary 
shall be established to consist of one supreme tribunal," 
agreed to nem. con. 

On the clause, " The judges of which to be appointed by 
the second branch of the National Legislature," — 

* This vote is not to be considered as any certain index of opinion, as a number in 
the affirmative probably had it chiefly in view to alarm those attached to a depend- 
ence of the Executive on the Legislature, and thereby facilitate some final arrange- 
ment of a contrary tendency. The avowed friends of an Executive " during good 
behaviour" were not more than three or four, nor is it certain they would have 
adhered to such a tenure. 

An independence of the three great departments of each other, as far as possible, 
and the responsibility of all to the will of the community, seemed to be generally ad- 
mitted as the true basis of a well constructed Government. 

t There was no debate on this motion. The apparent object of many in the affirma- 
tive was to secure the re-eligibility by shortening the term, and of many in the'nega- 
tive to embarrass the plan of referring the appointment and dependence of the Execu- 
tive to the Legislature. 



374 DEBATES IN THE [178T. 

Mr. Gorham would prefer an appointment by the second 
branch to an appointment by the whole Legislature; but he 
thought even that branch too numerous, and too little per- 
sonally responsible, to ensure a good choice. He suggested 
that the Judges be appointed by the Executive with the ad- 
vice and consent of the second branch, in the mode pre- 
scribed by the Constitution of Massachusetts. This mode 
had been long practised in that country, and was found to 
answer perfectly well. 

Mr. Wilson would still prefer an appointment by the 
Executive; but if that could not be attained, would prefer, 
in the next place, the mode suggested by Mr. Gorham. He 
thought it his duty, however, to move in the first instance, 
" that the Judges be appointed by the Executive." 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion. 

Mr. L. Martin was strenuous for an appointment by the 
second branch. Being taken from all the States, it would 
be best informed of characters, and most capable of making 
a fit choice. 

Mr. Sherman concurred in the observations of Mr. 
Martin, adding that the Judges ought to be diffused, which 
would be more likely to be attended to by the second branch, 
than by the Executive. 

Mr. Mason. The mode of appointing the Judges may 
depend in some degree on the mode of trying impeach- 
ments of the Executive. If the Judges were to form a 
tribunal for that purpose, they surely ought not to be 
appointed by the Executive. There were insuperable 
objections besides against referring the appointment to the 
Executive. He mentioned, as one, that as the seat of gov- 
ernment must be in some one State; and as the Executive 
would remain in office for a considerable time, for four, five, 
or six years at least, he would insensibly form local and 
personal attachments within the particular State that would 
deprive equal merit elsewhere of an equal chance of pro- 
motion. 

Mr. Gorham. As the Executive will be responsible, in 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 375 

point of character at least, for a judicious and faithful 
discharge of his trust, he will be careful to look through all 
the States for proper characters. The Senators will be as 
likely to form their attachments at the seat of government 
where they reside, as the Executive. If they cannot get 
the man of the particular State to which they may respect- 
ively belong, they will be indifferent to the rest. Public 
bodies feel no personal responsibility, and give full play to 
intrigue and cabal. Rhode Island is a full illustration of 
the insensibility to character produced by a participation of 
numbers in dishonourable measures, and of the length to 
which a public body may carry wickedness and cabal. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris supposed it would be improper 
for an impeachment of the Executive to be tried before the 
Judges. The latter would in such case be drawn into 
intrigues with the Legislature, and an impartial trial would 
be frustrated. As they would be much about the seat of 
government, they might even be previously consulted, and 
arangements might be made for a prosecution of the Execu- 
tive. He thought, therefore, that no argument could be 
drawn from the probability of such a plan of impeach- 
ments against the motion before the House. 

Mr. Madison suggested, that the Judges might oe 
appointed by the Executive, with the concurrence of one- 
third at least of the second branch. This would unite the 
advantage of responsibility in the Executive, with the 
security afforded in the second branch against any incautious 
or corrupt nomination by the Executive. 

Mr. Sherman was clearly for an election by the Senate. 
It would be composed of men nearly equal to the Exec- 
utive, and would of course have on the whole more wisdom. 
They would bring into their deliberations a more diffusive 
knowledge of characters. It would be less easy for candi- 
dates to intrigue with them, than with the Executive Magis- 
trate. For these reasons he thought there would be a 
better security for a proper choice in the Senate, than in the 
Executive. 



376 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Randolph. It is true that when the appointment 
of the Judges was vested in the second branch an equality 
of votes had not been given to it. Yet he had rather leave 
the appointment there than give it to the Executive. He 
thought the advantage of personal responsibility might be 
gained in the Senate, by requiring the respective votes of 
the members to be entered on the Journal. He thought, 
too, that the hope of receiving appointments would be 
more diffusive, if they depended on the Senate, the mem- 
bers of which would be diffusively known, than if they de- 
pended on a single man, who could not be personally known 
to a very great extent ; and consequently, that opposition to 
the system would be so far weakened. 

Mr. Bedfobd thought, there were solid reasons against 
leaving the appointment to the Executive. He must trust 
more to information than the Senate. It would put it in 
his power to gain over the larger States by gratifying them 
with a preference of their citizens. The responsibility of 
the Executive, so much talked of, was chimerical. He 
could not be punished for mistakes. 

Mr. Gobham remarked, that the Senate could have no 
better information than the Executive. They must like 
him trust to information from the members belonging to 
the particular State where the candidate resided. The 
Executive would certainly be more answerable for a good 
appointment, as the whole blame of a bad one would fall on 
him alone. He did not mean that he would be answerable 
under any other penalty than that of public censure, which 
with honourable minds was a sufficient one. 

On the question for referring the appointment of the 
Judges to the Executive, instead of the second branch, — 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, aye — 2 ; Connecticut, Dela- 
ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina South Carolina, 
no — 6 ; Georgia, absent. 

Mr. Gorham moved, "that the Judges be nominated 
and appointed by the Executive, by and with the advice and 
consent of the second branch ; and every such nomination 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 377 

shall be made at least days prior to such appointment." 

This mode, he said, had been ratified by the experience of 
a hundred and forty years in Massachusetts. If the ap- 
pointment should be left to either branch of the Legisla- 
ture, it will be a mere piece of jobbing. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded and supported the 
motion. 

Mr. Sherman thought it less objectionable than an abso- 
lute appointment by the Executive ; but disliked it, as too 
much fettering the Senate. 

On the question on Mr. Gorham's motion, — Massachu- 
setts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, aye — 4; Connect- 
icut, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, no — 4 ,-. 
Georgia, absent. 

Mr. Madison moved, "that the Judges should be 
nominated by the Executive, and such nomination should 

become an appointment if not disagreed to within 

days by two-thirds of the second branch." 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris seconded the motion. 

By common consent the consideration of it was post- 
poned till to-morrow. 

" To hold their offices during good behaviour, and to 
receive fixed salaries," — agreed to, nem. con. 

"In which [salaries of Judges] no increase or diminu- 
tion shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in 
office at the time." 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to strike out " or 
increase." He thought the Legislature ought to be at 
liberty to increase salaries, as circumstances might require ; 
and that this would not create any improper dependence in 
the Judges. 

Doctor Franklin was in favor of the motion. Money 
may not only become plentier ; but the business of the 
Department may increase, as the country becomes more 
populous. 

Mr. Madison. The dependence will be less if the 
iucrease alone should be permitted ; but it will be improper 



378 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

even so far to permit a dependence. Whenever an increase 
is wished by the Judges, or may be in agitation in the 
Legislature, an undue complaisance in the former may be 
felt towards the latter. If at such a crisis there should be 
in court suits to which leading members of the Legisla- 
ture may be parties, the Judges will be in a situation which 
ought not to be suffered, if it can be prevented. The 
variations in the value of money may be guarded against 
by taking for a standard wheat or some other thing of per- 
manent value. The increase of business will be provided 
for by an increase of the number who are to do it. An 
increase of salaries may easilv be so contrived as not to 
affect persons in office. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The value of money may 
not only alter, but the state of society may alter. In this 
event, the same quantity of wheat, the same value, would 
not be the same compensation. The amount of salaries 
must always be regulated by the manners and the style 
of living in a country. The increase of business cannot be 
provided for in the supreme tribunal, in the way that has 
been mentioned. All the business of a certain description, 
whether more or less, must be done in that single tribunal. 
Additional labor alone in the Judges can provide for addi- 
tional business. Additional compensation, therefore ought 
not to be prohibited. 

On the question for striking out, "or increase," — Mas- 
sachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, 
South Carolina, aye — 6 ; Virginia, North Carolina, no — 
2 ; Georgia, absent. 

The whole clause, as amended, was then agreed to, 
nem. con. 

The twelfth Kesolution, " that the National Legislature 
be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals," being taken 
up — 

Mr. Butler could see no necessity for such tribunals. 
The State tribunals might do the business. 

Mr. L. Martin concurred. They will create jealousies 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 379 

and oppositions in the State tribunals, with the jurisdiction 
of which they will interfere. 

Mr. G-orham. There are in the States already Federal 
Courts, with jurisdiction for trial of piracies, &c. committed 
on the seas. No complaints have been made by the States 
or the courts of the States. Inferior tribunals are essential 
to render the authority of the National Legislature effect- 
ual. 

Mr. Eandolph observed, that the courts of the States 
cannot be trusted with the administration of the National 
laws. The objects of jurisdiction are such as will often 
place the general and local policy at variance. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris urged also the necessity of 
such a provision. 

Mr. Sherman was willing to give the power to the 
Legislature, but wished them to make use of the State tri- 
bunals, whenever it could be done with safety to the general 
interest. 

Col. Mason thought many circumstances might arise, 
not now to be foreseen, which might render such a power 
absolutely necessary. 

On the question for agreeing to the twelfth Eesolution, 
empowering the National Legislature to appoint inferior 
tribunals, — it was agreed to, nem. con. 

The clause of "Impeachments of national officers,' 7 was 
struck out, on motion for the purpose. 

The thirteenth Eesolution, " The jurisdiction of the 
National Judiciary, &c." being then taken up, several criti- 
cisms having been made on the definition, it was proposed 
by Mr. Madison so to alter it as to read thus; "that the 
jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under the na- 
tional laws; and to such other questions as may involve 
the national peace and harmony," which was agreed to, 
nem. con. 

The fourteenth Eesolution, providing for the admission 
of new States, was agreed to, nem. con. 

The fifteenth Eesolution, " that provision ought to be 






380 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

made for the continuance of Congress, &c. and for the com- 
pletion of their engagements," being consider ed,- 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris thought the assumption of 
their engagements might as well be omitted ; and that Con- 
gress ought not to be continued till all the States should 
adopt the reform; since it may become expedient to give 
effect to it whenever a certain number of States shall adopt it. 

Mr. Madison. The clause can mean nothing more than 
that provision ought to be made for preventing an interreg- 
num; which must exist, in the interval between the adop- 
tion of the new Government and the commencement of its 
operation, if the old Government should cease on the first 
of these events. 

Mr. Wilson did not entirely approve of the manner in 
which the clause relating to the engagements of Congress 
was expressed ; but he thought some provision on the sub- 
ject would be proper in order to prevent any suspicion that 
the obligations of the Confederacy might be dissolved along 
with the Government under which they were contracted. 

On the question on the first part, relating to the contin- 
uance of Congress, — Virginia, North Carolina, South Caro- 
lina,* aye — 3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, no — 6. The second part, as 
to the completion of their engagements, was disagreed to, 
nem. con. 

The sixteenth Eesolution, " That a republican Constitu- 
tion and its existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each 
State by the United States " being considered, — 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris thought the Eesolution very 
objectionable. He should be very unwilling that such laws 
as exist in Rhode Island should be guaranteed. 

Mr. Wilson. The object is merely to secure the States 
against dangerous commotions, insurrections and rebellions. 

Col. Mason. If the General Government should have 
no right to suppress rebellions against particular States, it 
will be in a bad situation indeed. As rebellions against 

* In the printed Journal, South Carolina, no. 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 381 

itself originate in and against individual States, it must re- 
main a passive spectator of its own subversion. 

Mr. Kandolph. The Kesolution has two objects, — 
first, to secure a republican government; secondly, to sup- 
press domestic commotions. He urged the necessity of 
both these provisions. 

Mr. Madison moved to substitute, "that the constitu- 
tional authority of the States shall be guaranteed to them 
respectively against domestic as well as foreign violence." 

Doctor McClurg seconded the motion. 

Mr. Houston was afraid of perpetuating the existing 
Constitutions of the States. That of Georgia was a very bad 
one, and he hoped would be revised and amended. It may 
also be difficult for the General Government to decide be- 
tween contending parties, each of which claim the sanction 
of the Constitution. 

Mr. L. Martin was for leaving the States to suppress 
rebellions themselves. 

Mr. Gorham thought it strange that a rebellion should 
be known to exist in the Empire, and the General Govern- 
ment should be restrained from interposing to subdue it. 
At this rate an enterprising citizen might erect the stand- 
ard of monarchy in a particular State, might gather to- 
gether partizans from all quarters, might extend his views 
from State to State, and threaten to establish a tyranny 
over the whole, and the General Government be compelled 
to remain an inactive witness of its own destruction. With 
regard to different parties in a State, as long as they con- 
fine their disputes to words, they will be harmless to the 
General Government and to each other. If they appeal to 
the sword, it will then be necessary for the General Govern- 
ment, however difficult it may be, to decide on the merits 
of their contest, to interpose and put an end to it. 

Mr. Carroll, Some such provision is essential. Every 
State ought to wish for it. It has been doubted whether it 
is a casus foederis at present ; and no room ought to be left 
for such a doubt hereafter. 



382 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Randolph moved to add, as an amendment to the 
motion, " and that no State be at liberty to form any other 
than a republican government." 

Mr. Madison seconded the motion. 

Mr. Rutledge thought it unnecessary to insert any 
guarantee. No doubt could be entertained but that Congress 
had the authority, if they had the means, to co-operate with 
any State in subduing a rebellion. It was and would be 
involved in the nature of the thing. 

Mr. Wilson moved, as a better expression of the idea, 
" that a republican form of Government shall be guaranteed 
to each State ; and that each State shall be protected against 
foreign and domestic violence." 

This seeming to be well received, Mr. Madison and Mr. 
Randolph withdrew their propositions, and on the question 
for agreeing to Mr. Wilson's motion, it passed, nem. con. 
\, Adjourned. 

Thursday, July 19th. 

In Convention, — On re-consideration of the vote ren- 
dering the Executive re-eligible a second time, Mr. Mabtin 
moved to re-instate the words, " to be ineligible a second 
time." 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris. It is necessary to take into 
one view all that relates to the establishment of the Execu- 
tive; on the due formation of which must depend the 
efficacy and utility of the union among the present and 
future States. It has been a maxim in political science, 
that republican government is not adapted to a large extent 
of country, because the energy of the executive magistracy 
cannot reach the extreme parts of it. Our country is an 
extensive one. We must either then renounce the blessings 
of the Union, or provide an Executive with sufficient vigor 
to pervade every part of it. This subject was of so much 
importance that he hoped to be indulged in an extensive 
view of it. One great object of the Executive is, to con- 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 383 

troJ the Legislature. The Legislature will continually seek 
to aggrandize and perpetuate themselves; and will seize 
those critical moments produced by war, invasion, or con- 
vulsion, for that purpose. It is necessary, then, that the 
Executive magistrate should be the guardian of the people, 
even of the lower classes, against legislative tyranny; 
against the great and the wealthy, who in the course of 
things will necessarily compose the legislative body. 
Wealth tends to corrupt the mind; — to nourish its love of 
power; and to stimulate it to oppression. History proves 
this to be the spirit of the opulent. The check provided 
in the second branch was not meant as a check on legisla- 
tive usurpations of power, but on the abuse of lawful pow- 
ers, on the propensity of the first branch to legislate too 
much, to run into projects of paper-money, and similar 
expedients. It is no check on legislative tyranny. On the 
contrary it may favor it; and if the first branch can be 
seduced, may find the means of success. The Executive, 
therefore, ought to be so constituted, as to be the great 
protector of the mass of the people. It is the duty of the 
Executive to appoint the officers, and to command the 
forces, of the Republic ; to appoint, first, ministerial officers 
for the administration of public affairs; secondly, officers 
for the dispensation of justice. Who will be the best 
judges whether these appointments be well made? The 
people at large, who will know, will see, will feel, the effects 
of them. Again, who can judge so well of the discharge 
of military duties for the protection and security of the 
people, as the people themselves, who are to be protected 
and secured ? He finds, too, that the Executive is not to be 
re-eligible. What effect will this have? In the first 
place, it will destroy the great incitement to merit, public 
esteem, by taking away the hope of being rewarded with a 
re-appointment. It may give a dangerous turn to one of 
the strongest passions in the human breast. The love of 
fame is the great spring to noble and illustrious actions. 
Shut the civil road to glory, and he may be compelled Tl 



.384 



DEBATES IN THE 



[1787, 



seek it by the sword. In the second place, it will tempt 
him to make the most of the short space of time allotted 
him, to accumulate wealth and provide for his friends. In 
the third place, it will produce violations of the very Con- 
stitution it is meant to secure. In moments of pressing 
danger, the tried abilities and established character of a 
favorite magistrate will prevail over respect for the forms 
of the Constitution. The Executive is also to be impeach- 
able. This is a dangerous part of the plan. It will hold 
him in such dependence, that he will be no check on the 
Legislature, will not be a firm guardian of the people and 
of the public interest. He will be the tool of a faction, of 
some leading demagogue in the Legislature. These then, 
are the faults of the Executive establishment, as now pro- 
posed. Can no better establishment be devised? If he is 
to be the guardian of the people, let him be appointed by 
the people. If he is to be a check on the Legislature, let 
him not be impeachable. Let him be of short duration, 
that he may with propriety be re-eligible. It has been 
said that the candidates for this office will not be known to 
the people. If they be known to the Legislature, they 
must have such a notoriety and eminence of character, 
that they cannot possibly be unknown to the people at large. 
It cannot be possible that a man shall have sufficiently dis- 
tinguished himself to merit this high trust, without having 
his character proclaimed by fame throughout the Empire. 
As to the danger from an unimpeachable magistrate, he 
could not regard it as formidable. There must be certain 
great officers of state, a minister of finance, of war, of 
foreign affairs, &c. These, he presumes, will exercise 
their functions in subordination to the Executive, and will 
be amenable, by impeachment, to the public justice. 
Without these ministers, the Executive can do nothing of 
consequence. He suggested a biennial election of the 
Executive, at the time of electing the first branch ; and the 
Executive to hold over, so as to prevent any interregnum in 
the administration. An election by the people at large, 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION. 385 

throughout so great an extent of country, could not be 
influenced by those little combinations and those momen- 
tary lies, which often decide popular elections within a 
narrow sphere . It will probably be objected, that the elec- 
tion will be influenced by the members of the Legislature, 
particularly of the first branch ; and that it will be nearly 
the same thing with an election by the Legislature itself. 
It could not be denied that such an influence would exist. 
But it might be answered, that as the Legislature or the 
candidates for it, would be divided the enmity of one part 
would counteract the friendship of another; that if the 
administration of the Executive were good, it would be un- 
popular to oppose his re-election; if bad, it ought to be 
opposed, and a re-appointment prevented; and lastly, that 
in every view this indirect dependence on the favor of the 
Legislature could not be so mischievous as a direct depend- 
ence for his appointment. He saw no alternative for making 
the Executive independent of the Legislature, but either 
to give him his oflice for life, or make him eligible by the 
people. Again, it might be objected, that two years would 
be too short a duration. But he believes that as long as he 
should behave himself well he would be continued in his 
place. The extent of the country would secure his re-elec- 
tion against the factions and discontents of particular 
States. It deserved consideration, also, that such an 
ingredient in the plan would render it extremely palatable 
to the people. These were the general ideas which 
occurred to him on the subject, and which led him to wish 
and move that the whole constitution of the Executive 
might undergo re- consideration. 

Mr. Eandolph urged* the motion of Mr. L. Martin for 
restoring the words making the Executive ineligible a sec- 
ond time. If he ought to be independent, he should not be 
left under a temptation to court a re-appointment. If he 
should be re-appointable by the Legislature, he will be no 
check on it. His revision ary power will be of no avail. 
He had always thought and contended, as he still did, that 



386 



DEBATES IN THE 



[1787. 



the danger apprehended by the little States was chimerical ; 
but those who thought otherwise ought to be peculiarly- 
anxious for the motion. If the Executive be appointed, as 
has been determined, by the Legislature, he will prob- 
ably be appointed, either by joint ballot of both houses, or 
be nominated by the first and appointed by the second 
branch. In either case the large States will preponderate. 
If he is to court the same influence for his re-appointment, 
will he not make his revisionary power, and all the other 
functions of his administration, subservient to the views of 
the large States? Besides, is there not great reason to 
apprehend, that, in case he should be re-eligible, a false 
complaisance in the Legislature might lead them to continue 
an unfit man in office, in preference to a fit one ? It has 
been said, that a constitutional bar to re-appointment, will 
inspire unconstitutional endeavours to perpetuate himself. 
It may be answered, that his endeavours can have no effect 
unless the people be corrupt to such a degree as to render 
all precautions hopeless; to which may be added, that this 
argument supposes him to be more powerful and danger- 
ous, than other arguments which have been used admit, and 
consequently calls for stronger fetters on his authority. 
He thought an election by the Legislature, with an inca- 
pacity to be elected a second time, would be more accept- 
able to the people than the plan suggested by Mr. Gouver- 
neur Morris. 

Mr. King did not like the ineligibility. He thought 
there was great force in the remarks of Mr. Sherman, that 
he who has proved himself most fit for an office, ought not 
to be excluded by the Constitution from holding it. He 
would therefore prefer any other reasonable plan that could 
be substituted. He was much disposed to think, that in 
such cases the people at large would choose wisely. There 
was indeed some difficulty arising from the improbability of 
a general concurrence of the people in favor of any one 
marj. On the whole, he was of opinion that an appointment 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION 38 ? 

by electors chosen by the people for the purpose would be 
liable to fewest objections. 

Mr. Patterson's ideas nearly coincided, he said, with 
those of Mr. King. He proposed that the Executive should 
be appointed by electors, to be chosen by the States in a 
ratio that would allow one elector to the smallest, and three 
to the largest, States. 

Mr. Wilson, It seems to be the unanimous sense that 
the Executive should not be appointed by the Legislature, 
unless he be rendered ineligible a second time: he perceived 
with pleasure that the idea was gaining ground of an 
election, mediately or immediately, by the people. 

Mr. Madison, If it be a fundamental principle of free 
government that the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary 
powers should be separately exercised, it is equally so that 
they be independently exercised. There is the same, and 
perhaps greater, reason why the Executive should be inde- 
pendent of the Legislature, than why the Judiciary should. 
A coalition of the two former powers, would be more imme- 
diately and certainly dangerous to public liberty. It is 
essential, then, that the appointment of the Executive should 
either be drawn from some source, or held by some tenure, 
that will give him a free agency with regard to the Legisla- 
ture, This could not be, if he was to be appointable, from 
time to time, by the Legislature, It was not clear that an 
appointment in the first instance, even with an ineligibility 
afterwards, would not establish an improper connection 
between the two Departments. Certain it was, that the 
appointment would be attended with intrigues and con- 
tentions, that ought not to be unnecessarily admitted. He 
was disposed, for these reasons, to refer the appointment to 
some other source. The people at large was, in his opinion, 
the fittest in itself, It would be as likely as any that could 
be devised, to produce an Executive Magistrate of dis- 
tinguished character The people generally could only 
know and vote for some citizen whose merits had rendered 
him an object of general attention and esteem. There was 



388 DEBATES IN THE [1787- 

one difficulty, however, of a serious nature, attending an 
immediate choice by the people. The right of suffrage 
was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern 
States; and the latter could have no influence in the election, 
on the score of the negroes. The substitution of Electors 
obviated this difficulty, and seemed on the whole to be liable 
to fewest objections, 

Mr. Gerry. If the Executive is to be elected by the 
Legislature, he certainly ought not to be re-eligible. This 
would make him absolutely dependent. He was against a 
popular election, The people are uninformed, and would 
be misled by a few designing men. He urged the expedi- 
ency of an appointment of the Executive, by Electors to be 
chosen by the State Executives. The people of the States 
will then choose the first branch; the Legislatures of the 
States, the second branch of the National Legislature ; and 
the Executives of the States, the National Executive. This 
he thought would form a strong attachment in the States 
to the National system. The popular mode of electing the 
Chief Magistrate would certainly be the worst of all. If 
he should be so elected, and should do his duty, he will 
be turned out for it, like Governor Bowdoin in Massachu- 
setts, and President Sullivan in New Hampshire. 

On the question on Mr. Gouverneur Morris's motion, 
to reconsider generally the constitution of the Executive, 
— Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, and all the 
others, aye. 

Mr. Ellsworth moved to strike out the appointment by 
the National Legislature, and to insert, " to be chosen by 
Electors, appointed by the Legislatures of the States in the 
following ratio; to wit: one for each State not exceeding 
two hundred thousand inhabitants ; two for each above that 
number and not exceeding three hundred thousand; and 
three for each State exceeding three hundred thousand." 

Mr. Broom seconded the motion. 

Mr. Kutledge was opposed to all the modes, except the 



1787.] FEDERAL CONVENTION 389 

appointment by the National Legislature. He will be 
sufficiently independent, if he be not re-eligible, 

Mr. Gerry preferred the motion of Mr. Ellsworth to 
an appointment by the National Legislature, or by the peo- 
ple; though not to an appointment by the State Executives, 
He moved that the Electors proposed by Mr. Ellsworth 
should be twenty-five in number, and allotted in the follow- 
ing proportion: to New Hampshire, one; to Massachusetts, 
three; to Rhode Island, one; to Connecticut, two; to New 
York, two; to New Jersey, two; to Pennsylvania, three; to 
Delaware, one; to Maryland, two; to Virginia, three; to 
North Carolina, two; to South Carolina two; to Georgia, 
one, 

The question, as moved by Mr. Ellsworth, being divi- 
ded, on the first part " Shall the National Executive be 
appointed by Electors? r — Connecticut, New Jersey, Penn- 
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye — 6; North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 3; Massachusetts, 
divided* 

On the second part, " Shall the Electors be chosen by 
the State Legislatures?" — Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North 
Carolina, Georgia, aye — 8 ; Virginia, South Carolina no 
— 2> 

The part relating to the ratio in which the States should 
choose Electors was postponed, nem. con. 

Mr. L. Martin moved that the Executive be ineligible 
a second time 

Mr. Williamson seconds the motion. He had no great 
confidence in electors to be chosen for the special purpose. 
They would not be the most respectable citizens ; but per- 
sons not occupied in the high offices of government, They 
would be liable to undue influence, which might the more 
readily be practised, as some of them will probably be in 
appointment six or eight months before the object of it 
comes on. 



390 DEBATES IN THE [1787. 

Mr. Ellsworth supposed any persons might be ap- 
pointed Electors, except, solely, members of the National 
Legislature. 

On the question, "Shall he be ineligible a second 
time?" — North Carolina, South Carolina, aye — 2; Mas- 
sachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela- 
ware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, no — 8. 

On the question, "Shall the Executive continue for 
seven years ?" It passed in the negative, — * Connecticut, 
South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 3 ; * New Jersey, Pennsyl- 
vania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no — 5 ; Massachu- 
setts, North Carolina, divided. 

Mr. King was afraid we should shorten the term too 
much. 

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was for a short term, in order 
to avoid impeachments, which would be otherwise necessary. 

Mr. Butler was against the frequency of the elections. 
Georgia and South Carolina were too distant to send 
electors often. 

Mr. Ellsworth was for six years. If the elections 
be too frequent, the Executive will not be firm enough. 
There must be duties which will make him unpopular for 
the moment. There will be outs as well as ins. His 
administration, therefore, will be attacked and misrepre- 
sented. 

Mr. Williamson was for six years. The expense will 
be considerable, and ought not to be unnecessarily repeated. 
If the elections are too frequent, the best men will not 
undertake the service, and those of an inferior character 
will be liable to be corrupted. 

On the question of six years, — Massachusetts, Con- 
necticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye — 9 ; Dela- 
ware, no. 

Adjourned. 

* In the printed Journal, Connecticut, no ; New Jersey, aye. 



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